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If what we believe can directly modify our (visual) experience, our experience is doxastically variable. 
If so, the following seems possible: our false and irrational background beliefs can modify our 
experience such that in it, things look distorted, or that it conforms with and appears to confirm the 
false and irrational beliefs that helped bring it about in the first place. If experience is doxastically 
variable, it seems, its epistemic function can be undermined. 
However, in this dissertation, I argue that we can devise accounts of (visual) experience that meet 
two requirements: they are fully compatible with all kinds of doxastic variation and on them, even 
doxastically variable experience serves to rationally constrain our beliefs. 
I begin with a novel interpretation of Hanson’s account of theory-laden observation—a valiant, 
yet ultimately unsuccessful attempt to meet both these requirements. Next, I analyze and reject various 
contemporary relationalist accounts of experience and the most sophisticated recent 
representationalist attempt to accommodate phenomena of doxastic variation: Siegel’s (Rich) Content 
View. Then, based on the lessons learned and drawing on Hanson’s and Gupta’s work, I show what 
shape a successful account may take. 
Ultimately, I argue for the following theses: 1) Neither of the two dominant accounts of 
experience—relationalism and standard representationalism—currently succeeds in satisfactorily 
meeting both requirements. 2) To arrive at accounts that do meet them, we should drop both the 
restrictive relationalist conception of experience as a relation to mind-independent items and the 
standard representationalist conception of experience as justifying beliefs. 3) We make progress by 
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 v 
adopting both the general conception of experience as making rational transitions to beliefs, 
judgments, and actions and a (slightly) modified version of Gupta’s presentationalist account of 
experiential phenomenology. Finally, 4) the possibility of devising successful accounts is independent 
of a major issue dividing relationalists and representationalists: whether experience has content. 
In the final chapters, I address various follow-up questions concerning the nature of views, 
conceptual capacities, conceptual content, and linkages between a subject’s experience and her 
responses. In concluding, I show that the account of experience I recommend is widely applicable in 
philosophy and beyond. 
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PREFACE 
“बिन गुरु ज्ञान कह ॉं से पाऊँ ।” 
Mohammad Rafi (1952). Man Tarpat Hari Darshan Ko Aaj. Baiju Bawra 
 
This is a long dissertation. Also, it has been long in the making. I cannot pinpoint exactly when I began 
to think about the so-called theory-ladenness of observation, but I suspect that it must have been 
roughly 15 years ago, when at the University of Münster, I participated in a reading group on 
philosophy of science and somehow happened upon Norwood Russell Hanson’s first chapter of his 
1958 book Patterns of Discovery—the chapter on observation—in which the term ‘theory-ladenness of 
observation’ is coined.  
It is impossible to say how often I have read this chapter since, or the much more extended 
version of the arguments it contains that spans several chapters in Hanson’s posthumously published 
Perception and Discovery. Not only did I reread this material frequently, I also drew on the concept of 
theory-ladenness in my Master’s thesis on Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism. In it, I 
complained, inter alia, that van Fraassen does not provide us with a notion of experience that fits his 
empiricist leanings. Accordingly, I submitted, we cannot assess whether his account improves over 
that once proposed by the Logical Empiricists, whose notion of experience, arguably, was ill-suited to 
accommodate theory-ladenness. I repeatedly presented on Hanson’s work and on theory-ladenness in 
general at various conferences and Hanson’s chapter on observation became a standard syllabus 
component whenever I taught introductory classes on philosophy of science. Typically, my 
audiences—and many students, too—enjoyed Hanson’s work and what I extracted from it, but only 
a handful of people had even so much as heard about Hanson before. And among these select few, 
even fewer had read anything of him, and nobody had ever read it the way I think we should.  
 xi 
Today, too, though Hanson is frequently mentioned as a forbear of e.g. Kuhn and Feyerabend, 
his work is largely ignored.1 Within philosophy of science, the main discussion has long since shifted 
from general philosophy of science—to which Hanson’s account of the theory-ladenness of scientific 
observation belongs—to the discussion of issues that arise within the special sciences. In discussions 
within epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of perception, the same pattern occurs: 
even if his discussion of theory-ladenness is often mentioned as an important precursor to the 
contemporary debate on the so-called cognitive penetrability of perception, Hanson is at best cited 
briefly, or just in a footnote.2 
My Master’s degree marked the end of a period of intense studies in Indian Studies, Philosophy, 
Psychology, some Indo-European Studies, and some Religious Studies, which was generously 
supported by the Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes e.V. Next, I received funding through a doctoral 
scholarship provided by the Evangelische Studienwerk Villigst e.V. Yet since I lacked an advisor who 
shared my interests, I dabbled along only slowly and ended up focusing a lot on teaching. Halfway 
through the scholarship, I renounced it to take up a position as main coordinator at the Center for 
Logic, Philosophy of Science, and History of Science at the University of Rostock, where I taught, 
organized workshops, conferences, and lecture series. But then things took an important turn: I visited 
the University of Pittsburgh on a pre-doctoral fellowship granted by the Max Planck Institute for the 
History of Science, Berlin, and inspired by the intellectual atmosphere at Pitt, I decided to apply for Pitt’s 
Ph.D. program in Philosophy. Throughout, Hanson’s witty and incisive style and the numerous 
insights he manages to weave into his discussion had never ceased to fascinate me. Accordingly, once 
I had been accepted at Pitt, I knew right from the start that I wanted to write about Hanson and 
                                                 
1  To cite an example: in his entry on Theory and Observation in Science in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Bogen 
2017), Jim Bogen rightly attributes the claim that seeing is a theory-laden undertaking to Hanson. But this attribution 
is one of only two occasions on which Hanson is mentioned in the entire entry. Hanson’s claims are never discussed.  
2  An example is Stokes 2015, who in this paper on the cognitive penetration of perception recognizes Hanson as 
challenging the idea that observation is theory-neutral and sketches a variant of an example from Hanson that will 
figure prominently in the second chapter of this book as well (it involves Tycho and Kepler). When Stokes cites this 
example, he does so in a context in which he suggests that theory-ladenness is a potentially problematic consequence 
of the idea that experiences could be affected by cognitive states such as the subject’s beliefs. On my reading of 
Hanson, however, it is one of his central contentions that theory-ladenness is not a contingent, but a necessary feature 
of scientific observation, without which such observation would fail to be intelligible. This feature escapes Stokes and 
has, to my knowledge, been completely ignored in the entire literature on this issue. 
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showcase the relevance I take his seminal ideas to have for the contemporary debate on perception. 
By then, I had devoured, inter alia, Robert Brandom’s Making It Explicit, John McDowell’s Mind and 
World, and Anil Gupta’s Empiricism and Experience—a lot of Sellars’ work, too—and was eager to absorb 
and be part of the extraordinarily stimulating philosophical atmosphere at Pitt. Between leaving 
Pittsburgh after the pre-doctoral scholarship and returning a few months later, I got married to my 
wife Sabrina, and we were excited to start this adventure together. 
An adventure it turned out to be indeed. A few months after our arrival, when I was already knee-
deep in coursework on Hegel, Leibniz, Kant, the M&E core, and a seminar on epistemology, Sabrina 
and I learned that we were expecting. By the end of the first year, our beautiful twin girls Tara and 
Luna were born. The following years were not always easy. Going through graduate school as a parent 
of twins, whose wife was in the US on a visa that did not allow her to work, was a tough challenge. 
Meeting it would have been impossible without the support of friends and family members back home, 
our new-won friends in Pittsburgh, and, especially, the unending support of my advisor, Anil Gupta. 
Not only did he enable me to conduct my research by granting me several generous scholarships, he 
also entrusted me with the organization of a large and immensely stimulating conference on Perceptual 
Experience and Empirical Rationality in 2016, and he believed in my work throughout, even in times when 
I did not. He was extremely personable, an excellent and supportive mentor, a friend and mentor also 
to Sabrina, and, to my great satisfaction, like his wife Mukta Ji and his daughter Donna, quite smitten 
with our girls. Anil, the epigraph, a line from one of my favorite Rafi songs, is for you. 
Everyone who knows anything about Anil’s work or that of Bob Brandom and John McDowell 
will see the massive effect their respective ideas have had on this book. Overall, Anil’s influence will 
be most obvious, since I adopt the two key elements of the view I am recommending from him: a) 
the conception of the general rational role of experience and b) (a slightly modified version of) his 
account of experiential phenomenology. In the following, his influence becomes most apparent when 
my inquiry enters its constructive phase, which begins in chapter 7.3. 
Long before coming to Pittsburgh, I had convinced myself that Hanson’s account of epistemically 
significant observation is best understood as involving an implicit commitment to a broadly holistic 
 xiii 
account of conceptual content. Thus, in thinking through Hanson’s view, Bob’s intriguing work on 
inferentialism and conceptual holism was never far from my thoughts. However, I had to consistently 
resist the temptation to engage with it more. Early on, Anil had advised me—wisely, but surely not 
always successfully—that I had to be like Arjuna, the warrior prince and famously skilled archer from 
the Indian epic Mahābhārata. Like no other, it is said, Arjuna was able to focus his attention just on 
what is important—his target—completely oblivious to what else may also be interesting. To be like 
Arjuna, I had to resist getting side-tracked by including discussions that would have lured me away 
from my target and invited me to engage with Bob’s work more directly, e.g. by thinking about the 
expressive function of subjunctive conditionals in Hanson’s account of seeing as. When in 9.2.3, I 
discuss the role of linkages, the temptation to delve into such discussions was particularly strong. I 
mostly resisted it, but for everyone who looks more closely, the influence of Bob’s work on my 
thinking remains rather noticeable. For the most part, Bob comfortably dwells in many of the 
numerous footnotes. But I also address his view explicitly—in 10.3.1, where I consider the challenge 
raised against the kind of view I recommend by what I call his No Phenomenology view. 
At times, Bob’s presence could seem threatening. “Experience,” he likes to say, “is not one of my 
words.” It is one of mine. In the following pages, it occurs numerous times—mostly used, and rarely 
just mentioned. Since my project focuses on experience, it was clear that Bob would suspect it to be 
misguided. Like Rorty, he is inclined to take it that the notion of experience is irrecoverably confused. 
And yet, when I asked Bob to join my committee, he was the first to come on board. He played a 
tough and incredibly useful devil’s advocate. “When you say ‘experiential phenomenology’,” he once 
quipped at me, “all I hear is ‘boojang.’ And then I hope that in what follows, you will either explicitly 
or implicitly define the term.” Thanks to Bob, when examining the relationalist accounts of 
experiential phenomenology, I was reliably disposed to read nothing but ‘boojang.’ As will transpire in 
what follows, in most cases, that disposition has yet to be updated. 
As for John, upon coming to Pittsburgh, I was particularly sympathetic to his claim that 
experience has conceptual content. After all, Hanson thought so, too, and even claimed—just like I 
thought John would—that only in virtue of having such content, experience can be epistemically 
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significant in the first place. John, I thought, was on my philosophical team, as it were. To me, John’s 
view remains appealing until today. Moreover, his ability to stop one from making an argument even 
when one thinks that one has not even begun to make it is impressively uncanny. Somehow, with him, 
my default expectation is that upon hearing an objection that could be taken to target his view, he will 
simply respond with a gentle laugh, followed by some ingenious way of dodging the bullet.  
Later in this book it will become apparent that I have somewhat moved away from the idea that 
experience must have content. That said, I still expect John to have at least one ace up his sleeve. In 
part, this is why at the very end of this book, I leave room for the possibility that one might try to 
undercut the account of experiential phenomenology that Anil proposes, and a modified version of 
which I recommend we adopt, by arguing that to spell out the notion of presentation on which it 
fundamentally rests, drawing on the actualization of conceptual capacities is indispensable. 
I wish to express my sincere thanks to all my committee members, including Edouard Machery, 
who was a constant source of support and with whom I had a great and encouraging conversation 
about the job market and about letters of recommendation that came at just the right time. 
Over the years, my views gradually changed, under the influence of my conversations e.g. with 
Anil, both face-to-face and in the very stimulating reading group on experience he oversaw. In the 
latter, the following participated or appeared as visitors: Ori Beck, Tom Breed, Bill Brewer, Derek 
Brown, Peter Brössel, David de Bruijn, Alessandra Buccella, Mazviita Chirimuuta, Chris Hill, Ulf 
Hlobil, Vincent Israel-Jost, Adam Marushak, John McDowell, Alison Springle, Wayne Wu, and Miloš 
Vuletić. My heartfelt thanks go to all of them for excellent and trenchant discussions.  
I also thank all the other current and past fellow graduate students, visitors, audience members, 
and conversation partners, who at some point or other were willing to engage with me over my work 
and without whose inputs thinking about these issues would have been rather dull and uninteresting. 
As the saying goes, it takes a village to raise a child. Arguably, so does raising a philosopher. In my 
case, its residents include, but are most certainly not limited to, Scott Aikin, Mikio Akagi, Torin Alter, 
Jochen Apel, Andrea Arndt, Marius Backmann, Simone Bahrenberg, Andreas Berg-Hildebrandt, 
Jürgen Blühdorn, Karsten Böger, Otavio Bueno, Jon Buttaci, Camille Buttingsrud, John Campbell, 
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Cathy Carrol, Julianne Chung, Haixin Dang, Uta Delius, Casey Doyle, Rachael Driver, Josh Eisenthal, 
Rachel Fedock, Johannes Fehr†, Dirk Franken, Jörg Gauerke, Sam Gavin, Bernward Gesang, Franz 
Gniffke, Benedikt Göcke, Chuck Goldhaber, Burkhard Hafemann, Christoph Halbig, Sabrina Hao, 
Björn Henning, Jens Hesekamp, Brandon Hogan, David Hoinski, Mark Hopwood, Ned Howells-
Whitaker, Justin Humphreys, Andreas Hüttemann, Iraklis Ioannidis, Nurbay Irmak, Frank Jackson, 
Michael Janda, Ludger Jansen, Zoe Jenkin, Eva-Maria Jung, Marie I. Kaiser, Steffen Kammler, Kareem 
Khalifa, Matthias Kiesselbach, Christian Kobsda, Carolin Köhne, Dave Kovacs, Michael Kremer, 
Michael Kühler, Sebastian Laukötter, Lok-Chun Kelson Gus Law, Martin Lemke, Will Leonard, 
Gordon Leonhard, Tina Liensdorf, Kathryn Lindeman, Haoying Liu, Suzie Love, Stephen Mackereth, 
Tom Marré, Joe McCaffrey, Robert McDonald, Tina Mennigmann, Jared Millson, Joe Milburn, 
Matthew Kenneth Minerd, Andrew Moon, Volker Müller, Katharina Nieswandt, Jasmin Özel, 
Annalisa Paese, Paolo Palmieri, Shivam Patel, Jan Peters, Roman Piontek, Martin Pleitz, Michael Pohl, 
Panu-Matti Pöykkö, Bernd Prien, Ina Pütz, Yvonne Raden, Vina Radevic, Brentyn Ramm, Alexander 
Reutlinger, Martin Richter, Peter Rohs, Christa Runtenberg, Jack Samuel, Kranti Saran, Hagop 
Sarkissian, Karl Schafer, Matthias Schliewe, Peter Schloss, Oliver Scholz, Benjamin Schulz, Bob 
Schwartz, David P. Schweikardt, Ansgar Seide, Markus Seidel, Susanna Siegel, Ludwig Siep, Joshua 
Smart, Declan Smithies, Daniel Björn Stecher, Daniel Maria Steinke, Robert Steel, Peter Stemmer, 
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Thein, Tina Torrance, Andrew Towers, Douglas Vaaler, Anand Jayprakash Vaidya, Robert Velten, 
Andreas Vieth, Daria Vitasovic, Oliver Voigt, Tyler Wasson, Arne Weber, Daniel Wenz, Marcus 
Willaschek, Diane Zekl, Pablo Zendejas Medina, and Christian Zeuch. 
Special thanks go to Rosemarie Rheinwald†, my first really important philosophical mentor. She 
passed away much too early, but I know that she would have been so happy to see this project come 
to fruition. The massive influence she has had on me will stay with me and I will remain forever 
thankful to her for her trust, the time, and the lessons she so generously shared. Special shout-outs as 
well to Kieran Setiya for introducing me to the work of Iris Murdoch, to Kristen Inglis for making me 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Since this is a long dissertation, this introduction will be comparatively short. In the following chapters, 
I embark on an inquiry aimed at devising an account of experience that meets the following two 
constraints: first, it should be fully compatible with what I call the doxastic variability of experience. 
Second, it should make available a notion on which doxastically variable experience can provide 
rational empirical constraint.1 
First of all, what do I mean by ‘doxastic variability’? A doxastic variation in one’s experience, 
according to the most general characterization, is a change in one’s overall experience that is due to a 
change in one’s overall doxastic state—paradigmatically, in what one believes.  
There are many ordinary and straightforward ways in which experience is doxastically variable. 
Not all such cases are interesting for this inquiry. Not interesting are cases in which the variation in 
one’s experience is mediated a) via action or b) via an obvious shift in one’s attention,2 and c) cases 
that do not involve visual experience. 
For an example of a), suppose that you are sitting in your philosopher’s armchair, realize that you 
are hungry, and come to believe that there is some eggplant lasagna in the oven. As a result, you might 
decide to get up, go into the kitchen, and look in the oven. And indeed, you see an eggplant lasagna. 
It is true of course that in this very simple case, your experience has been modified in part due to your 
belief that you are hungry and your belief that in the oven, some food can be found. But by themselves, 
                                                 
1  In the following, I take it for granted that the relevant empirical constraint is rational, as opposed to merely causal, so 
I drop the qualification.  
2  As we will see later, on some relationalist accounts, cases of expert vision may be explicable in terms of attention 
shifts. If all expert vision could be explained that way, this would be an interesting result, not an obvious fact. 
2 
 
these beliefs did not suffice to modify your visual experience. Had you merely adopted these beliefs, 
then quite plausibly, your experience would have remained the same. For a modification of your 
experience to occur, action was necessary, i.e. that of walking to the kitchen and looking in the oven. 
For an example of both b) and c), suppose that a friend, an expert in such matters, informs you 
that the piece of jazz music that you are currently listening to involves a rather interesting chord 
progression in the second verse. As a result, you may pay special attention to the second verse. As you 
do, you notice that indeed, the chord progression is bizarre, yet pleasantly unusual. In this very simple 
case, your experience while hearing the second verse may be rather different from what it would have 
been had you lacked the belief you formed upon receiving the piece of information your expert friend 
made available to you: i.e. that the chord progression in the second verse is rather interesting. But by 
itself, that belief did not change your experience. Instead, it guided your experience in that it made 
you selectively focus on the second verse and attend to what you were told was there to be found.  
Again, both these cases are ordinary straightforward cases of doxastic variation. However, neither 
of them falls in the scope of the notion of doxastic variation that matters for the following inquiry.  
What, then, is the kind of cases that matters? To convey the idea, let me provide some toy 
examples. Suppose, first, you somehow acquired the irrational and false belief that your upstairs 
neighbor really hates you. If that belief makes it so that from now on, whenever you see your (in fact 
rather friendly) upstairs neighbor, she looks hateful to you, your experience has been shaped by your 
belief. Your experience is doxastically variable.  
For another example, suppose someone gives an x-ray picture to you. You do not recognize 
anything on it, put it somewhere, completely forget about it. You then go through med school and 
after the day of your graduation, as you are finally cleaning up your desk, you find the x-ray picture 
again. You right away see it as showing a small brain tumor located in V3. Your knowledge and your 
training make it so that you now see the x-ray picture differently than before. Your visual experience 
has changed along with a change in your doxastic state. Your experience is doxastically variable.  
Finally, suppose that someone shows you a fairly realistic depiction of a banana and asks you to 
adjust it to an achromatic gray. If you are like one of the test subjects in a study conducted by Hansen 
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et al. (Hansen et al. 2006), you will adjust it to a slightly bluish hue. If Hansen et al. are correct, this is 
due to the fact that you firmly believe, indeed know, that typically, bananas are yellow, which affects 
your experience in such a way that even when the illustration of the banana is actually gray, it still 
strikes you as yellowish. As a result, you adjust its color further to compensate for the effect. If this 
explanation is accurate, then for some time during the process of adjusting the color of the illustration, 
your belief that bananas are yellow affected your experience. Your experience is doxastically variable.3 
For now, these few examples must suffice. Over the course of the next chapters, the notion of 
doxastic variability will become clearer. As we will see, one important question to raise is what about 
experience it is that is taken to be doxastically variable. The answer, as we shall see as well, depends 
on what one takes experience to be. 
Suppose, then, that experience is doxastically variable. If we accept this, our notion of experience, 
whatever it is, meets the first constraint. Why should we be unable to meet the second constraint, as 
well? What stands in the way of thinking that experience can both be doxastically variable and provide 
(rational) empirical constraint? 
Here is the problem: suppose that as we think of experience as providing empirical constraint, 
we think that experience constrains what we believe by providing an independent touchstone for it. 
If so, and if our beliefs are true, our experience should, in some sense, cohere with them. If, conversely, 
our beliefs are false or irrational, our experience cannot, as it were, confirm them. But if we allow that 
experience is doxastically variable, this picture may be too simple. For if experiences can change along 
with changes in beliefs, it may be that if a given experience coheres with your beliefs, this is not due 
to how things are in the world, but due to the fact that the experience already has been modified by 
your standing beliefs in such a way as to seemingly conform to them.  
If such cases are possible, as the claim that experience is doxastically variable entails, experience 
can be an independent touchstone only if it has not been modified by our beliefs.  
                                                 
3  I will repeatedly return to this experiment and to the issues it raises for relationalist accounts in chapters 4, 5, and 6. 
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But how can we know that our current experience has not been so modified? How do we know 
whether our current experience can be trusted? Doxastic variability, it seems, threatens to undermine 
the idea that experience can provide empirical constraint.  
In the following chapters, I begin my inquiry by examining the seminal account of (scientific) 
observation offered by Norwood Russell Hanson. As I mentioned in the preface, today, Hanson’s 
work is little known. He is remembered as the philosopher who coined the term ‘theory-ladenness of 
observation’ in the first place, but that is about all people know about him.  
As I show in the next chapter, Hanson’s account constitutes a valiant attempt to characterize an 
account of experience that meets our two constraints. Ultimately, it fails. But the questions Hanson 
asks are worth asking, the distinctions he draws useful, the account he provides of the epistemic 
significance of seeing fascinating, and his account of empirical constraint flawed, but promising.  
Hanson’s account sets the stage for everything that follows. Here is how I proceed: again, I begin 
by providing an analysis of Hanson’s view, which I take to be flawed in two related respects. First, 
Hanson fails to provide a satisfactory account of the phenomenology of experience that shows how 
experiential phenomenology depends, at least in part, on the presence of mind-independent items in 
the subject’s environment. But as I argue, without such an account, his account of empirical constraint 
does not get off the ground.  
Second, Hanson suggests that to understand how experience can be epistemically significant, we 
should take concepts to be operative in experience itself. As I show, Hanson’s broadly holistic account 
of how such concepts derive an essential part of their significance for the subject from being integrated 
in the subject’s background view allows him to address an interesting puzzle: how subjects whose 
background views differ can look at the same object and yet each see it as a different kind of thing. 
Still, Hanson’s notion of experience remains underdeveloped. For not only does he owe us an 
account of the phenomenal dimension of experience, he also provides no account of how, in 
experience, its alleged conceptual and phenomenal dimensions relate. 
Having uncovered these two issues, I leave—for the time being—the consideration of Hanson’s 
position behind and proceed, in chapter 3, by first characterizing two very different kinds of 
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experiential doxastic variability that I extract from the discussion of Hanson’s position—the Doxastic 
Variability of Experiential Content (DVEC) and the Doxastic Variability of Experiential 
Phenomenology (DVEP). With these notions in hand, I then transition to an extended discussion 
of one of the two dominant contemporary kinds of accounts of perceptual experience: the relational 
view. I spend roughly three and two thirds of a chapter on an in-depth analysis of three different 
relationalist positions, viz. the accounts provided by William Fish (chapter 4), Bill Brewer (chapter 5), 
and James Genone (chapter 6), hoping to extract from these views a viable characterization of the 
phenomenal dimension of experience that could possibly help improve Hanson’s view. Thus, I focus 
on analyzing how, on the various relationalist views I consider, experiential phenomenology is said to 
depend on the mind-independent items in the subject’s environment and whether these views also 
manage to accommodate effects that fall under DVEP.4  
The result of this analysis, however, is sobering. Each of the accounts is shot through with 
problems; none fully viable. As I show, the accounts frustrate our hope in both respects. They neither 
succeed in providing an intelligible notion of experiential phenomenology, nor in accommodating 
effects that fall under DVEP, such as expert vision and projection effects (of which the banana 
example mentioned earlier is a prime instance). Among the many issues that arise, one is particularly 
pertinent: according to the relationalists’ core tenet, experience is inevitably a relation between subjects 
and mind-independent items. Apart from Genone, who hints at the possibility of endorsing the idea 
that experiential phenomenology could in part be constituted by other factors, relationalists take the 
mind-independent items to which experience is said to relates us to be that which accounts for 
experiential phenomenology. This conception, I argue, is the main reason why relationalist accounts 
are incompatible with projection effects. And since Genone’s view, though interesting and potentially 
powerful, faces its own issues, I ultimately reject it as well. 
In chapter 7, I provide an in-depth analysis of Siegel’s (Rich) Content View—arguably the most 
sophisticated recent representationalist attempt to accommodate phenomena not just of doxastic 
                                                 
4  As will transpire, given the relationalist conception of experience, considering phenomena that would fall under 
DVEC is irrelevant.   
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variability, but of influences exerted on experience by cognitive states more broadly construed. 
However, I show that Siegel’s view is ill-motivated, lacks an account of experiential phenomenology, 
an account of experiential content, and—like Hanson—an account of how the phenomenal 
dimension of experience and the dimension of experiential content relate. Like most standard 
representationalists, Siegel assumes that the default role of experience is to provide justification for 
beliefs. From a perspective shaped by that assumption, many conceivable phenomena of doxastic 
variation appear as a threat. They threaten to provide illicit justification for irrational or false beliefs. 
Siegel develops a highly revisionary account that, I suggest, we should interpret as a way of putting in 
place various defensive mechanisms that serve to thwart that threat. On the resulting account, 
experiences have epistemic powers that are reduced in case the relevant experience has been formed 
in some epistemically non-kosher way. Furthermore, Siegel suggests that even if unbeknownst to 
them, subjects undergo experiences that have been formed in some such non-kosher way, the rational 
way for subjects to respond to their experience is by suspending judgment. The result of these two 
suggestions is a view on which experiences that should not serve to provide illicit justification do not 
provide such justification and should anyway be ignored. The relevant experiences have been rendered 
harmless, as it were. 
Such a view, I argue, is deeply unattractive. Most importantly, it ignores that in an important 
sense, the rationality of the subject is completely unimpaired if she responds to her experience in a 
way that given her perspective is rational, and imposes instead the rational requirement that the subject 
respond to her experience in a way, i.e. by suspending judgment, that from within the subject’s own 
perspective must seem completely unmotivated. My response to Siegel’s view is to reject the 
conception she shares with most standard representationalists of the default rational role of 
experience. As I will show, once that conception is dropped, there is no longer any motivation to put 
in place her defensive measures. Accordingly, I drop both her account of epistemic power and her 
injunction to suspend belief upon having an experience that has been formed in some non-kosher 
way as both unnecessary and unmotivated. The key move for everything that follows is to adopt 
Gupta’s suggestion that the general rational role of experience is to make rational view-dependent 
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transitions to judgments, beliefs, and actions. In a series of steps, I subsequently move further away 
from Siegel’s account and show that Gupta’s conception of the general rational role of experience is 
compatible with a modified Content View (chapter 7.3), with an improved and enriched Hansonian 
view (chapter 8), and with Gupta’s view of experience (chapter 9), on which experience has no content 
at all. 
Gupta’s view is particularly interesting. For if slightly modified, it succeeds where both Siegel and 
the relationalists fail: it offers a conception of experiential phenomenology that is fully compatible 
with all the effects that fall under DVEP. Moreover, it has ample room for the idea that 
phenomenology is at least in part constituted by the mind-independent items in the subject’s 
environment. And if the account is combined with a Hansonian broadly holistic conception of 
content, it can also preserve Hanson’s insights concerning DVEC.  
Ultimately, I suggest that various rather different accounts can be devised that meet our two 
constraints. Interestingly, we find that the ability to do so is independent of the long-standing debate 
between representationalists and relationalists about whether experience has content. With respect to 
the issue of how to accommodate both doxastic variability and empirical constraint, this debate does 
not get to the heart of the matter. Making progress requires eschewing both the restrictive relationalist 
and the limiting standard representationalist conception of what experience is, and what it does for 
us, and instead endorse the conception of the general rational role of experience that Gupta suggests. 
Another constructive result springs from the discussion conducted in the second half of chapter 
9. There, I focus on Gupta’s central, but as of yet underdeveloped notion of rational linkages. I suggest 
that a modified version of Hanson’s notion of seeing as can be utilized to make the conceptions subjects 
have of these linkages available for empirical debate and, thus, for rational criticism. Furthermore, I 
offer a way of construing the sense in which these linkages are contained in a view.  
In the tenth and last chapter, I provide an extended summary of the book and an eight-point list 
of important lessons learned. I then confront the kind of view I recommend with two challenges: the 
No Phenomenology challenge (issued by Bob Brandom) and the Receptive Knowledge complaint (issued by 
John McDowell). Though I provide a response to each, both bring us face-to-face with deep 
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philosophical issues and leave us with open questions and further projects to pursue. I end by 
compiling a list of issues that in light of our discussion it would be fruitful to investigate further, as 
well as an overview of areas of research in which the results of this inquiry can be applied—within 
philosophy and beyond. 
Before we begin, let me provide some reading advice. Given my interest in promoting Hanson, I 
strongly suggest that every reader read chapters 2 and the part preceding chapter 3.1. Those who favor 
relationalism should read up to and including chapter 6 very closely. For besides the abundance of 
critical remarks, I also offer several suggestions as to how the views under consideration could be 
improved. Ultimately, I think that relationalist accounts that draw on a notion of constitution to 
accommodate the phenomenology of experience are doomed. But those who think otherwise may still 
find that my attempts to improve them provide some pointers as to how to develop their favored 
views further. Those who are already convinced that relational views are misguided can either enjoy 
reading my arguments to that effect or skip ahead to chapter 7. After that, I really do not think that 
anything else should be skipped. 
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2.0 HANSON’S ACCOUNT OF THEORY-LADEN OBSERVATION 
Our beliefs and theories about the world may be wrong, perhaps partly irrational. But ultimately, we 
trust, our observations will help us correct them, hold them to objective standards, and make our 
dealings with the world more rational, responsive, and responsible to the facts. Observation, we think, 
plays a vital rational role: it constrains our thinking by anchoring it to reality’s solid grounds. 
As is widely acknowledged, too, observation is also thoroughly theory-laden. We couch it in terms 
that implicate theories we do or did once hold. And though we routinely distinguish observational 
from non-observational vocabulary, that distinction is malleable, perhaps purely pragmatic, or merely 
methodological. Moreover, our philosophical predecessors realized that items on each side of the 
distinction depend in various ways on items on the other. Consequently, the search for an independent 
stratum of observation—suitable as a semantic and epistemological foundation—began to look 
hopeless, if not ill-conceived. However, non-foundationalist alternatives such as full-fledged semantic 
holism or epistemological coherentism seem unpalatable, too. Such views provide ample room for 
semantic and epistemological interdependences. But if on them, observation is not credited with any 
special epistemological significance, these views surely go too far. 
Observation as constraining and anchoring our thinking to the world and observation as 
thoroughly infused by theory—both ideas are now deeply entrenched. But how are we to characterize 
observation and its rational and epistemic significance while giving theory-ladenness its due? How can 
observation free us from the superstitions that may affect it, how constrain our thinking while 
depending on what it purports to constrain?  
This, again, is the main question guiding our present inquiry: how are we to think about experience 
in such a way as to accommodate the various ways in which our background beliefs may conceivably 
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affect it, while at the same time holding on to the thought that experience also plays the vital role of 
providing our thinking with rational empirical constraint. To address this issue, we need a starting 
point. A suitable way of beginning our inquiry, I contend, is by looking at the account of (scientific) 
observation offered by the philosopher who coined the term ‘theory-ladenness of observation’ in the 
first place: Norwood Russell Hanson.  
In this chapter, I present Hanson’s account of visual experience as an attempt to accommodate 
both the ideas mentioned above: that our experience can be affected by our beliefs and that experience 
can serve to exert rational empirical constraint. Ultimately, I argue that Hanson’s view remains in 
important ways underdeveloped; it needs improvement. Having looked at it closely, we will embark 
on our quest for a better account, or for the resources that could serve to improve his. For looking at 
Hanson’s account will already provide us with rich resources, which in the following chapters I will 
draw on to assess some important versions of the two currently dominant accounts of experience and 
its rational role are currently: relationalism and standard representationalism.  
We will examine these views and provide characterizations of them in due course. For now, let 
us begin by noting a striking feature of Hanson’s account: on it,1 theory-ladenness is not a contingent, 
but an essential feature of observation: observation, he claims, must be theory-laden to be epistemically 
significant.2 Note also that often, the term ‘observation’ is used rather liberally, even to report what 
cannot literally be seen. Hanson, however, restricts its use to visual observation: throughout, his 
discussion is couched in terms of seeing.3 To understand his account, the questions we shall need to 
address are the following: why, and in what sense, must such seeing be theory-laden? And if so, how 
can it still constrain and anchor our thinking?  
1
2
3
Cf. Hanson 1958 (henceforth: PoD), chapter 1; Hanson 1969 (henceforth: PD). Again, Hanson’s view is seldom 
discussed these days. Radder 2006, Lund 2010, and Hickey 2016 are rare exceptions. 
To affirm that theory-ladenness is an essential feature of scientific observation is to challenge a common 
preconception. On the latter, theory-ladenness—or generally, the dependence of observation on background 
beliefs—appears not as essential to observation, but as problematic, as something that must be minimized and, 
ideally, eliminated, as it allegedly detracts from our observations’ objectivity (I noted this already in fn. 2 of the 
Preface). As we will see, both the relationalist views I discuss in chapters 4-6 and Siegel’s (Rich) Content View 
discussed in chapter 7 implicitly share this preconception. Gupta’s presentationalist account, however, which I 
discuss in chapter 9, does not. 
In this inquiry, I follow Hanson in focusing on visual experience and will not attempt to extend his arguments to 
other modalities, though the former may well apply to the latter as well. 
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To address the first question, I will examine three claims Hanson endorses: 
(1) Epistemically significant seeing involves seeing as. 
(2) Seeing as is intelligible only in terms of seeing that. 
(3) Through seeing as, beliefs can affect one’s visual field. 
Sections 2.1-2.3 are devoted to these claims, respectively. In 2.4, I address the second question and 
extract Hanson’s account of how observation can still constrain our world-directed thinking. In 2.5, I 
highlight the respects in which Hanson’s account is still wanting. 
2.1 EPISTEMICALLY SIGNIFICANT SEEING INVOLVES SEEING AS 
Seeing, Hanson claims, is not just being in some physical state: 
(1) Seeing is an experience. A retinal reaction is only a physical state—a photochemical 
excitation. […] People, not their eyes, see. Cameras, and eye-balls, are blind. Attempts 
to locate within the organs of sight (or within the neurological reticulum behind the 
eyes) some nameable called ‘seeing’ may be dismissed. That Kepler and Tycho do, or 
do not, see the same thing [i.e. while looking at the sun at dawn] cannot be supported 
by reference to the physical states of their retinas, optic nerves or visual cortices: there 
is more to seeing than meets the eyeball. (PoD, p. 6f., cf. also: PD, chapter 4) 
As experiences, seeings are conscious states. These, as passage (1) indicates, cannot be characterized 
in exclusively physical terms: there is more to seeing than meets the eyeball. Passage (1) also references 
a fictitious case Hanson frequently revisits: Tycho and Kepler look at the sun at dawn, in identical 
settings. Both visually relate to it and have normal vision. What is etched on their retinas may be 
identical, like their respective sketches of the scene (cf. PoD, pp. 6-7). But in an epistemically significant 
sense, Hanson maintains, they start from different data. Though they face the same objects, they see 
different things (cf. e.g. PoD, p. 4).4 How so? And what makes seeing significant to begin with? 
4 There is of course a prior sense, in which, as they visually relate to the same object, both see it. But there may also 
be a sense in which they see different things. The latter is what Hanson is after. 
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On a widely-accepted gloss, to say that experiences are conscious states is to say that they are 
states there is something it is like for one to be in.5 Moreover, seeings have a distinctively visual aspect; 
they involve being visually struck in some way. ‘What it’s like,’ however, is an umbrella term: what it’s 
like to have an experience can vary with e.g. what items one faces, one’s response to it, and the internal 
and external circumstances of one’s experiencing. Tycho and Kepler may differ in what it’s like for 
them to see the sun in some, but not other respects. Some of these respects may, others will not help 
explain the sense in which Tycho and Kepler see different things. Moreover, while seeing involves being 
visually struck in some way, being so struck does not determine what things one sees. One can be 
struck in the same way while facing different objects, and struck by the same objects differently.  
To understand how, as we experience objects, we can see (different) things, something else must 
enter the equation. Seeings may trigger, but are no instances of judgings: we can judge without seeing 
and vice versa. But judgings and significant seeings, Hanson contends, share an important feature: both 
involve concepts. As we will see, this assumption is crucial to his account of how two observers who 
face identical objects can see different things and, more generally, of how seeing can be epistemically 
significant to begin with. 
To be epistemically significant, seeings must be able to bear on our beliefs. Not all seeings are like 
that. Peeking through a microscope and staring through the window of a moving train—these are 
instances of seeing. But one may be ignorant of what one sees, or stare mindlessly. When Hanson 
contends that such seeings lack epistemic import, his point is broadly Kantian. Without concepts, Kant 
famously claimed, intuitions are blind (Kant 1968, B 75). Similarly, Hanson holds that seeings that are 
exhausted by one’s being visually struck remain kaleidoscopic. To acquire the ability to bear on our 
beliefs, the visual aspect of seeing must be brought under concepts. For seeing to be epistemically 
5 The expression, which goes back at least to Wittgenstein’s Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, famously figures in 
Thomas Nagel’s characterization of conscious states as states there is something it is like to be in (cf. Nagel 1974, 
p. 519), and is very widely used. For references and discussion on the semantics of ‘what it’s like’ sentences, cf.
Stoljar 2016. As we will see in chapter 7, Siegel, too, freely uses this notion. 
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significant, that is, concepts must be involved. It must, Hanson suggests, involve seeing as.6 Roughly, 
his idea is this: as we observe the items we face, we see them as things of a certain kind, as having or 
lacking certain properties, and as behaving in certain ways. Perceptual judgments we issue in response 
may either cohere or clash with the expectations and beliefs we antecedently harbor with respect to 
what we see things as. Hence, the former may either render inductive support to the latter, or trigger 
revision. 
We will explore this further. For now, let us record that according to Hanson, epistemically 
significant seeing involves concepts and, more specifically, seeing as. Let us observe, too, that seeing as 
differs from both judging and seeing that. I can see something as F while judging—or seeing—that it is 
not F.7 Nevertheless, Hanson claims, seeing as and seeing that are intimately related: the former is 
unintelligible without the latter. To see why, we must further explore Hanson’s notion of seeing as. This 
will reveal why, for him, scientific observation must be theory-laden, and how Tycho and Kepler, 
looking at the same sun in identical settings, can both see it, see it as the sun, and yet see different things. 
2.2 SEEING AS IS INTELLIGIBLE ONLY IN TERMS OF SEEING THAT 
Consider the following passage: 
(2) There is a ‘linguistic’ factor in seeing, though there is nothing linguistic about what 
forms in the eye, or in the mind’s eye. Unless there were this linguistic element, 
nothing we ever observed could have relevance for our knowledge. We could not 
speak of significant observations: nothing seen would make sense, and microscopy 
would only be a kind of kaleidoscopy. For what is it for things to make sense other 
than for descriptions of them to be composed of meaningful sentences? (PoD, p. 25) 
6
7
Why seeing as? Hanson rejects sense-datum views, on which sense-data are associated with unique meanings that they 
carry  on  their  sleeves,  as it were. Such views are incompatible with what Hanson took to be a fact: experiences of 
identical items can be seeings of them as different things. I return to this issue in 2.3.1.   
Sometimes we wince even when we know that what we see is not what we see it as, e.g. that rather than a real tiger 
jumping at us, we in fact see a computer-generated 3D simulation presented to us on a screen. We cannot but see it 
as a tiger, though we don’t take it to be one. I will return to differences in how robust instances of seeing as can be in 
chapter 8.1.3.  
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If nothing about what forms in the eye is conceptual (or linguistic8) then on Hanson’s view, it remains 
kaleidoscopic. But if, to be relevant for knowledge, and to make sense, seeing must involve concepts—
indeed: seeing as—how are concepts involved? As passage (2) indicates, Hanson thinks that concepts 
are operative in epistemically significant seeing itself.9 In it, visual and conceptual elements are 
thoroughly blended: “Seeing is, I should almost like to say, an amalgam of the two—pictures and 
language” (PoD, p. 25).10 Relatedly, Hanson denies that such seeing is a two-stage process: 
(3) [O]ne does not first soak up an optical pattern and then clamp an interpretation on 
it. […] Ordinary accounts of […] experiences […] do not require visual grist going 
into an intellectual mill: [rather,] theories and interpretations are 'there' in the seeing from the 
outset. (PoD, p. 9f., emphasis added) 
Together, passages (2) and (3) reveal a further aspect of Hanson’s view: the intelligibility of seeing is 
construed in terms of meaningful sentences. Not just concepts, but theories and interpretations are 
‘there’ in the seeing, right from the outset. 
Though he does not quite put it this way, Hanson thinks that having epistemically significant 
experiences requires that experiencing subjects inhabit some doxastic context. Moreover, some of the 
beliefs such a context contains must relate the concepts that, on his view, epistemically significant 
seeing involves to other concepts. Per Hanson, what a concept operative in experience means, to a 
subject S, is to an essential part determined by what role it plays in S’s doxastic context.11 Indeed, 
having some such role is essential to something’s being a concept to begin with; nothing could be an 
application of a concept (in seeing or otherwise), if no such context were available. And indeed, absent 
any doxastic context in which the concept F is articulated, what could seeing something as F possibly 
8
9
10
11
Presumably, Hanson’s reason for calling that element linguistic is that, like Wittgenstein, whom he cites frequently, he 
takes thinking to ultimately depend on language. 
Albeit  in  a  different  context,  McDowell  1994  argues  roughly  for  a  similar  claim:  in  epistemically  significant 
experience, spontaneity, rather than operating on receptivity, is operative in receptivity itself. 
Here, too, Hanson draws on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations.   
The meaning of concepts need not be exhausted by their conceptual role. Tycho and Kepler see the sun as different 
kinds of thing, though they visually relate to, and refer to, the same physical object. If e.g. reference were taken to 
be part of a concept’s meaning, Tycho and Kepler’s concepts would differ in the dimension of sense, not in that of 
reference. 
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be?12 Subjects could not intelligibly see anything as F if they lacked beliefs about Fs entirely, including 
beliefs about how Fs and non-Fs differ.13 Seeing as F, that is, requires a context provided by one’s 
beliefs about how F-ish items relate to other items: all Fs are G, probably H, perhaps J, certainly not 
K, say. Hanson allows that such contexts can remain implicit, “‘built into’ thinking, imagining and 
picturing” (PoD, p. 14).14 Crucially, though, without some such context, seeing as cannot occur. 
Let us return to Hanson’s claim that seeing as and seeing that are intimately related. Sometimes he 
suggests that seeing something as F is seeing that it may be expected to behave in all the ways Fs do (cf. 
PD, p. 116).15 Sometimes he says, more cautiously, that seeing something as a certain kind of thing is 
seeing that, if suitably circumstanced, it does, will, or would probably react in ways characteristic of what 
it is seen as. 16 The claim that seeing as involves seeing that, I submit, encapsulates in a slogan the following 
line of thought: it starts from Hanson’s assumption that concepts are operative in epistemically 
significant seeing itself, and that such seeing involves seeing as. For these concepts to imbue experience 
12 “The appropriate aspect of the illustration is brought out by the verbal context in which it appears. It is not an 
illustration of anything determinate unless it appears in some such context. […] The context is part of the illustration itself.” 
PoD, p. 14 (emphasis added). This, Hanson claims, obtains not just in illustrations, but “in all seeing.” PoD, p. 17 
13 Suppose that upon seeing an unfamiliar kind of object, you decide to call it F. Can’t you now, pace Hanson, see it as 
F, even though you lack the (allegedly) requisite belief context concerning Fs? “New visual phenomena,” Hanson 
responds, “are noteworthy only against our accepted knowledge of the observable world.” PD, p. 109. The ability to 
single out objects as unfamiliar is intelligible only in the context of the ability to distinguish them from familiar ones. 
This in turn requires attributing properties to them that one believes they share with other objects, lack, or both. As 
one ostensively defines something as F, where “F” is a newly coined term, the context such beliefs constitute and 
the ability to make or withhold attributions of the properties figuring in them thus make both one’s ostensive 
definition and one’s subsequent seeing items as F intelligible to begin with. 
14 The passage continues (with a nod to the Gestaltpsychologists in a footnote): “We are set to appreciate the visual 
aspect of things in certain ways.” Also: “Such “contexts” are very often carried around with us in our heads, having 
been put there by intuition, experience, and reasoning.” PD, p. 100 
15  This is too strong. We cannot expect things to behave in ways we don’t believe they can. Expressions of 
expectations, if they complement the seeing that locution, must be constrained by what we in fact believe. 
16 PoD, p. 21: “To see fig. 1 as a transparent box, an ice-cube, or a block of glass is to see that it is six-faced, twelve-
edged, eight-cornered;” PoD, p. 18: “The schoolboy and the physicist both see that the X-ray tube will smash if 
dropped;” for the probabilistic qualification, see e.g. PD, p. 112; PoD, p. 20f.: “What is it to see boxes, staircases, 
birds, antelopes, bears, goblets, X-ray tubes? It is (at least) to have knowledge of certain sorts. […] It is to see that, 
were certain things done to objects before our eyes, other things would result” (all emphases added). Note also 
PoD, p. 24, where he claims that seeing something as something is to see that certain further observations are 
(im)possible. Hanson thus appears to hold that for a concept operative in seeing as to be intelligible, the belief 
context it inhabits must involve at least implicit commitments to subjunctive claims. Though I cannot pursue this 
here, this view puts Hanson in a camp with Kant and Sellars, who as Brandom argues, subscribed to what Brandom 
dubs the modal Kant Sellars-thesis. On one rough formulation of it, “[t]he ability to use ordinary empirical descriptive 
terms such as ‘green’, ‘rigid’, and ‘mass’ already presupposes [implicit] grasp of the kinds of properties and relations 
made explicit by modal vocabulary.” Brandom 2008, p. 96f. 
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with significance, they must themselves be significant. In general, for a concept F to have some 
significance for a subject S is for F to play some role in S’s doxastic context. The beliefs contained in 
this context that specify what is required and entailed by some object’s falling under F, including 
beliefs concerning the various ways being F relates to and differs from having other properties, serve 
to inferentially articulate an essential part of what, to S, F means.17 What a subject S’s seeing something 
as F amounts to thus depends on S’s beliefs about Fs: on what meaningful sentences S would, in 
characterizing Fs, assert about what else being F involves, follows from, or is incompatible with. 
Jointly, these sentences constitute the set of suitable complements for the ‘seeing that’ locution.18 Such 
complements may be rather varied. They need not e.g. specify actual or possible experiences, nor 
anything visible, though they may (PoD, p. 22).19 Also, some concepts figuring in instances of seeing as 
may link up with numerous beliefs. But for a given seeing to be epistemically significant, links to rather 
few beliefs suffice.20 
Seeing that, Hanson asserts, “threads knowledge into our seeing” (PoD, p. 22; PD, p. 107; see also 
the passages quoted in fn. 16). The importance of knowledgeable beliefs is something we shall consider. 
First, however, note that some of one’s beliefs about e.g. Fs may be false or irrational. Accordingly, in 
seeing something as F, one can take oneself to be seeing that something is, could, or would (probably) be 
the case, if certain other things obtained or happened, yet be mistaken. Seeing that is of course factive. 
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In what follows, I focus on beliefs, but the requisite context may be present in form of commitments to apply 
concepts, commitments at least partly implicit in what the subject does.   
Which of these beliefs are more or less salient may of course vary across situations. 
In some cases, one may, in a sense, see that if x happened, y would, too: if I moved my hand a little closer to the 
rabid dog’s snarling muzzle, I would surely lose a finger or two, don’t you see? But seeing a certain mark on a black 
board as a 3 involves, inter alia, seeing that adding 1 to what it represents yields 4. Lest we uncharitably think Hanson 
credits us with perceptual access to modal contexts, what seeing that threads into seeing need not itself pertain to 
something visible. 
See also fn. 13 above. Sometimes, how concepts operative in seeing differ come out not in what one would or could 
say about them, but in their application. Consider looking at an eye chart through a manual refractor, while the 
oculist who assesses your eye-sight keeps exchanging the lenses. During your subsequent experiences, you see the 
chart as (but typically won’t not judge it to actually be) differing in blurriness. Generally, Hanson will say, seeing 
things as (more or less) blurry is intelligible only against the backdrop of doxastic contexts that relate ‘blurry’ in 
various ways to further beliefs, and that, presumably, imply that blurriness comes in degrees. Seeing the chart as more 
(or less) blurry is an epistemically significant experience. One can issue judgments based on subsequent visual 
experiences due to how blurry one sees things as while having them. At the same time, there may not be much one 
can say about what is distinctive of them. Thanks to Alessandra Buccella for urging me to comment on such cases 
on Hanson’s behalf. 
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If we take ourselves to see that which cannot be seen, we thus go astray. Accordingly, something besides 
knowledge and true belief can be threaded into seeing as well. Acknowledging this fact is crucial, for 
it allows us to explain both in what sense Tycho and Kepler can see different things and why scientific 
observation must be theory-laden.  
Consider the following passage: 
(4) Seeing the dawn was for Tycho […] to see that the earth’s brilliant satellite was beginning its 
diurnal circuit around us, while for Kepler and Galileo it was to see that the earth was 
spinning them back into the light of our local star. (PoD, p. 20, emphasis added) 
We, of course, side with Kepler (and Galileo). Tycho’s view is geocentric; Kepler’s (and Galileo’s), like 
ours, is not. Still, for Tycho, i.e. by the lights of what he thought he knew, seeing the dawn—i.e. seeing 
the sun at dawn, as the sun—was to see that the earth’s brilliant satellite was beginning its diurnal circuit 
around us. Again, since seeing that is factive, we cannot assert that this is what he in fact saw. But he 
would have asserted it, which is what in passage (4), the insertion of ‘for Tycho’ signals. Surely Tycho’s 
doxastic context was crucially shaped by his belief that the sun revolves around the stationary earth. 
Failing to acknowledge this is failing to grasp what thing he thought he saw. Again, Tycho and Kepler 
visually relate to the same object. Both see it as the sun. But to the extent to which their doxastic 
contexts differ, they differ in what, to them, the concept sun means, in how it is, in their respective 
doxastic contexts, inferentially articulated. This, in turn, imbues their experiences with (differing) 
epistemic significances.21 In this sense, their theories are there in the their seeings. Tycho and Kepler see 
the sun as the heavenly body that figures in their respective theories. Their theories differ; hence they 
see different things, even though they look at the same objects and though the visual aspect of their 
respective experiences may well be identical. 
To sum up: starting from the broadly Kantian idea that epistemically significant seeing must 
involve concepts, Hanson suggests that such seeing involves seeing what one faces as something. For 
any concept ψ to be operative in some S’s seeing something as ψ, he holds, a doxastic context must be 
present, which is constituted by S’s beliefs about ψ -ish things. These beliefs serve to inferentially 
21 Also, the extent to which Tycho and Kepler share theories is the extent to which they see the same thing. Cf. PoD, 
p. 18. 
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articulate what for S, ψ-ish things are and what S takes being ψ to entail, require, or be incompatible 
with. For any ψ, seeing something as ψ is intelligible only in the presence and in terms of some such 
context. And if, as in scientific observation, such a context contains theories about ψ-ish things, 
Hanson’s claim ensues: scientific observation must be theory-laden.22 
Seeing that, Hanson claims, threads knowledge into our seeing. What he means by that comes out 
e.g. in what Hanson claims attributing states of seeing requires: 
(5)  [What must] have taken place for a man to be described as seeing a […] spirochete; 
unless a person had had at least one visual sensation and knew what a spirochete was 
[and, Hanson adds elsewhere: what it looks like (e.g. PoD, p. 21)], we would not say that 
he had seen a spirochete. (PD, p. 112, emphasis added.) 
In attributing to you that you see an apple, I might simply report that you are visually related to 
one while being awake, not drugged, etc. For this attribution to be true it is not necessary that you 
know anything.23 But Hanson’s point concerns not such cases, but cases of epistemically significant 
seeing. Applied to our example, his claim is that I cannot intelligibly attribute to you that you see 
something as an apple unless I take you to know what apples are. In other words, I must assume that 
you hold at least some beliefs about them that I, too, consider as knowledgeable complements of the 
22 Such theories, recall, may figure in contexts implicitly. Two clarifications: First, some (cf. van Fraassen 1980) 
characterize theories, not as sets of beliefs, but as families of models and reject the assimilation of theories to 
doxastic contexts. But if proponents of such a view grant that proponents of different theories hold different 
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beliefs, Hanson’s point is secured. Second, theory-ladenness is not what makes seeing epistemically significant in 
general. For many ordinary concepts – e.g. sister, pain, or rose garden – it is absurd to hold that such concepts 
cannot be intelligibly operative in seeing unless a corresponding theory were held. If taken to entail that we need to 
hold e.g. some theory of pain to intelligibly attribute pain to others or express that we are in pain, such a view would 
imply a dubious conception of psychological and other ordinary concepts (for discussion, see Hacker & Bennett 
2010, chapter 13). We best read Hanson as claiming that generally, epistemically significant seeing must be concept-
laden, only scientific observation must be theory-laden. For ease of exposition, I will stick with the term ‘theory-
ladenness,’ while noting the following: whether a given concept functions as observational or as theoretical concept 
and whether what is required for its mastery includes that one hold something properly called a theory may vary with 
concepts and contexts of use. 
Such attributions may be reasonable even if I mistakenly believe that you are so related, even if your or my concept 
apple is confused: nothing falls under it. If so, reasonable attributions of seeings of F do not require knowledge of F. 
But if having a belief context at all required that the subject have some knowledge, then so would attributing seeings of 
F – if not knowledge of F-ish things (for there may be none), then knowledge implemented in one’s ability to see 
whatever one takes to be F as being distinct from other things.  
Consider a subject, S, who can subsequently overcome and revise the many beliefs she holds. The procedure S 
engages in as she does may involve assuming these beliefs, reasoning from them, and adjusting them in light of 
other beliefs and her experience. In an important respect, S is more rational than R, most of whose beliefs are true, 
yet who cannot engage in a similar procedure to weed out false ones. If we take this dimension of rationality – and 
the procedure that S can engage in, but not R – to be part of what ‘reasonable’ picks out, one can be reasonable 
even if some of the beliefs one reasons from are false, and reasonable in reasoning from them.   
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seeing that locution.24 Again, we grant that Tycho saw the sun as the sun while acknowledging that some 
of his sun-related beliefs were false. However, suppose all of them had been false. If so, so would have 
been those that serve to differentiate the sun from other objects. Lest we render it completely 
indeterminate what, by claiming that Tycho saw the sun as the sun, we are attributing to Tycho, we 
cannot thus assume that all his beliefs about the sun were false.25 For our attribution to make sense as 
a specification of a determinate propositional attitude to Tycho, at least some of them must have been 
knowledgeable by our lights, too.26 Without knowledgeable complements of the seeing that locution, in 
other words, attributions of seeing as remain unintelligible.  
This latter idea is compelling independently of the perceptual situation we consider. Often, for 
instance, S’s seeing something as red is a case of seeing (and knowing) that it is red, that it is colored, and, 
depending on S’s knowledge, other things, e.g. that what bears its complementary color will be green. 
But Peter Achinstein objected against Hanson that when A playfully sees a cloud as a horse, A cannot 
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Taking attributions of seeing that as governed by what we take true is more appropriate than endorsing a strong 
factivity requirement that is met only if what complements the seeing that locution are sentences expressing facts that 
actually obtain. That we may not know all the facts, either, then does not make such attributions inappropriate. 
Likewise, we deny that phlogiston theorists saw phlogiston, and, as they looked at phenomena involving 
combustion, that they saw that phlogiston was involved. Still, we affirm that they saw such processes as involving 
phlogiston. Moreover, like Tycho, phlogiston theorists were not completely off. We still find their characterizations of 
the phenomena significant, can reconstruct what they saw, and pinpoint the respects in which they went astray. If 
we accept that the meaning of one’s concepts is at least in part articulated by the way these concepts figure in one’s 
total belief context, we cannot separate what the beliefs phlogiston theorists held were from how these beliefs were 
articulated, i.e. how these beliefs, and the concepts figuring in them, were inferentially entangled with other beliefs, 
some of which we have since come to reject. Fully grasping what their beliefs were would be a massive interpretive 
task. It would involve reconstructing the entire doxastic context in which these beliefs lived and breathed. However, 
we need not perform such gargantuan tasks to acknowledge the wide-ranging similarities between their and our 
ways of characterizing relevant phenomena. Moreover, there are broad similarities between the inferential moves 
licensed within their and our theories of combustion, respectively. As we assess their views, the proper unit of 
comparison might thus not be belief, but rather significant differences in the structures constituted by the inferential 
moves that constitute their and our belief contexts, respectively. 
For many concepts, different sub-communities differ in what standards they impose on concept mastery. They will 
differ in what else one needs to know, or be able to do, for a belief one holds to count as knowledgeable. Hanson 
observes that some of the knowledge seeing as requires is “of a rather more logical nature […]. [W]e should not say 
of anything that it was a physical object […], were it not locatable in space or itself a tangible, space-occupying 
entity; nor should we say of any physical object that it is a cube unless it is six-faced, twelve-edged, and eight-
cornered. On the other hand, that liquids and gases (per se) are not suitable for the formation of boxes and cubes 
and rigid frames is something we must learn from experience in a way rather different from the ways in which we 
gain our knowledge about what objects and cubes are.” PD, p. 113. If he is right, then some beliefs regarding physical 
objects are not only more modally robust than others, but express facts concerning what something must be to be a 
physical object at all. Though I cannot pursue this here, it may thus be that for some concepts, there are beliefs one 
must have, or that one must at least be implicitly committed to, to have the concept at all. Moreover, it may be that 
certain kinds of such implicit commitments must be in place for one to count as having any concepts at all. 
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see that, if suitably circumstanced, it would act in ways we know horses do (see Achinstein 1972). Since 
seeing that is factive, Achinstein’s assessment is quite correct. It would, however, be mistaken to infer 
that playful seeing as does not involve seeing that at all. For surely, to intelligibly engage in playfully seeing 
a cloud as a horse, A must see it as a cloud and thus see that it does, will, or would behave like A knows 
clouds do, when suitably circumstanced.27 Likewise, to see a cloud as a horse, A must see that if it were a 
horse, it would be what A knows horses are, and behave like A knows horses do, when suitably 
circumstanced.28 Finally, suppose A has an illusory experience as of a horse, or hallucinates one. 
Arguably, both illusions and hallucinations involve ways their subjects are struck visually, though in 
hallucinations, no physical object may do the striking.29 Still, A, if unaware of her state, will see, or at 
least seem to see, something as something. But note that the concepts operative in seeing—and the 
seeing, too—can be significant even if A does not in fact visually relate to what she sees things as, or 
to any object.30 Intelligibly attributing to someone (oneself or others) that one sees something as F 
requires a doxastic context that involves at least some beliefs that the attributer takes to be 
knowledgeable. But so does the seeing as and the seeming involved in illusions and hallucinations.31 In 
illusory or hallucinatory experiences, too, we cannot assume that none of A’s beliefs about Fs is 
knowledgeable and still ascribe to A that she sees something as F. The former assumption renders the 
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From an attributor B’s perspective, it may involve seeing that p, q, …, where these express beliefs both A and B 
endorse. 
Here, what complements ‘seeing that’ is a subjunctive conditional. As e.g. Sellars 1948 and, following him, e.g. Brandom 
2015, have argued, such conditionals express modally robust commitments. Construed as complements of ‘seeing 
that,’ they tie the concepts operative in seeing to modally robust commitments explicitly or implicitly contained in our 
belief context—including e.g. laws and lawlike generalizations concerning the things we take to fall under them.  
Though many take it to be obviously true, the assumption that visual hallucinations involve a visual aspect is not 
universally shared. Fish 2009, who takes hallucination to lack phenomenal character, denies it (see also chapter 4). 
Moreover, as we will see in chapter 9, Gupta holds, and I reject, that even in total hallucinations, there must be 
something that does the striking. 
Accordingly, concepts that nothing falls under can be significant. 
As for known illusions, consider the Müller-Lyer. Upon first exposure, we typically see it as featuring two unequal 
lines. Doing so will involve seeing that, if things were the way we see them as, we would be able to measure a 
difference in their length. But seeing what we know to be an instance of the Müller-Lyer illusion as featuring two 
apparently unequal lines is compatible with both seeing that if we were to measure the lines, we would discover that 
they are equal in length and seeing that we would detect a difference in length if the lines were the way we see them as. 
We may not be able to see the lines of the Müller-Lyer as anything but unequal in length, while we typically do not 
find it difficult to stop seeing a cloud as a horse, or to see it as not horse-like, e.g. by focusing on dissimilarities. If so, 
there are certain limits to the extent to which how we are set to see things as can be modified (recall also the tiger case 
from fn. 7). 
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latter ascription indeterminate. This generalizes. Also, if all my own beliefs about Fs were false, I could 
not be seeing anything as F, either. For on the former assumption, ‘seeing something as F’ does not single 
out anything determinate I could be doing. Accordingly, seeing as involves seeing that and is unintelligible 
without it. 
This concludes our analysis of Hanson’s second claim. As we saw, seeing as inherits its significance 
from how the concepts figuring in it are inferentially articulated in the subject’s doxastic context, which 
thus determines an essential part of what these concepts mean to the subject in question. Doxastic 
contexts can differ in what theories they explicitly or implicitly contain. Subjects who inhabit different 
doxastic contexts and look at identical objects in identical settings can therefore still see different 
things in the following regimented sense: they see objects as things of the sort that populate their 
respective different theories. If in scientific observation, we see objects in the context of the theories 
we endorse, scientific observation must be theory-laden (and ordinary seeing at least concept-laden). 
Moreover, if some of our beliefs are false, then in seeing something as something, we may take ourselves 
to be seeing that something is or would be the case even though it is not, or would not be. However, 
one cannot intelligibly engage in seeing as while lacking knowledge altogether: if one’s belief context 
contained only false beliefs, the concepts it contained would be indeterminate, as would be ascriptions 
of seeing as. Hence, seeing as must occur against the backdrop of doxastic contexts that contain at least 
some knowledgeable beliefs—or rather: beliefs that we, too, would count as knowledgeable. Seeing as 
without seeing that, so construed, is unintelligible.32 Let us turn next to Hanson’s third claim: through 
seeing as, beliefs can affect one’s visual field. 
32 Again, such commitments may be partly or entirely implicit. Depending on the expressive power of their language, 
subjects may be unable to thematize commitments to the material or subjunctive conditionals that would serve to 
articulate the role their concepts play. Material conditionals, incidentally, encode commitments to inference rules that 
govern applications of ‘is F’ to ‘is G’, ‘is not J’, etc. Subjunctive conditionals, in contrast, encode commitments to rules 
that are modally robust across a range of contexts. Such commitments come in different modal flavors, they can be 
commitments to e.g. laws of nature, a priori principles, moral, aesthetic, epistemic, or semantic norms. I cannot here 
address the question commitment to which (kinds of) conditionals must implicitly govern our linguistic and 
perceptual practice to make it intelligible how anything could count as a concept suitable to figure in instances of 
seeing something as F. For an investigation of the expressive roles of material and subjunctive conditionals see 
Brandom 2008, 2015. 
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2.3 THROUGH SEEING AS, BELIEFS CAN AFFECT ONE’S VISUAL FIELD 
So far, in my analysis of Hanson’s account, the visual aspect of seeing played no important role. I 
focused on the claim that to be (epistemically) significant, (visual) experience, or seeing, must be able 
to bear on our beliefs and thus, on Hanson’s view, involve concepts. I then showed that for Hanson, 
such concepts are in turn intelligible in terms of the doxastic contexts in which they are inferentially 
articulated and that changes in such contexts translate into changes in what things subjects see. So far, 
theory-ladenness thus appears to be a predominantly semantic affair—it comprises the content-
determining effects one’s doxastic context has on the meanings of the concepts that instances of 
seeing as involve.  
As we will see shortly, though, Hanson thinks that theory-ladenness can take other forms as well: 
what we believe can affect the visual aspect of seeing itself. As he refers to this visual aspect, or an 
experience’s phenomenology, ‘the visual field and its elements’ is the characterization Hanson resorts 
to most frequently. One could suspect that talk about the visual aspect reintroduces sense-data. 
Hanson does not offer a full account of the visual aspect, but does reject sense-datum accounts. To 
remove this apparent tension, I will sketch, next, what Hanson finds objectionable in sense-datum 
accounts: not the idea that seeing may involve mental images of some sort, but a certain conception of 
what role such images could play (2.3.1). Next, I explain his view that beliefs and theories may affect 
the organization of the visual field and how it coheres (2.3.2) and, finally, that via projection effects, they 
may affect the visual field itself (2.3.3). 
2.3.1 What’s Wrong with Sense-Datum Accounts 
In many places, Hanson forcefully rejects sense-datum accounts (cf. esp. PD, ch. 5). Note, though, 
the following passage:  
(6) If Tycho and Kepler are aware of anything visual, it must be of some pattern of 
colours. What else could it be? […] This private pattern is the same for both 
observers. […] what they really see is discoid to begin with. It is but a visual aspect of 
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the sun. In any single observation[,] the sun is a brilliantly luminescent disc, a penny 
painted with radium. 
So something about their visual experiences at dawn is the same for both: a 
brilliant yellow-white disc centred between green and blue colour patches. 
Sketches of what they both see could be identical—congruent. In this sense 
Tycho and Kepler see the same thing at dawn. The sun appears to them in the 
same way. The same view, or scene, is presented to them both. (PoD, pp. 7-8) 
“[O]ur visual consciousness,” Hanson maintains as well, “is dominated by pictures;” “[v]ision is 
essentially pictorial” (PoD, p. 25). Occasionally, he even refers to such pictures as sense-data.33 He also 
grants that sometimes, the phenomenal language featured in passage (6) is quite appropriate: in the 
oculist’s office or if, in the lab, one lacks detailed knowledge of what one sees. Plausibly, both Kepler 
and Tycho could agree on a characterization of the sun, or of their sketches thereof, in phenomenal 
terms. Such agreement would indicate that the doxastic contexts both inhabit, respectively, are similar 
enough for them to use phenomenal terms in sufficiently similar ways. It would not, however, entail 
a two-stage account of seeing, on which both are first aware of a mental image, characterized in 
identical phenomenal terms, on which, second, they then put different interpretations. The two-stage 
account, if true, would have to be true of seeing reversible figures also, e.g. the duck-rabbit. But we 
typically do not see such figures as something for which a description in phenomenal terms would be 
accurate. Indeed, coming to see them in such a way, if possible, requires tremendous effort. 
Phenomenal seeing, Hanson claims, is atypical, not a kind of seeing on which all ordinary seeing must 
be modeled.34 Moreover, the two-stage account is inaccurate not just of cases of seeing reversible 
figures: 
33
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About congenitally blind patients who post-surgically learn to see, Hanson asks: “Of course, these people can see in 
the sense-datum sense of “see,” but can they see anything?” PD, 151. Clearly, he wants to elicit agreement with the 
first, disagreement with the second half. Such patients have visual experiences, but it takes them a long time to see 
what they face as anything. Hooking up the visual aspect of seeing with our knowledge is a complex and arduous 
process. 
See also PoD, 20, and PD, 150: “It [phenomenal observation] is something we must develop from our ordinary sorts 
of seeing, and not that from which our ordinary sort of seeing is developed.” Like Bacon, who advocated freeing 
the mind from the Idols of the Tribe, Hanson holds that phenomenal seeing, while atypical, can be useful for getting rid of 
preconceptions or for arriving, ultimately, at new ways of seeing. Cf. also PD, 109, 111-2. For Bacon on idols of the 
mind, cf. Klein 2015, esp. section 3.1. 
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(7) Is the physicist doing more than just seeing? No; he does nothing over and above 
what the layman does when he sees an X-ray tube. […] One does nothing beyond 
looking and seeing when one dodges bicycles, glances at a friend, or notices a cat in 
the garden. (PoD, p. 16) 
Sense-datum theorists, Hanson suggests, focus on cases in which we do not see things as what 
they are. They try to find “something pure and unadulterated by inference or intellect” (PD, p. 114), 
something that could, presumably, serve to ground knowledge. In doing so, he argues, sense-datum 
theorists ignore the wide range of cases wherein we are in fact right in our observations: 
(8) They [sense-datum theorists] are so concerned to discover what it is that we are right 
about when we are right in saying we see a duck (when only an owl is before us) that 
they leave unexamined all that is involved when we are right in saying we see a duck 
when there is a duck to be seen—a surprisingly frequent occurrence. In doting on our 
observational mistakes[,] the phenomenalist portrays a world in which the senses are 
generally misleading and deceptive. But the world of science is not […] everywhere 
like this. […] This “pure visual something,” whether it be the crude retinal reaction 
or the more subtle sense-datum, is what no one without a theory would dream of 
calling seeing, save in those relatively rare contexts where seeing as and seeing that are not 
possible, as with the oculist’s eye-exercises or at the furthest frontiers of scientific 
research or in the visual responses of infants and idiots.35 (PD, p. 114) 
The thought that there must be something purely visual that different observers placed in identical 
settings share could rest on the hope that one could find, in that purely visual something, a certain 
ground for knowledge. But this hope, Hanson holds, rests on a confusion: reference to some 
unadulterated seeing cannot possibly help provide a full explanation of what it is that we get right even 
when we are mistaken. Surely, when mistakes occur, the relevant experiences, lest they disqualify as 
seeings, must have a visual aspect. For seeings to be mistaken or correct, however, they must bear 
epistemic significance, they must be seeings as (or corresponding seemings). Moreover, if Hanson is 
correct, one’s doxastic context, even if flawed, must contain some knowledge. Yet if so, then whatever 
images significant seeing may involve, they cannot ground knowledge from scratch. Hanson’s insistence 
on the claim that epistemic significance requires beliefs, including knowledgeable ones, thus undercuts 
certain foundationalist motivations for insisting that in relevantly similar settings, the visual aspect of 
35 Hanson’s focus is on seeing objects as things of some kind or other. However, complements of “seeing as” need not 
be limited to names of things. We can see something as e.g. red, blobby, flashlike, x-shaped, as instantiating or 
involving certain processes, as beautiful, or wrong. Pace Hanson, some of the cases he lists may thus involve seeing as, 
too.  
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subjects’ seeings must be intersubjectively stable. For the idea that such stable aspects could ground 
knowledge founders on the following fact: epistemically capitalizing on such aspects requires that 
concepts and beliefs, including knowledgeable ones, are already in place.36 
Again, Hanson rejects neither that seeing has a visual aspect, nor that we may talk about it in 
terms of images. But whether such images are intersubjectively stable or not, they cannot ground 
knowledge. Let us consider, next, Hanson’s claim that beliefs affect the organization of the visual field. 
2.3.2 The Organization of the Visual Field 
To approach the issue of organization, consider the following passage. In it, Hanson draws on the 
duck-rabbit figure and on an example from Pierre Duhem, which serves to contrast what an untrained 
visitor to a physicist’s lab sees with what the physicist sees (cf. Duhem 1954, 218):   
(9) The elements in his [the visitor’s] visual field, though perhaps similar or identical to 
the elements of the physicist’s visual field in color, shape, arrangement, etc., are not 
organized conceptually for him as they are for the physicist. And this is much the same 
situation as we find when both you and I gaze at Figure 3 [depicting the duck-rabbit] 
but I see a rabbit and you see a duck. The conceptual organization of one’s visual field 
is the all-important factor here. It is not something visually apprehended in the way 
that lines and shapes and colors are visually apprehended. It is rather the way in which 
lines, shapes, and colors are visually apprehended. (PD, p. 104, emphases added) 
Though we lack a precise account of it, let us accept Hanson’s talk of visual fields and its elements. 
What could it be for these elements to be organized differently? Organization, passage (9) indicates, is 
conceptual. Relatedly, Hanson points out that the plot of a story is not another detail of it, nor is the 
tune of a musical piece just another note. Likewise, the organization is not an element of the field, nor 
something that can be seen (cf. PoD, p. 13; PD, p. 95).37 
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I return to the assumption of intersubjectively stable visual aspects in the discussion of Fish, who accepts it, and in 
the discussion of Gupta, who, I think, quite rightly rejects it. 
Perhaps the elements in one’s visual field cannot be seen. Searle 2015 argues that only real-world objects can be 
proper objects of one’s experience, ontologically subjective entities, however, cannot. This view, too, is compatible 
with the idea that both seeing real world objects and hallucinating involve having (though not seeing) conscious 
experiences in which one’s visual field’s is populated with elements. 
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We can explicate Hanson’s talk of ways of apprehending and conceptual organization by drawing on our 
previous discussion: if we see something as the sun from Tycho’s perspective, we apprehend the item 
seen in one way, if we see it from Kepler’s perspective, we apprehend it in another way. Likewise, seeing 
the duck-rabbit figure as depicting a duck or as depicting a rabbit are two different ways of 
apprehending it. Generally, to say that the same objects can be apprehended in different ways just is 
to claim that they can be seen as different things (or features). 
Ways of apprehending objects typically involve expectations as to how, were we to perform in 
certain ways with respect to them, they would in turn perform (cf. PD, p. 150). The context set up, 
inter alia, by such expectations organizes the elements of the visual field conceptually—by situating 
them in a space of expectations concerning how the visual field is likely to change. 
Differences in conceptual organization may yield further effects. On example of such effects are 
so-called selection effects. We rarely attend to the space between the leaves of a tree (PoD, p. 17), or to 
our own noses and cheeks (PD, p. 152), even though surely, in almost all seeing, the latter serve to co-
constitute our visual field. Moreover, whenever leaves leave their marks on a subject’s visual 
consciousness by figuring, in our experience,38 as elements in the visual field, so does the space between 
them. Selection effects concern what we look at, what is foregrounded or, conversely, what is taken 
to be part of the background (cf. PD, p. 92). They concern which aspects of the items populating our 
visual field are “thrown into relief” (PD, p. 104) as salient or ignored. “[T]he identity badge of every 
modern scientist,” Hanson quips, “consists of those things he ignores among his visual data” 
(PD, p. 152).39 
A different kind of effect concerns how the elements of one’s visual field “pull together” (PD, 
p. 94) or “cohere” (PoD, p. 13; PD, p. 103). Imagine yourself as you see an unidentified object; some 
38
39
See PoD, p. 15: “Elements in our experience do not cluster at random” (emphasis added). 
What counts as significant may change along with one’s theories and the development of new technologies. A well-
known example concerns the Golgi apparatus. Although discovered by Camillo Golgi as early as 1898, for more 
than 50 years many scientists suspected that what we now affirm is a bona fide cell organelle was an artefact of certain 
staining techniques. Only after the introduction of the electron microscope the controversy subsided. See Farquhar 
& Palade 1981 for details and further references. In the following chapters, I will mostly ignore selection effects. 
They do matter for my suggestion as to how Genone could try to accommodate cases of expert vision (cf. chapter 
6). 
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of its parts are visible, others covered in mist. Once you recognize the object, things snap into place. 
Its visible parts pull together, forming a coherent and unified whole, whereas previously, they may 
have seemed almost like randomly juxtaposed. In seeing reversible figures, too, the elements of one’s 
visual field cohere in different ways, depending on how one apprehends the figures at hand. And 
finally, it may be that once one becomes an expert, the way the objects of one’s expertise look to one, 
how their parts cohere, may differ from how they did back when one was a layperson.  
This effect is difficult to place and Hanson admits as much. Maybe, as Hanson at times suggests, 
as we transition between ways of seeing reversible perspective figures, “[n]othing optical or sensational 
is modified” (PoD, p. 12). Though you and I see them differently, our sense-datum pictures “must be 
the same” (PoD, p. 11). But it is also tempting to say that once we recognize what we face, our seeing 
is so thoroughly transformed that the visual field itself must have changed. As Hanson suggests, one 
might argue with Wittgenstein that the duck-rabbit figure, if seen as (depicting) a duck, has not the 
slightest similarity to the same figure if seen as (depicting) a rabbit (cf. PD, p. 98; PoD, p. 13).40 
As we transition from merely seeing something to seeing it as something determinate, or from seeing 
it as one determinate kind of thing to seeing it as another, characterizing what changes is hard. Don’t 
the elements of one’s visual field alter? Sense datum theorists may be mistaken in what epistemic role 
they assign to the visual aspect. Yet for all we have said, it remains possible that Hanson’s claim that 
beliefs affect how the observer’s visual field is organized is compatible with the idea that the visual 
aspect remains stable across observers whose belief contexts differ. Either way, as we will see next, 
Hanson explicitly allows that due to what we believe, elements of the visual field themselves can be, 
and sometimes are, modified as well. 
40 I return to such effects in Chapter 9.1.1. 
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2.3.3 Effects on the Elements of the Visual Field 
That objects can be seen differently, Hanson claims, philosophers must accommodate. Why such 
differences obtain, and how they arise, psychologists must address (cf. PoD, p. 17).41 However, such 
claims do not settle whether the elements of the visual field can themselves vary with the subject’s 
beliefs. Hanson’s remarks on this issue waver between both options and are often fairly guarded.42 If 
asked if the elements of different observers’ visual fields differ, Hanson claims that “we can do no 
better here than to review some of the findings of experimental psychologists […] [who] rush in where 
philosophers fear to tread” (PD, p. 158). After surveying such findings, he concludes: 
(10) Many experiments have shown how, e.g., the shape, size, color, and position of 
objects are, as it were, “projected” onto them by the observer. The perception of 
color and shape depends not alone on the thing looked at but partly on past 
experience of the color and shape of similar and dissimilar things. (PD, p. 152) 
Despite the scare quotes and the cautionary ‘as it were’, the term ‘projected’ is highly suggestive. On 
a natural interpretation of (10), it is not just the actual color, size, etc. of what one faces that constitute 
the visual field. Rather, if projection effects occur, what color, size, etc. one sees things as having is 
modified by subjective factors. Maybe projection effect could even co-determine what elements 
populate the field. Hanson does not explicitly mention beliefs as what may cause such effects. 
However, the following is a natural assumption:  one way for past experiences to influence current 
experience is via (possibly implicit) beliefs and expectations that the former helped shape. 
Some of the experiments Hanson cites in support of his assessment (cf. PD, chapter 9) have since 
come to be eyed with suspicion. In contemporary discussion, too, what kinds of effects on the visual 
aspect of seeing occur remains a contested question. However, it is certainly conceivable that, as 
41
42
Since on Hanson’s account, such differences will partly rest on differences in subjects’ belief contexts, psychologists 
may furnish explanations why people hold certain beliefs and explore whether, and how, holding certain beliefs, 
having undergone certain kinds of experiences, or kinds of training, may dispose subjects to single out certain 
objects or features as significant – in short: what subjects set to see things in certain ways. 
Recall e.g. passage (9): it is only perhaps that the elements in the visitor’s field are similar or identical to those 
populating the physicist’s. But cf. PoD, p. 17, where Hanson seems to grant that the elements of their visual fields 
are identical.  
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Hansen et al. suggest, one’s knowledge, beliefs, or memory of the typical color of bananas could bring 
it about that a realistic depiction of a banana, though colored in a monochromatic gray, still strikes 
one as slightly yellow.43 And when biased subjects primed with pictures of black men tend to classify 
ordinary tools as guns,44 such effects could be partly visual. How things visually strike one and what 
properties subjects see items as having could be affected by what kind of thing one sees them as and by 
what context one’s being primed makes salient, given what expectations it contains about what may 
happen next. 
The philosopher’s currency is logical possibility, it is not their task to settle empirical facts in 
advance. Nothing conceptually rules out that such effects could occur. Moreover, many psychological 
experiments can be, and are, interpreted as involving projection effects, as we will henceforth call 
them. Hence, accounts of visual experience had better not rule them out as impossible, but show how 
to accommodate them. It is a distinctive virtue of Hanson’s view, that it purports to accommodate 
them. Let us examine next whether he also accommodates the idea that observation can anchor and 
constrain our beliefs. 
2.4 DOES OBSERVATION CONSTRAIN OUR BELIEFS? 
Since it allows that our visual fields may be shaped by factors that depend on the subject, it can seem 
as if on Hanson’s account, the idea that seeing has objective import, anchors, and constrains our 
thinking, has little room. Observation, it seems, could be a less than objective guide to how things are. 
Rather than assisting us in overcoming our prejudices, it may seem to confirm them if the beliefs we 
want to test are those that affect our visual field. Hanson is aware of such concerns. As the following 
43
44
See Hansen et al. 2006, Olkkonen et al. 2008. As mentioned before, I  return to an extensive discussion of  this case 
in the various chapters on the relational view. 
Cf. Payne 2001. There is a  large  body of  psychological  literature and a raging philosophical debate concerning the 
question whether such cases, often subsumed under the label cognitive penetration, do in fact occur. For discussion, see 
e.g. Siegel 2012, 2015, 2017; Stokes 2013; for a critical voice, see Scholl & Firestone 2016. 
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passage shows, he concedes that the visual facility with which we see, notice, and observe familiar 
things has its price:  
(11) For it [the visual facility with which we see. etc.] does incline us sometimes to overlook 
certain discrepancies between what is there to be seen and what we ourselves see. By 
its use, as by the use of any efficient adaptation to our environment, we can 
occasionally go wrong. (PD, p. 153) 
To make such a concession, however, is not to give up the idea that observation can exert 
empirical constraint. In this context, Hanson’s remarks on illusions and conjuring tricks are instructive: 
(12) We see only what we know, that is what makes conjuring tricks possible. Deceptions 
must proceed by an exploitation of what is the normal, ordinary case. […] [T]hat a 
sleight-of-hand artist can get our minds and our eyes, i.e. our seeing, moving in one 
direction while catching us out in another direction is a clear indication of the way our 
SEEING usually proceeds. It is because our thoughts are so intimately a part of seeing 
that we must sometimes rub our eyes at illusions. (PD, p. 115) 
To be deceived or subject to illusions, passage (12) reminds us, our belief context must contain 
expectations governing how, in the situation at hand, our visual field may change. Our expectations 
may be off. But when they are frustrated, we may of course realize it: 
(13) [W]hen we have seen the conjurer saw the young lady in half, we are no longer at 
liberty to see this as an ordinary case of […] dis-joinery. We cannot see the conjurer’s 
saw as an ordinary saw, nor his actions as those of an ordinary woodsman, nor the 
situation as an ordinary case of sawing, if when he is finished with his work the young 
lady smiles and waves gaily while happily kicking her feet. And when we say we cannot 
believe our eyes in such a case, we indicate that seeing things as we saw them originally 
was just to see that certain things could not follow. (PD, p. 116)45 
Seeing is corrigible, “which everyone would happily concede.” If the behavior of what we see as x 
diverges from “what we expect of x’s[,] we may be blocked from seeing it as a straightforward x any 
longer” (PoD, p. 22; similarly: PD, p. 116). The possibility of such divergence, I submit, is the possibility 
of friction between our belief contexts and the world; it is what enables our seeing to constrain our 
world-directed thinking. Such friction, note, is possible even if projection effects occur often. Only if 
one assumes, pace Hanson, that generally, the doxastic contexts that we inhabit fully determine our 
45 In such a case, correcting one’s view is triggered by the realization that one did not in fact see what one thought one 
did,  but  that  one  was  mistakenly  taking oneself to see that certain things could or could not follow. I return to the 
case in chapter 8. 
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visual field in such a way as to force it to conform with our expectations, the idea of empirical 
constraint is lost.46 For empirical constraint to be possible, the visual aspect, the phenomenology of 
experience, must thus be able to at least sometimes change independently of our beliefs, in a way that 
may thus frustrate our expectations. At the same time, the visual aspect, even if it does change in such 
unexpected ways, cannot exert empirical constraint by itself. For not only must what we see diverge 
from what we expect, we must also acknowledge such divergence; we must see the items we face as 
exhibiting features or behavior we did not expect. Put differently, to be able to exert constraint, seeing 
must be epistemically significant. It must, as Hanson will insist, involve seeing as. 
Relatedly, the visual aspect alone cannot settle how or even whether to adjust our beliefs. Again, 
if what we see as x behaves in unexpected ways, we may be blocked from seeing it as x any longer. In 
response, we may decide to drop the concept x altogether. Or we may decide to revise it to 
accommodate that x’s sometimes do behave in ways we had not previously envisaged. At times, we 
may not know how to respond. If so, we may suspend judgment, keep observing, and search for new 
intelligible ways of organizing what we see. Which of these is called for neither depends just on what 
we see, nor on the visual aspect alone. Crucially, it depends on the doxastic context we inhabit and on 
how robust we take our frustrated expectations to be. We could e.g. barely keep seeing something as a 
piece of gold if we saw it melt at 100° F. But depending on our doxastic context, we may reasonably 
keep seeing a celestial body as a comet even as it takes unexpected turns, or our friend as good-natured 
and kind, even as we see her commit what otherwise looks like a heinous crime. 
For Hanson, then, the relation between beliefs and the world is anything but simple. Seeing what 
we face as what it is—this is a remarkable ability. For many items (but not for all), especially items 
46 For a similar assessment, see Schurz 2015, p. 140. The idea that our visual field is fully determined by our explicit 
and implicit beliefs, while highly counterintuitive, is not logically defective. However, motivating and defending an 
account of experience that incorporates it, while retaining the idea that experience plays a vital role in our epistemic 
endeavors, or that alternatively shows why the latter idea is mistaken, is a daunting task and anyway requires 
substantial argument. Pending it, there is no special onus on Hanson to show that such an account is impossible. It 
is, incidentally, compatible with his view that some aspects of our visual life are systematically determined by what we 
believe. But to entertain this possibility is neither to say that we could not find out whether it is actual, nor to deny 
that visual experience could play an important role in doing so. I return to Hanson’s account of empirical constraint 
in more detail in 8.1.2. 
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populating our scientific theories, mastering this ability may require that we overcome dispositions to 
apprehend shaped by deeply entrenched false beliefs and expectations. These may make us ignore or 
overlook important details, make things seem to cohere in odd ways, or cause us to project onto the 
scene elements or features it does not contain. Coming to see not what we expect, but what is there 
to be seen is a difficult, perhaps an ongoing task. Sometimes it may be helped by bracketing our 
expectations, by paying close attention to details, and by characterizing what we see in phenomenal 
terms to find new ways of organizing the phenomena, of making what we see intelligible. But improving 
our beliefs may require time and effort. As Hanson reminds us, “thirteen centuries of expert 
observation failed to disclose the error in Galen’s contention that the septum between the ventricles 
of the heart is perforated” (PD, p. 168).47 
Before I proceed to a critique of Hanson’s view, let me take stock: in section 2.1, I introduced 
Hanson’s claim that epistemically significant seeing must involve concepts. On his account, seeing 
involves two elements blended together like an amalgam: a visual aspect, characterized in terms of the 
visual field and its elements, and a way of apprehending things, characterized in terms of seeing as.  
In 2.2, I argued that on Hanson’s view, instances of seeing as derive an essential part of their 
significance for the subject from the way the concepts figuring in them are inferentially articulated in 
her doxastic context. So construed, doxastic contexts serve to determine what, in the given setting, 
instances of e.g. “This is F” are taken to entail, what they are taken to follow from, and what they are 
taken to be incompatible with. Doxastic contexts, I emphasized, may contain false or even irrational 
beliefs. Again, suppose you see something as F. If so, your erroneous beliefs about Fs may bring it 
about that you take yourself to be seeing that certain other things do or would obtain, in various further 
specifiable circumstances, even though they do or would not. As Tycho saw the sun at dawn as the 
sun, he took himself to see that the earth’s brilliant satellite was beginning its diurnal circuit around us. 
He was, of course, mistaken. Still, his mistaken beliefs were central to the geocentric worldview he 
47 Plausibly, overcoming flawed dispositions to see what one faces as things that do not exist is hard to do solo. But as 
the  quote  indicates,  even as a  social  enterprise,  correcting  our  views  can  be a  laborious and time-consuming 
endeavor. 
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endorsed. Accordingly, we cannot grasp what thing he saw as he looked at the sun at dawn unless we 
take that view into account. Hanson claims that observers who look at the same physical objects in 
identical settings may see different things and that scientific observation must be theory-laden. If 
instances of seeing something as F inherit their significance from the belief context in which “being F” 
is integrated, these claims, I argued, are defensible. Finally, I argued that Hanson is right that every 
seeing as must involve seeing that. For if everything S believed about Fs were false by the lights of what 
we, too, consider knowledgeable, ‘S sees something as F’ could not pick out any determinate activity.  
In 2.3, I did two things. First, I showed that though Hanson rejects sense-datum theories, he does 
not reject the idea that seeing involves a purely visual aspect or, as he puts it, a visual field with 
elements. Instead, he rejects the idea that this aspect could serve to ground knowledge. Proponents 
of this idea, he thinks, fail to acknowledge that to epistemically capitalize on the visual aspect of seeing, 
concepts and beliefs, including knowledgeable ones, must already be in place. Again, epistemically 
significant seeing involves seeing as, and seeing as must involve seeing that. Second, I showed that apart 
from selection effects, Hanson also accommodates effects beliefs may have on the organization of the 
visual field, on how its elements cohere, and, finally, projection effects. At least some of these, I argued, 
pertain not to the concepts Hanson takes seeing to involve, but to the visual aspect of seeing itself. 
In 2.4, I showed how on Hanson’s view, observation can constrain our thinking even if it is 
theory-laden. In this context, the visual aspect of seeing turned out to play a vital role, albeit one it 
cannot play solo, but only in tandem with our beliefs. If that aspect is typically (though not necessarily) 
brought about at least partly by the worldly items we face, the development of the visual aspect 
depends not fully on what we believe, but in part on what is in fact the case. This partial independence 
of the visual aspect of our beliefs, I argued, creates the possibility of friction between what we see 
things as with our beliefs and expectations and thus anchors our seeing to the world. Note, however, 
that which worldly items do the anchoring, and how exactly they do it, may often remain opaque to 
us. In epistemically significant seeing, our relation to the world is mediated twice, once through the 
visual aspect of seeing, once through the ways we are set to apprehend things. The former must 
sometimes be at least in part independent of what we believe, the latter, however, is not. As I pointed 
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out, it follows that for many items, seeing them as what they are is a remarkable ability. To acquire it, 
the doxastic context we inhabit must be sufficiently correct and justified. If it is not, we may apprehend 
such items incorrectly and in endorsing that things are what we see them as, we may subsequently issue 
perceptual judgments that are false or unjustified. In doing so, we need not be rationally at fault. And 
yet, the judgments we issue, the beliefs we form, and the actions we accordingly take may be based on 
the mistake of taking what we face to in fact be what we erroneously see it as.  
In sum, on Hanson’s view, seeing is crucially shaped by the doxastic context we inhabit—indeed, 
epistemically significant seeing, seeing as, is unintelligible without such a context. In seeing, our beliefs 
can lead us astray. Still, seeing is corrigible. Hanson thus appears to accommodate both ideas 
mentioned at the outset: observation, though deeply laden with theory, can nevertheless constrain and 
anchor our beliefs.48 
In the remaining section of this chapter, I argue that Hanson’s account, despite its appealing 
features, is wanting. The central issue is this: it lacks an account of the visual aspect, or of the 
phenomenology of experience. 
2.5 PHENOMENOLOGY, EMPIRICAL CONSTRAINT, AND AMALGAMATION 
As we saw above, Hanson’s preferred way of referring to the visual aspect of experience is in terms 
of the so-called visual field and its elements. He variously characterizes this aspect as pictorial, as involving 
mental images, and as representing objects in the way pictures do, by being a kind of copy of what is 
seen.49 The problem, however, is that we lack a more thoroughgoing account of this aspect, of the 
48
49
Acknowledging that our seeing can be impaired should humble us. Others might see better where our vision is 
murky. Attending to them may provide an antidote to our prejudiced dispositions. For the idea that facing 
alternative viewpoints can be productive, and that they can serve as antidotes to our mistaken views see also Feyerabend 
2010. For views that emphasize humility and paying close attention to alternative viewpoints in the domain of moral 
perception see Murdoch 1970, Buddhaghosa 1991 for a Buddhist source, also Garfield 2015, chapter 8, and 
Heim 2015.  
“[W]hile seeing is at the least a ‘visual copying’ of objects, it is also more than that. It is a certain way of seeing objects: 
seeing that if x were done to them y would follow.” PoD, p. 29, emphasis added. The second sentence of this 
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phenomenology of experience. To some extent, this lack of an account of the phenomenology may 
be explained by the fact that in the context of the conceptions of experience Hanson responds to—
sense-datum theories—the idea that the visual aspect of experience represents, resembles, or copies 
mind-independent items was standardly taken for granted. This, arguably, is why Hanson feels 
compelled to point out, for example, that “the gap between pictures and language is not closed one 
millimeter by focusing on sense-data and basic sentences” (PoD, p. 29). Only if epistemically significant 
seeing is construed in terms of involving concepts, he thinks, and—as per his more specific 
suggestion—in terms of involving seeing as, can that gap be bridged. 
Hanson’s focus on the conceptual element that he thinks seeing involves, I contend, is thus at 
least in part explicable against the backdrop of the dialectic setting from within which he operates. 
Given that within the contemporary discussion, sense-datum theories have lost their appeal, the 
demand for a thorough account of experiential phenomenology can no longer be ignored as easily. 
And clearly, this demand is pressing. For recall that on the account Hanson offers, the phenomenology 
of experience plays a vitally important role. As we saw, Hanson relies on the assumption that the 
phenomenology is at least in part generated by the mind-independent items that surround us. Even 
though the phenomenology may also in part, perhaps often, be the result of doxastic effects, this 
assumption is absolutely crucial for him to get his conception of empirical constraint off the ground. 
Against this background, the fact that Hanson remains largely silent on how to construe the relation 
of such mind-independent items to experiential phenomenology constitutes a serious deficiency in his 
account of empirical constraint.  
There is a further serious problem. Hanson, recall, claims that his conception of seeing allows 
him to bridge the gap between pictures and language. Seeing, on his account, involves the application 
of concepts, which in turn serves to explain that seeing can be epistemically significant. However, not 
passage, I think, is slightly misleading. For as Hanson suggests before, epistemically significant seeing involves seeing 
as, which is intelligible in terms of seeing that. A better way of putting his point, I think, would be the following: It is a 
certain way of seeing objects: it is to see them as something—F, say—which is to see that if they were in fact F (which 
they may not be), then if x were done to them y would follow. Since I have repeatedly noted that one can see 
something as what one knows it is not, seeing as should, I think, be construed as involving no commitment to 
whether things are indeed the way one sees them as.  
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only does Hanson owe us an account of what the phenomenal dimension is, we also lack an account 
of how, in epistemically significant seeing, the conceptual and the phenomenal dimension are fused. 
What exactly it is that settles which instance of seeing as having an experience with a certain 
phenomenology involves? How are the conceptual and the phenomenal, as Hanson puts it, 
amalgamated? What governs such amalgamation? Is amalgamation robust, can it be modified? If so, 
how? These are issues Hanson never explores. Jointly, they constitute what I call the problem of 
Amalgamation. 
To sum up, I conclude that Hanson’s account allows us to distinguish various ways in which a 
subject’s doxastic context could affect her experience. For one, it contains an interesting and broadly 
holistic account of experiential content; an account of how we are to understand an essential part of 
what to a given subject, the concepts Hanson takes to figure in her epistemically significant experience 
mean. This account is powerful since it allows Hanson to address the puzzle how e.g. Tycho and Kepler 
could see the same object, see it as the same object, and yet see different things.50 For another, the 
account purports to be compatible with various kinds of effects that an experiencing subject’s doxastic 
context can have on her experiential phenomenology. However, pending an account of the 
phenomenology, this cannot be but a promissory note.  
Third, the account provides an account of how experience, even if it is often affected by the 
subject’s doxastic content, can still exert empirical constraint. But again, without an account of how 
experiential phenomenology is to be understood, how mind-independent items can constitute it, and 
without an account of Amalgamation, neither his account of empirical constraint nor his claim that 
seeing as serves to bridge the gap between the phenomenal and the conceptual are clear enough to be 
acceptable. As things stand, thus, Hanson’s account remains seriously underdeveloped. 
As we move on to the discussion of contemporary views, we will have to keep these issues in 
mind. The strategy I pursue in what follows is to look for a solution to the problems Hanson’s account 
50 As should be clear by now, the solution is, in effect, to reject the characterization of the puzzle. For even if both 
Tycho and Kepler were to claim that they both see the sun as the sun, what their seeing something as the sun 
involves, respectively, is different. Accordingly, they both see the sun, both may also call it ‘sun’, but what, in doing 
so, they say is rather different. 
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faces by examining the two dominant accounts of experience in the contemporary literature. I begin 
by examining so-called relationalist accounts of experience. As we shall see, it is a central relationalist 
tenet that experience relates subjects to mind-independent items, and relatedly, that the 
phenomenology of experience is constituted by the items that experience relates us to. We may thus 
hope that the relationalist accounts enable us to improve our understanding of the phenomenology 
of experience, perhaps even provide an account that could serve as a supplement to Hanson’s account. 
Ultimately, I argue that this hope is in vain. For it is precisely their excessive emphasis on the 
thought that experiential phenomenology must be explained in terms of the subject’s being related to 
mind-independent items that renders relationalists incapable of accommodating at least some of the 
doxastic effects that Hanson calls our attention to.
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3.0 FROM HANSON TO RELATIONALISM 
If what background beliefs one holds may, by itself, affect one’s perceptual experience, I stipulate, 
perceptual experience is doxastically variable. In the previous chapter, I examined the view of 
observation implicit in Norwood Russell Hanson’s account of the theory-ladenness of scientific 
observation. As we saw, there are two ways in which, according to Hanson, (visual) experience is 
doxastically variable. These two varieties of doxastic variability are captured by the following two 
theses: Doxastically Variable Experiential Content and Doxastically Variable Experiential 
Phenomenology.  
Doxastically Variable Experiential Content (DVEC) is the thesis that experiential content, 
construed as the conceptual content of (visual) experience, is doxastically variable: if everything else is 
held fixed, the experiential content of a subject’s experience may vary just with what the subject 
believes. For any subject S who holds beliefs and undergoes experiences, DVEC is non-vacuously 
true if S enjoys experiences of which the conjunction of the following two claims is true:  
Content  
S’s visual experience e has conceptual content: experiential content. 
Beliefs May Co-Determine Experiential Content 
If everything else is held fixed, differences in S’s beliefs may yield differences in e’s 
experiential content. 
Hanson, recall, motivates Content as follows: to be epistemically significant, he insists, perceptual 
experience must be such as to possibly bear on our beliefs. This conception of what the epistemic 
significance of experience requires makes him wary of conceptions of visual perceptual experience on 
which experience has a phenomenal dimension, yet lacks conceptual content altogether. Such 
conceptions, he contends, establish a logical gulf between the phenomenal and conceptually contentful 
39 
 
items such as judgments or beliefs. Unless they provide a way of bridging this gulf, proponents of 
such conceptions thus leave it mysterious how experience could ever be significant or relevant for our 
beliefs.  
With this concern in mind, Hanson develops his own proposal: epistemically significant (visual) 
experience is an amalgam of a pictorial and a conceptual dimension. We must, Hanson suggests, accept 
Content for epistemically significant experience, though we can leave it as a possibility that some 
(atypical) experiences may lack such content and, thus, epistemic significance. Either way, for Hanson, 
the upshot of adopting a conception of epistemically significant experience that endorses Content is 
that on such a conception, the logical gulf between experience and conceptually contentful states such 
as beliefs or judgments disappears. For that experiences that have conceptual content already can bear 
on other contentful items such as beliefs or judgments is at least prima facie hardly mysterious. 
As we noted, Hanson is particularly impressed by the fact that bi-stable pictures such as the duck-
rabbit can be seen as depicting rather different things. Seeing such pictures, he maintains, cannot be 
properly understood in terms of a two-stage process of taking in a picture first and then, second, 
clamping on an interpretation. We simply do not see bi-stable pictures in some allegedly neutral purely 
phenomenal way first, i.e. not already as depicting either a rabbit or a duck. Indeed, if we can see such 
pictures in such a neutral way at all, Hanson insists, doing so takes considerable effort. This, he 
suggests, is true of vision quite generally. As Hanson puts it, in all ordinary cases of seeing, theories 
are there in the seeing right from the start. To capture this idea, he construes epistemically significant 
seeing generally in terms of seeing as. 
Unpacking the notion of seeing as further revealed Hanson’s rationale for accepting Beliefs May 
Co-Determine Experiential Content (BMCEC). More specifically, in discussing his claim that seeing 
as is intelligible only in terms of seeing that, I suggested that we take his commitment to BMCEC to 
flow from his patent commitment to a broadly holistic conception of conceptual content.1 According 
                                                 
1  Recall that it had to be left it open whether his conception of content is completely holistic or whether content could 
also be partly determined by other, e.g. referential relations. To remain neutral with respect to this possibility, I talk—
here and in what follows—in terms of a broadly holistic conception of conceptual content, of the subject’s background 
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to this conception, concepts that complement the seeing as locution derive an essential part of what 
they mean to the subject S from how they are inferentially articulated within the set of S’s (possibly 
implicit) background beliefs. Roughly, the idea is that the commitments S undertakes in endorsing 
various beliefs jointly form an inferential network of commitments and entitlements that in turn serves 
to semantically co-determine the meanings of the concepts figuring in that network, including those that 
can feature in S’s experiential content.2 In any such network of interrelated contents, I suggested, at 
least some beliefs must be knowledgeable by our lights as well, since the assumption that none of them 
are makes it unintelligible how the relevant set of purported beliefs and commitments could confer 
determinate contents on those concepts in the first place. But if so, then Hanson seems right: every 
seeing as is intelligible only against the backdrop of a set of beliefs that—though it may contain false 
beliefs as well—must contain at least some beliefs that are not merely assumed as true by the 
perceiving subject, but knowledgeable by our lights as well. Seeing as, in other words, is intelligible only 
in terms of seeing that. 
Returning to BMCEC, the argument I attributed to Hanson ran roughly as follows: differences 
in background beliefs entail differences in how the concepts featuring in these beliefs are articulated 
within the inferential network these beliefs jointly set up, which in turn typically affects the inferential 
articulation of many (possibly all) other (non-logical) concepts. Again, on a broadly holistic conception 
of meaning, the way beliefs are inferentially related and the way that the concepts featuring in the 
network set up by these beliefs are, accordingly, articulated, is taken to co-determine the meanings of 
these concepts. Thus, differences in a subject’s beliefs and, hence, in the inferential network set up by 
                                                 
view as co-determining experiential content, and in terms of a concepts inferential articulation as conferring an essential 
part of what that concept means, to the relevant subject, on that concept.  
2  One reason to think that Hanson’s account of concept determination is incomplete is that a full story may require 
drawing not just on the inferential relations holding between beliefs (and the commitments and entitlements these 
involve) held by the individual subject, but also on social processes e.g. of mutual recognition, the attribution of 
commitments and entitlements to others, processes of negotiation, rational reconstruction, and, where necessary, 
sanction (see Brandom 1994, 2009 (especially part I), and Brandom ms. for a fully developed account that 
accommodates such factors). None of this, however, appears in Hanson. Accordingly, presenting his account did not 
require drawing on such factors. All that mattered was understanding the general idea that does figure in Hanson, i.e. 
that the significance a concept has for a given subject at least to a large extent consist in the way the beliefs it figures in 
(and the commitments and entitlements these involve) are inferentially related with one another and with other beliefs 
that are contained in the subject’s belief context.   
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them, may and often do amount to (perhaps rather subtle) differences in what, to the subject, the 
concepts articulated in that network mean. This, the idea goes, applies to all (non-logical) concepts. 
Accordingly, the concepts figuring in experiential content, too, derive an essential part of what they 
mean to the subject by way of being articulated in the inferential network constituted by the subject’s 
set of beliefs. Differences in that set may thus yield differences in what, to the subject, these concepts 
mean. In this sense, differences in belief may yield differences in the content of the subject’s 
experience itself. This, in short, is how Hanson’s account of epistemically significant experience—
based on a notion of seeing as and combined with his commitment to a broadly holistic construal of 
the meanings of the concepts that complement the seeing as locution—captures the idea that theories 
are there in the seeing right from the start. Due to the holistic component, his account entails BMCEC 
and, hence, DVEC. Again, DVEC, so construed, is a semantic claim. According to it, if everything 
else is held fixed, experiential content may vary with what subjects believe precisely because a subject’s 
beliefs semantically co-determine what the experiential content of her experience is.3 
Doxastically Variable Experiential Phenomenology (DVEP), on the other hand, is a claim 
that concerns not the putative conceptual content of epistemically significant (visual) experience, but 
its phenomenal dimension. Hanson’s characterization of this dimension, recall, remains incomplete. 
He rejects sense-datum accounts, but not because he opposes the idea that perceptual experience has 
a phenomenal dimension that the notion of sense data is supposed to capture. The reason he takes 
such accounts to be flawed is rather that their proponents typically take the phenomenal to play a 
certain role, namely to serve as a foundation in foundationalist accounts of knowledge. Given his view 
on what is required for experience to be epistemically significant, Hanson must reject such accounts. 
Again, he thinks that for a subject to be able to epistemically capitalize on her experience, that 
experience must involve concepts; on his view: the subject’s experience must be one of seeing things as 
something. And given his particular construal of this notion, Hanson thinks that to epistemically 
                                                 
3  The stronger claim that experiential content must vary with changes in what subjects believe may be true on an account 
of meaning on which meanings are very fine-grained. We can remain neutral with respect to the question whether 
such an account should be endorsed, and for lack of evidence must remain neutral with respect to the question 
whether Hanson endorsed it. 
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capitalize on experience, beliefs, including knowledgeable ones, must already be in place. Again, then, 
while Hanson does deny that sense-data can play a foundational role in epistemology, he does not 
deny that sense-data exist—or perhaps something like them. Quite to the contrary, he insists that 
epistemically significant seeing essentially also involves a phenomenal dimension. This dimension, 
Hanson holds, is logically separable from the conceptual, involves some sort of iconic representation, 
and is frequently referred to in terms of the pictorial or in terms of the visual field and its elements. That we 
do not learn much more about the specifics of this dimension was a problem, as I argued near the end 
of the previous chapter. Nevertheless, even from what little he divulges, it is clear that Hanson 
endorses the following thesis: 
Phenomenology   
For any subject S and any of her visual perceptual experiences e, e has a 
phenomenology characteristic of vision: (visual) experiential phenomenology.  
Moreover, and importantly, he also accepts: 
Beliefs May Co-Determine Experiential Phenomenology 
If everything else is held fixed, differences in what S believes may yield 
differences in the experiential phenomenology of S’s experience.4 
For subjects who hold beliefs and undergo visual perceptual experiences, DVEP, the claim that 
(visual) experiential phenomenology is doxastically variable—that if everything else is held fixed, it 
may vary with what subjects believe—is non-vacuously true if the subjects enjoy experiences of which 
the conjunction of both these claims is true.  
Hanson motivates Beliefs May Co-Determine Experiential Phenomenology (BMCEP) by 
way of providing examples that he draws both from ordinary contexts and from the psychological 
literature of his time. In doing so, he distinguishes several kinds of effects he thinks a subject’s beliefs 
may have on experiential phenomenology. Apart from leading to selection effects, Hanson thinks that 
                                                 
4  We need not attribute to Hanson the stronger and less plausible claim that each difference in belief implies some 
difference in phenomenology. Also, different sets of beliefs could affect experiential phenomenology in the same way. 
However, since we saw that the relation between the phenomenal and the conceptual is something Hanson fails to 
address, how he would have conceived it must remain open. I return to this issue with a more constructive proposal 
in chapters 8 and 10.  
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one’s beliefs may also affect how the elements making up the visual field are organized, how they cohere, 
or pull together—a claim he illustrates by drawing on cases in which the elements of the visual field seem 
to snap into perspective as one recognizes an object, when one transitions from one way of seeing a 
bi-stable picture to another, when one sees it as something new, or when one sees an item equipped 
with the sophisticated understanding and the recognitional capacities of an expert.  
Another kind of effect that Hanson thinks is not just possible but—as he takes the empirical 
evidence to suggest—actual are projection effects, i.e. effects that manifest as modifications of 
specific features of the elements populating the visual field, such as their size, color, shape, or 
movement properties, perhaps even as effects on which elements are present. 
While some of the empirical studies Hanson cites to support the claim that projection effects are 
actual have since been contested, the contemporary psychological literature is rife with similar 
evidence—evidence that often figures in the context of the debate on the so-called cognitive 
penetrability of perception. That said, in the contemporary debate, too, the question how wide-spread 
such effects are remains a contentious issue. Patently, however, such effects will be markedly different 
from effects that fall under DVEC. For when the elements of the visual field snap into perspective as 
one recognizes an object or when the depiction of a banana that is in fact monochromatic gray strikes 
one as slightly yellow still simply because that is the color that one knows bananas typically are, these 
are hardly semantic effects on the concepts that Hanson takes experience to involve.5 Instead, they 
appear to be causal effects that affect how things subjectively are for experiencing subjects when they 
undergo their experience: they affect their experiential phenomenology. On accounts of experience that 
accommodate such effects, BMCEP and DVEP must thus be true; they must allow for a subject’s 
experiential phenomenology to vary just with what the subject believes.6 
                                                 
5  In my discussion of the individual relationalist views, I will return to the banana case repeatedly. 
6  Once one has a proper fix on the terminology, it may remain be an open question whether the differences in 
background beliefs that alter experiential content (if such content is taken to exist) are the same differences that lead 
to modifications in experiential phenomenology. Likewise, it can be an open question whether the way in which these 
kinds of effects are related is the same across individuals.  
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With the distinction between these two different kinds of doxastic variability of experience in 
hand, we can examine influential contemporary accounts of experience with respect to whether they 
can accommodate the idea that experience is doxastically variable in these ways.7 As I indicated in the 
preceding chapter, I begin by focusing on the relational view. The main motivation for turning to 
relationalist view first is that on the relationalist view, experience is a relation between subjects and 
mind-independent items. And as we saw in the previous chapter, for Hanson to be able to flesh out 
his account of empirical constraint, he needs an account of how the phenomenology of experience 
can be understood as at least in part generated by relations to mind-independent objects. Since 
relationalists purport to provide such an account, looking at it for help is a natural step to take. At the 
same time, the account of experiential phenomenology should have room for doxastic effects. 
Accordingly, we must ask not just what the relationalist account of experiential phenomenology is, 
but also the following: can the relational view accommodate the idea that experience is doxastically variable? 
To tackle this question, I begin, in the remainder of this chapter, by sketching some of the main 
ideas underlying the relational view, then raise some initial questions, and draw out some preliminary 
implications. As will quickly transpire, proponents of the relational view must reject DVEC, though 
they could endorse a closely related thesis. I suggest that their view presents them with exactly the 
kind of challenge that Hanson sought to avoid by endorsing Content. For Hanson, this particular 
challenge does not arise. Nevertheless, I will suggest that if we abstract from the details, we see that 
Hanson and the relationalists face issues that are structurally analogous. 
In the following chapters, I pursue the question whether various proponents of the relational 
view can accommodate DVEP. I proceed by taking a close look at three different versions of the 
view: the version suggested by Bill Fish (chapter 4), the account developed by Bill Brewer (chapter 5), 
                                                 
7  Note that depending on how one construes experience, further flavors of doxastic variability are conceivable. If, for 
instance, one combines the idea that experience has content with the insistence that such content is non-conceptual, 
one could hold that such non-conceptual content, too, can be affected by what the experiencing subject believes. Like 
the phenomena captured by Doxastically Variable Experiential Phenomenology, the effects constituting the doxastic 
variability of such content would probably need to be understood in terms of causal, not semantic effects. Siegel’s 
view that I discuss in chapter 7 can be understood as being an instance of such an account. That said, as I will argue 
there, her notion of experiential content, and her account of what determines it, remain problematic. 
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and the view defended by James Genone (chapter 6). The views differ in various respects, notably in 
what they take the mind-independent items to be that experience is said to relate subjects with and 
with respect to the role conceptual capacities play in experience. Ultimately, I argue that with the 
possible exception of Genone, these views fail to accommodate all possible variants of DVEP. They 
particularly struggle with accommodating projection effects. And if Genone appears to succeed where 
the others fail, we will see that this is so only because his account provides powerful resources that 
enable him to explain away such effects. This, I will suggest, is a laudable and interesting feature of his 
account. However, there are still numerous further respects in which it fails. The overall conclusion 
of the arguments presented in the following chapters is this: to accommodate all variants of DVEP, 
relationalists must give up some of their core ideas. In other words: if DVEP is true without further 
restrictions, relationalism is not. 
In the following, I begin by sketching some main ideas underlying the relational view (3.1). I then 
briefly suggest that while relationalists cannot accommodate DVEC, they may try to accommodate a 
similar claim in the vicinity, but that doing so presents them with a challenge (3.2). I end this chapter 
by commenting on the dialectical situation between Hanson and the relationalists (3.3). 
3.1 NO CONTENT, ACQUAINTANCE, AND CONSTITUTION 
The relational view is standardly introduced by contrasting it with its main alternative: 
representationalism. Following this practice, let us consider what as per Susanna Schellenberg’s widely 
accepted characterization is the most minimal representationalist commitment. According to it, 
perceptual experience is inevitably a matter of a subject representing her environment as being a 
certain way (cf. Schellenberg 2011, p. 715; similarly: Genone 2014, Nanay 2014).  
There are various ways in which this minimalist commitment can be enriched, notably with 
respect to how the putative representational content of perceptual experience is specified. We saw one 
way of doing this in the last chapter: in terms of seeing as. As we noted, seeing as does not form 
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propositional contents. But other conceptions of non-propositional contents are available as well. For 
instance, once could follow Wilfrid Sellars in thinking of such contents in terms of complex 
demonstrative   expressions. Or one could think (as does McDowell in McDowell 1994) that such 
contents are propositional, and then go on to specify what kind of proposition such contents can be 
or add further commitments that pertain to the question what propositions are in the first place.  
Relationalists, however, reject even the minimal representationalist commitment. Perceptual 
experience, they insist, is not a matter of representing anything. Instead, they claim, it is a relation. 
Here is how Bence Nanay characterizes the basic idea. On the relational view, he says, 
(1) [p]erceptual states are not representations: they are constituted by the actual perceived 
objects. Perception is a genuine relation between the perceiver and the perceived 
object—and not between the agent and some abstract entity called ‘perceptual 
content’ (Nanay 2014, p. 3).8 
If perceptual experience is characterized as a relation, what are its relata? What kind of relation is 
it? According to (1), the answer to the first question is that experience is a relation between a perceiving 
                                                 
8  Representationalists need not understand perceptual content merely in terms of abstract entities. Like e.g. 
Schellenberg (cf. Schellenberg 2011, 2013a, 2013b, 2016a), they can claim that at least typically, perceptual content is 
singular or object-involving. On such a view, it is (typically) the singular worldly items one perceives together with general 
abstract entities –concepts, Fregean senses, or modes of presentation – that co-constitute the representational content 
of perception. On Schellenberg’s account, cases of perceptions of numerically different but otherwise 
indistinguishable objects share modes of presentations, or content-schemas, but differ in content since the worldly 
items that fill the slots reserved for them in the relevant content schema are numerically different in the different 
cases. However, on such accounts, too, there are cases in which perception is nothing but a relation between the 
perceiver and some general abstract entity: in hallucinations, no relevant objects may be present. In such cases, the 
perceptual content is solely constituted by the content-schema involved, which remains gappy in those slots which in 
the non-hallucinatory case is filled by particular items. An advantage of such views is that their proponents 
acknowledge and seek to capture the intuition that perceptual experiential states may have singular contents. Such 
proponents can thus claim that perception, as John Campbell has put it, “can confront [one] with the individual 
substance itself” (Campbell 2002a, p. 116), which in turn may enable them to also develop an account of how the 
contact with the relevant mind-independent particulars may ground our demonstrative thoughts about such objects. 
At the same time, they can insist that they can explain that while veridical perceptions and matching hallucinatory 
differ in content, they can seem the same to subjects: both involve the same concept-schema or mode of presentation.  
Two comments: first, relationalists will welcome the thought that perceptual states typically involve relations with 
singular worldly items. However, they will insist that this is so generally, i.e. that it is true of every perceptual state. At 
the same time, they will reject the idea views like Schellenberg retain: that perceptual experience inevitably involves 
representation. Second, regardless of such relationalist qualms, taking perceptual contents to be potentially gappy may 
come at a price. Representationalists like Schellenberg must explain the connection between the representational 
content they take perceptual states to involve and judgments that a subject is said to acquire evidence for through 
having such states. If, however, they construe the content of perceptual states in terms of a (potentially gappy) content-
schema, such a content cannot obviously figure in such an explanation. The problem is that content-schemas lacks 
truth conditions. If so, content so construed fails to specify a determinate way the world would have to be if it is to 
be the way it seems. Consequently, it remains unclear what the singular judgments would be for which gappy content-
schemas could serve as evidence (for an argument along these lines, see Gersel 2017). 
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subject and perceived objects. Importantly, contemporary relationalists emphatically reject a view once 
defended by e.g. Bishop Berkeley and Bertrand Russell, viz. that the direct objects of perceptual 
experience, the items experience relates its subject with, are mind-dependent objects, such as, e.g. ideas 
or sense-data. Instead, relationalists insist that perceptual experience directly relates perceiving subjects 
with mind-independent items in the perceiver’s environment. Bill Brewer, for instance, states that  
(2) [t]he direct objects of perception are the persisting mind-independent physical objects 
that we all know and love […]. The very objects that are presented to us in perceptual 
experience are themselves mind-independent in nature. (Brewer 2011, p. 93f.)9 
Similarly, William Fish asserts the following:  
(3) [T]he naive realist claims […] that when we see the world, the presentational character 
of the experience we have—the array of features that we are presented with […]—is 
constituted by features from the mind-independent world. (Fish 2009, p. 15)10 
To characterize a perceptual experience, relationalists contend, it does not suffice to cite the 
perceiving subject and the mind-independent environing items with which the subject’s experience 
relates that subject. And indeed, were these all that relationalists cited, they would lack the resources 
to explain that subjects can be perceptually related to the same items while the relevant ways of 
experiencing these items differ. They would be at a loss to explain, for instance, why to a subject who 
is perceptually related to a coin, say, that coin may sometimes look round, sometimes elliptical, 
sometimes blurry, sometimes small, sometimes large, sometimes salient, and sometimes not. 
Conversely, relationalists should also want to be able to say that subjects can be perceptually related 
to different items and yet be appeared to in ways that are subjectively the same.11 In other words, 
                                                 
9  Brewer endorses property nominalism, other relationalists do not. That said, proponents of the relational view are 
united in insisting that perception is a relation with mind-independent items. How such items are specified, i.e. as 
qualities of mind-independent objects (cf. Campbell & Cassam 2014), as physical objects (cf. Brewer 2011) as facts, 
construed as object-property couples, (cf. Fish 2009), as perspectival properties (cf. Noë 2004), appearance properties (cf. 
Shoemaker 1994 and Genone 2014), or yet differently, is then a further issue. In chapters 4-6, I consider accounts 
that are based on three different conception of such items. 
10  I return to Fish’s view in chapter 4. Roughly, on it, the presentational character of one’s experience is constituted by facts, 
which he construes as mind-independent object-property couples. As we will see, according to Fish, it depends on 
further factors which of the facts populating the subject’s environment the subject is presented with in her experience. 
11  As specified, both these requirements rely on the idea that there are two ways of characterizing experiences that need 
not line up: first, a way of characterizing the experiential relation itself and, second, a way of characterizing how things 
are with the subject of the experience as she stands in that relation, viz. that to her, in her experience, things looks or 
appear a certain way, say, that the experience has a qualitative or phenomenal character, or that there are ways it is 
like to have the relevant experience. Not all relationalists accept this idea. Notably, Campbell tries to eschew talk of 
48 
 
proponents of the relational view must accommodate a rather ordinary fact about perception: how, in 
perceptual experience, things look or appear to the subject can vary with factors besides the perceiver 
and the mind-independent items experience is said to relate her with.12 Some relationalists address this 
issue by lumping several pertinent factors together into a third relatum of the perceptual relation, 
variously labeled the subject’s standpoint (cf. Campbell 2009) or the subject’s point of view (cf. Brewer 
2011; Campbell & Cassam 2014). On such construals, experience emerges as a three-place relation 
between a perceiving subject, environing items, and a point of view, where the latter is standardly 
taken to comprise the subject’s spatiotemporal position vis-à-vis the relevant environing items and 
further relevant circumstances of perception such as e.g. the sensory modality (or modalities) involved, 
the perceiving subject’s visual acuity (assuming the perception is a visual one), the distribution of her 
attentional resources, or lighting conditions.13  
With this rough specification of the alleged relata of the experiential relation in hand, let us ask 
next what kind of relation relationalists take perceptual experience to be. According to the standard 
relationalist response, perceptual experience is a relation of direct awareness of, of being acquainted with, 
environing mind-independent items. Acquaintance is said to be a conscious relation. Typically (and 
not just by relationalists), the idea of experience as having a conscious dimension is expressed in terms 
of the assertion that experience has a phenomenal or qualitative character, which in turn is frequently 
glossed in terms of saying that there is a way it is like to undergo experiences. Like Hanson, relationalists 
thus accept Phenomenology. But they disagree among themselves on how exactly to characterize the 
phenomenal dimension of experience. 
                                                 
phenomenal properties of experience entirely, at least if these are taken to be some sort of inner phenomenon. If, 
however, such talk is accepted, the relationalists’ task, as it were, is to provide an account of the experiential relation 
that enables them to explain how differences and similarities in that relation generate the appropriate differences and 
similarities in how things are with the experiencing subject. And such an explanatory account will have to respect that 
the set of differences and similarities in the experiential relation may not be congruent with the set of differences and 
similarities in how things are with the experiencing subject that stands in such relations. 
12  All I am claiming here is that in ordinary contexts, it is perfectly uncontroversial to assert that how things appear may 
differ with a variety of factors. I am not claiming that there is an ordinary and obvious way of cashing out this claim. 
Just like Hanson’s talk about the visual field and its elements left us wondering how to think about such alleged entities, 
talk of looks, appearances, and the phenomenal notoriously stands in need of further explication, too. 
13  As we will see, Fish pursues an alternative strategy. On his account, the factors that others characterize as elements 
of the third relatum of the perceptual relation appear as constraints on which facts feature in the perceiving subject’s 
presentational character. I return to this issue in chapter 4. 
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John Campbell, for example, an influential champion of contemporary relationalism, is especially 
wary of the idea that one should characterize the qualitative character of experience as some sort of 
internal phenomenon, as something that somehow occurs in the head, as it were. On his alternative 
proposal, he wants to give a fully externalist account of experience. Integral to this externalist account 
is the following claim: the external objects, their colors, etc., are themselves that which constitutes the 
phenomenal character of visual experience. The locus classicus for this characterization is the following, 
widely cited passage: 
(4) On a Relational View, the phenomenal character of your experience, as you look 
around the room, is constituted by the actual layout of the room itself: which particular 
objects are there, their intrinsic properties, such as colour and shape, and how they 
are arranged in relation to one another and to you. (Campbell 2002a, p. 116; similarly: 
Martin 1998, pp. 173-5; Foster 2000, p. 60; Smith 2002, pp. 43-44; Logue 2012, p. 
212; French 2014, pp. 395-6; Campbell & Cassam 2014, e.g. p. 72, p. 136) 
The question how to understand constitution is, however, a difficult one. Frequently, Campbell 
claims that “[o]n the relational view, the qualitative character of the experience is the qualitative 
character of the object itself” (e.g. Campbell & Cassam 2014, p. 33). So construed, constitution appears 
to be identity; the qualitative character of the experience just is the qualitative character its direct objects 
possess—relative, presumably, to a point of view.14 But it is hard to see how that could be true. Note 
that Campbell contends the following: the relational view he proposes manages to give an account of 
                                                 
14  Cf. also Campbell & Cassam 2014, p. 18. Campbell concedes that next to the point of view, further parameters may 
have to be taken into account, such as adverbial modifications of the type of experience in question like ‘watchfully’ 
and ‘steadily’ (Campbell & Cassam 2014, p. 28 and p. 51). But he insists that “once these other parameters are set, on 
the relational view, the qualitative character of the experience is then constituted by the qualitative character of the 
object.” (Campbell & Cassam 2014, p. 33). Incidentally, Cassam, too, interprets Campbell’s constitution talk as identity 
talk (see ibid., p. 138). 
 Taking the phenomenal character to be constituted by the qualitative character of the environing objects 
themselves constitutes one major respect in which the relational view differs from many representationalist views, 
since many (though not all) representationalists think that the phenomenal character of experience is constituted by, 
supervenes on, or is somehow identical with its representational content. Even so, if like e.g. Schellenberg (see fn. 8 
above) representationalists think that at least in the veridical case, the representational content of experience is co-
constituted by the actual environing items perceived, their position is not very far from Campbell’s. But there remains 
a crucial difference: Schellenberg will affirm what relationalists deny, i.e. that these items are never the sole constituents 
of experience. Rather, she will insist that modes of representation, concepts, or content schemes also make crucial 
contributions. Representationalists could not side with Campbell and hold that that at least in the veridical case, the 
qualitative character of experience is fully constituted by the particular environing items perceived (though Cassam 
seems to suggest that they might, cf. Campbell & Cassam 2014, p. 140). After all, representations of items are not 
identical with the items represented. If Campbell construes ‘constitution’ in terms of identity, representationalists will 
thus insist, against Campbell, that in experience, something must be present that differs from the environing items 
and that does the representing. 
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how, through experience, the environing objects’ “qualitative features are brought into the subjective 
life” of the perceiver (Campbell & Cassam 2014, p. 33).15 However, it is not obvious how one is to 
understand the metaphor of transportation involved, let alone the idea that whatever such 
transportation into the perceiver’s subjective life may yield could be identical with the properties of the 
environing objects themselves. Briefly put, it is not obvious why and how we are to think of features 
of the subjective experiential states that presumably make up the perceiver’s subjective life as being 
identical with features of what is experienced. Conversely, if the idea of an internal experiential state 
of the subject is to be eschewed, it is not obvious what sense, if any, to attach to Campbell’s notion 
of the perceiver’s subjective life. Again, Campbell’s view is influential; many relationalists cite him 
approvingly and readily adopt his language of constitution. As we will see below, however, they differ 
significantly with respect to how they characterize the kind of dependence they take constitution to 
involve.  
It is fair to say, though, that relationalists are united in thinking that the main role of the 
experiential relation is to (somehow) bring (features of) the environing items into our subjective lives 
and to thus make them in some sense available to us as something that we are consciously aware of. 
And since they all share a commitment to some version of constitution-talk, they agree, further, that 
there is some strong dependence between the mind-independent items that a subject’s experience 
relates her with and the phenomenal features characteristic of her conscious visual perceptual 
experience. 
                                                 
15  One may wonder what it means to say that a physical object has a qualitative character. Campbell states that the world 
can be described at various different levels. We can acknowledge, he concedes, that “there is something fundamental 
about the physics of our surroundings, at least in that all other facts about our world supervene on physical facts,” 
and at the same time hold that other levels of description are available, too – such as the level of description we 
employ to characterize the qualitative world we encounter in experience. However, and this is his central contention, 
we can treat the attribution of qualitative features to the environing objects simply as “a matter of saying how things 
are ‘at a different level’ than the level of description used by the physicist.” We may then hold on to the thought that 
these features are still mind-independent, even if we may lack the ability or knowledge that would allow us to translate 
between different levels of description. (See Campbell & Cassam 2014, p. 3). Accordingly, if Campbell says that a 
physical object has qualitative features, this is to be read in the light of his commitment to the idea that qualitative 
expressions ultimately refer to mind-independent features of the world and that we should not, as he puts it, allow 
“physics to push visual experience inside the head.” (e.g. ibid., p. 12) 
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Typically (though not necessarily), these phenomenal features vary with differences in the relata 
of the perceptual relation. In most perceptual circumstances, there will be a phenomenal difference 
between the experiences one undergoes when looking at suitably different objects—a picture of Phil 
Collins, say, and a single grain of rice. Likewise, there will be a phenomenal difference between the 
experience of looking at a person face-to-face and that of looking at the same person from behind or 
from above, and a difference between looking at an object when one’s visual acuity is impaired and 
looking at it in otherwise identical circumstances when it is not.16  
On the other hand, the mere existence of some difference in the relata of the acquaintance relation 
need not entail a corresponding difference in phenomenology.17 Intuitively, there is no phenomenal 
difference between looking at two numerically different, but otherwise qualitatively identical objects, 
if all the other factors are held fixed. Moreover, if perceptual circumstances are suitably tweaked, it 
may well be, again intuitively, that there is no phenomenal difference between two experiences, even 
though the items the two experiences relate one with differ in various ways. However, relationalists 
are confident that each of these phenomena can be accommodated within the relationalist framework, 
by way of suitably spelling out the third relatum or by citing further constraints that may govern the 
experiential relation. 
Keeping in mind that there are differences with respect to how to understand the kind of 
dependence that the constitution relation is supposed to involve and differences with respect to how 
to construe experiential phenomenology, we can sum up the basic commitments of the relational view 
by characterizing it as the combination of the following three theses:  
No Content  
Experience lacks (representational) content; it is not a matter of a subject representing 
anything. 
 
Acquaintance  
Experience is a relation through which a perceiver becomes acquainted with certain 
mind-independent items. Acquaintance is a relation through which perceivers become 
directly and consciously aware of such items, from a point of view. This in turn is a 
                                                 
16  This should be uncontroversial on any notion of the phenomenal. 
17  Whether relationalists agree with this claim depends on how they spell out the notion of phenomenology. This will 
become pertinent in the discussion of Fish’s view in chapter 4. 
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matter of the perceiver’s experience’s having certain phenomenal or qualitative 
features or a matter of its bringing certain features of the mind-independent items into 
the subjective life of the perceiver. 
 
Constitution  
The phenomenal character of an experience is constituted by the environing mind-
independent items with which the experience relates the perceiver. 
With this characterization in hand, let us proceed by briefly examining the relationalists’ position 
vis-à-vis DVEC (3.2), to then consider the dialectical situation between them and Hanson (3.3). 
3.2 RELATIONALISM, DVEC, BMCEC, AND BMCC 
Patently, No Content serves to set apart the relational view from representationalist views. Notably, 
it also entails that experience can neither be veridical or non-veridical, neither accurate nor inaccurate. 
After all, having such properties requires having contents that can be evaluated for truth or accuracy.18 
Due to their commitment to No Content, proponents of the relational view will also reject 
Doxastically Variable Experiential Content (DVEC): if perceptual experience lacks experiential 
content, it a fortiori lacks experiential content that is variable—doxastically or otherwise.19 For the same 
reason, they must reject Beliefs May Co-Determine Experiential Content (BMCEC)—the claim, 
recall, that what subjects believe co-determines the experiential content of their experience such that 
(if everything else is held fixed) differences in a subject’s beliefs may yield differences in that content.  
                                                 
18  According to Genone (2014), this is indeed one of the main respects in which the relational view differs from 
representationalist views: according to the latter, but not the former, experience itself can be erroneous. 
19  As should be obvious, proponents of the relational view must make extra efforts to accommodate total hallucinations. 
For one, according to Acquaintance, it follows that total hallucinations are not experiences. After all, in total 
hallucinations, subjects are ex hypothesi not perceptually related to environing objects. Relatedly, via Constitution, it 
follows that total hallucinations either lack phenomenal character altogether (this is, incidentally, Fish’s view) or, if 
they do not lack it, that it must be generated in a way that differs from how the phenomenal character of matching 
experiences is generated. This is a familiar issue. Some relationalists acknowledge the problem, but set it aside (e.g. 
Brewer 2018), others characterize total hallucinations epistemically, i.e. in terms of their subjective indistinguishability 
from the good case (e.g. Martin 2004), but without giving a positive account of them. Since this issue has been 
extensively covered in the literature, I will not focus on it here. 
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However, perhaps some relationalists are sympathetic to a broadly holistic account of conceptual 
content—even one similar in shape to the one we attributed to Hanson. They might, that is, accept a 
kind of view according to which what a given concept means to a subject depends at least to a 
significant part on how the relevant concept is articulated in the network constituted by the subject’s 
set of inferentially related beliefs. Again, since they endorse No Content, proponents of the relational 
view will reject the idea that differences in such articulation may affect experiential content—according 
to them, there is none. But they could accept that such differences affect contents that, though not 
contents of experience itself, are closely associated with experience—contents of perceptual beliefs or 
judgments, say. Such relationalists could well accept Beliefs May Co-Determine Content (BMCC), 
i.e. the more general claim that what subjects believe co-determines the content of their conceptually 
contentful states and activities, including perceptual judgments or conceptual categorizations, such 
that if everything else is held fixed, differences in subjects’ beliefs may yield differences in the 
conceptual content of such states and activities.  
Note, though, that to accept this idea is to incur an explanatory debt—one that, as we saw above, 
may be owed by Hanson as well. For presumably, relationalists will want to insist that the conceptual 
content of beliefs, judgments, etc., rather than being fully determined by the inferential relations that 
concepts stand in, is at least in part determined externally, i.e. by the actual mind-independent items 
that the subject is acquainted with through her experience. Accordingly, if Hanson’s account is 
unsatisfactory in part because it leaves us in the dark with respect to what role, if any, experience might 
play in co-determining experiential content, then surely, the same would hold of a relationalist account 
that accepts BMCC, but remains silent about what role, if any, experience plays in their account of 
conceptual content. Hence, if relationalists are willing to accept that specifying a concept’s position 
within the inferential structure of the subject’s beliefs is a way of specifying a crucial dimension of that 
concept’s content, and if they also insist that such content is also in part determined externally, they 
will need to provide an account that shows how these two ideas can come together. 
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I am not aware of any fully developed relationalist account of conceptual content that takes this 
shape.20 But this is not the place to assess whether an account of conceptual content that entails 
BMCC could be acceptable to proponents of the relational view, and what an account that combines 
BMCC with an externalist component agreeable to relationalists would have to look like—this is a 
task suitably inclined relationalists would have to take on. For our purposes, it suffices to observe the 
following: relationalists reject Content and, thus, DVEC and BMCEC. Accepting a more general 
claim in the vicinity, BMCC, might allow them to take on board suitably adjusted versions of the 
claims Hanson makes about concepts, and to take these to apply not of experience itself, but to the 
perceiver’s conceptual responses to experience. However, relationalists who pursue such a strategy 
would owe us an account of conceptual content that combines the broadly holistic picture of 
conceptual content with a role carved out for experience, construed as acquaintance. The existence of 
such an explanatory debt does not, however, speak against relationalism per se. Arguably, Hanson, too, 
owes an analogous debt, i.e. an account of what, if any, contribution the phenomenal dimension of 
experience makes to experiential content. 
I will argue next that with respect to the challenges they face, the parallels between the two kinds 
of views extend even further. 
                                                 
20  The closest I have seen is Campbell’s account in Campbell & Cassam 2014. In chapter 2, Campbell suggests that the 
grasp of a term referring to an ordinary physical object is a combination of a) the grasp of the characteristic patterns 
of inference to which the term is subject and b) grasp of the semantic justification for the pattern of use of the term, 
which, Campbell contends, is provided by our acquaintance with the categorical objects themselves in experience. 
Again, the idea is that through sensory encounters with the categorical objects themselves, the thing itself is brought 
into the perceiver’s cognitive life. How exactly one is to understand the relevant notion of grasp of semantic 
justification (sometimes: validation, cf. ibid. p. 41) that figures in b) remains, however, at least as unclear as the notion 
of bringing the objects (or features) themselves into the subject’s life. For some pertinent discussion of related issues, 
e.g. the role acquaintance may play in understanding singular thought, see the various contributions in Jeshion 2010.  
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3.3 HANSON AND RELATIONALISM 
Recall again that what motivates Hanson’s endorsement of Content is his assumption that to be 
epistemically significant, it must be intelligible how experience can bear on our beliefs. This, Hanson 
thinks, requires that concepts be involved in experience itself, which ultimately leads him to construe 
epistemically significant seeing in terms of seeing as. If asked how perceptual experience so construed 
can intelligibly bear on beliefs, Hanson’s response could go roughly like this: 
“Suppose my perceptual experience e is such that I see, or seem to see, something as F. Suppose, 
further, that I am not aware of any pressing reason to believe that what I see is not F – I may even 
take myself to have excellent reasons to believe that for me to encounter Fs, circumstanced as I am, 
is quite likely. In such a case, I may well come to believe, or judge, on the basis of my experience, that 
I am, in fact, in the presence of some F—that as far as the presence of Fs is concerned, things are as 
I see them. I could of course be wrong. I could be misclassifying what I see, or hallucinate and see 
nothing. If so, future experiences might (but need not) reveal my mistake and force me to revise my 
beliefs or judgments. But it could also be that e is indeed a case of seeing an F. Perhaps my seeing it as 
an F even enables me to gain knowledge. If I endorse that things are what I see them as, thus take 
myself to see that there is, in fact, an F, I could be quite right, and for good reasons. Either way, given 
what else I believe about Fs, the perceptual circumstances, the status of my visual system, the likely 
presence or absence of suitable ringers and so forth, having e may make it perfectly rational for me to 
form the belief (or issue the perceptual judgment) that I am, in fact, in the presence of some F. 
Conversely, suppose again that my perceptual experience e* is such that I see (or seem to see) 
something as F. But now suppose that as I keep observing the scene, I see what I see as F also as 
exhibiting a kind of behavior—φ, say—of which I believe that Fs do not (or cannot) exhibit it. In such 
a situation, and assuming I do not fail to notice the issue, I face a choice. One option is to revise my 
beliefs—and, accordingly, my concept of F (and even of φ-ing)—in such a way as to accommodate 
what I would take myself to have just discovered: though I previously thought that they do not or 
cannot φ, Fs do φ after all! Alternatively, I could hold on to the belief that Fs cannot φ and thus insist 
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either a) that what I saw as F previously cannot actually be F, or b) that it was an F alright, but that, 
since it could not have φ-ed, I must have misclassified its behavior. Finally, I could also be uncertain 
which of these options to take, suspend judgment, keep observing, and hope for further clues to be 
revealed. 
Which of these responses to undergoing e* would be rational for me to exhibit, in the particular 
setting in which I find myself, will presumably depend on what other beliefs I hold, how firmly I hold 
them, and revising which of my beliefs accordingly seems best and, perhaps, least costly in terms of 
the net-preservation of beliefs I take to be true.21 Figuring out these details may be a complicated task 
and may require extended reflection. But the important point is this: while it may at times be difficult 
to figure out what exactly the rational bearing is that a given experience has on my beliefs, the question 
how perceptual experience can have a bearing on my beliefs in the first place is, on my view, not 
mysterious.” 
If, thus primed with a reminder of the considerations that motivate Hanson’s view, we return to 
the relational view, the fact that its proponents endorse No Content prompts an obvious question: 
how can (visual) experience—construed as conscious acquaintance with mind-independent 
environing items from a point of view—be epistemically significant? How can it bear on our beliefs? 
How can it be anything but kaleidoscopic? 
If asked what perceptual experience does for us, different relationalists provide different answers. 
A common response is to claim that perceptual experience somehow grounds our concepts, that it 
makes mind-independent environing items available for demonstrative reference and puts subjects in 
a position to think about them.22 Some also hold that experience serves to explain how we can have 
the conception of objects as mind-independent in the first place or, again, that experience somehow 
                                                 
21  As we will see in the discussion of Siegel’s view in chapter 7, this conception of what determines what would be 
rational to do in a given situation is one she explicitly rejects.  
22  See Campbell 2002a, Campbell & Cassam 2014, also Imogen Dickie: “A subject, S, is acquainted with an object, o, iff 
S is in a position to think about o in virtue of a perceptual link with o and without the use of any conceptual or 
descriptive intermediary.” Dickie 2010, p. 213. Brewer 2011 suggests (albeit without defense) that an acceptable 
account of concept possession should involve reference to the conscious confrontation with paradigm instances of 
kinds that fall under the relevant concept. 
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grounds such a conception. Furthermore, some relationalists think that acquaintance provides a kind of 
non-propositional knowledge that is somehow more basic than, and required for, obtaining propositional 
knowledge and that it serves to justify not perceptual judgments themselves, but our use of certain 
patterns of inference.23 Other relationalists, however, reject the classification of acquaintance as 
providing knowledge and claim that acquaintance is more basic than any epistemic relation, that it 
neither is nor entails knowledge, but may serve as a source of it, in that it makes certain perceptual 
judgments evidently correct.24 
Among this mix of purported semantic and epistemic contributions, let us focus on the epistemic 
ones. We need not rule out that perhaps an account of justification can be given on which it is not 
conceptually contentful states, but the mind-independent objects themselves that can intelligibly serve 
as justifiers for patterns of inference. Likewise, maybe one can develop an account of perceptual 
evidence on which standing in a given experiential relation can itself be what makes certain perceptual 
judgments evidently correct, or an account on which the mind-independent objects experience relates 
one with figure themselves as reasons for the truth of certain perceptual judgments.25 We need not 
deny, that is, that relationalists may be able to propose some account that explains how perceptual 
experience, construed as a conscious relation of acquaintance with mind-independent objects, may be 
said to feed into or otherwise ground, support, or make possible our epistemic activities. It is worth 
emphasizing, however, not just that a full account of that shape has yet to developed, but moreover, 
that it is not obvious what such an account must look like.  
On Hanson’s account, in contrast, it is comparatively easy to see how experience, just in virtue 
of having conceptual content, can play an evidentiary role. And Hanson has no need for the notion 
of acquaintance, nor does he, accordingly, need to give an account of it or of its epistemic significance. 
Nothing forces him to characterize of mind-independent objects as reasons, as justifiers, or as 
explanantia of the appropriateness of certain beliefs, judgments, or patterns of inferences. Hanson 
                                                 
23  See again Campbell & Cassam 2014, chapter 2, as well as Cassam’s criticism, especially chapter 7.  
24  See Brewer (2011), pp. 141-143 and ibid., section 6.3. 
25  See again Brewer (2011), pp. 143-144, for this way of talking. 
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thus dodges many of the clarificatory tasks at least some of which relationalist must address to provide 
an account of the epistemic role that experience—construed as a specific kind of relation between a 
subject with mind-independent items standing in which is associated with, or gives rise to in the 
subject, a certain phenomenology—is supposed to play. And if it is indeed not obvious how 
relationalists must proceed to address these tasks, Hanson’s dialectical position vis-à-vis the 
relationalist appears to be fairly strong. 
However, recall that Hanson’s view, too, raises questions. If the complaint is raised against the 
relational view that the epistemic and semantic role of experience and its phenomenal character 
remains unclear, a similar complaint can be raised against Hanson’s account as well. After all, on his 
view, what epistemic significance a given experience has, in a given context, ultimately rests on the 
concepts it is said to involve. But what epistemic or semantic contribution, if any, the phenomenal 
dimension of experience is supposed to make, or in virtue of what it can make it, must remain unclear 
as long as an account of experiential phenomenology is pending. 
Quite generally, I contend that both Hanson and proponents of the relationalist view face 
structurally similar issues: ultimately, both owe us an account of what the phenomenal dimension of 
experience is and how exactly it relates to both the conceptual and the realm of mind-independent 
objects. From Hanson, we would thus need to know more about how to understand the notions of 
iconic representation, the visual field, and its elements. What are these elements? Given that Hanson 
takes it that beliefs can modify them, e.g. via projection effects, he clearly takes them both to be 
distinct from and to be less than fully dependent on the mind-independent objects they are in some 
sense said to represent. But how we are to understand them and the way they relate to the mind-
independent items in the perceiver’s environment? These remain open questions. As for the relation 
between the phenomenal and the conceptual, recall that on Hanson’s view, in perceptual experience, 
the conceptual and the phenomenal dimensions are fused like an amalgam. Accordingly, for him, the 
question how the phenomenal and the conceptual relate must concern the mechanics of 
amalgamation.  
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How, then, are we to think about the associations between phenomenal elements and conceptual 
items? How do they come about and what is their status? Are they fixed once and for all or can they 
(or some of them) vary, perhaps with what subjects believe? If so, what governs such variation? Again, 
these questions remain open.26 
Proponents of the relational view, on the other hand, pull apart what on Hanson’s account is 
assumed to be fused. Accordingly, for them, the question how the phenomenal and the conceptual 
relate takes a different shape and turns into the question how to understand the (epistemic and 
semantic) relations between perceptual experiences, on the one hand, and conceptually contentful 
items—such as beliefs, judgments, or conceptual classifications—on the other. But like for Hanson, 
questions arise not just with respect to how the phenomenal relates to the conceptual, but also with 
respect to how it relates to the mind-independent items in the perceiver’s environment. As we have 
seen already, it is clear that via Constitution, relationalists want to tightly link the phenomenal 
dimension to the mind-independent objects themselves. But as we noted also, how exactly we are to 
construe Constitution and the dependence of the phenomenal features of experience on mind-
independence it is taken to involve remains a question that different relationalists respond to 
differently. 
Let us grant, then, that both accounts face serious explanatory challenges. However, as I will show 
in the next three chapters, relational accounts are not as powerful as Hanson’s account purports to be 
when it comes to accommodating potential cases of Doxastically Variable Experiential 
Phenomenology. Indeed, as I will argue, relationalist accounts are marred by two crucial issues: first, 
their accounts of the phenomenology of experience cannot serve to help further develop Hanson’s 
view: they are riddled with problems. And even if these problems are bracketed, there is a range of 
cases of doxastic variation that relationalists cannot accommodate. Let us turn, then, to the analysis 
of our first relational view: the relational account William Fish develops in his 2009 book Perception, 
Hallucination, and Illusion.
                                                 
26  I will return to these questions frequently. 
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4.0 RELATIONALISM I: FISH’S OBJECT-PROPERTY VIEW 
In this chapter, I critically analyze William Fish’s relationalist account of the phenomenology of 
experience and the prospects it affords for accommodating Doxastically Variable Experiential 
Phenomenology (DVEP). I begin by laying out Fish’s view, including his take on Constitution and 
his understanding of the phenomenal dimension of experience (4.1). Next, I show how he tries to 
accommodate at least some cases of DVEP, notably cases of expert vision (4.2). After raising several 
issues for his account (4.3 and 4.4), I show, first, that even if these could somehow be resolved, Fish’s 
account still appears to be at odds with a fundamental relationalist commitment. Second, I argue Fish 
cannot accommodate projection effects (4.5). In 4.6, I briefly sum up the discussion. 
4.1 CONSTITUTION, THE PHENOMENAL, THE PRESENTATIONAL, AND 
CONSTRAINING FACTORS 
Qua relationalist, Fish accepts No Content. He also clearly endorses some version of Constitution. 
Here is how, using terminology by Martin, he initially phrases this commitment: 
(1) [W]hen we see, external objects and their properties “shape the contours of the subject’s 
conscious experience” (Martin 2004, p. 64), where the metaphor of ‘shaping’ is read in a 
constitutive rather than a merely causal sense. […] [E]xternal objects and their properties 
shape the contours of the subject’s conscious experience […] by actually being the contours 
of the subject’s conscious experience. (Fish 2009, p. 6) 
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This passage suggests that like Campbell, Fish, too, understands ‘constitution’ in terms of identity.1 
However, without a clearer sense of what Fish thinks conscious experience is and given the 
metaphorical character of the specification of such experience as having contours, it is hard to gauge 
what the relata of the identity relation are supposed to be.  
To get a better handle on Fish’s reading of Constitution, let us ask how he understands the 
notion of phenomenal character. As indicated in the previous chapter, this notion is often used (not just 
by relationalists) to refer to the conscious character of subjects experiences, which is also frequently 
glossed in terms of what it’s like for a subject to undergo a given experience.2 Fish, too, adopts this 
gloss: he understands the phenomenal character of an experience e as “that property [of e] that types 
e according to what it is like to undergo e” (Fish 2009, p. 7 and p. 8, citing Byrne 2002, p. 9, and 
Chalmers 2006, p. 50). Phenomenal character, Fish contends, is composite: it is composed of 
phenomenal properties, so that (again following Chalmers): “[t]wo perceptual experiences share their 
phenomenal character if [...] the experiences instantiate the same phenomenal properties” (Fish 2009, 
p. 10). Accordingly, Fish endorses:  
Phenomenal Character Composition 
The overall phenomenal character of an experience e is composed of e’s 
phenomenal properties (cf. Fish 2009, p. 10; p. 147). 
Patently, one point of introducing phenomenal properties is to give a sense to the assertion that 
what it is like to have experiences that differ in their overall phenomenology may nevertheless be the 
same in some respects. To illustrate, consider the experience of looking at the red aspect of a traffic 
light in Pittsburgh (USA) and the experience of looking at the red aspect of a traffic light in Edmonton 
(Canada). If the color properties of the aspects, the lighting conditions, and the other conditions of 
perception (e.g. my position vis-à-vis the traffic light, my visual acuity, etc.) are relevantly similar, then 
intuitively, the phenomenal dimension of my experience of the red aspect of the traffic light in 
Pittsburgh may be very much the same as the phenomenal dimension of my corresponding experience 
                                                 
1  He, too, approvingly cites Campbell on constitution, referencing passage (4) of the previous chapter. 
2  Again, the expression is said to go back to Nagel 1974, but can already be found in Wittgenstein’s Remarks on the 
Philosophy of Psychology (Wittgenstein 1980). Cf. also Stoljar 2016. 
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in Edmonton, even if the objects I experience differ in the two cases, as well as the items surrounding 
the two traffic lights and even how the aspects of the traffic lights are arranged (vertically in Pittsburgh, 
horizontally in Edmonton). Do the two experiences share phenomenal properties, then? Intuitively, 
the answer should be “yes.” 
On Fish’s view, however, the two experiences do not share any phenomenal properties. For as 
he has it, phenomenal properties are individuated along with the mind-independent items the 
experience relates its subject with. Accordingly, even if from the perspective of the subject, there is 
no detectable or undetectable difference with respect to how things are, phenomenally, as far as the 
experience of the respective red aspects of the two traffic lights is concerned, Fish will insist that the 
two experiences differ in their phenomenal properties precisely because they are experiences of 
different objects. 
To understand this better, note the distinction Fish draws between the presentational and the 
phenomenal. Partly, this distinction is a response to Campbell’s characterization of Constitution. Recall 
that the reason why Campbell’s take on Constitution is so mystifying is that it is hard to see how we 
are to understand the claim that the qualitative features of subjective experiences just are the qualitative 
features of the experienced objects. Fish concurs, asserting that “a phenomenal character that was 
constituted by external objects and their properties could not be a property of an experience” (Fish 
2009, p. 10, citing Dretske 2003, p. 67, Tye 2000, p. 49, and Lycan 2001, p. 32, who voice similar 
worries).  
Unlike Campbell, Fish thus refrains from identifying the qualitative or phenomenal features of 
experience with the qualitative features of the mind-independent items themselves that, on the 
relational view, one’s experience relates one with. Instead, following Chalmers and Martin, he 
distinguishes the phenomenal properties and the phenomenal character of an experience from its 
presentational properties and its presentational character (cf. Chalmers 2004, p. 156; Martin 1998, 
p. 174).  
According to this distinction, the phenomenal character is indeed a property of an experience, 
viz. that property that types the experience according to what it’s like to have it. The presentational 
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character, in contrast, is said to be “the perceived scene” itself (Fish 2009, p. 13), “a collection [or 
array] of properties (and perhaps objects) that the subject is presented with in having an experience 
and that thereby characterize what it is like to have it” (ibid., p. 16). 
Representationalists, Fish points out, can accept this distinction, too. But they will also hold that 
experiences have the property of representing that the elements constituting the presentational character 
of the experience are instantiated and then identify this property with the phenomenal character of 
experience. For relationalists, this is unacceptable. First, it would be patently at odds with No Content. 
Second, if we read Constitution as intended to imply a strong dependence of the phenomenal 
character of experience on mind-independent objects, representationalism threatens to undercut the 
spirit of Constitution in the following way: unless further specifications are added, the view allows 
that two experiences are identical with respect to their representational properties—and thus their 
phenomenal characters—yet differ in that only in one of them, the properties the experiences 
represent as being instantiated are indeed part of the presentational character of the subject’s 
experience. But if so, then contrary to Constitution, the experience’s phenomenal character does not 
seem to depend on the presence of suitable mind-independent items in the subject’s environment, but 
merely on the experience’s representational properties.3 
For Fish, the phenomenal character of a given experience e is neither identical with qualitative 
features of the mind-independent objects that e relates one with (as Campbell holds) nor with some 
representational property. Instead, it is identical with e’s property of acquainting one with e’s 
presentational character. Here is how Fish phrases the idea: 
(2) [A]cquaintance names an irreducible mental relation that the subject can only stand 
in to objects that exist and features that are instantiated in the part of the environment 
at which the subject is looking. […] Thus, for any given presentational character—
the array of features that the subject is presented with in having that experience—the 
experience itself will have the property of acquainting the subject with that 
                                                 
3  This is known as explanatory screening off (cf. Martin 2004, p. 71). If we find something that serves to explain the 
phenomenal character of an experience in cases in which no actual perception takes place, the question arises why the 
same something should not be that which serves to explain the phenomenal character in the perceptual case as well. 
If there is a preferred alternative explanation for the perceptual case, it seems to be explanatorily screened off, i.e. 
rendered explanatorily redundant. In the present case, the representational property is taken to be that which 
constitutes the phenomenal character in the non-perceptual case. Accordingly, in the perceptual case, that property 
appears to explanatorily screen off the actual presence of what it purports to represent.  
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presentational character. […] This acquaintance property can […] be identified with 
the experience’s phenomenal character […] [T]he phenomenal character of the 
experience—the property of the experience that types the experience by what it is like 
to have it—is the property of acquainting the subject with such-and-such a 
presentational character. (Fish 2009, pp. 14-15; and similarly: ibid., p. 50) 
As evidenced by passage (2), Fish endorses the following two claims: 
Irreducibility  
 Acquaintance is an irreducible mental relation subjects can only stand in to objects that 
exist and features that are instantiated in the part of the environment at which the 
subject is looking. Whenever a subject S is presented, in her experience, with a given 
presentational character, S’s experience has the property of acquainting S with it.  
 Identity  
 For every experience e and every subject S, e’s phenomenal character is identical with 
e’s property of acquainting S with e’s presentational character. 
Note that while Fish does entertain a notion of acquaintance, on his construal, acquaintance 
emerges not as a three-place relation between a subject, mind-independent items, and a point of view. 
Rather, given Irreducibility and Identity, acquaintance is a two-place relation holding between a 
subject and the presentational character of her experience. And since the presentational character is 
said to be the perceived scene itself, the acquaintance property of any given experience and thus its 
phenomenal character are tied to the specific mind-independent items that populate that scene.4  
On Fish’s view, the basic units featuring in the presentational character of experiences are object-
property couples – facts, on his usage of the term.5 Facts so construed are not true propositions. Rather, 
they are necessarily actual pieces of reality. They are states of affairs that are either of the form “a’s 
being F” or (for relational facts) “a’s R-ing b” that can serve as truth-makers for beliefs and judgments 
(cf. Fish 2009, p. 52; though Fish only considers binary relations, the account naturally extends to n-
ary relations). Accordingly, Fish also holds 
 
 
                                                 
4  As we will see below, there are constraints as to which of the environing items make it into the presentational 
character. 
5  To motivate the idea that the items constituting the presentational character of experience are object-property couples, 
Fish draws on arguments presented by Matthen and Firth (cf. Matten 2005; Firth 1949) to the effect that neither 
objects nor properties could appear in experience solo. We cannot, he suggests, perceive objects without properties, 
nor properties that are not of objects. 
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Presentational Character Composition 
The presentational character of an experience e is composed of all the object-property 
couples—the individual facts—that e presents to the subject. 
Moreover, analogous to the way he understands the phenomenal character of an experience e as 
e’s property of acquainting its subject with e’s presentational character, Fish takes the phenomenal 
properties of e to be identical with the properties e has of acquainting its subject with the individual 
facts featuring in e’s presentational character. Accordingly, we can modify Identity in the following 
way: 
 Identity*  
 An experience e’s property of acquainting its subject S with e’s presentational character 
is identical with e’s phenomenal character and e’s properties of acquainting S with the 
individual facts that feature in e’s presentational character are identical with e’s 
phenomenal properties. 
With this explication of the difference between the presentational and the phenomenal in hand, 
we can now return to the two issues that arose earlier. First, we can now elaborate on Fish’s take on 
Constitution and sum up how, on his view, the phenomenal aspect of experience depends on the 
mind-independent items in the subject’s environment. Second, and relatedly, we can now understand 
why on Fish’s view, experiences like those of the two traffic lights that we mentioned above cannot, 
strictly speaking, share phenomenal properties. 
As for the first issue, the version of Constitution Fish accepts clearly differs from Campbell’s. 
Both understand Constitution in terms of identity. However, Campbell takes it that it is the phenomenal 
(or qualitative) character of a subject’s experience that is constituted by the features of mind-
independent items. For Fish, in contrast, it is the presentational character of the subject’s experience that 
such items constitute—in his case: the facts that populate the tract of the environment that the subject 
is looking at—or at least some suitable subset of them. And the sense in which the phenomenal 
character and the phenomenal properties of a subject’s experience e depend on the relevant mind-
independent items is provided by Identity*, i.e. via the claim that the phenomenal properties of an 
experience are identical with the properties the experience has of acquainting the subject with the 
specific facts that constitute the presentational character of her experience.  
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We see, thus, that on Fish’s account, it follows that the phenomenal properties of a given 
experience (and its phenomenal character) are individuated along with the facts that constitute its 
presentational character. Accordingly, if two experiences are relations to different objects, they cannot 
share a phenomenal character. Moreover, the phenomenal properties of two experiences e and e* can 
only overlap to the extent that the respective presentational characters of e and e* are at least partly 
constituted by the exact same facts. This explains why Fish must resist the idea that the experiences 
referred to in our example above, i.e. the experiences of the two traffic lights, share phenomenal 
properties. After all, the phenomenal properties of the two experiences are identical with different 
things, viz. with the property each of the two different experiences has of acquainting the subject with 
the specific object-property couples present in their respective environments.  
Above, we observed that one point of introducing phenomenal properties in the first place is to 
give a sense to the assertion that experiences that differ in their overall phenomenal character may 
nevertheless be such that in some respects, what it’s like to have them may be the same. However, 
given the way Fish specifies the notions of phenomenal properties and phenomenal character, they 
cannot, on his view, play that role.  
In response to this issue, Fish follows McDowell in suggesting that phenomenal characters and 
phenomenal properties can be grouped into kinds. Experiences that have phenomenal properties or 
characters that are not identical, but match phenomenally—such as e.g. the experience of two 
numerically different, but qualitatively identical objects—can then be said to be “of the same kind.” 
Accordingly, with respect to what it is like to have them, experiences with (partly) matching but 
different phenomenal properties are, if not (partly) identical, then at least (partly) of the same kind 
(Fish 2009, p. 24, fn. 28, referring to McDowell 1984/1998, p. 200).  
With this general picture of Fish’s view in mind, let us ask, next, how Fish accommodates what 
other relationalists seek to capture by way of adding a third relatum to the acquaintance relation, i.e. 
that perceivers who look at the same items can have experiences that differ in phenomenal character. 
Fish answers this question by way of construing the presentational character of a subject’s experience 
as being constrained by various further factors, including the subject’s position vis-à-vis the environing 
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objects, lighting conditions, her visual acuity (Fish 2009, p. 55), and the distribution of her attentional 
resources (ibid. pp. 58-64). The tract of the environment one looks at, Fish grants, typically contains 
more facts than those that end up constituting the presentational character of one’s experience. This 
is very plausible once we acknowledge that some of these further facts may be such that they cannot 
be picked up by vision or, for that matter, by any other sensory modality. But among the more specific 
set of facts that subjects who are endowed with a functioning visual system can pick up on in principle, 
the question which facts will in fact be picked up, Fish contends, depends, inter alia, on the various 
further factors mentioned above. 
Note that by thinking about these factors as constraints on the presentational character of the 
subject’s experience, Fish respects the claim central to Irreducibility, viz. that the acquaintance 
relation is primitive and cannot be further analyzed—not even by reference to further factors. For on 
the view he suggests, the dependence of acquaintance (and, thus, via Identity*, of the phenomenal 
character of one’s experience) on these further factors is merely indirect. Rather than affecting the 
phenomenal character of experience directly, the relevant factors constrain which facts figure in the 
presentational character of the subject’s experience and thus only mediately what her experience 
acquaints her with. But once the relevant constraints are in place, acquaintance really is nothing but a 
relation between a given subject and a given presentational character—a relation, Fish can insist, that 
is irreducible and unanalyzable.  
This way of setting things up is especially important in the context of the final factor that Fish 
thinks governs the presentational character of experience and that is especially pertinent to his attempt 
to accommodate Doxastically Variable Experiential Phenomenology (DVEP). I turn to it next. 
68 
 
4.2 NO ACQUAINTANCE WITHOUT CONCEPTUAL CAPACITIES: FISH ON 
EXPERT VISION 
Again, there is one final factor that Fish takes to govern the presentational character of a subject’s 
experience. Here is how he introduces it: 
(3) [F]or one to become acquainted with a particular fact, or to have a particular fact 
feature in the presentational character of one’s experience, one must have the capacity 
to see that fact or, more broadly, facts of that kind. (Fish 2009, p. 67) 6 
The thought, then, is that for subjects to be acquainted with various kinds of facts, they need to 
possess the relevant capacities to see them. For our purposes, this feature of Fish’s view is interesting 
since by adding it, Fish creates the conceptual leeway required to accommodate some cases of DVEP, 
notably cases of expert vision.  
That accommodating such cases is indeed what he has in mind comes out when, drawing on an 
example discussed in Crane 1992, he asserts that the fact that the object in front of her is a cathode 
ray tube is one that can feature in the presentational character of the expert, but not in that of an 
untutored child.7 Here is Fish’s explanation:  
(4) [T]he former [i.e. the expert] has a conceptual-recognitional capacity that the latter 
[i.e. the untutored child] lacks—the capacity to pick up on the fact of the object’s 
being a cathode ray tube. This is a […] visual-recognitional capacity because it is a 
capacity to recognize, through vision, certain features in the world; it is a conceptual 
capacity because possession of the capacity requires the subject to possess the relevant 
concept. (Fish 2009, pp. 68-69) 
                                                 
6 Note that passage (3) also corroborates that Fish is indeed committed not just to Identity, but to Identity*. 
Identity*, if combined with Phenomenal Character Composition, suggests Acquaintance Composition, i.e. the 
claim that being acquainted with the presentational character of one’s experience is a property that obtains in virtue of 
one’s being acquainted with the individual facts that compose that presentational character. If so, the acquaintance 
property of one’s experience that is identical with that experience’s having a phenomenal character would be reducible 
to the properties the experience has of acquainting the subject with the individual facts that compose the 
presentational character of her experience. Irreducibility would have to be restricted in scope so as to yield 
Irreducibility*, according to which acquaintance is an irreducible mental relation that subjects can only stand in to 
facts that exist in the part of the environment at which the subject is looking. Whenever a subject’s experience presents 
her with a fact, that experience has the property of acquainting the subject with it. 
7  This is an example also discussed in Hanson 1958 (=PoD). 
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Suppose, then, that which conceptual-recognitional capacities S possesses affects the 
presentational character of her experience. If so, then surely, possessing the capacity to recognize 
cathode ray tubes will typically require that S possess certain beliefs, e.g. beliefs about what cathode 
ray tubes are, how they work, what one can do with them, etc. Fish concurs: having the concept of a 
cathode ray tube requires mastery of the relevant term—which will at least in part be a matter of 
holding certain beliefs. If so, Fish’s account entails that if everything else is held fixed, what beliefs 
one holds may affect what facts constitute the presentational character of one’s experience. And if 
they do, then given Irreducibility and Identity*, what beliefs one holds mediately affect what facts 
the experience acquaints the subject with, thus its phenomenal properties and, given Phenomenal 
Character Composition, the phenomenal character of one’s experience. DVEP is thus true on Fish’s 
account—at least for cases of expert vision. Knowing more about what one faces, Fish thinks, can 
have a phenomenal effect: it can modify one’s conceptual capacities so that these can lift more or 
different facts into the presentational character of one’s experience and thus modify the experience’s 
phenomenology. 
Fish adds several further remarks. First, he wants to accommodate the intuition that the physicist 
and the child have something perceptually in common. To that end, he tentatively endorses the idea 
that the presentational character of both the child’s and the physicist’s experience could be co-
constituted by rudimentary or basic shape facts, color facts, etc. (cf. Fish 2009, p. 68). 
Second, he concedes that a substantive story must be told about what it is to have a conceptual 
capacity. He does not provide such a story, but expresses some sympathy with the idea that often, 
having such a capacity will require not only that one have a functioning visual system. As noted already, 
he thinks that in many cases, it may also require the mastery of a language that contains the relevant 
term, viz. “cathode ray tube” (cf. ibid., p. 69). Furthermore, following McCulloch 1995 and Noë 2004, 
he thinks that it will also require having a range of tacit expectations as to how the appearances of 
certain objects will change under movement (ibid.).8 
                                                 
8  Noë’s view is reminiscent of Hanson’s in that he contends that to see something “as a tomato is to see it as something 
whose visual appearance will vary in certain predictable ways as we move around it.” As Fish tries to translate this 
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Finally, Fish holds that for every fact, its figuring in the presentational character of a subject’s 
experience requires that the subject have the corresponding conceptual-recognitional capacity. 
Accordingly, on his view, conceptual-recognitional capacities are not a factor that constrains the 
presentational character of a subject’s experience. Rather, they enable subjects to have experiences 
with a presentational character—and thus, mediately, an experience with a phenomenal character—in 
the first place. In other words, Fish’s view entails what we may dub the No Acquaintance Without 
Conceptual Capacities principle. Modifying a claim by McDowell, Fish asserts the following: 
(5) In experience, one finds oneself saddled with presentational character. One’s 
conceptual capacities have already been brought into play, in the presentational 
character’s being available to one, before one has any choice in the matter (Fish 2009, 
p. 71).9 
                                                 
idea into his own terminology, he states that in perceiving “the fact of an object’s being a tomato, we implicitly take 
that object to fall under a particular pattern of sensorimotor contingencies, which in turn explains why we experience 
the three-dimensional nature of that object.”  
It is an interesting question how to understand the notion of a perceiver’s implicitly taking an object to fall under 
such patterns. If made explicit, the relevant commitments involved in such taking could be characterized in terms of 
a set of subjunctive conditional beliefs about what one would be likely to observe were one to engage in certain 
activities directed at the object. For instance, to see something as a tomato is, inter alia, to see that if it were a tomato, 
it would be very likely that we would make very specific further observations (i.e. O1, O2, …  On) were we to move 
around it, pick it up, cut it in half, etc. As we saw, Hanson grants that it may well be that such commitments, which 
form part of what can complement the seeing that locution, may remain implicit. Indeed, it could be that the practice a 
subject engages in with respect to tomatoes lends itself to a characterization in terms of such commitments even if 
the subject himself lacks the conceptual capacities to express such commitments.  
Fish’s claim that in perceiving the fact of something’s being a tomato we implicitly take what we see to fall under 
a particular pattern of sensorimotor contingencies could be spelled out in a similar way. Perhaps one could stipulate 
that for a subject to possess the conceptual capacity to see an item’s being a tomato, the subject’s actions must be of 
a certain sort. More specifically, they must be such that they can be construed as manifesting dispositions to act 
towards tomatoes that can in turn be characterized in terms of subjunctive conditionals that accurately capture the 
relevant patterns of sensorimotor contingencies associated with the perception of tomatoes. However, without a full 
account of what conceptual capacities are, the precise nature of the relation between a subject’s possession of 
conceptual capacities and the phenomenology of her experience must remain unclear. In particular, it remains unclear 
how to construe Fish’s contention that specific facts about how a subject’s conceptual capacities are related to patterns 
of sensorimotor contingencies could serve to explain why we experience the tomato’s three-dimensional nature. 
9  Fish cites McDowell 1994, p. 10, where McDowell asserts a claim that is identical with the one Fish is happy to 
endorse except for the fact that it has “content” where the passage above has “presentational character”. With respect 
to it, Fish then says the following: “Substitute “presentational character” for “content” here, and I fully endorse 
McDowell’s claim” (Fish 2009, p. 71). The result is passage (5). Fish also briefly discusses the possibility that “our 
capacities to see certain rudimentary facts, including e.g. facts about shape and color, are not conceptual-recognitional 
capacities at all” and that instead “subjects have the capacity to see such facts simply in virtue of having, say, a fully 
functional visual system” (ibid., p. 72). He rejects this possibility, however, because he thinks, similar to McDowell, 
that the capacity responsible for perceiving and for bringing facts into the presentational character of one’s experience 
is the same capacity that allows one to think about these facts. 
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Referring to Kirk 2005, Fish then suggests that having a conceptual capacity need not be 
construed in terms of the subject’s being a language user (Fish 2009, pp. 73-74) at least not for all such 
capacities. In other words, while he grants that possession of some conceptual capacities, e.g. the 
conceptual capacity to recognize cathode ray tubes, presupposes language possession, he rejects that 
this need not be true for every such capacity. 
It is a virtue of Fish’s account that he seeks to accommodate doxastic effects on experiential 
phenomenology. And as we are looking for a way to think about the phenomenology of experience 
that could supplement Hanson’s view and provide us with a way to make sense of his account of 
empirical constraint, Fish’s incorporation of expert vision as one kind of DVEP makes his view 
attractive. From a relationalist point of view, too, the way he attempts to do so seems attractive. For 
suppose Fish were to understand the possession of conceptual capacities (and whatever beliefs on the 
part of the subject such possession may require) as forming part of a third relatum of the acquaintance 
relation itself. If so, the acquaintance relation would appear to be further analyzable, viz. in terms of 
the conceptual capacities of the subject and whatever representational states the possession of these 
capacities may require. Understanding acquaintance as analyzable in terms of representational states 
would undermine Irreducibility. Moreover, it would do so in a particularly damaging way, for such 
an analysis would be fundamentally at odds with the relationalists’ anti-representationalist 
commitments. However, if, like on Fish’s view, the possession of conceptual capacities is said to 
govern the phenomenal character of experience only indirectly, i.e. via determining the presentational 
character of one’s experience, then on the resulting view, acquaintance—at least acquaintance with 
particular facts—remains irreducible. 
In the next sections, I will argue that Fish’s position is problematic in various ways. It remains 
underdeveloped, appears to be at odds with at a commitment at least some relationalists hold dear, 
and affords no conceptual leeway to accommodate projection effects. 
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4.3 IDENTITY*, SUPERVENIENCE, AND INTERSUBJECTIVE 
COMMONALITIES 
Fish, recall, wants to accommodate the intuition that the physicist and the child who look at the 
cathode ray tube have something perceptually in common. On the assumption of Identity* and 
Irreducibility, differences in which facts constitute the presentational character of one’s experience 
entail differences in the acquaintance properties and, accordingly, the phenomenal properties one’s 
experience possesses. As we saw, this thought—combined with the idea that conceptual-recognitional 
capacities play an essential role in generating the presentational character of a subject’s experience—
allows Fish to accommodate the phenomenon of expert vision: given the differences in their 
conceptual-recognitional capacities, the presentational characters of the expert and the child will differ, 
as will, hence, the phenomenal characters of their respective experiences.  
Conversely, to the extent that the facts composing the presentational characters of both the child’s 
and the expert’s experience overlap, the acquaintance properties of the two experiences and thus, 
presumably, the phenomenal properties of their respective experiences, will be the same. 
Though the basic idea seems rather straightforward, it raises several questions. Let us begin by 
focusing on Identity*. Consider two experiences, e and e*, had by a subject, S, where e and e* are 
experiences of two numerically different but qualitatively identical items in otherwise identical 
perceptual circumstances. Since e and e* relate S to different objects, on Fish’s view, each acquaints S 
with a different set of object-property couples. As per Identity*, differences in acquaintance 
properties entail differences in phenomenal properties. Accordingly, it follows that even though the 
objects of e and e* are qualitatively identical, and though there is neither a difference in the 
circumstances of perception nor in the subject of the respective experiences, the phenomenal 
properties of e and e* differ and, hence, their phenomenal characters.  
In this context, recall also that Fish characterizes the presentational character as the perceived scene 
itself “that the subject is presented with in having an experience and that thereby characterize[s] what it is 
like to have it” (Fish 2009, p. 16, emphasis added). On the most straightforward reading of this latter 
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remark, what facts one’s experience acquaints one with individuates both the phenomenal character 
of a given experience, but also what it is like to have it. Accordingly, when Fish concedes, with respect 
to experiences that are like e and e*—i.e. experiences of qualitatively identical but numerically different 
objects—that what it is like to have them “will plausibly be the same,” he must be speaking carelessly. 
At best he may be able to say (as he does a few lines further in) that what having these experiences is 
like is the same in kind (cf. Fish 2009, p. 24, fn. 28). 
We have noted this before, when we noted that phenomenal character is individuated along with 
the mind-independent items that experiences relate subjects with. It is, however, worth emphasizing 
how odd this result is. It is odd because presumably, the notions ‘phenomenal character’ and ‘what 
it’s like to have an experience’ are intended to refer to the conscious nature of experience, i.e. to how 
things subjectively are for the subject, something that at least presumably is readily accessible to self-
conscious subjects. But as it turns out, on Fish’s view, both the notion of the phenomenal character of an 
experience and the notion of what it is like to have an experience ultimately refer to features that may 
remain outside the subject’s ken. If the phenomenal character of one’s experience is individuated along 
with the facts one’s experience relates one with, and if what these facts are can be beyond one’s ken, 
then one can err with respect to what the phenomenal character of one’s experience is. Likewise, since 
the phenomenal character of an experience is taken to type experiences by what it is like to have them, 
one can err with respect to what it is like to have one’s experience.10 Note that such a situation need 
not be one in which the subject suffers an illusion. Rather, it could be a perfectly innocuous non-
illusory experience such as having e* instead of e. Either way, the upshot is this: if what it is like to 
have an experience is also individuated along with the facts that one’s experience acquaints one with, 
and if the expression ‘what it’s like to have an experience’ is intended to refer to specific ways things 
subjectively are for the experiencing subject, Fish is saddled with the odd consequence that how things 
subjectively are for the subject may well remain opaque to the subject. 
                                                 
10  Note also the following consequence: that two token experiences are the same in what it’s like to have them will be a 
very rare occurrence since the relevant identity will hold only between experiences that are composed of the same 
facts.  
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What about Fish’s suggestion that experiences that differ in phenomenal properties can be of the 
same kind? The problem is that one must wonder what the relevant sameness in kind amounts to and 
how it is to be explained. Note that to a representationalist, the following response to this question is 
available: she can suggest that e and e* (say) are fully or partly the same, or the same in kind, in virtue 
of the fact that both represent things as being the same way. Depending on the precise specification 
of experiential content she endorses, this could be true even when the objects of e and e* differ.11 
To the relationalist, this strategy is patently unavailable. Unless they give up their anti-
representationalist commitments, they cannot tie the identity conditions of phenomenal properties to 
representational states. But if we think that it is not acceptable for relationalists to simply take it to be 
a brute fact that the phenomenal character of certain experiences is of the same kind, then, as Miloš 
Vuletić rightly points out, “[r]elationalists who reject the possibility of different objects having identical 
looks owe us an account of looks that accommodates and explains this apparent identity” (Vuletić 
2015, p. 56). And this is a task that arises independently of the fact that illusions or hallucinations are 
possible. For as soon as one accepts the commonplace idea (as Fish does) that in suitable 
circumstances, the same objects can give rise to experiences with differing phenomenal characters, 
there is also room for the possibility that various experiences of objects that differ both numerically 
and qualitatively may have phenomenal characters that are subjectively the same. In other words, one 
could have an experience e*, which is an experience of objects and properties rather different from 
those involved in e, in rather different perceptual circumstances, but which is nevertheless such that 
the relevant factors conspire in such a way that things are the same with the subject as they would 
have been had she undergone e instead. 
The notion of phenomenal identity, or of things being the same with the subject appealed to here may 
need a more careful explanation, especially if one is sympathetic to the relationalist’s claim that such 
sameness is not to be construed in terms of the identity of experiential content.12 For present purposes, 
                                                 
11  It is not true on views like Schellenberg’s, on which the objects perceived are themselves taken to be part of the 
content. 
12  I return to this issue in the discussion of Gupta’s view in chapter 9. 
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let us note that all parties of this debate agree that there is an intuitive sense in which the experience 
of two numerically different but qualitatively identical items can be the phenomenally the same.13 But 
as soon as this is granted, we can easily transition to the idea that the same kind of phenomenal identity 
could obtain between experiences that differ not just with respect to the objects involved, but also 
with respect to the properties these objects instantiate and the viewing conditions in which they are 
had. 
Unless we rule out that such scenarios are possible (and it is hard to see why one should), the 
following issue thus arises: if, as Fish stipulates, the identity of phenomenal properties is tied to the 
facts that feature in the presentational character of the subject’s experience, then experiences may be 
phenomenally identical in the intuitive sense just sketched, but different in their phenomenal 
properties, in what it is like to have them (as Fish construes these notions), and in which  objects and 
properties they involve. 
If this is so, then it seems not open to Fish to suggest an explanation on which the relevant 
phenomenal identity obtains in virtue of, say, the identity of the properties instantiated by the objects 
of the respective experiences. How else Fish could hope to account for the relevant identity remains, 
however, an open question.14 Perhaps he could modify his view and grant that from the perspective 
of the subject, there really is no difference in what it’s like to have e and e*, respectively. He could 
eschew Identity* and instead embrace:  
Supervenience 
An experience e’s phenomenal character supervenes on e’s property of 
acquainting its subject with e’s presentational character. Likewise, e’s individual 
phenomenal properties supervene on e’s individual properties of acquainting 
its subject with the individual facts featuring in e’s presentational character. 
 
                                                 
13  As for Fish, this is indicated by the passage already quoted two pages earlier, in which he grants (though he cannot 
really claim it) that what it is like to have experiences of qualitatively identical items that differ only numerically is 
plausibly the same. 
14  Phenomenal identity, Fish could insist, is a brute fact. However, one suspects that relationalists will want to give an 
informative explanation in terms of the sameness, in some respect, of the constituent items. As we will see in the next 
chapter, Brewer offers a solution to the problem in terms of similarity relations. 
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Perhaps this is acceptable to Fish. Note, however, that to accept this proposal is to put some 
distance between the presentational character and the phenomenology of experience: the 
phenomenology of experience cannot be individuated along with its presentational character. And if 
Supervenience is supposed to be more than the label for the problem of how to explain sameness in 
phenomenal kind, an account of that relation is still needed. Moreover, if Identity* is given up in 
favor of Supervenience, the resulting view no longer entails that two experiences that differ in 
presentational character will also differ in their phenomenal properties. From the mere fact that the 
expert has the (visual) conceptual recognitional ability to pick up on the fact of an object’s being a 
cathode ray tube, it then still follows, via Irreducibility, that the expert’s experience will acquaint her 
with facts that differ from those that the layperson’s experience acquaints her with. It no longer 
follows, however, that upon looking at a cathode ray tube, the phenomenal character of the expert’s 
experience will differ from that of the layperson. 
Substituting Supervenience for Identity* thus yields a view that does not entail that expert 
vision could involve DVEP. However, the resulting view does not rule out such effects either; it 
remains compatible with the possibility that some or all cases of expert vision exhibit the relevant kind 
of variation. Even so, what triggers such variation would remain to be explained. An account would 
be needed to specify why acquaintance with some facts, but not with others, does or may modify the 
phenomenology of experience, how we are to think of such modifications, and—given that the tight 
link between acquaintance and phenomenology is severed—how we are to think of the identity criteria 
governing what is being modified in the first place. 
Consider, next, Fish’s suggestion that the physicist and the child might have something 
perceptually in common. One way of interpreting this suggestion is as a claim about the 
phenomenology of their respective experiences. The view would be that for the physicist and the child 
to have something perceptually in common is for there to be an overlap of the phenomenal properties 
of their respective experiences. Such an overlap would then presumably rest on the fact that the child’s 
and the physicist’s respective experiences relate them to at least some of the same facts. 
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In this context, we should note that it remains unclear why the phenomenal properties that 
according to Identity* and Supervenience are either identical with or supervene on a subject’s being 
acquainted with the specific facts that compose the presentational character of her experience should 
be identical (in kind) across subjects, or even across different time-slices of one and the same subject. 
Why should we believe that when different (time-slices of) subjects are acquainted with the same facts 
in sufficiently similar conditions, the phenomenal properties and characters of their respective 
experiences will be the same (in kind) also? Is acquaintance with a given fact phenomenally the same 
(in kind) for you as it is for me? Is it the same (in kind) for you now as it was, or would have been, 
yesterday, or ten years ago? And what, if any, are the epistemological consequences associated with 
the different answers one could offer to such questions? 
Fish does not address such concerns. But if the claim that the physicist and the child have 
something perceptually in common is indeed to be cashed out in terms of an overlap of the 
phenomenal properties of their respective experiences (at least in kind), it remains unclear whether 
Fish does in fact manage to accommodate it. 
To be sure, it is not obviously the case that Fish’s account rules out that phenomenal 
commonalities could obtain across subjects. But pending an argument for the assumption that 
acquaintance and phenomenal properties and the facts of which the presentational character of a 
subject’s experience are composed are linked in the same or sufficiently similar ways across (time-
slices of) subjects, it remains perfectly conceivable that the phenomenal character of the experiences 
of the child and that of the expert differ wildly. 
Part of the issue is that tying the individuation of phenomenal properties closely to (somewhat) 
more familiar entities such as e.g. facts or—as representationalists would prefer—representational 
contents can appear to be what allows us to individuate phenomenal properties in the first place. If 
so, then once we loosen or sever these ties (by accepting Supervenience, say, or by introducing talk 
about identity in kind), we lose our grip on what it is for (kinds of) phenomenal states to be identical 
or different, on how they can be compared, let alone across different individuals. Accordingly, as we 
question the tight links Fish takes to obtain between facts and phenomenal properties, ask what these 
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links are and in virtue of what they are said to obtain, we realize that we do not have much of an 
independent grip on what, on his view, phenomenal properties are.15 Pending a satisfactory account 
of what the criteria are for sameness and difference (in kind) of phenomenal properties, and how these 
may be generated, the claim that there is an overlap between the phenomenal properties of the 
experiences of the expert and the layperson is simply hard to evaluate. As a skeptic, one may take this 
to show that like Hanson, Fish provides us with a fairly unsatisfactory account of what the phenomenal 
dimension of experience is supposed to be. But suppose one is sympathetic to the idea that some 
specification of the phenomenal dimension may be given and that some important links obtain 
between facts and the phenomenal properties of subjects’ experiences. Even then, the question 
remains what explanatory and epistemological weight the idea is supposed to bear that some such 
connections are or must be the same across different (time-slices of) individuals, and further, whether 
the obtaining of such similarities is a brute fact or something relationalists can explain or argue for. 
Fish does not address these issues. But even if they are bracketed, further problems soon obtrude. 
4.4 FACTS, PROPERTIES, AND CONCEPTUAL CAPACITIES 
Patently, Fish takes the phenomenology of a subject’s experience to depend in some strong sense (i.e. 
via Identity* or, perhaps, Supervenience) on what facts feature in the presentational character of 
                                                 
15  Two comments: first, it is exactly this kind of issue that motivates Campbell to interpret Constitution in terms of 
identity. For if the relevant identity claim could be made sense of, it would be guaranteed that the experience of 
subjects that are acquainted with the same items in sufficiently similar circumstances will have the same qualitative 
features, i.e. those that the environing items actually possess. However, as indicated above, Campbell’s identity claim 
remains problematic in that it leaves us with the problem of understanding how a property of an experience should 
be identical with the property of that experience’s object.  
Second, suppose one suggested that the similarity of the phenomenal character of the child’s and the expert’s 
respective experiences could be inferred from an alleged similarity of their respective neuronal properties. Even if 
such similarities could be shown to obtain, to Fish, this move is unavailable for the following reason: to make room 
for his claim that hallucinations lack phenomenal character altogether, Fish spends a lot of effort on rejecting what 
he calls the local supervenience principle, according to which the phenomenal character of an experience supervenes 
on the subject’s brain processes. Were he to appeal to the goodness of inferential moves from brain processes to 
phenomenology, he would thus threaten to undermine his own arguments against the goodness of such inferential 
moves in hallucinatory cases. 
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her experience. And which facts do so feature is in turn said to depend on the conceptual-recognitional 
capacities the subject possesses. Differences and similarities in the phenomenology of a subject’s 
experience (and, on Fish’s assumption, across subjects) thus hinge not just on differences in which 
facts one’s experience relates one to (given specific perceptual circumstances), but also, and crucially, 
on differences and similarities in the perceiving subjects’ conceptual capacities. The role of these 
capacities is to lift such facts, as it were, into the presentational character of her experience or, to use 
another image, to bring them into the subject’s view.  
But do we have a good sense of how this is supposed to work? Suppose we ignore the issues that 
we saw arise in the context of characterizing the relation between acquaintance properties and 
phenomenal properties and the relation between the phenomenal properties of experiences had by 
different (time-slices of) subjects. Does Fish provide an account of expert vision that accommodates 
both differences and commonalities in the acquaintance properties had by the respective experiences 
of the expert and e.g. an untutored child?  
Recall that on Fish’s view, what an experience’s acquaintance properties are is a matter of what 
facts feature in that experience’s presentational character. Accordingly, our question translates into the 
following one: does Fish provide an account of how the subject’s conceptual capacities generate the 
presentational character of experience that accommodates both differences and commonalities in 
which facts co-constitute the presentational characters of the respective experiences of the expert and 
a child? As it stands, Fish’s account is not developed enough to address the issue.  
To bring out the problem, recall, first, that Fish thinks of facts as object-property couples. A 
natural claim for him to endorse is thus that for any two mind-independent facts, these facts will differ 
from one another iff there is a difference in the objects constituting them or in what properties these 
objects have or instantiate, and they will be the same facts otherwise. Also, recall that on Fish’s 
construal, the facts of which the presentational character of a subject’s experience is composed are 
constituted by, and thus identical with, some of the mind-independent facts that do obtain in the 
subject’s environment.  
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Let us grant all of this and explore Fish’s suggestion that differences in visual conceptual-
recognitional capacities can affect the presentational character of one’s experience by governing which 
among the facts that in the perceiver’s environment anyway obtain compose it. To begin with, note 
that Fish remains completely silent with respect to what he thinks properties are and also mostly silent 
as to what properties can in principle serve to co-compose the presentational character of a subject’s 
visual experience. As for the latter, the only criterion implied is that the relevant properties must be 
such as to be possibly picked up by visual conceptual-recognitional capacities, i.e. capacities that 
respond to facts that are recognizable by vision.  
This criterion no doubt serves to rule out some properties. The property a neutrino may have of 
passing through me will hardly qualify, whereas a pink elephant’s standing right in front of me (with 
nothing impeding or impairing my vision) probably should. But in many cases, Fish’s criterion 
provides little help. Are the facts that a person is angry, sad, just, or bad at fixing a Mojito such that 
they can be picked up by vision? More pertinently, consider a trained physicist who observes a colored 
line appearing in a bubble chamber. Given what the physicist thinks and knows about electrons, 
bubble chambers, and about how electrons interact with the gaseous contents of such chambers, are 
we to say that the fact that a given electron has the property of passing through the bubble chamber 
features in the presentational character of the physicist’s experience? And must we then also to say 
that it does not so feature in the corresponding presentational character of a 5th-grader? 
One question that arises in the context of such an observation is whether we are entitled to the 
claim that it is indeed a fact that an electron is passing through the chamber. Scientific realists will want 
to affirm this, constructive empiricists or instrumentalists with respect to theoretical terms would 
not.16 But even as a scientific realist, one can doubt whether we should consider this alleged fact as 
one that can, given sufficient training, be picked up by vision, rather than inferred. What is needed, 
                                                 
16  Constructive Empiricism is the view that accepting a scientific theory does not involve a commitment to its truth – 
neither to its truth simpliciter nor to its approximate truth – but a commitment to its empirical adequacy, which is, 
roughly, the truth of the theory with respect to the observable phenomena (see van Fraassen 1980). As a constructive 
empiricist, one can accept a scientific theory and still remain agnostic regarding the question whether theoretical terms 
like ‘electron’ do in fact refer to worldly items. Instrumentalists go further in that they, unlike constructive empiricists, 
reject the idea that sentences containing theoretical terms have truth values. 
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patently, is an account of what the visual recognitional capacities are that human subjects can possess, 
what the properties are that they respond to, and to what extent the relevant capacities can be extended 
or modified by what subjects know. Without such an account, the question which facts can co-
constitute the presentational character of experience lacks a clear answer. 
In the examples he provides as he explicates his view, Fish typically refers to seemingly simple 
properties, such as a car’s being red, a rope’s being coiled up, or a coin’s being elliptical. Also, he 
presupposes that kind properties such as being a tomato, being a rope, being a snake, or being a cathode ray 
tube can figure in the presentational character of one’s experience and that their presence or absence 
makes a phenomenal difference. It is not obvious, I think, that the capacity to recognize kindhood of 
various sorts is to be construed as a visual capacity.17 But as I will argue next, even with respect to 
allegedly simple properties, difficult questions arise. 
Let us consider an example: the visual capacity to recognize a certain shade of green—green23, say. 
Presumably, being green23 is a determinate property objects can either have or lack. As per Fish’s view, 
if one has the visual conceptual-recognitional capacity to pick up on an item’s being green23 then in 
suitable perceptual circumstances in which one is acquainted with an item that is green23, the very fact 
of that item’s being green23 should be part of what composes the presentational character of one’s 
experience. If, however, one lacks the relevant capacity, that property cannot co-constitute the 
presentational character of one’s experience. 
                                                 
17  At the very least, the story to be told about what it is to have the visual conceptual-recognitional capacity to pick up 
facts involving kind properties and how having such a capacity may affect the phenomenal character of one’s 
experience is, I think, a complicated one. At the very least, the capacity to recognize such properties—tomatohood, 
say—should be fallible. To illustrate, suppose you are confronted with two objects:  a tomato that is sitting right next 
to a perfect tomato replica. You do not know which one is which. If you had an infallible capacity to pick up on 
tomatohood, the real tomato should look different from the perfect replica anyway. In other words, for someone who 
has the capacity to pick up on tomatohood, there could be no perfect replicas.  
More plausibly perhaps, the situation as specified is such that in it, subjects cannot properly execute their capacity 
to recognize tomatohood—due to the presence of a ringer. But if being acquainted with the fact of an item’s being a 
tomato is said to make a phenomenal difference, and if it is indeed a fact that can be picked up by vision, one might 
suspect that being told—by a supremely reliable source, say—that only the left one of the two (say) is indeed an actual 
tomato could suffice to lift the fact of it’s being a tomato into the presentational character of one’s experience. The 
tomato’s property of being a tomato would then co-constitute the presentational character of one’s experience so as 
to make it look different from the ringer (on might even be puzzled that one did not see it before). If this seems 
implausible, more needs to be said about how visual capacities to pick up on facts involving kind properties are to be 
specified and how they may affect the phenomenology of one’s experience. 
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Let us contrast two different subjects: a professional painter and an untutored child. The painter, 
let us assume, has enjoyed a rigorous art education. Moreover, she looks back on a long career, which 
naturally involved countless experiences with different colors. Her experience as an artist has provided 
her with a profound understanding of the many relations that obtain between different colors in 
different contexts and with an extensive knowledge of such colors, including many details, e.g. about 
how they have been used in the history of art. In short, the painter knows a lot about green23, certainly 
a lot more than the untutored child does. In ordinary lighting conditions, the latter fairly reliably 
distinguishes items that are green23 from items that are not, and appropriately labels such items as green23 
(or withholds that label, as required). But apart from whatever this ability may require, let us assume 
that there is not much else the child knows about green23. 
At first blush, it may look as if we are facing just another ordinary case of expert vision. If so, 
Fish should be able to treat it just like the case of the cathode ray tube. Recall that according to Fish, 
in the latter case, the alleged difference between the presentational character of the expert’s experience 
and that of the experience had by an untutored child is this: the former features the fact of the item’s 
being a cathode ray tube, whereas the latter does not. Accordingly, both the expert and the child are 
acquainted with different sets of facts and the phenomenal characters of their respective experiences 
will (given Identity*) or may (given Supervenience) differ as well. On the other hand, Fish holds 
that there are many properties that both the expert and the child pick up on, e.g. some basic facts 
involving color and shape properties, so that there is also a sense in which the phenomenal characters 
of their respective experiences are the same, since their presentational characters are alike with respect 
to the basic facts that co-constitute them. 
Patently, this suggestion presupposes some notion of basic color and shape facts. Therefore, 
considering the hypothetical case of the painter is instructive. For in it, it is precisely the capacity to 
recognize a certain color of an object—one of the allegedly basic properties, that is—that is at issue. 
However, with respect to such a property, too, I contend, it could be that the presentational character 
of the expert’s experience differs from that of the child’s experience.  
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To get a sense of what expertise in this case may amount to, consider the following 
characterizations of the object of one’s acquaintance o: 
A:  o is the exact same shade of green that Leonardo da Vinci used when painting some of the trees 
visible in the background of his Mona Lisa, 
B: o’s color is the color that results (given some suitable set of standard conditions) from mixing two 
parts of yellow17 and one part of blue12, and 
C:  o’s color differs from yellow15. 
Do A, B, and C attribute features to o that can figure in one’s presentational character? Why not? 
After all, pending further arguments, it is hard to see why being a tomato or being a cathode ray tube should 
be properties whose instantiations in a given object constitute facts that can be recognized by vision, 
whereas those attributed to o in A, B, and C are not. 
On Fish’s view, the presentational character of an expert’s experience is said to differ from the 
corresponding presentational character of the non-expert’s experience precisely because the former 
possesses conceptual capacities that allow her to visually recognize properties that the latter cannot 
recognize. If the expert’s and the untutored child’s visual systems work in sufficiently similar ways, 
then presumably, the difference in these capacities will to a large part be a function of their prior 
experiences, and of what they believe and know. And since we are assuming that our professional 
painter has, throughout her career, achieved a profound understanding of colors, it seems rather 
plausible that the object o’s having features that are attributed to o by e.g. A or B would be exactly the 
kind of facts that she could recognize by looking at green23 items, facts that would feature in the 
presentational character of her experience, but not in the corresponding presentational character of 
the child’s experience. (The child may know that green23 is not yellow15, but perhaps not—it may lack 
the concept of yellow15). 
Suppose we accept this characterization and assume, like Fish, Identity*. On this assumption, it 
then follows that the phenomenal properties of the painter’s experience differ from that of the child’s. 
We already noted that on the assumption of Supervenience, the corresponding inference no longer 
holds. For it could be that the property of an experience to have a certain phenomenal character 
supervenes on the facts featuring in one’s presentational character in such a way that the painter and 
the child have experiences that do not differ with respect to their phenomenal properties. And even 
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if we were to stick with Identity*—pending an account of what constrains when experiences are and 
are not of the same kind, the following is at least conceivable: while strictly speaking, what it is like to 
have the respective experiences of the painter and the child differs as a function of the differences in 
the presentational and (hence) phenomenal characters of their experiences, what it is like to have these 
two experiences is of the same kind. In such a case, the phenomenon of expert vision would be such 
that with respect both to the phenomenal characters of their experiences and to what it’s like to have 
them, the expert and the child would differ—but this difference would manifest in a way that remains 
opaque to the subjects involved.18 
For the sake of the argument, let us assume that features like the ones picked out by A, B, and C 
could be suitably multiplied so as to massively enrich the presentational character of the painter’s 
experience. The more we enrich it, the more plausible it is that on any account Fish might propose of 
the relation between acquaintance properties and phenomenal properties, the differences between the 
presentational character of the painter’s experience and that of the child’s experience would generate 
phenomenal differences as well. And as soon as we allow that the properties featuring in the 
presentational characters of their respective experiences may differ, Fish’s view is at least compatible 
with the possibility that in the case of the painter, too, expert vision may be reflected phenomenally.  
How about Fish’s further stipulation, then, i.e. the stipulation that the expert and the child have 
something perceptually in common? Can it be accommodated, too? Doing so would require that Fish 
specify which facts feature in the presentational characters of both the artist’s and the child’s 
experiences. So far, we have operated under the assumption that the expert has the visual conceptual 
capacities to recognize the presence of features—such as those attributed to the object by A, B, and 
perhaps C—that the child may lack and that this creates room for differences between their respective 
presentational characters. It is, however, an entirely open question how we should understand what 
happens to a person’s extant capacities when her visual capacities to recognize various features expand.  
                                                 
18  Given the issues involved in understanding what intersubjective comparisons of experiences may amount to, we can 
imagine that the contrast is one between the professional artist and that very artist as a child. 
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With respect to the case at hand, we can ask, more specifically: as the painter acquires the visual 
conceptual capacities to recognize the object’s falling under A, B, and C, should we take it that she 
acquires further and entirely distinct conceptual-recognitional capacities, while the capacity to visually 
recognize green23 remains unchanged? If so—if, that is, conceptual capacities are construed on the 
model of building blocks that one can freely combine and that do not change as one adds more 
blocks—the claim that the expert and the child share certain conceptual capacities and that their 
presentational characters feature some of the same properties could perhaps be defended.  
However, it seems much more plausible that during the course of the painter’s extensive training, 
the capacities she already possessed were transformed. But on a view, on which conceptual capacities, 
rather than being distinct and separable units, may affect, modify, and mutually shape each other—it 
is far less clear how to explicate the sense in which some of the painter’s and the child’s conceptual 
capacities are the same. Correspondingly, it is unclear how to cash out the claim that the presentational 
characters of their respective experiences are partly co-constituted by the same properties.  
It may seem tempting to insist that both the child and the artist have the visual conceptual capacity 
to recognize an item’s being green23. After all, we stipulated that being green23 is a property objects can 
have or lack. Moreover, given how we described the situation, both the painter and the child possess 
some conceptual-recognitional capacity that allows them to reliably distinguish items that do from 
items that do not have that property. The problem is, however, that on Fish’s view, the properties that 
feature in the presentational character of a subject’s experience are taken to be lifted into that character 
by the subject’s conceptual capacities. Accordingly, if subjects differ in their understanding of what it 
is for an item to be green23 and if that entails that their conceptual capacities differ, it is not obvious 
that what the artist and the child, in passively deploying their respective conceptual-recognitional 
capacities, lift into the presentational character of their respective experiences, are indeed the same 
facts. 
To make this more vivid, suppose that from the perspective of the artist (but not from that of 
the child), something’s being green23 involves having the (visually recognizable) feature attributed by B 
as well. Green23 just may be the color that results (in suitably specified standard conditions) if one mixes two parts of 
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yellow17 and one part of blue12, so that an item could not be green23 unless it had the feature attributed by B. 
Moreover, suppose the artist insists that understanding what it is for something to be green23 requires 
that one know that green23 things also have the features attributed by A, B, and C. In other words, in 
the artist’s cognitive architecture, the capacity to recognize green23 things may be inextricably 
intertwined with the capacities to recognize features attributed by A, B, and C—so much so that the 
capacity to recognize all these features may well appear as part of one and the same capacity—a 
capacity sensitive to what appears to be a more determinate property, roughly, the property of being 
green23 and, as such, also having features that are attributed by A, B, and C. 
Consider, then, a case in which the child and the expert look at an object that is green23. We will 
assume that being green23 is a fully determinate way that things can be or fail to be. How are we to 
characterize what the child’s and the artist’s respective conceptual-recognitional capacities lift into the 
presentational characters of their respective experiences? Fish will respond that what the artist’s 
presentational character features corresponds to the visual-conceptual capacities she passively deploys 
in her experience. And unless we accept a building block model of conceptual capacities, these 
capacities will in turn be shaped by the way they are connected, within the artist’s cognitive 
architecture, with further capacities such as the visual capacity to recognize items as characterizable in 
terms of A, B, and C (where A, B, and C also attribute features that are visually recognizable).19  
Likewise, Fish will say that what the presentational character of the child’s experience features 
corresponds to the visual-conceptual capacities the child passively deploys in her experience. Again, if 
we reject the building block model of conceptual capacities, the child’s capacities, too, will be shaped 
by the way they are connected, within her cognitive architecture, with further capacities. But in the 
child’s case, these further capacities may well exclude the visual capacity to recognize items as 
characterizable in terms of A, B, and perhaps even C. The child may lack the relevant conceptual 
capacities or even believe, erroneously, that green23 items does not or cannot have the properties 
attributed by A or B, which, again, to the knowledgeable expert form an essential part of the semantic 
                                                 
19  Arguably, the capacities will also be shaped by beliefs that concern features that are not visually recognizable. If so, 
this further aggravates the worry that the respective conceptual capacities of the painter and the child differ. 
87 
 
network that specifies what being green23 is. Finally, note that it may also well be that the conceptual 
capacities of neither the artist nor the child are such as to enable their bearers to fully bring the item’s 
determinate property of being green23 into the presentational character of their experience. 
Understanding green23 fully, in its various connections with other properties, may exceed even the 
abilities of the expert.  
Suppose, then, we think that each of them only partly succeeds in bringing the relevant property 
into the presentational character of their respective experiences. Even so, we still need an account of 
properties, of what it is to bring them into the presentational character of one’s experience partly, how 
such parts are individuated, and in what sense the resulting facts that constitute the presentational 
character of one’s experience are the same in the child and the expert, and of the sense in which how 
what has been lifted into the presentational character only partly can still be said to be identical with 
the mind-independent facts that populate the subject’s environment. 
Fish concedes that he has no satisfactory account of conceptual-recognitional capacities and that 
there are big explanatory questions in the wings (Fish 2009, p. 70). But without such an account, it 
remains that Fish’s suggestion that experts and laypeople may have something perceptually in common 
is hard to evaluate. As we saw earlier, it is hard to evaluate if interpreted as a claim about the 
phenomenal properties of the two subjects’ experiences. And as the discussion conducted in the 
previous paragraphs brought out, pending suitable accounts of how to individuate conceptual 
capacities and properties, it is also hard to evaluate if interpreted as a claim about the presentational 
characters of their respective experiences.20 
 
                                                 
20  We should note that Hanson, due to his broadly holistic account of (experiential) content, must be understood as 
rejecting the building block model. Moreover, he would claim that the sense in which the painter and the child see 
the same thing or property is to be understood not in terms of the phenomenology of experience, but in terms of the 
background beliefs they may share. On his account, recall, Tycho and Kepler both see the sun, but in what seeing it as 
the sun amounts to they differ. If they see the same, then only to the extent that the complements of the seeing that 
locution are the same. Strictly speaking, however, even this is not quite accurate. For the concepts that figure in these 
complements will be articulated in their respective background views in different ways and thus have a (perhaps 
slightly) different significance for each of them. 
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In light of these issues, I contend that at least in its current shape, Fish’s account is too 
underdeveloped to enable us to understand how on it, the phenomenon of expert vision can be 
accommodated and how it can be squared with the idea that both the expert and the non-expert have 
something perceptually in common. 
4.5 BASIC ACQUAINTANCE AND PROJECTION EFFECTS 
Charitably put, the issues raised in the previous two sections could be construed as invitations for Fish 
to further elaborate on various aspects of his view so as to enable us to get a better sense of how he 
manages to accommodate certain varieties of phenomenal variation, notably expert vision. In this 
section, I show, first, that even if all these issues could be resolved, Fish’s account is still at odds with 
a claim that at least some relationalists hold dear: Basic Acquaintance (4.5.1). Second, I argue that 
there are certain cases of doxastic phenomenal variation that Fish cannot accommodate in principle: 
projection effects. As I illustrate via the extended discussion of a specific empirical case, his account 
also lacks the resources to accommodate such cases in some alternative fashion (4.5.2). 
4.5.1 Basic Acquaintance 
As we saw, Fish’s account of how to accommodate expert vision is problematic and must be developed 
further to be intelligible. At first blush, the idea seems clear enough: as an expert in a given area, one 
knows more about the pertinent facts. Over the course of one’s becoming an expert, one develops 
visual recognitional conceptual capacities that are different from or more sophisticated than those of 
the layperson. This in turn makes one sensitive to additional or different facts. But if the presentational 
character of the expert’s experience is generated by different conceptual capacities than that of the 
layperson, it may well contain different facts. And since the acquaintance properties, the phenomenal 
properties, and the phenomenal character of a subject’s experience are said to strongly depend on 
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which facts the experience’s presentational character contains, the phenomenal character of the 
expert’s experience may well differ from that of the layperson’s experience as well. It appears, thus, 
that on Fish’s account, what one knows can very well affect the phenomenal character of one’s 
experience.  
In the previous two sections, I argued that what at first blush looks clear enough falls apart once 
we look at the details more closely. But suppose that all the issues previously raised could be 
satisfactorily resolved and that Fish’s account turned out to accommodate expert vision and, thus, at 
least some cases of Doxastically Variable Experiential Phenomenology.21 Again, I take it that it 
would be a virtue of Fish’s account if he succeeded in accommodating such effects. But I also contend 
that at least some relationalists should be wary of Fish’s account, especially of his appeal to the 
possession of conceptual capacities as a necessary condition on a subject’s having an experience with 
a presentational character in the first place. Recall that following Kirk 2005, Fish suggests that at least 
for some conceptual capacities, having the relevant capacity may not require that the subject 
possessing it be a language user. He is sympathetic to this view because he is hesitant to bind “our 
very ability to have conscious visual experiences to the possession of language” (Fish 2009, p. 74).  
Engaging in a general inquiry into how concept possession and language may be connected would 
lead us too far afield. For the sake of the argument, I simply concede that having a language may not 
in general be necessary for one to have conceptual capacities, nor for one to have conscious (visual) 
experiences. For present purposes, what matters is something else: on Kirk’s account, being a 
conscious perceiver requires the possession of conceptual capacities in the following sense: one must 
be able, inter alia, to acquire, retain, interpret, and use information, e.g. by way of assessing situations 
and choosing between alternative courses of action on the basis of such information (cf. Fish 2009, p. 
73, citing Kirk 2005, p. 89). In the present context, the problem with this requirement is that it is hard 
to see how the relevant capacity to acquire, retain, interpret, and use information in such ways could 
                                                 
21  At least some of the issues raised in the last section depend on Fish’s contention that one should be able to show that 
the expert and the layperson have something perceptually in common. His work might thus be significantly eased if 
this contention were dropped.   
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fail to rely on epistemic abilities, or indeed, how it could fail to be an epistemic capacity. But if one 
cannot characterize such an ability without referring to epistemic relations obtaining between the 
perceiver and his or her environment, then for Fish to endorse an account of the kind Kirk suggests 
would make it rather difficult for him to also accommodate a claim that at least some relationalists 
hold dear: Basic Acquaintance, the claim that acquaintance is independent of and more basic than 
any epistemic relation perceivers may stand in with their surroundings.22  
If Fish were to accommodate Basic Acquaintance, it would not be enough for him to show that 
on an account like Kirk’s, we can understand at least some of the conceptual capacities one must have 
to get acquainted with facts as independent of the mastery of language. Rather, he would need to argue 
for the more ambitious claim that the relevant capacities can be characterized independently of the 
perceiver’s standing in any kind of epistemic relation with the environment. For if acquaintance 
requires the possession of conceptual capacities and if such possession in turn requires that the 
possessing subject stand in epistemic relations with her environment, acquaintance simply cannot be 
more basic than, and independent of, epistemic relations.  
For our purposes, it will be enough to simply note this tension of Fish’s view with other 
relationalist accounts. Whether and in what sense relationalists must hold on to Basic Acquaintance, 
i.e. the idea that the acquaintance relation is more basic than epistemic relations, will very much depend 
on the role acquaintance is being assigned in their overall epistemological picture. In any event, these 
are issues that relationalists must sort out among themselves and since our guiding question is whether 
and to what extent relationalists can provide a helpful account of experiential phenomenology that 
also accommodates phenomena falling under DVEP, pursuing them would distract rather than assist 
us in our inquiry. Accordingly, in the following section, I return to our guiding question and argue that 
even if all the issues raised so far could somehow be resolved, there remains a clearly circumscribed 
class of conceivable cases Fish is in principle barred from accommodating: projection effects. 
                                                 
22  For an example, see again Brewer (2011), pp. 141-143. 
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4.5.2 Projection Effects 
The following discussion will be structured around the discussion of an empirical experiment 
conducted in 2006 by Thorsten Hansen et al., which for simplicity I will refer to as the banana case. 
Though I will be relying on this specific example only, let me note that the current psychological 
literature is rife with studies that are like the banana case in the relevant respect: the explanation 
researchers provide for the effects under consideration relies on the idea that a subject’s beliefs can 
have top-down effects that modify the phenomenal character of the various test subjects’ experience 
directly.  
For some of these experiments, alternative interpretations have been proposed and various 
methodological concerns have been raised. In some cases, follow-up experiments have been 
conducted that were intended to cast doubt on the initial interpretation, but that have in turn also 
been criticized. We cannot wait for the scientific community to reach a final verdict and must work 
with what is currently available. Possibly, as our understanding of the empirical issues involved 
improves, an alternative interpretation of the banana case may come to light and eventually come to 
be accepted. But I contend that the arguments I am offering in the next sections can be adjusted to 
apply to other empirical cases that are taken to involve top-down effects. Accordingly, my arguments 
should not be construed as standing or falling with the credentials of the specific experiment discussed. 
Rather, they should be taken as illustrating the claim that for relationalists like Fish, cases that are said 
to involve top-down effects from beliefs on experiential phenomenology pose a formidable challenge. 
This follows from a general fact about their view: on it, the relevant direct top-down modifications of 
the phenomenal character of a subject’s experience simply cannot occur. 
Given what we know about Fish’s view, the argument for this latter claim can be made rather 
quickly. Recall, first, that on Fish’s account, the presentational character is composed of facts, which 
are in turn construed as necessarily actual pieces of reality. Next, recall that acquaintance is said to be 
a relation that obtains only between subjects and facts so construed—one cannot be acquainted with 
anything that does not exist. Third, on Fish’s view, the phenomenal properties of any given experience 
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are identical with (or, perhaps, supervene on) its acquaintance properties. Accordingly, they, too, 
depend on the existence of suitable mind-independent items. In other words, nothing but the presence 
of suitable facts in the environment of the perceiver can affect the phenomenal properties of the 
perceiver’s experience.23 However, that just means that on Fish’s view, projection effects—effects, recall, 
in which the phenomenal character is modified to match what in light of our knowledge, our beliefs, 
and our prior experience we expect—must be impossible.24 
In what follows, I begin by introducing the banana case, highlighting that on the interpretation 
provided by the researchers who conducted it, it is an example of a projection effect, and showing 
that this particular interpretation is one that Fish cannot endorse (4.5.2.1). I then examine the accounts 
Fish provides for each of the three kinds of illusion he distinguishes—physical (4.5.2.2), cognitive 
                                                 
23  Unless relationalists were to hold (which currently they do not) that the principle of composition governing 
Phenomenal Character Composition is independently sensitive to beliefs, the same would hold for the phenomenal 
character of experience as well. 
24  As Ori Beck has helpfully put it in a recent article, Fish defends a selectionist account. On such accounts, Beck stipulates, 
the subject’s standpoint—a collective term for all the conditions constraining the objects of the perceptual relation—
serves to select which of the many items in the subject’s environment the subject perceives. Also, on such accounts, 
a perception has the phenomenology that it does completely in virtue of the items perceived in the perception. Cf. Beck 
2018, pp. 4-5. Beck opposes selectionist accounts. Selectionists, Beck argues, cannot deal with differences in 
experiential phenomenology that rest on attentional variation or on variations in sex, race, and age. Drawing on 
empirical results that appear to indicate that similarities in phenomenal properties are well-correlated with similarities 
in the subject’s neuro-computational properties, but only poorly correlated with similarities in the perceived 
properties, he suggests (following Pautz 2011, 2014, and 2017) that attending to the same object could result in 
different neuronal response patterns in different subjects. This, he surmises, might yield differences in the ways the 
respective subject’s phenomenal similarity spaces are organized (cf. Beck 2018, pp. 6-7), which would in turn yield 
differences in what color, to the subjects involved, the object looks to be.  
In response, recall that Fish explicitly includes the distribution of attentional resources in his characterization of 
what constrains the generation of the presentational character (P) of a subject’s experience. Fish is thus likely to 
respond that differences in attention do affect which properties feature in P. If so, then pace Beck, cases of attentional 
variation need not provide counterexamples to Fish’s view. The deeper problem in the vicinity, I think, is the one 
discussed in 4.4: on Fish’s view, it remains unclear how to understand how and which mind-independent properties 
are brought into P and how such properties are individuated. Settling whether Beck’s argument succeeds ultimately 
requires settling these issues first. The other two objections presuppose a notion of intersubjective comparability of 
experiential phenomenal properties. Making them stick thus requires an account of such a notion (which, as I noted 
in 4.3, Fish does not provide, and Beck does not provide one either). Finally, Fish argues (in Fish 2009, chapter 5) 
against the idea that the phenomenal properties of a subject’s experience supervene on the neuronal patterns in the 
subject’s brain in such a way that the latter are sufficient to yield the former. Accordingly, Fish might resist an 
assumption that underlies Beck’s third kind of case, viz. that similarities and differences in neuronal response patterns 
correlate with phenomenal similarities and differences.  
In sum, I contend that with respect to the putatively problematic cases Beck levels against Fish’s view, matters 
are less straightforward than he lets on. I am sympathetic with Beck’s conclusion that Fish’s view fails to accommodate 
cases of phenomenal variation, so if Beck’s arguments can be clarified and improved, I would welcome such a result. 
Until then, however, I prefer to rest my case against Fish’s view on arguments that probe the internal intelligibility of 
Fish’s notion of phenomenology in the first place and that show his (related) inability to accommodate putative cases 
of DVEP. 
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(4.5.2.3), and optical illusions (4.5.2.4.)—and show that the banana case cannot be adequately captured 
by any of them. The result is this: while accounts whose proponents, like Hanson, allow direct top-
down effects beliefs may have on the phenomenal character of experience can easily accommodate 
the banana case, Fish’s only hope is to accommodate such effects in some other way. However, his 
account currently lacks the resources to do so. 
4.5.2.1 The Banana Case The psychological experiment I will draw on in what follows to 
illustrate the issues Fish faces with projection effects—the banana case, as I will call it—was conducted 
by Thorsten Hansen and his colleagues and published in a brief communication in nature neuroscience 
(Hansen et al. 2006). In the test condition, Hansen et al. presented subjects with digitized photographs 
of fruits against a uniform gray background (henceforth: the banana object25). Subjects were then tasked 
to adjust the color of the banana object to an achromatic gray. In the control condition, subjects were 
asked to engage in the same kind of adjustment, but instead of the banana object, the item whose 
color was to be adjusted was either a uniform spot of light or a random noise patch. The interesting 
difference between what resulted in the two conditions concerned what color test subjects adjusted 
the item to. In the control condition, this color did not differ significantly from the neutral gray 
background against which the items were presented. In the test condition, however, subjects adjusted 
the color of the banana object not to an achromatic gray, but to a bluish hue. The difference was 
significant and called for an explanation. The explanation Hansen et al. suggested is this: the test 
subjects’ knowledge that bananas are (stereo-)typically yellow affected the way the banana object 
appeared to them. 
(6) [S]ubjects adjusted the banana to a slightly bluish hue—its opponent color—in order 
for it to appear neutral gray. (Hansen et al. 2006, p. 1, emphasis added).  
And further:  
(7) Our knowledge of the world affects our perception […]. …prior knowledge about 
the natural color of fruit objects […] is used together with other local and global 
information about the scene to determine color appearance. This allows the visual 
                                                 
25  The relevant effect was not limited to bananas, but was found for other natural fruit objects, too. 
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system to function and perform even under reduced conditions when only single 
objects are shown under an unknown illuminant, as in our experiments. (Hansen et 
al. 2006, p. 2) 
On Hansen et al.’s interpretation, the banana case illustrates that the phenomenology of 
experience is doxastically variable; the subjects’ background beliefs affect how things appear to them, 
which, it is suggested, is beneficial to the subject since it improves the function of the visual system. 
If Hansen et al. are correct, it is at least in part in virtue of the subjects’ knowledge that bananas are 
(stereo-)typically yellow that the banana object, even if actually gray, still strikes them as yellowish. To 
compensate for this effect—in order for the banana object to appear natural gray, as Hansen et al. put 
it in passage (6)—subjects adjust the color or the banana object to a slightly bluish hue. 
For Hansen et al., the banana case is thus an example of what in the discussion of Hanson’s 
account I labeled projection effects (cf. 2.3.3). If so, the test subjects’ experience of the banana object 
when it has been adjusted to an achromatic gray is such that the color that the banana object is expected 
to have—given their knowledge of, prior experience of, and appurtenant expectations concerning 
bananas—is projected onto it. As a result, the banana object appears to be a color that it is in fact not: 
though being gray, it appears to be slightly yellow. That subjects adjust uniform color spots and noise 
patches to what in fact is (close enough to) achromatic gray in turn suggests that these objects, in 
contrast to the banana object, do not strike subjects as yellowish. This is important to observe since 
between the two conditions, most of the constraints that govern the presentational character of the 
subject’s experience, as Fish would put it, are held constant. More specifically, neither the subject’s 
position vis-à-vis the object, nor the lighting conditions, the subject’s visual acuity, nor the distribution 
of the subject’s attentional resources seem to be factors one could draw on to explain the difference 
between the two conditions. The only potentially relevant factor, arguably, is the fact that in the test 
condition, the object presented is recognizably a depiction of a banana, so that in the two conditions, 
different conceptual-recognitional capacities are deployed.  
Could it be, then, that somehow, the visual conceptual-recognitional capacities that are operative 
in the test condition, but not in the control condition, are responsible for the effect? This, of course, 
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would be an explanation that fits with the explanatory strategy offered by Hansen et al.26 But as we 
saw above, to Fish, this strategy is not available. According to No Acquaintance Without 
Conceptual Capacities, a subject must have the relevant conceptual capacities to have the 
corresponding facts feature in the presentational character of her experience. Patently, the mere 
passive deployment of the relevant conceptual capacities in the subject cannot by itself affect which 
mind-independent facts populate the subject’s environment. And since the phenomenal properties of 
a subject’s experience are said to depend on which facts feature in the presentational character of the 
subject’s experience, which in turn is constrained by which facts actually obtain in the subject’s 
environment, the mere passive deployment of the relevant conceptual capacities cannot, on Fish’s 
view, affect the phenomenal properties of the subject’s experience either. After all, the banana object, 
once adjusted to an achromatic gray, simply does not have the relevant property. Accordingly, there 
is no way any conceptual capacity that test subjects could possess could make that property feature in 
the presentational character of their experiences. As a result, then, Fish must reject Hansen et al.’s 
proposed explanation. Given the constraints his account entails, he must reject as impossible the idea 
that to test subjects, the gray banana object could actually appear yellowish. Let us examine, then, what 
other options Fish may have available to accommodate the case.  
4.5.2.2 Physical Illusions To begin with, let us ask whether the banana case could be 
characterized as what Fish calls a physical illusion. According to Fish, physical illusions are such that to 
subjects who undergo them, objects look “to be a shape and/or color other than the shape or color 
that it really is” (Fish 2009, p. 150). As a characterization of the banana case, this may sound promising. 
                                                 
26  A study conducted by Olkkonen et al. (Olkkonen et al. 2008) adds some further details to the picture. According to 
their results, the effect is robust under varying illuminations, is strongest when the depiction of the banana is realistic, 
and decreases the less realistic the depiction is. Indeed, if subjects are only presented with a mere outline shape, the 
effect disappears. Since the main focus of Olkkonen et al.’s study is to bring out that the effect is stimulus-dependent, 
but illumination-independent, they do not commit to an explanation of the effect in terms of the subjects’ background 
knowledge and only state that such an explanation cannot be ruled out. In the context of Hansen’s proposed 
interpretation of the banana case in terms of the subjects’ knowledge, the indication would be that for projection effects 
to occur, it is not enough for subjects to merely recognize what the item presented is a depiction of. Rather, for the 
subjects’ background beliefs to yield a projection effect, color expectations must be strong enough, which in turn 
requires that the stimulus must sufficiently many characteristic visual features of bananas—shape, shading, and texture. 
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However, the cases Fish has in mind differ from the banana case. In them, subjects are located vis-à-
vis the perceived objects in certain unusual ways, or non-standard lighting conditions obtain. It is these 
factors that are said to serve to explain why, for instance, round things can look elliptical or why red 
things can look orange, such as e.g. a red car parked below a street light, observed in the night.  
Physical illusions, as Fish construes them, are special cases of veridical perceptions—veridical 
perceptions of colored or shaped objects that are had in non-standard circumstances.27 With respect 
to color illusions in particular, he suggests that relationalists can accommodate them by assuming that 
an object’s color is a physical property that is defined not just by “the light reflected by the surface of 
the object (the color signal), but” co-determined by “the ratio of the different elements of this color 
signal to the corresponding elements of the color signal reflected from the surround” (Fish 2009, 
p. 153). 
Drawing on such an account, Fish suggests, the relationalist can assert that “the color a particular 
has will differ according to its surroundings.” This, Fish points out, “is just what the […] [relationalist] 
requires,” since  
(8) [o]n such a conception of color, as the lighting conditions and the reflectance 
properties of an object’s surround change, so would the color that the particular 
possesses. As the color changes, then so does the color fact that has the particular and 
that color property as constituents. Thus, the fact that the subject is acquainted with 
in experiencing the object will indeed change as the relevant viewing conditions 
change, and the relevant phenomenal property of the experience […] will likewise 
change. (Fish 2009, p. 154) 
Suppose we grant that the relational conception of color Fish sketches in passage (8) is indeed fit 
to explain why, if a red car in certain lighting conditions looks orange, our experience can still be said 
to acquaint us with the car’s actual color. Roughly: things that are and look red in certain viewing 
conditions look orange in others.28 In the banana case, however, the lighting conditions, the reflectance 
properties of the surround, the subject’s perspective vis-à-vis the object, her visual acuity, etc.—all 
                                                 
27  In the context of the relational view, the expression ‘veridical perception’ is somewhat misleading. Only what can be 
assessed for veridicality can possibly be or fail to b veridical—which to the phenomenology of experience cannot 
apply. Patently, what Fish has in mind are cases in which things look the way they in fact are. 
28  What this proposal shows is that on Fish’s view, lighting conditions do not just serve to constrain which facts can 
feature in the presentational character of one’s experience, but also play a role in generating some of the facts—here: 
color facts—that then feature in the presentational character of the subject’s experience in the first place. 
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these factors are held constant between the test condition and the control setting. Accordingly, it 
remains unclear which facts the relationalist could cite that can play the dual role of a) being causally 
responsible for the fact that the banana object looks yellowish, while b) lacking a corresponding effect 
on the subject’s experience when the relevant object is a uniform color spot or a noise patch. 
Accordingly, there is no obvious way in which the account Fish draws on to accommodate the car 
case would enable us to accommodate the banana case. For why, one can ask, should the banana look 
yellowish, while the color spots and the noise patches do not, even though they are being presented 
in the exact same setting? 
If Fish’s current sketch of a relational view of color appears to be ill-suited to accommodate the 
banana case, perhaps one could improve on the relational account of color so as to specifically include 
texture and shade properties in what co-determines an object’s color. Perhaps on such an account, for 
all the fruit items tested, the combination of their characteristic shade and texture properties with a 
gray background could be held to yield experiences with phenomenal properties regarding color that 
deviate from achromatic gray in the required ways, and independently of whether the subject 
recognizes the objects in question. Accordingly, if comparable significant differences with respect to 
the adjustment of the color of objects (if presented against a gray background) were found between 
a) suitably fruit-textured, yet not recognizably fruit-shaped items and b) differently-textured control 
items, such findings could serve as supporting evidence for such a hypothesis. 
We can neither draw on Hansen et al. 2006 nor on Olkkonen et al. 2008 to settle the issue. After 
all, in their experimental settings, subjects did recognize what objects they were presented with. In 
general, the empirical evidence with respect to the influence of texture on color appearance is fairly 
mixed. On the one hand, it is clear that for texture detection, both luminance and color detection are 
relevant. Conversely, some results indicate that at least in certain cases, surface texture properties can 
affect color appearance (e.g. Amookht et al. 2014). Also, color and texture are not always processed 
completely independently in visual segmentation (see e.g. Saarela & Landy 2012). On the other hand, 
subjects can discount texture and shape properties in color matching tasks (see. e.g. Giesel & 
Gegenfurtner 2010). Also, often, texture and color are processed separately (see Cavina-Pratesi et al. 
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2010). Moreover, while there is a lot of empirical work on how texture, color, and shape cues can 
serve as diagnostic tools in the context of object recognition tasks in various conditions, work on 
whether these properties may influence color appearance outside the contexts of such tasks is less 
prevalent. 
To sum up, to argue that the banana case is a physical illusion, Fish cannot rely on the relational 
account of color he sketches since the factors that, on it, are said to account for changes in color 
appearance are held constant in the banana case.29 Moreover, the empirical relations between texture, 
shade, and luminance properties, on the one hand, and color appearances on the other are not 
obviously as tight as he would need them to be for it to be possible to modify the relational account 
of color so as to accommodate the case. It is thus on Fish to show that an empirically adequate 
relational account of color is available, or possible, that enables him to accommodate the banana case. 
Before we examine Fish’s accounts of the two other kinds of illusions he distinguishes, let us step 
back and abstract from the details of the banana case. As I indicated earlier, there are numerous cases 
in the contemporary empirical literature of which it is claimed that beliefs—or cognitive states more 
generally, i.e. also e.g. desires, hopes, or fears—directly influence the phenomenal character of the 
respective subject’s experience. It is worth emphasizing that since Fish cannot accommodate the idea 
that such effects are possible, he must insist that for each of these putative cases, some alternative 
explanation is true. Given the structure of his relational account, every such case poses a serious 
challenge for Fish. We may even say that the fate of Fish’s account is tightly linked to whether he 
succeeds in addressing each of these cases so as to rule out projection effects. Since we cannot rule 
out in advance that finding alternative accounts for each of these cases is possible, the mere prevalence 
of such cases fails to show that Fish’s relational view is false. Yet cases like the banana case exert a 
significant amount of pressure on Fish’s relational view. This pressure does not affect proponents of 
                                                 
29  Incidentally, it can also be doubted that Fish can easily help himself to any relational account of color. For at least on 
some such accounts (e.g. Matthen 2005), color identity for subjects is spelled out in part in terms of the epistemic 
practices the relevant subject engages in. However, if it is accepted that epistemic practices co-determine color identity, 
this would again seem to be at odds with the relationalist idea that acquaintance (including acquaintance with color 
properties) is more basic than epistemic relations. If Fish wants to rely on a relational view of color, it will thus be 
important for him to ensure that this view is not at odds with his broader relationalist commitments.  
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accounts on which projection effects are not ruled out in principle—such as, for instance, Hanson’s 
account that we discussed in chapter 2, but as we will see, also Siegel’s account (see chapter 7) or 
Gupta’s account (see chapter 9). 
4.5.2.3 Cognitive Illusions The second kind of illusions Fish discusses, cognitive illusions, comprises 
cases of misclassification, in which we take something we see to be something that it is not, such as 
when someone who is afraid of snakes takes a coil of rope nestled under a log to be a snake. Such 
cases, Fish suggests, cannot plausibly be accommodated by making a move analogous to the one made 
in the case of physical color illusions. As we saw, with respect to the latter, Fish thinks that 
relationalists should draw on a relational account of color and propose that there is indeed a fact that 
in seeing e.g. a red car as orange the subject is acquainted with: in certain lighting conditions, the car’s 
being red just is to look like an orange car would in ordinary lighting conditions. In cases of cognitive 
illusions, however, there may well be no suitable fact available for the subject to be acquainted with—
the environment in which a snake illusion occurs, for example, may be completely devoid of snake-
involving facts. Thus, since the strategy Fish employs for addressing color illusions depends on the 
availability of suitable facts in the subject’s environment that can then be understood relationally, there 
is no obvious way to apply this strategy to cognitive illusions. 
On Fish’s alternative proposal, a subject who upon seeing a rope suffers a snake illusion will 
typically be acquainted with many facts about that rope—its being brown, say, its being coiled, or its 
being nested under a log. Importantly, however, Fish insists that such a subject will not be acquainted 
with the rope’s property of being a rope. In line with his suggestion regarding expert vision that we 
discussed earlier, Fish claims that there is a phenomenal difference between the experience of a subject 
who sees and recognizes a rope as a rope and the experience of a subject who sees the rope, yet fails 
to recognize it. The reasons why no such recognition takes place can be various and may have to do 
with idiosyncratic facts about the subject and their history. It may for instance be that phobic subjects 
may suffer a snake illusion because they are, due to their fear of snakes, much more readily disposed 
to deploy the conceptual-recognitional capacities that would be appropriately deployed upon seeing 
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actual snakes than a non-phobic subject. For this is the last element in Fish’s account of cognitive 
illusions: subjects who suffer such illusions deploy certain conceptual-recognitional capacities, but do 
so erroneously. 
Recall, however, that on Fish’s view, the erroneous deployment of such a capacity cannot change 
which mind-independent facts populate the tract of the environment the subject is looking at. In our 
example, the erroneous deployment of the conceptual capacity for recognizing snakes cannot bring 
about or make visible any snakeish facts that the subject could get acquainted with. But since for Fish, 
the phenomenal character of a subject’s experience solely depends on what facts the subject’s 
experience acquaints her with, it follows that the mere fact that some conceptual capacity is deployed 
erroneously will not alter the phenomenal properties of a subject’s experience. Accordingly, Fish 
suggests that when a subject erroneously deploys the relevant conceptual capacity, she may, based on 
that deployment, come to believe, erroneously, that she does indeed see a snake and that she has an 
experience endowed with suitable phenomenal properties. In fact, having such beliefs is what having 
the illusion amounts to—it does not, emphatically, have in fact the kind of phenomenology that her 
experience would have if the subject were in fact acquainted with an actual snake. 
A consequence of this account is that one cannot have a cognitive illusion of a snake without 
coming to believe that the object one sees is a snake (see Fish 2009, p. 171, where he acknowledges 
this explicitly). Again, according to Fish’s version of Constitution, there simply cannot be anything 
snakeish in the phenomenology of the subject’s experience unless an actual snake is in fact around 
and perceived. Instead, he thinks that the phenomenology of the phobic subject’s experience of the 
snake illusion may be exactly like the phenomenology of the corresponding experience of someone 
who is a non-expert with respect to ropehood—of someone, that is, who looks at the rope in 
sufficiently similar conditions, picks up on various facts about the rope, but lacks the conceptual 
capacity to recognize the fact of its being a rope. 
Can Fish utilize this account of cognitive illusions to accommodate the banana case? Might he 
not insist that upon seeing the banana object, and given their knowledge of what color bananas 
typically are, subjects are disposed to deploy the conceptual recognitional capacity that in the good 
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case picks up on an object’s being yellow? Consider the specific situation in which the banana object 
has been adjusted to an achromatic gray. Could Fish not suggest that in such a context, the test subjects 
erroneously deploy the conceptual capacity for picking up on yellow(ish) things, thus come to believe 
that what they see is still yellow(ish), and respond to what the beliefs thus formed by adjusting the 
color of the banana object further towards a blueish hue?30 By pursuing this explanatory strategy, it 
seems, Fish should be well-poised to account for the phenomena of the case. 
There are, however, (at least) two related reasons to resist this strategy. Fish himself mentions 
one, when in the context of considering physical illusions he thinks about how to accommodate color 
illusions. He briefly considers and then rejects the following suggestion: when a subject has the illusory 
experience of a red car that under a street lamp looks orange, her experience simply lacks a 
phenomenal property that corresponds to the car’s color. What happens is simply that the subject 
suffering the illusion erroneously deploys the conceptual capacity associated with picking up on 
something’s being orange. As a result, the subject comes to believe both that the car is orange and 
that she has an experience with the appropriate phenomenal character (Fish 2009, p. 151).  
Clearly, what Fish here considers and rejects is the strategy of interpreting the car case as a 
cognitive illusion. Why, then, does Fish oppose it? The reason pertinent to our discussion is this: 
according to him, we see the shape of the car under the streetlight in part by seeing the color it merely 
appears to be. On the proposed account, however, the subject does not become acquainted with the 
car’s color at all. She just believes that she does. If so, however, then we are, Fish contends, left 
“without a plausible explanation of how it is we can nevertheless veridically see the car’s shape given 
that we fail to see its color” (ibid., p. 115). If this counts as a reason to resist treating the car case as 
one in which the subject’s experience has no phenomenal property corresponding to color, then by 
Fish’s own lights, it should also work as a reason to resist treating the banana case as a cognitive 
                                                 
30  In the snake case, Fish’s paradigm example of a cognitive illusion, what is misrecognized is the kind of object one faces, 
not what further property that kind of object might instantiate. In the banana case, the misrecognition concerns not 
what kind of object it is, but another property: its color. While there is thus a slight disanalogy between the two cases, 
I do not see that this alone would prevent Fish from treating the banana case as a case of a cognitive illusion. For it is 
not obvious why Fish should have to think that cognitive illusions can only concern kind properties. 
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illusion. If, that is, seeing the shape of the banana object is as much a matter of seeing its apparent 
color as seeing the shape of the car is a matter of seeing its apparent color, then Fish can hardly suggest 
that subjects who look at the banana object when its color is adjusted to an achromatic gray do get 
acquainted with the object’s shape, but fail to get acquainted with its color. 
Suppose, however, we surmise, against Fish, that subjects need not detect an object’s color 
properties to determine its shape—perhaps all that doing so requires is that they detect differences in 
luminance or texture (and that the required capacities are sufficiently independent of color detection). 
Even so, problems arise if we ask how, in treating the banana case as a cognitive illusion, we are to 
characterize what happens when subjects adjust the color of the banana object towards a bluish hue. 
To see why, suppose first—pace Fish—that the test subjects’ knowledge that bananas are typically 
yellow and the expectation that the object recognized as a banana is, too, can indeed co-determine the 
phenomenology of the subjects’ experiences. Assume, further, with regard to whatever processes in 
the visual system may underpin a subject’s capacity to have experiences with a specifically visual 
phenomenal character, that these processes are sensitive to both bottom-up and top-down 
information, where bottom-up information includes sensory input and top-down information 
cognitive states such as beliefs. The phenomenal character of a subject’s experience, we may then 
surmise, reflects what results when information flowing from the different sources is factored in.31 
On such a view, for subjects to adjust the stimulus material is to modify one of the various factors 
that jointly generate the phenomenology of their experience. And as they make such adjustments, the 
phenomenology of their respective experiences changes gradually, according to the specifics of 
whatever function takes all the relevant factors as input and outputs some experiential 
phenomenology. On this view, it is these gradual changes in the phenomenology of their experience 
that subjects keep responding to as they engage in a series of color adjustments until, eventually, the 
phenomenology of their experience is such that they judge that the banana object has now been 
adjusted to an achromatic gray. 
                                                 
31  See Clark (2013), Hohwy (2014), and Lupyan (2015) for accounts that emphasize the importance of top-down effects 
for the generation of percepts. 
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Contrast, next, how different the story to be told would be if one sought to treat the banana case 
as a cognitive illusion. To begin with, note that it is quite unclear on what grounds Fish would be able 
to claim that in the test condition, the erroneous deployment of whatever conceptual capacities may 
be required for the recognition of different shades of yellow is confined to some specific set of 
conditions or to some specific interval. Why, for instance, should it be limited to the time between the 
point in time at which the banana object’s color has been adjusted to an achromatic gray, say, and the 
point in time at which it has been adjusted to the bluish hue where the adjustment terminates. For all 
we know, the cognitive illusion could be quite widespread, so that possibly, many (if not most) of the 
experiences test subjects undergo as they adjust the banana object’s color would have to be classified 
as cognitive illusions. Consequently, at least to the extent that they concern the banana object, for 
many (if not most) of these experiences, it would follow that subjects would merely believe to have, 
but in fact lack experiences with a phenomenal character associated with the experience of different 
shades of yellow. 
Clearly, as test subjects adjust the banana object’s color, they modify the facts that obtain in their 
environment, viz. which color properties the banana object instantiates. However, unless Fish 
provides a reason for thinking that the extent of cognitive illusions involved is limited, he would have 
to concede that in many if not most experiences subjects undergo in the course of the test condition, 
the relevant color facts do not actually make it into the presentational character of their respective 
experiences. Accordingly, the test subjects would fail to get acquainted with these facts. Indeed, if 
between any two adjustments of the banana object’s color, each adjustment involved was followed by 
a further cognitive illusion on the part of the subject, then on Fish’s view, the actual phenomenology 
of that subject’s experience would not change at all! But why, then, would they come to believe that it 
does? Relatedly, what would make them stop adjusting the color at some point?  
These questions bring us face-to-face with the following fact: if Fish were to treat the banana case 
as a case of cognitive illusion, he would have to suggest that as subjects adjust the banana object’s 
color, they somehow engage in a systematically connected series of erroneous deployments of the 
conceptual capacity (or capacities) that, if deployed appropriately, would make visible different degrees 
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of an item’s being yellow. In tandem with the subsequent erroneous deployments of these capacities, 
Fish would have to insist, subjects come to believe that the phenomenal character of their subsequent 
experiences changes—erroneously, though, for in fact, according to Fish, no such change obtains. 
And this process would continue until, eventually, subjects would (somehow) deploy the conceptual 
capacity that in the good case picks up on an item’s being gray—again erroneously—which would 
then lead them to believe that the banana object has now been suitably adjusted. As a result, they 
would cease to adjust its color any further. 
The problem with this story should be obvious. Given that Fish would have to claim that nothing 
in the phenomenology of subject’s experience changes, it remains mysterious how the test subjects’ 
process of adjusting the banana object’s color should be construed as a response to actual changes in 
that object’s color properties. Also, we are left without an explanation of what should bring about the 
systematically connected series of erroneous deployments of conceptual capacities that Fish needs to 
draw on to make sense of the adjustment process and of the fact that it eventually terminates. By 
comparison, it seems much more plausible to say what Fish is barred from saying, i.e. that as subjects 
adjust the color of the banana object up to a certain point, they do so in response to actual differences 
in the phenomenal character of their subsequent experiences. 
The situation is further aggravated by the following fact: when Fish discusses the case of the snake 
illusion, he contrasts the illusion as had by a cowardly phobic person with that had by a more 
courageous counterpart. Upon suffering the snake illusion, he stipulates, the coward flees the scene. 
Never revisiting it, the coward may remain forever convinced that what he saw was indeed a snake 
and thus hold on to what according to Fish is simply a false judgment about the coward’s experience: 
that its phenomenal character contained suitably snakeish properties (though it did not).  
The coward’s more courageous counterpart, on the other hand, engages in further perceptual 
investigation and soon realizes the following fact: what she initially took to be a snake is nothing but 
a rope (or, if she lacks the concept of a rope: not a snake). As Fish suggests, further perceptual 
investigation “will often result in false judgments of this kind—and hence illusions of this kind—
being swiftly overcome” (Fish 2009, p. 170). However, Fish also concedes that in some extraordinary 
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situations, the illusory effects are much more stable. Such may be situations that involve the ingestion 
of drugs, for example, or situations that involve mental illness. Returning to the banana case, observe 
that as they engage in their task, test subjects continuously attend to the object’s color. Also, since 
there are no time constraints, they can take as much time as they need. Their situation is thus quite 
unlike the one that the cowardly snake phobic finds himself in and much more like that of his 
courageous counterpart. Accordingly, one should expect that if, upon looking at the banana object, 
test subjects were to suffer from some initial cognitive illusion, their subsequent perceptual 
investigation of the banana object should make it likely for that cognitive illusion to be swiftly 
overcome. If so, and on the plausible assumption that Hansen et al.’s test subjects neither suffered 
from effects of drug ingestion nor from mental illness, one should expect, on Fish’s account, that the 
effect Hansen et al. found should not even occur.32 
In sum, the strategy of characterizing the banana case as a cognitive illusion holds little promise. 
As we will see shortly, the situation is not better if we try to characterize it as a case of the third kind 
of illusion Fish accommodates: as an optical illusion. 
4.5.2.4 Optical Illusions According to Fish, in an optical illusion, certain features of the 
perceived scene function so as to trick or mislead our perceptual mechanisms (cf. Fish 2009, p. 173). 
This, Fish contends, is the case e.g. on Richard Gregory’s interpretation of the Müller-Lyer illusion 
(cf. Gregory 1970, p. 91). According to it, the difference in the direction of the arrowheads on the 
ends of the two horizontal lines amounts to a difference in what perspective cues the respective 
arrangements provide, which in turn leads us to interpret the two horizontal lines involved as differing 
in length. The key point, as Fish has it, is that “because of the way the lines have been contrived to 
produce misleading perspective cues, we cannot but passively deploy an inappropriate conceptual-
recognitional capacity […]” (ibid., pp. 173-4, emphasis added). As in the case of cognitive illusions, 
                                                 
32  Though I have not emphasized the point, Fish stipulates that at least typically, cognitive illusions are dues to 
idiosyncratic disturbances in the subject’s doxastic state at the time of the experience. Accordingly, the default 
expectation should be that if cognitive illusions occur, they should be rare and not, as in Hansen et al.’s experiment, 
stable across a number of test subjects. 
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thus, in optical illusions, too, it is the erroneous deployment of conceptual-recognitional capacities 
that putatively explains why the subject endorses both the erroneous belief that the two lines differ in 
length and the erroneous belief that she has an experience that has a corresponding phenomenal 
character. 
There is, however, a complication. For as most people familiar with the Müller-Lyer illusion will 
readily confirm, even subjects familiar with the illusion claim to experience it, even though they do 
not actually form the belief that the lines differ in length. However, Fish claims, while it is true that 
such subjects no longer come to believe that the lines actually differ in length, the relevant features of 
the experience still make people affirm that the lines look to be different in length. The explanation, 
according to Fish, is that the relevant conceptual-recognitional capacity operates at such a low level 
(presumably: of the subject’s cognitive hierarchy) that it cannot be completely offset by higher 
cognitive factors. Since, given the right kind of cues, it cannot but be deployed, subjects come to 
believe, albeit erroneously, that they have an experience with the kind of phenomenal character their 
experience would have if the capacity had been deployed non-erroneously. At the same time, given 
what they know, they resist forming the belief that things are the way they take them to look. 
With this characterization of optical illusions in hand, it is easy to see why the strategy of 
characterizing the banana case as an optical illusion is not promising either. Arguably, optical illusions, 
as Fish understand them, are very much like cognitive illusions. In contrast to the former, optical 
illusions are just more stable. They are hard-wired responses to certain features of the environment 
that inevitably trigger the deployment of certain conceptual capacities, even in cases in which such 
deployment is inappropriate and even though the subject may well know that deploying it will be 
inappropriate. Accordingly, if the banana case were to be treated as an optical illusion, one should 
certainly want to have an account specifying both why the effects Hansen et al. describe should have 
come to be hard-wired in the relevant way and why they occur in the test condition, but not in the 
control condition. Moreover, it remains that like above, to treat the banana case as an optical illusion 
would be to claim that many (if not all) of the experiences test subjects undergo in the test condition 
lack the phenomenal properties associated with the various shades of yellow that the banana object is 
107 
 
merely believed to be. Accordingly, the problems we raised for the attempt to characterize the banana 
case as a case of cognitive illusion would arise with equal force for the attempt to characterize that 
case as an optical illusion. 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
This concludes our discussion of Fish’s view. In 4.3. and 4.4, I argued that Fish’s account raises a 
number of pressing questions that he needs to address to show how his account of expert vision is 
supposed to work and how it can accommodate the intuition that experts and laypeople have 
something perceptually in common. In 4.5, I showed that even if all these questions could be 
addressed, Fish’s account should still seem to be unattractive to relationalists who endorse Basic 
Acquaintance and thus think that the acquaintance relation is more basic than epistemic relations. 
Finally, I argued that there is a kind of effect beliefs may have on experiential phenomenology—
projection effects—that Fish is in principle barred from accommodating. And as the extensive 
discussion of the so-called banana case illustrated, the resources his view currently makes available do 
not enable him to provide a satisfactory alternative way of explaining away such effects, either.  
As for our guiding question, the result, briefly put, is that on Fish’s view, the notion of 
phenomenology is intrinsically problematic for several reasons. Most importantly, perhaps, is the 
problem that it draws on the idea that conceptual capacities lift properties into the presentational 
character of experience, where it remains unclear on what notion of conceptual capacities and on what 
conception of properties this account could be based. With respect to the issue of doxastic variability, 
there is, on Fish’s view, only very limited conceptual leeway for accommodating Doxastically 
Variable Experiential Phenomenology. Currently, his account of expert vision raises too many 
questions to allow a clear verdict. Moreover, for the reason sketched in 4.5.1, it may be unattractive 
to many relationalists anyway. Apart from these issues, projection effects pose a formidable challenge 
for Fish’s view—one that at least currently, he has no resources for addressing. Such effects are 
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conceivable. And as the banana case illustrates, empirical researchers do draw on them to explain their 
findings. That Fish cannot accommodate them thus puts him at an additional disadvantage. For not 
just the banana case, but arguably any case that appears to involve projection effects must pose a 
comparable threat to Fish’s relational view. As I show next, Brewer’s version of the relational view 
improves on at least some of these issues. However, as we will see, it faces many problems of its own.
109 
 
5.0 RELATIONALISM II: BREWER’S OBJECT VIEW 
An alternative version of the relational view, developed by Bill Brewer, is the so-called Object View 
(OV). According to (OV),  
(1) [t]he most fundamental characterization of our perceptual relation with the physical world 
is to be given in terms of a relation of conscious acquaintance between perceiving subjects 
and the particular mind-independent physical objects that are presented to them in 
perception as genuine direct objects […]. (Brewer 2011, p. 94) 
Like Fish, Brewer, too, characterizes experience in terms of conscious acquaintance. Moreover, 
he, too, embraces a version of Irreducibility, claiming that “perceptual presentation irreducibly 
consists in conscious acquaintance with mind-independent physical objects” (ibid.).1 
Unlike Fish, however, and like Campbell, Brewer construes acquaintance not as a two-place, but 
as a three-place relation:   
(2) [P]erceptual experience is a matter of a person’s conscious acquaintance with various 
mind-independent physical objects from a given spatiotemporal point of view, in a particular 
sense modality, and in certain specific circumstances of perception (such as lighting conditions in the 
case of vision). These factors effectively conjoin to constitute a third relatum of the 
relation of conscious acquaintance that holds between perceivers and the mind-
independent physical direct objects of their perceptual experience. (Brewer 2011, 
p. 96) 
As passage (2) indicates, on Brewer’s view, at least some of the factors that Fish takes to constrain 
which facts feature in the presentational character of a subject’s experience appear as what jointly 
constitutes the third relatum—the location vis-à-vis the environing items and lighting conditions, for 
                                                 
1  See also Brewer 2018, p. 3: “Acquaintance is an unanalyzable conscious relation that we are enabled to stand in with 
such things [i.e. particular concrete worldly objects] by the normal functioning of our brains and perceptual systems.” 
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example. There are, however, some differences to Fish’s view;2 a few factors that Fish thinks govern 
the presentational character remain absent in Brewer’s characterization—most pertinently, for our 
purposes: what conceptual-recognitional capacities the subject possesses.3 Also, whereas Fish talks 
about the phenomenal dimension of experience in terms of its phenomenal properties, its phenomenal 
character, and of what it’s like to undergo an experience, Brewer generally prefers to talk in terms of how 
physical objects look. That said, for an object to look some way in a subject’s experience of it, he 
maintains, is “a fully phenomenological fact about the subject’s experience” (Brewer 2011, p. 120). 
To determine the extent to which Brewer can accommodate Doxastically Variable 
Experiential Phenomenology (DVEP), we must examine his conception of ways objects can look 
and ask to what extent such ways can be modified by what subjects believe. Here is how I proceed: I 
begin by briefly introducing Brewer’s central distinction between the notions of thinly and thickly 
looking (5.1). Focusing on the former notion first, I examine the notion of visually relevant similarities 
on which it rests (5.2). I then discuss ways in which objects can thinly look the same, ask what a 
Brewerian notion of Constitution would look like, and uncover a constraint Brewer’s account entails 
on the ways objects can thinly look (5.3). Next, I show how this constraint also affects the ways objects 
can thickly look some way (5.4) and compare Brewer’s view with Fish’s, suggesting that Brewer’s view 
may appear to be better equipped to address at least some of the issues with which, as we saw, Fish 
struggles (5.5). However, I argue that appearances are misleading and that Brewer’s account is 
problematic as well (5.6). I close by summing up the discussion (5.7). 
                                                 
2  One obvious difference is that on Brewer’s view, the mind-independent items that experience is said to acquaint the 
subject with are objects, not facts. Another difference that I will ignore in what follows is that Fish explicitly mentions 
the perceiver’s visual acuity and the distribution of attentional resources as constraining what facts feature in the 
presentational character. On Brewer’s account, deficiencies in visual acuity can be characterized as cases of degraded 
acquaintance (cf. Brewer 2011, p. 116), differences in attention may be construed as differences in which similarities 
between the objects perceived and paradigm exemplars become visually relevant or which ones will be registered 
(again, I will ignore this in what follows, but the terminology will become clearer shortly). 
3  As indicated earlier, listing conceptual-recognitional capacities as part of what constitutes the third relatum would 
seem ill-advised. Plausibly, an account of conceptual capacities will involve the claim that for one to conceptually 
recognize something is, at least in many cases, to represent it (in some sense) as being a certain way. Listing such a 
capacity as part of the acquaintance relation would thus threaten to undermine the relationalists’ anti-
representationalist commitments. 
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5.1 THINLY AND THICKLY LOOKING OBJECTS 
Objects, Brewer thinks, can thinly look some way, or thickly. Here is how he introduces the two notions: 
(3) [A]n object of acquaintance o thinly looks F iff o has, from the point of view and in 
the circumstances of perception in question, appropriate visually relevant similarities 
with paradigm examples of F. […] [S]ome, but not all, of these thin looks will be 
salient to us in any particular case, for example, as we switch between the duck and 
rabbit looks of the duck-rabbit diagram. I say that an object, o, thickly looks F iff o 
thinly looks F and the subject registers its visually relevant similarities with paradigm 
exemplars of F. The paradigm case of registration as I understand it involves the active 
deployment of the concept of an F; but (OV) also recognizes a variety of significantly 
less demanding modes of registration, including those involved in systematic 
behavioral responses, such as simple sorting, and those involved in the noticing of 
various organizational, orientational, or other gestalt phenomena. (Brewer 2018, 
pp. 3-4) 
As this passage reveals, at least paradigmatically, for objects to thickly look some way, e.g. F, to a 
subject, the subject must deploy the concept of an F. The characterization of thinly looking F, on the 
other hand, relies merely on the notion of visually relevant similarities. For things to look thinly some 
way, concepts, it appears, are not yet in play. Ultimately, it is in Brewer’s account of thickly looking 
some way that we will see how, on his view, the conceptual and the phenomenal interact and the 
extent to which, he thinks, beliefs may influence the phenomenal aspect of experience. But as we see 
in passage (3), thickly looking some way is defined in terms of thinly looking some way. Accordingly, nothing 
can thickly look F unless it thinly looks F, too. Whatever may constrain how objects can thinly look 
on Brewer’s view will thus constrain how objects may thickly look as well. As we will see shortly, 
Brewer’s account of ways of thinly looking implies such a constraint—one, I will argue, that limits his 
capacity to accommodate DVEP. 
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5.2 WAYS OF THINLY LOOKING AND VISUALLY RELEVANT SIMILARITY 
RELATIONS 
In passage (3) above, how an object of one’s acquaintance thinly looks is characterized in terms of 
visually relevant similarities. What, then, are these similarity relations between objects and paradigm 
exemplars of various kinds of objects?4 Qua relationalist, Brewer’s anti-representationalist 
commitments clearly bar him from construing such similarity relations in representational terms. He 
cannot, that is, claim that the experiences of the objects in question are similar in how they represent 
things as being. How else are these relations to be understood, then? As he presents it, I contend, 
Brewer’s alternative notion is ambiguous between two readings, each of which raises further questions. 
As evidenced by passage (3) and many similar passages, the similarity relations that Brewer claims 
ground and explain5 the way things thinly look are thus said to obtain between mind-independent 
physical objects themselves—the various objects one is looking at, on the one hand, and suitable 
paradigm exemplars of various kinds of objects (see Brewer 2011, p. 97 and passim) on the other. On 
this reading of the notion of the similarity relations in question, if an object o thinly looks F, it is thus 
o itself that has visually relevant similarities with paradigm exemplars of F. In a slogan that Brewer 
occasionally uses, “the way things look are the ways (perceptually presented) things look from that point 
of view in those circumstances” (Brewer 2011, p. 99 and passim). 
As this last quote indicates, Brewer insists that what these similarities between objects and 
paradigm exemplars are, as well as which of them are visually relevant, is specific to the point of view 
                                                 
4  Brewer admits that he commits himself, without defense, to a controversial account of concept possession on which 
paradigm exemplars play an essential role in acquiring (at least very basic kinds of) concepts and applying them with 
understanding (cf. Brewer 2011, p. 105). Pending the specifics of such an account, making the notion of a paradigm 
exemplars more precise will be difficult, as will be any attempt to assess it. In what follows, I suppress discussion of 
the notion of a paradigm exemplars and focus instead on Brewer’s notion of similarity relations, using only the 
assumption that (at least paradigmatically), paradigm exemplars will be mind-independent physical objects as well 
(special accommodations may be required with respect to concepts of mythical creatures such as unicorns, where 
paradigm exemplars may perhaps be construed as illustrations or sculptures, perhaps, as Brewer suggests, based on 
description, Brewer 2011, p. 104, fn. 9). 
5  Brewer variously states that objects look some way in virtue of standing in such similarity relations (e.g. Brewer 2011, 
p. 95, p. 99) and that these similarities are what grounds and explains the various ways physical objects look (ibid., 
p. 103). 
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from which the object is perceived and to the circumstances of perception. This is a relativization not 
just to positions vis-a-vis the object and circumstances of perception, but also—tacitly—to kinds of 
observers. For presumably, the following holds: which similarities obtain between an object (in given 
circumstances) and paradigm exemplars of various kinds of objects is a matter of independent facts. 
However, which of these similarity relations can be visually picked up by ants, bats, or eagles, say, 
from various points of view and in carious perceptual circumstances will certainly differ at least in 
part—both among various non-human animals and between them and human beings (perhaps even 
among different human subjects)—just in virtue of the various ways in which visual systems of 
different species differ. 
As Brewer admits, a lot more needs to be said than he does about what makes similarities visually 
relevant, which ones, and how. Answers to such questions, he takes it, “are many, varied, and largely 
empirical” (Brewer 2011, p. 102). But even given what little he says, the following view emerges: at 
any given time, any given object stands in various sets of similarity relations. Every object a subject is 
acquainted with through her experience will thus thinly look various ways to a subject, from that point 
of view, and in those specific circumstances of perception, and it will look various further ways from 
other points of views, and in other circumstances of perception, depending on the visually similarities 
that obtain between the object in question and paradigm exemplars of various kinds of objects in 
those specific circumstances. Accordingly, the following seems possible: if viewed in suitable 
circumstances, numerically and qualitatively different objects may stand in at least some of the same 
similarity relations with various paradigm exemplars. If so, the way they thinly look may at least in part 
be the same.6 
                                                 
6  Some interpret Brewer’s account of how things look as fully externalist, claim that ways things look are features of 
mind-independent objects and that different objects can only look ways that are indistinguishable, but not identical 
(see e.g. Vuletić 2015, p. 57). Since Brewer claims that looks are grounded and explained by visually relevant similarity 
relations, I do not find this compelling (see 5.3 below for further discussion). What is correct, however, is this: Brewer 
will insist that on the fundamental theoretical characterization, phenomenally identical experiences of different objects 
are different experiential conditions—precisely because what he takes to be the theoretically fundamental 
characterization explicitly cites the specific objects the experience relates one with. 
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Before turning to the alternative interpretation of the similarity relations that ground Brewer’s 
notion of looks, let us note that the reading just sketched has some intuitive appeal. First, whether a 
red ball that has been split in half, say, looks like an unsplit but otherwise identical red ball—which, 
for simplicity, we will assume to be a paradigm exemplar both for the concept red and the concept 
ball—will no doubt partly depend on our position vis-à-vis the split ball and on other circumstances 
of perception. Given suitable lighting conditions, for instance, the split ball will look as red to us as 
the paradigm exemplar would, whereas typically, it will not if lighting conditions are suitably different. 
Moreover, from certain positions vis-à-vis the split ball, it might look just the way the paradigm 
exemplar of an (unsplit) red ball would, but not so from others. 
Second, it seems right that not all the similarities that may obtain between objects and paradigm 
exemplars of various kinds of objects anyway need to be or become visually relevant, certainly not in 
every situation. The two objects from our toy example could be similar with respect to their interior 
structure or their weight. In some situations, such similarities could become visually relevant, too—in 
many others, however, they will not. Indeed, some similarities may never become visually relevant at 
all (nor, for that matter, relevant with respect to any other sensory mode). 
Third, it is easy to see how similarities in how things look to us may rest on similarities in features 
of the objects themselves: in our toy example, the surface features of both the split ball and the unsplit 
one (at least for a part of the ball) are such that they reflect light in similar ways. Provided that the 
processes underlying the subject’s capacity for vision operate in sufficiently similar ways, we thus may 
expect that the ways the two objects (thinly) look to the subject, given suitably similar points of view 
and perceptual circumstances, would be similar as well. 
To sum up, on the proposed reading, visually relevant similarities are similarity relations that 
obtain between mind-independent physical objects and paradigm exemplars of various kinds of 
objects, which are mind-independent physical objects as well. Such similarity relations obtain between 
the relevant objects anyway, albeit relative to points of view, circumstances of perception, and, 
presumably, the kind of observer involved. And if some mind-independent object o is in the vicinity 
of a suitable subject—an ordinary human observer with a normally functioning visual system, say—
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the following can happen: the observer may become acquainted with o, through vision. According to 
the interpretation we are considering, it is in virtue of the similarity relations that o stands in anyway 
(in the relevant circumstances) with paradigm exemplars of various kinds of objects and in virtue of 
the general set-up of the observer’s visual system that o will thinly look various ways to the subject, 
relative to her specific point of view and the circumstances of perception.  
Again, while thickly looking some way involves the deployment of conceptual activities, for an 
object o to thinly look F to a subject S, S need not have the concept of F.  An object, Brewer thus 
holds, can look ducklike to a child even if the child lacks the concept of a duck (Brewer 2011, p. 121), 
remarkably even if nobody in the child’s world possesses the concept of a duck (cf. ibid., p. 130).7 
Accordingly, on Brewer’s view, facts concerning how an object thinly looks to a subject are facts about 
what similarity relations the object de facto stands in with other objects, given a point of view, perceptual 
circumstances, and the subject’s visual system. And whether the object stands in such relations is 
completely independent of whether the subject—or anyone, really—possesses the relevant concepts, 
or any concepts at all.8 
                                                 
7  Can objects (thinly) look ducklike to subjects who live in a world in which no ducks exist? In other words: are the 
similarities that Brewer thinks ground the ways things (thinly) look anyway similarities between existing objects or do 
similarities with possible objects count as well? And if so, in what sense of “possible?” Brewer does not say, but I 
think that that his view may be compatible with various answers here. For one, he might be willing to multiply ways 
things thinly look so as to include relations with merely possible objects (this seems to be his view, as passage (7) 
below suggests) and then insist that what matters epistemologically is anyway not the number of similarity relations a 
given object de facto stands in, but which among them we actually register (which will also require that we have 
somehow acquired a sense of what a paradigm exemplar of the possible kind of object looks like). Even if it may well 
be that a given object is in some respect similar to Vorgon space ships (say) in some alternative possible world, and 
even if this similarity is one that our visual system might be able to detect, it would in all likelihood never become 
relevant. Alternatively, Brewer might be an antirealist with respect to possible worlds and claim that no similarity 
relations to non-existing objects can obtain. While the notion of similarity relations is thus not fully characterized with 
respect to the scope of these relations, there may be ways to develop the account in either direction. 
8  What this suggests is that at least for the characterization of ways of thinly looking, the notion of paradigm exemplars 
should be dispensable. All Brewer appears to need to specify a notion of an object’s looking some way is that the 
object stand in relations of similarity and dissimilarity with other objects that are such that the visual system of the 
kind of observer in question can pick up on them. Paradigm exemplars may be important on Brewer’s account of 
concept acquisition that he does not provide. In the context of the specification of ways objects can thinly look, it 
seems, the notion of paradigm exemplars is primarily a convenient device that enables Brewer to refer more easily to 
specific ways things may look, such as “red,” say, or “ducklike.” But making such a move may not be innocuous. For 
by using this device in his characterization of thin looks, Brewer draws on a way of grouping ways things may look 
into kinds that is intelligible only in the context of conceptual abilities to classify things as being or looking some way, 
ducklike, say. And while we have seen that Brewer thinks that the relevant conceptual capacities need not necessarily 
be the subject’s, one would think that they must be someone’s. Whose capacities these are, however, and what 
accounts for the relevant grouping—these are questions Brewer does not address.  
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The interpretation just sketched, I think, is the one Brewer ultimately endorses. But at times, what 
he says pulls into a different direction. Consider the following passages: 
(4) [V]isually relevant similarities are similarities of the various kinds to which the physical 
processes enabling visual perception respond similarly, as a result of both their 
evolutionary design and their development over the course of our lives. (Brewer 2011, 
p. 118) 
Also: 
(5) [V]isually relevant similarities […] are similarities by the lights of the various processes 
enabling and subserving visual acquaintance: similarities in such things as the way in 
which light is reflected and transmitted from the objects in question and the way in 
which stimuli are handled by the visual system, given its evolutionary history and our 
shared training during development. (Brewer 2018, p. 3) 
Remarkably, in both these passages, Brewer characterizes visually relevant similarities not in terms 
of the objects themselves, but in terms of the ways in which stimuli are handled by the subject’s visual 
system, of how that system responds to objects. Now, it is one thing to construe the similarities that 
are said to ground the ways things look in terms of similarities that obtain between the objects 
themselves, and to then perhaps suggest that these similarities in turn ground and explain similarities 
in the ways these objects are processed by sensory systems of various kinds.9 It is quite another thing, 
however, to claim that the similarities that ground the way things look just are similarities that obtain 
at the level of visual processing.10 After all, the following two scenarios seem possible: first, it seems 
possible for a subject—on different occasions, say—to look at the same array of objects (that have 
the same features in both cases), from the same point of view and in sufficiently similar circumstances 
of perception, while the processes that occur in her visual system and the way things look to her differ.  
                                                 
9  This is the first interpretation, of course, on which the similarities are primarily similarities between the objects. It also 
seems to be in play when Brewer states that “[o]bjects have visually relevant similarities when they share sufficiently 
many common properties amongst those that have a significant involvement in the various processes underlying 
vision” (Brewer 2011, p. 103). Note especially that unlike the formulation Brewer uses in passage (4), this latter 
formulation does not imply that the processes underlying vision of objects that have visually relevant similarities are 
themselves similar. 
10  This is probably too simplistic anyway. A complication arises, for instance, if we acknowledge that the same look may 
well be associated with different kinds of visual processes. I think Vuletić is right when he notes that a) it is far from 
clear that, given the various different ways in which differing stimuli are processed, the criterion for assessing similarity 
at the level of visual processing is not just a phenomenological one, and that b) Brewer would “not give much of an 
explanation of looks if it were to account for an object’s looking F in terms of the phenomenological similarity (if not 
identity) that obtains between the object’s looking F and other objects’ way[s] of looking” (Vuletić 2015, p. 62).    
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Second, it seems possible for a subject to look at objects that differ with regard to the similarity 
relations they stand in with other objects, while the same processes occur in her visual system in such 
a way that the objects look the same to her anyway. If so, similarities that obtain between mind-
independent physical objects and similarities in the visual processes that occur in response to being 
suitably related to such objects and that ground similarities in the ways these objects (thinly) look can 
come apart. Accordingly, on the assumption that Brewer wants to characterize visually relevant 
similarities as similarities that obtain between mind-independent physical objects anyway, he should 
refrain from also specifying them in terms of similarities in visual processing. Again, he could of course 
try to argue for the further assumption that some of the similarities that obtain between objects anyway 
bring about corresponding similarities in visual processing. If, however, this is an assumption Brewer 
indeed relies on, he does not, unfortunately, provide an argument for it. 
As we move on, let us frame our discussion in terms of the following question: can similarities 
between objects and similarities between processes in the visual system and (thin) looks come apart? 
In other words, let us ask to what extent Brewer’s position affords the conceptual leeway to 
accommodate the two scenarios just mentioned. As I will show in the next two sections, with respect 
to both scenarios, that leeway is limited. 
5.3 THINLY LOOKING THE SAME, NO DVEP FOR THIN LOOKS, BREWERIAN 
CONSTITUTION, AND THE GENERAL CONSTRAINT ON THIN LOOKS 
Let us begin with the second of the two scenarios mentioned in the previous section. Our question, 
thus, is this: is it possible, on Brewer’s view, for a subject S to look (on different occasions) at objects 
that differ regarding the (visually relevant) similarity relations they stand in with other objects, while 
the same processes occur in S’s visual system, such that the objects look the same to her anyway?  
Let us observe, first, that on Brewer’s view, qualitatively identical but numerically different 
objects—o1 and o2, say—can look the same to a subject. If had in suitable circumstances, a given 
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subject S’s two metaphysically distinct experiences—one acquainting S with o1, the other acquainting 
S with o2—can be introspectively indistinguishable and have the same phenomenal character in the 
following sense: for every predicate φ, o1 looks φ to S iff o2 looks φ to S, too (cf. Brewer 2011, p. 101, 
relativization to S added). This should not be a surprising statement. After all, o1 and o2 are qualitatively 
identical. As such, each will stand in the same similarity relations with paradigm exemplars of various 
kinds of objects as the other. Accordingly, with respect to each point of view and each set of perceptual 
circumstances, o1 and o2 will stand in the same visually relevant similarity relations. And if the latter are 
indeed said to ground and explain how a given object (thinly) looks, then one should expect that 
sameness with respect to these relations should yield sameness in the ways o1 and o2 look as well.  
On Brewer’s view, objects that differ in yet further ways can look the same as well. Two objects 
that differ in various ways can still both look F—two rather different plants, for example, will 
presumably both look plantlike and clearly, two otherwise very different objects can both look red, 
either because both are red or because the perceptual circumstances conspire in such a way that both 
objects look red, even if only one of them or neither is in fact red. For things can look F even though 
they are not F. A single coin, if looked at in suitable conditions, can look elliptical, a stick partly 
submerged in water can look bent, and a split ball can look like an unsplit ball one would. 
Importantly, according to Brewer, each of the cases just mentioned, along with many kinds of 
illusions, is to be explained by reference to similarity relations that de facto obtain between the object, 
o, that the subject S is looking at and suitable paradigm exemplars of various kinds of objects. As he 
states, “illusions come about in cases in which the direct objects of experience have […] similarities 
with paradigm exemplars of kinds of which they are not in fact instances” (Brewer 2011, p. 102, also 
p. 146), relative to the point of view and the circumstances of perception in question. Accordingly, for 
two objects to look the same—either partly or completely—suitable similarity relations between the 
objects must obtain. 
Incidentally, note that this explanation, too, is phrased in terms of similarity relations that obtain 
between paradigm exemplars and the direct objects of experience, i.e. the mind-independent physical 
objects themselves, and not between the processes that occur in the subject’s visual system. Again, 
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one may suspect that to get from similarities between objects to similarities in how things look to the 
subject, Brewer will assume that similarities of the former kind ground similarities with respect to the 
kind of visual processing that occurs in subjects acquainted with such objects. Here is a rough sketch 
of how this assumption might be spelled out: the similarity relations o stands in with paradigm 
exemplars of  various kinds of objects anyway (from the point of view and in the circumstances at 
hand) give rise to similarities between a) the stimuli o provides to S, given S’s position and the 
circumstances at hand, and how these are processed in S’s visual system, and b) the stimuli the relevant 
paradigm exemplars would provide, and how those stimuli would be processed. Perhaps it is then in 
virtue of these processes that in the situation at hand, o (thinly) looks the way it does to S.11 A straight 
stick, if partly submerged in water, may thus look bent to me because it is, from where I stand and in 
my circumstances of perception, relevantly similar to a bent stick. The visual stimuli the partly 
submerged straight stick provides me with, situated as I am, are relevantly similar to those a paradigm 
bent stick that is not submerged in water would provide me with, and are handled by my visual system 
in correspondingly similar ways. 
If the proposal just outlined is in fact what Brewer has in mind, he appears to assume the 
following: sameness of objects yields sameness of stimuli, which in turn yields sameness of visual 
processing and sameness of the way things (thinly) look, which, recall, is said to be a fully phenomenal 
fact about the subject’s experience. In other words, he appears to assume that the phenomenology 
associated with how mind-independent physical objects thinly look—from a point of view, to a 
subject, and in certain perceptual circumstances—is (though perhaps via a series of intermediate steps) 
fully determined by the similarity relations that the objects one’s experience relates one with de facto 
stand in with paradigm exemplars of various other kinds of objects. Moreover, for such a strong 
determination relation to hold, no other factor—such as e.g. what the subject believes—can play a 
role in determining the phenomenology associated with thin looks. For if it could, sameness of objects 
                                                 
11  Brewer might also add that these visual processes need to be properly caused, i.e. by the subject’s actually being related 
to suitable objects. Otherwise, visual processes would appear to screen off the objects as what (somehow) brings 
about the relevant looks. Even so, further complications would arise, e.g. the question if and how visual processes 
should be taken to be sensitive to what causes them when it comes to whether or not they give rise to certain looks.  
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and (thus) of the stimuli they provide, within some fixed set of perceptual conditions, might not bring 
about sameness of visual processing and sameness of the way things thinly look to the subject. In 
other words, if the interpretation suggested is accepted, then on Brewer’s view, the phenomenology 
associated with ways thinly look is shielded from doxastic effects; with respect to ways objects thinly 
look, DVEP is false. The latter is indeed Brewer’s view.12 However, what precisely he thinks about 
the putative relations between objects, visually relevant similarities, visual processing, and ways things 
look remains unclear. Indeed, whether Brewer would agree with the rough sketch of the determination 
relation provided in the previous paragraph is an open question. 
We can bring out the issue more sharply if we recall that relationalist views, as I suggested, 
characteristically involve a commitment to some version of Constitution. We already know that 
Brewer is committed to some version of Acquaintance. He is also clearly committed to No Content. 
What about Constitution? In contrast to Campbell and Fish, Brewer does not talk about the relation 
between similarities and looks in terms of constitution, but in terms of grounding and explaining. 
Nevertheless, I contend that to him, too, the following characterization should be acceptable:  
ConstitutionB: 
If a subject S is acquainted with an object o, then among the similarity relations that o 
stands in with paradigm exemplars of various kinds of objects, those that are visually 
relevant for S constitute the ways things (thinly) look to S, relative to S’s given point 
of view and the circumstances of perception at hand. 
We should ask what sense could attach to the word ‘constitution’ as it appears in this 
characterization. Again, Brewer himself does not talk this way.13 Still, considering what a Brewerian 
version of Constitution would plausibly look like is useful. It is a way of bringing out that on his 
current view, the problem is not just how the visually relevant similarity relations that are said to 
ground and explain (thin) looks are to be specified, and at what level they are taken to obtain 
(presumably at the level of objects, but perhaps also at the level of proximal stimuli or visual 
                                                 
12  See Brewer et al. 2018a, in which, prompted by my request, he confirms this.  
13  Brewer does talk about constitution when he asserts that mind-independent physical objects, not appearances, 
constitute the direct objects of experience, claims that acquaintance with such objects constitutes a source of 
knowledge, and maintains that such objects constitute reasons for predications. These, however, are separate issues.  
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processes). Arguably, things are worse: on Brewer’s view, the question how such similarities and ways 
things look relate has no clear answer, either. As we will see next, this is at least partly due to the fact 
that Brewer sends mixed signals with respect to the question what ways things look are.  
Recall that on the one hand, Brewer insists that “the way things look are the way things look”. In 
isolation, this quote reads as indicating that ways things look are properties of objects, not of 
experiences. On the other hand, Brewer insists that ways things look are “fully phenomenal fact[s] 
about the subject’s experience.” This statement invites a different interpretation: ways things look are 
properties of experiences (i.e. of the three-place relation Brewer takes experiences to be). 
Suppose we emphasize the former quote and assume that ways things look are properties of 
objects. Suppose, further, that visually relevant similarity relations, too, are relations between objects. 
If so, Brewer could try to construe ConstitutionB in terms of identity. Ways things look, he might 
suggest, are identical with visually relevant similarity relations between objects. If so, however, Brewer 
would also need to address the issue besetting Campbell’s account: how properties of objects can be 
identical with the properties of the subject’s experience (or, how first-order relational properties of 
objects can be identical with properties of the three-place relation Brewer takes experiences to be). If 
no such account is provided, the question how the relevant similarity relations and looks are related 
remains wide open.14 
Suppose, however, we emphasize the second quote and take looks to be properties of experiences. 
Experience, Brewer maintains, acquaints us with mind-independent physical objects. Does experience 
also acquaint us with the visually relevant similarity relations these objects stand in with paradigm 
exemplars of various kinds of objects? Might Brewer maintain, like Fish, that ways things look are 
identical (or supervene on) the acquaintance properties a subject’s experience possesses? How else are 
we to understand Brewer’s statement that visually relevant similarity relations “ground and explain” 
                                                 
14  Matters are further complicated by the fact that Brewer repeatedly indicates that he favors some version of 
resemblance nominalism with respect to properties (see e.g. Brewer 2011, p. 81, p. 142). As he himself acknowledges, 
the exact impact of resemblance nominalism on the Object View—whether the latter supports the former or vice 
versa—is a delicate issue. Since Brewer simply notes his commitment, but does not consider which implications his 
take on properties has on his notion of ways things look, I, too, will ignore such issues. 
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the ways things (thinly) look? The trouble, again, is that ways things (thinly) look are neither clearly 
associated with objects, nor with subjective experiences. Rather, Brewer vaguely associates them with 
both. And no matter how we phrase the question, whether we ask how ways things (thinly) look are 
constituted, how they are grounded, or how they are explained by objects and the similarity relations these 
are said to stand in—Brewer simply does not say. We are, thus, left without an account of what ways 
things look are. Clearly, this is a disappointing and unsatisfactory result. At the very least, it shows that 
Brewer needs to further develop his accounts both of visually relevant similarities and of thin looks. 
For as things stand, these accounts are not clear enough to provide us with a sense of what thin looks 
are and how they depend on the objects one’s experience is taken to relate one with and the similarity 
relations in which these objects are said to stand. 
With respect to our guiding question, however, i.e. the question whether Brewer’s view provides 
a potentially helpful notion of phenomenology, which can also accommodate DVEP, we are left with 
a first response: first, since the notion of thin looks cannot be clearly placed, the notion of 
phenomenology remains unclear. Second, on Brewer’s account, ways things (thinly) look are 
independent of the experiencing subject’s concepts and beliefs. Whatever ways of thinly looking are, 
with respect to them, Brewer holds, DVEP is false. 
Let us also put on the record the following general constraint on how, on Brewer’s account, things 
can thinly look. Granted, we neither know how exactly Brewer thinks about visually relevant similarity 
relations, nor how he thinks ways of thinly looking depend on visually relevant similarity relations 
between objects and paradigm exemplars of various kinds of objects. However, he clearly believes that 
the presence of suitable similarity relations is a necessary condition for things to (thinly) look certain 
ways. Accordingly, he endorses the following 
General Constraint on Thin Looks: 
For any predicate φ, any subject S, and any object o, o can thinly look φ to S only if a 
sufficient number of appropriate similarity relations between o and paradigm 
exemplars of objects that are φ do in fact obtain (from the point of view and in the 
circumstances of perception in question).   
Having uncovered this constraint, let us move on to considering Brewer’s notion of thickly 
looking some way. As we will already suspect, the constraint applies to it as well. 
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5.4 THICKLY LOOKING SOME WAY 
Were Brewer’s account of thinly looking some way all he provided, then on his view, the phenomenal 
dimension of a subject’s experience would be exhausted by the ways thinly look to the subject (S) 
undergoing it. Moreover, that dimension would appear to be (somehow) fully constituted by the mind-
independent physical objects in the environment that S’s experience acquaints her with, and the 
visually relevant similarity relations these objects stand in with other objects. Let us phrase this in 
terms of the two conceivable scenarios mentioned in 5.2.  
As for the second scenario, the discussion in the previous section showed that according to 
Brewer, it is indeed possible for numerically and qualitatively different objects to (thinly) look the 
same. However, according to him, this possibility is contingent on, and thus constrained by, the 
existence of suitable similarity relations that obtain between these objects—or, rather, the identity of 
some suitable subset of the similarity relations each of them stands in with a suitable set of paradigm 
exemplars, from the respective points of view and in the perceptual circumstances at hand. In the 
absence of such an overlap in similarity relations, objects cannot (thinly) look the same. More generally, 
it is, according to the General Constraint on Thin Looks listed at the end of the previous section, 
impossible for any object o to thinly look some way—F, say—unless o is sufficiently similar to 
paradigm exemplars of the relevant sort, e.g. to paradigm exemplars of objects falling under F. 
With respect to the other possible scenario mentioned in 5.2, i.e. that a subject—on different 
occasions, say—may look at the same array of objects from the same point of view and in sufficiently 
similar circumstances of perception, while the processes that occur in her visual system and the way 
things look to her differ, the result is this: on Brewer’s view, as far as the ways objects thinly look to 
subjects are concerned, the scenario is impossible. 
However, there is more to Brewer’s account: thick looks. As he puts it, “[o] thickly looks F iff o 
thinly looks F and the subject recognizes it as an F, or registers its visually relevant similarities with 
paradigm exemplars of F in an active application of that very concept” (Brewer 2011, p. 121-122).  
Crucially, registering thin looks or seeing an object as the kind of thing the paradigm exemplar of 
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which it is sufficiently similar to—a duck, say—is, Brewer claims, “a further genuinely phenomenological 
affair associated with our conceptual classificatory engagement with what is directly presented to us 
in experience: that very duck, as we would now say” (Brewer 2011, p. 121, similarly: Brewer 2018, 
p. 11). This is important as it indicates the following: on the plausible assumption that the possession 
of conceptual capacities requires at least typically (or even just in some cases) that the subject (S) 
possessing them hold certain beliefs, Brewer’s view entails that S’s beliefs may affect the ways an 
object thickly looks to S. And since we just saw that according to Brewer, an object’s thickly looking 
some way is a genuinely phenomenological affair, it follows that what beliefs S holds may affect the 
phenomenology of S’s experience. 
Initial appearances notwithstanding, Brewer thus does make room for the idea that a subject S 
may look, on different occasions, at the same array of objects from the same point of view and in 
identical circumstances of perception, while the processes that occur in her visual system (presumably) 
and the way things look to her differ overall. Again, on Brewer’s view, it is impossible, for there to be 
a difference between such occasions in how things thinly look. However, it is well possible for there 
to be differences with respect to which thin looks are being registered—i.e. to how things thickly look. 
Note, however, that ways objects thickly look are defined in terms of ways they thinly look. 
Accordingly, the General Constraint on Thin Looks also constrains the former. The ways things 
can thickly look—relative to a point of view and circumstances of perception—remains, accordingly, 
limited. This will become important when, in 5.6, we return to the issue of what kinds of cases that 
fall under DVEP Brewer can accommodate. But first, I suggest, in the following section, that the 
distinction between thinly and thickly looking appears to allow Brewer to dodge a couple of issues 
that we saw beset Fish’s account. 
125 
 
5.5 FISH AND BREWER 
For simplicity, and in line with the assumption that visually relevant similarities are indeed similarities 
that obtain between objects themselves anyway, we may think of the similarity relations that Brewer 
takes objects to stand in with paradigm exemplars of various kinds as structurally analogous to the 
facts that according to Fish populate the tract of the environment the subject looks at. Which facts 
populate that tract, Fish maintains, is a completely mind-independent matter and constrains what can 
feature in the presentational character of the subject’s experience and, thus, what the phenomenal 
properties of her experience can be. Likewise, on Brewer’s account (as I am interpreting it), which 
similarity relations objects stand in to other objects is a completely mind-independent affair. And just 
like Fish’s facts constrain what a subject’s experience can acquaint her with and what, accordingly, the 
phenomenal character of her experience could be, Brewer’s similarity relations constrain the ways 
objects can look, both thinly and—since thick looks are defined in terms of thin ones—thickly, too.  
As we saw, Fish is officially committed to Identity*. Identity*, recall, is the claim that a) the 
phenomenal properties of a subject S’s experience e are identical to e’s acquaintance properties, which in 
turn relate S to the individual facts that feature in e’s presentational character, and that b) e’s phenomenal 
character is identical with the property e has of acquainting S with e’s presentational character. Since on 
Fish’s view, facts are object-property couples and thus individuated partly by which objects these 
couples contain, Identity* entails that experiences that involve being acquainted with different objects 
cannot have the same phenomenal character. This, we saw, is at odds with what seemed to be one 
motivation behind the characterization the phenomenal character of experience that Fish endorses, 
i.e. as that property which types experiences with respect to what it is like to have them—namely to 
have a way of talking about the subjective aspect of experience that is accessible to the subject. 
Likewise, it is at odds with what we said was one major motivation behind introducing talk of 
phenomenal properties in the first place, namely to have a way of talking about ways in which different 
experiences can be phenomenologically the same. And though Fish (in a footnote) introduces the 
notion of kinds of phenomenal character (and, presumably, kinds of phenomenal properties), we saw 
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that he leaves us without an account of how to understand and explain the existence of such kinds. 
Fish, I suggested, could modify his view and accept Supervenience, i.e. the idea that phenomenal 
properties and the phenomenal character of an experience supervene on the acquaintance properties 
experiences may have. Doing so, I said, could allow him to accommodate the idea that experiences of 
different object-property couples can be phenomenologically the same, though it would still require 
him to provide an account of the relevant supervenience relation. 
On Brewer’s view, let us observe, an analogous modification is unnecessary. For him, objects 
(thinly) look certain ways in virtue of standing in similarity relations with paradigm exemplars of various 
kinds of objects, relative to a point of view and circumstances of perception. As we saw above, Brewer 
owes us an answer question how to understand the weight carried by the expression in virtue of (or its 
cognates). And though the details are far from clear, it is obvious that Brewer intends to characterize 
the phenomenal identity of a (thin) look, as it were, in terms of the position the object looked at 
occupies in a similarity space characterized by actual (and, perhaps: possible) paradigm exemplars of 
various kinds of objects.  
Suppose the problems concerning how similarities ground or constitute thin looks could 
somehow be resolved. Recall also that, as we discussed in 5.3, two different objects, looked at in 
suitable conditions, can overlap or even be identical with respect to what similarity relations they stand 
in with various paradigm exemplars. If so, then for Brewer, the idea that the experience of different 
objects can be characterized in terms of identical ways of thinly looking is comparatively easier to 
accommodate (cf. Brewer 2011, p. 99, p. 101). 
Let us move on to the topic of expert vision. When discussing Fish’s view, we observed that he 
remains silent as to which properties can feature in the presentational character of a subject’s 
experience, how such properties are individuated, and how they relate to the mind-independent 
properties that actually populate the subject’s environment. Pending such a story, it is difficult to assess 
the conceptual leeway his account affords for accommodating expert vision.  
Brewer, on the other hand, does not think that the experiencing subject gets acquainted with facts 
that are co-composed of properties (though we suggested above that his account could be understood 
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that way). More importantly, he does not think that acquaintance with facts requires that the subject 
possess suitable (or, for that matter, any) conceptual-recognitional capacities. Accordingly, he can 
maintain that an object may thinly look to the layperson all the ways it may thinly (and thickly) look 
to an expert. Brewer, in contrast to Fish, thus does not locate differences between the expert’s 
experience and that of the layperson at the level of acquaintance—which to him is the level of the 
ways objects thinly look. Instead, Brewer takes such differences to be a matter of which of the ways 
objects thinly look anyway subjects are able to register. Accordingly, the degree to which the expert’s 
vision can diverge from that of the layperson will depend on whatever constraints govern which 
similarities between objects can be registered by suitably informed observers. 
Brewer provides no account of what constraints may govern (visual) registration—no account 
that delineates and explains the ways things may thinly and thickly look. Can objects thinly and thickly 
look like a tomato or a snake? Presumably so. Can they thinly and thickly look like a cathode ray tube? 
Could a colored line that is forming, in certain specifiable conditions, in a bubble chamber thinly and 
thickly look like an electron passing by? Can a smoker’s lung, examined via an x-ray scan, look 
cancerous? Brewer does not say. Pending such an account, his account of expert vision thus cannot 
be made very precise—in a similar way in which, pending an account of which properties can be 
conceptually picked up by vision, Fish’s account cannot be made very precise either.  
Suppose we bracket concerns that in one or other way apply to both Fish’s and Brewer’s 
accounts.15 There at, I think, least two reasons, I think, why relationalists should prefer Brewer’s view 
that acquaintance does not presuppose the possession of conceptual capacities over Fish’s account. 
First, recall our discussion in 4.5.1. As we saw there, Fish, if he were to defend the idea, popular among 
relationalists, that acquaintance is more basic than any or, perhaps, other epistemic relations (Basic 
Acquaintance), would have to show how this idea can be squared with his additional commitment 
to the thought that acquaintance requires the deployment of conceptual capacities. But, I contended, 
doing so is problematic even if such capacities are construed in a Kirkean de-sophisticated manner.  
                                                 
15  Similar questions arise for many accounts of experience, not just for Fish or Brewer, nor just for relationalist accounts. 
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Contrast Brewer. Pace Fish, he thinks that a child who lacks the concept of a duck can be 
acquainted with ducks. It is, he holds, simply in virtue of the duck’s standing in similarity relations to 
paradigm exemplars of various kinds of objects (notably ducks) anyway that the duck thinly looks 
ducklike to the child, even to one who lacks conceptual capacities altogether, lives in a world without 
concept-users, perhaps even lives in a world in which ducks do not exist.16 For present purposes, the 
relevant upshot is this: Brewer does not tie acquaintance to concept possession, he can easily accept 
Basic Acquaintance, the claim that acquaintance is more basic than any epistemic relation, without 
being saddled with the explanatory burden this assertion entails for Fish.17 
To appreciate the second respect in which Brewer’s view appears to improve on Fish’s, we need 
to look more closely at Brewer’s account of thick looks and the account of expert vision it makes 
available. As we already know, for Brewer, what conceptual-recognitional capacities a subject S 
possesses is irrelevant to the ways objects can thinly look to S. However, like on Fish’s view, on 
Brewer’s account, too, what conceptual capacities S possesses does play an important role with respect 
to the phenomenology of S’s experience overall. Again, on Fish’s view, the crucial function of 
conceptual-recognitional capacities is to bring into the presentational character of the S’s experience 
facts that anyway populate the tract of the environment that S is looking at. His account left many 
questions unanswered. But the general idea underlying it was straightforward enough: the more 
conceptual recognitional capacities the S possesses and passively deploys in her experience e, the more 
facts feature in e’s presentational character. Deploying more capacities in undergoing e means that 
there are more facts in e’s presentational character that S is acquainted with, which will (or, if we favor 
Supervenience over Identity*: may) in turn enrich the phenomenal properties that compose e’s 
phenomenal character. 
On Brewer’s view, a subject S’s experience e acquaints S with all the objects in the tract of the 
environment that S is looking at and that S’s visual system can (given its current state, position, and 
circumstances of perception) process. If S is acquainted with a given set of objects, these objects then 
                                                 
16  Again, cf. Brewer 2011, p. 121, p. 130, also p. 145. 
17  Brewer explicitly embraces Basic Acquaintance in Brewer 2011, p. 141. 
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thinly look all sorts of ways to S, which is purely a matter of their de facto standing in visually relevant 
similarity relations with paradigm exemplars of various kinds of objects, from the point of view and 
in the circumstances of perception in question. Again, at this stage, no beliefs or concepts are involved, 
which is why thin looks are non-conceptual looks (cf. Brewer 2011, p. 135) and “belief-independent 
[…]. O may thinly look F to S even though S does not believe that o is F, or perhaps cannot do so 
because she does not have the concept ‘F’” (ibid., p. 136). Conceptual capacities come in only as the 
subject registers the relevant similarities that the objects she faces stand in with paradigm exemplars of 
various and thus (at least paradigmatically) applies the relevant concepts.18 Such registration yields 
thick or conceptual looks. For our purposes, what matters is the following: Brewer claims that 
registration, or categorization, is accompanied by a phenomenological change. Here is how he puts 
the point:  
(6) Both before and after any categorization using the colour concept ‘navy’ the carpet 
thinly looks navy; and this is a matter of constant visual phenomenology. After 
conceptual registration of its visually relevant similarities with paradigms of navy blue 
it also thickly looks navy; and this is a phenomenological change. Any problem arises 
only on the assumption that there is a single uncontroversial notion of visual 
phenomenology on which it makes perfectly good sense to ask, and it is always 
possible to answer, whether two experiential conditions are phenomenologically 
identical tout court. The whole point of the thin vs. thick looks distinction is precisely 
to deny that assumption. […] Recognition—of a cloud as shaped like a bull, or of a 
doodle as a distorted name, say—is both classificatory and phenomenological. In one 
sense it changes the way the thing in question looks; in another sense the shape it 
looks is unchanged. (Brewer 2011, p. 123) 
First off, this passage attests again to the familiar fact that on Brewer’s view, the possession of 
concepts and—to the extent that concept possession requires holding certain beliefs—holding certain 
                                                 
18  Fish insists that in generating the presentational character of experience, the subject’s conceptual capacities are 
deployed passively. Brewer, on the other hand, thinks of such deployment as an activity (as e.g. passage (3) shows). Fish, 
as we saw, construes the possession conceptual capacities as a necessary requirement for acquaintance. Moreover, he 
wants to do justice to the idea that in experience, we are simply saddled with a presentational (and, subsequently, a 
phenomenal) character. And since it seems patently odd to say that for any experience with a phenomenal character, 
there is something the subject must actively do to have it, Fish is sympathetic to the idea that in experience, the relevant 
capacities are being deployed passively. Brewer, on the other hand, grants that subjects may be induced to conceptually 
register similarities between objects they are acquainted with and suitable paradigm exemplars of various kinds relatively 
automatically (cf. Brewer 2011, p. 145). In such cases, he might agree, the relevant capacities are, in a sense, deployed 
passively. But since Brewer separates acquaintance from the deployment of conceptual capacities, he, unlike Fish, does 
not need any commitment to the effect that in every instance of a subject’s being acquainted with an object, such 
capacities are in fact passively deployed. Accordingly, for him, in standard cases, conceptual capacities are deployed 
actively.  
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beliefs can make a phenomenal difference. Accordingly, I suggest we read this passage as providing 
the resources for a Brewerian account of accommodating cases of DVEP that fall under the label of 
expert vision. Here it is: since experts hold knowledgeable beliefs and possess conceptual 
recognitional capacities that laypersons lack, the former can conceptually register visually relevant 
similarities between the object they face and paradigm exemplars of certain kinds of objects that the 
latter cannot register. On the one hand, Brewer insists that such registration makes a phenomenal 
difference. And yet, in the following sense, things look the same to both the expert and the layperson: 
provided that their respective point of views and the circumstances of perception are sufficiently 
similar, the relevant objects thinly look the same. And to the extent that the conceptual capacities that 
the layperson and the expert possess are the same, things thickly look the same as well. To the extent 
that these capacities differ, however, things thickly look different. 
Unlike Fish’s account—and this is the second respect in which Brewer’s account may appear 
preferable to Fish’s—Brewer’s account thus seems to provide the resources for accommodating both 
the phenomenon of expert vision and the idea that the expert and the layperson have something 
perceptually in common: things thinly (and perhaps, to some extent, thickly) look the same to them.19 
On Fish’s account, recall, the worry arose whether differences in sophistication of a subject’s 
background view and accompanying differences in her conceptual capacities could modify what 
properties the relevant capacity makes visible, how facts and properties are presented in the 
presentational character of a subject’s experience, and how the facts brought into the presentational 
character can be identical with the environing facts. This in turn made us wonder how to characterize 
the sense in which experts and laypersons might have something in common. 
None of these difficulties appear to arise for Brewer. Via his notion of thinly looking, he provides 
a notion of phenomenology that, as he puts it in passage (6), remains constant across changes in 
beliefs. At the same time, his notion of thickly looking provides room for phenomenological changes 
                                                 
19  Whether thinly looking F is the same phenomenological state in different (time-slices of) subjects is still an open 
question—for both Fish and Brewer. It will remain elusive as long as we lack identity criteria for phenomenal states 
that enable us to compare them independently of any reference to the way they are said to be brought about. 
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that are due to the possession of conceptual capacities. Accordingly, unlike Fish, Brewer appears to 
be able to deal with the case of the painter: to both the painter and the child, he can insist, an object 
o that is green23 thinly looks the same, relative to a certain point of view and perceptual circumstances. 
This is due simply to o’s de facto standing in visually relevant similarity relations with suitable paradigm 
exemplars of various kinds, which may well include the color Leonardo da Vinci used when painting 
some of the trees visible in the background of his Mona Lisa, say, or the color one gets if one mixes 
certain other colors in specific ways. And it may well be that visually relevant similarities like these are 
known and can be registered only by the painter, not by the layperson, which presumably yields a 
change in the phenomenology of the experience of the former in a way that has no counterpart in the 
phenomenology of the experience of the latter. 
5.6 MULTIPLE PHENOMENOLOGIES AND (AGAIN) THE BANANA CASE 
Given the issues just outlined, it is tempting to think that Brewer’s view is better placed than Fish’s 
when it comes to accommodating DVEP, at least with respect to cases of expert vision. I think, 
however, that this temptation must be resisted. For as I will argue next, like Fish’s account, Brewer’s 
account—at least in its current gestalt—cannot accommodate projection effects, either. 
To begin with, recall that Fish’s view gave rise to a number of unresolved questions with respect 
to the identity conditions of phenomenal properties and phenomenal character—questions that come 
to the fore once we insist that room should be made for the thought that experiences of different facts 
can be identical with respect to their phenomenology, or the same in kind. The issue, in a nutshell, 
was that given Fish’s commitment to Constitution, Irreducibility, and Identity*, phenomenal 
properties are individuated along with specific facts, construed as composed of particular objects and 
properties (or instantiations thereof). Accordingly, accommodating a notion of phenomenal identity 
across different facts was impossible. Modifying Fish’s account, however, e.g. by accepting 
Supervenience instead of Identity* or by introducing an (as of yet unexplained) notion of sameness 
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in phenomenal kind involved loosening the ties between mind-independent items and phenomenal 
properties. As a result, we lost what grip on the identity conditions of phenomenal properties these 
ties were supposed to provide. Worse even, we noted that it is unclear how to think about the facts 
Fish takes to constitute the presentational character. What troubled us was that they are said to be 
both identical with the mind-independent facts that populate the subject’s environment and at the 
same time made visible by the subject’s conceptual-recognitional capacities, which may be imperfect 
in various ways and differ across subjects. Pending suitable accounts of how properties and conceptual 
capacities are to be individuated, we are thus left in the dark as to how the experience of an expert 
could, as Fish insists, both differ from that of a layperson and yet have something in common with it. 
As I showed in 5.3, Brewer’s view, too, lacks a proper account of Constitution. Partly, I argued, 
the issue is that instead of unambiguously classifying ways of thinly looking some way as either the 
one or the other, Brewer vaguely associates thin looks both with objects (“the way things look”) and 
with experiences (“fully phenomenal facts about the subject’s experience”). As a result, ways of thinly 
looking are neither here nor there. What they are supposed to be—properties of objects, of 
experiences, or perhaps (as Campbell seems to say) both—remains unclear. Plainly, Brewer takes ways 
of thinly looking to ultimately depend on the existence of visually relevant similarity relations that 
obtain (presumably) between the objects that the subject’s experience acquaints her with and suitable 
paradigm exemplars of various kinds of objects. But we lack an account of the nature of this 
dependence and with conflicting statements about the level at which these relations obtain. 
In the previous section, I floated the suggestion that Brewer’s view may appear to improve on 
Fish’s view by affording a conceptual space for a notion of phenomenal identity—via the sameness 
of similarity relations. However, the crucial problem remains: like Fish, Brewer, too, owes us a proper 
account of the phenomenal dimension of experience, of what it is and of how it is grounded, 
constituted, or explained by the mind-independent items in the subject’s environment—be these 
characterized as physical objects, object-property couples, or as similarity relations that obtain between 
objects. In other words, while one can appreciate that Brewer’s idea of sameness of visually relevant 
similarities may promise to provide the resources for accommodating a notion of looks-identity, at 
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least currently, his account is simply not developed enough to show how this promise can be kept. 
With respect to the other part of our guiding question, i.e. whether relational accounts can 
accommodate DVEP, we saw that in virtue of his distinction between (nonconceptual) ways of thinly 
looking that remain constant across different doxastic contexts and thick (conceptual) looks that may 
vary along with such contexts, Brewer’s account appears to succeed where Fish’s account of expert 
vision struggles. Unlike Fish, it seems, Brewer can hold both that the phenomenology of the expert’s 
experience differs from that of the layperson and that there is also something perceptually that the 
expert and the layperson have in common. To establish the former claim, Brewer can draw on the 
idea that experts and laypersons differ in which visually relevant similarities they register. To establish 
the latter, he can point to similarities in the ways things thinly—and perhaps to some extent thickly—
look to them, respectively. 
Here is, in a nutshell, the problem with this account: if it is already unclear how to understand 
ways of thinly looking and in what sense they constitute the phenomenal dimension of experience, 
things do not get any clearer if yet another layer of phenomenology is thrown into the mix. 
Unfortunately, Brewer does not provide much of an account of this second putative layer of 
experiential phenomenology—the phenomenology associated with thick looks. Instead, he contents 
himself with making a few cursory remarks. Registering visually relevant similarity relations (whatever 
such registration may come to)20, Brewer holds, will leave these relations unchanged. They could not, 
one surmises, both change and yet ground a layer of phenomenology that remains constant across 
different doxastic settings, in which different ways of thinly looking are being registered. If so, then 
presumably, the phenomenological change registration is said to entail must be construed as an addition 
of some distinct phenomenal aspect or layer, as I will say, to the otherwise constant phenomenology 
constituted by ways things thinly look. Moreover, the change in phenomenology will plausibly be a 
                                                 
20  There may, Brewer suggests, be several modes of registration of visual similarities, some of which do not draw upon 
fully conceptual categorization and are, in that sense, less demanding (cf. Brewer 2011, p. 121-2, footnotes 24 & 25). 
He does not say whether various modes would differ with respect to their phenomenal effects. Moreover, he also 
takes the notion of conceptual registration as irreducibly primitive (Brewer 2011, p. 145). Accordingly, it appears that 
an account of conceptual registration that could explain its putative effects on the phenomenology is not forthcoming. 
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matter of the deployment of suitable conceptual capacities. In line with this, and with his contention 
that thick looks are conceptual looks, Brewer thus occasionally characterizes what is added as conceptual 
phenomenology (Brewer 2011, p. 122) or as a phenomenology that is associated with “the categorization 
of what is presented” (ibid., p. 124). He insists, however, that this additional layer of phenomenology 
cannot occur in isolation. Thick looks, recall, are defined in terms of thin looks, so that nothing can 
thickly look some way unless it thinly looks that way as well.  
The idea, then, is this: only if suitable thin looks are available, the subject can register them, which 
is said to be a matter of “actively and intelligibly subsuming the particular presented as the direct object 
of experience under that concept, in virtue of its evident similarities with the paradigms central to our 
understanding of that concept” (ibid., p. 122). On Brewer’s view, the deployment of the conceptual 
capacities that are involved in registration is thus necessary for the relevant phenomenological change 
to occur, but not sufficient. It must occur in conjunction with the presence of suitable thin looks.  
What this indicates, thus, is that like thin looks, thick looks, too, are taken to strongly depend on 
the presence of mind-independent items that, from the point of view and in the perceptual 
circumstances at hand, stand in suitable similarity relations with paradigm exemplars of various kinds 
of objects. Yet if it is already unclear what the nature of this dependence is in case of thin looks, it is 
not any clearer in the case of thick looks. How the phenomenal change is triggered and what such a 
change amounts remains completely open. 
Furthermore, one can ask whether Brewer’s theoretical distinction between ways of thinly looking 
and ways of thickly looking does in fact pick out a distinction that is phenomenologically relevant. 
One may doubt—like e.g. Hanson—that upon facing some set of objects in certain perceptual 
circumstances, there is, or must be, a layer of perceptual phenomenology that remains constant across 
experiences that occur in different doxastic settings. Part of the point of Hanson’s discussion of 
reversible figures was precisely this: that there is a neutral phenomenal layer, a conscious awareness of 
objects that is available to us anyway and on which we then, second, clamp an interpretation, as it 
were, is neither phenomenologically convincing nor obligatory. If we can see such figures in a neutral 
way at all, Hanson insists, i.e. not already as something or other, doing so requires tremendous effort. 
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If, as he maintains, this is true for all ordinary cases of seeing, why then should we assume that ways 
of thinly looking various ways form a proper part of our ordinary experience in the first place?  
Even if such concerns are bracketed, another one arises: what, we can ask, is the relation supposed 
to be between the two putative layers of phenomenology? As evidenced by passage (6), Brewer rejects 
the idea that there is a single uncontroversial notion of visual phenomenology on which it makes 
perfectly good sense to ask, and it is always possible to answer, whether two experiential conditions 
are phenomenologically identical tout court. I must confess that it is not clear to me why Brewer feels 
the need to make such a claim. Why not assert that the total visual phenomenology of experience 
comprises both ways of thinly looking and ways of thickly looking some ways? One way in which 
experiences can differ in their total phenomenology, he could say, is that they are the same with respect 
to the ways of thinly looking, yet different with respect to the ways of thickly looking they involve. 
If he thinks that this way of characterizing the phenomenal dimension of experience would be 
problematic, Brewer does not say why. His alternative characterization, however, is problematic. 
Again, Brewer suggests that the question whether two experiences are the same tout court may not 
always meaningful or may not always have a determinate answer. If this is taken seriously, then 
according to Brewer, for the phenomenal dimension of experience, identity conditions that determine 
similarity and difference of overall phenomenal states can either not be had (or not always) or do not 
exist. Surely, this must be an unsatisfactory result in and by itself. Also, it remains mysterious how an 
account on which we may be unable to say—or even meaningfully ask—whether the 
phenomenologies associated with two given experiences differ could be an illuminating account of 
expert vision. And finally, giving up the idea that the phenomenal dimension of experience is governed 
by determinate identity conditions certainly does not help alleviate the worry we already harbored with 
respect to ways of thinly looking, viz. that Brewer fails to provide a clear account of what the 
phenomenal dimension of experience is. As in Fish’s case, in Brewer’s case, too, the account is 
underdeveloped—so much so that the question whether Brewer can accommodate cases of DVEP 
that fall under the heading of expert vision is impossible to assess. Too many questions about the 
account remain open, issues that would need to be addressed to yield a proper understanding of it.  
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As we did in Fish’s case, let us nevertheless assume that all these issues could somehow be 
resolved and ask how Brewer’s account fares with respect to projection effects. More specifically, let us 
ask whether Brewer’s account provides the resources to accommodate the banana case.21 As per the 
General Constraint on Thin Looks stated in 5.3, there is no way an object can look some way, e.g. 
F, unless it stands in a sufficient number of visual similarity relations with paradigm exemplars of the 
relevant kind, e.g. Fs. Clearly, the banana object, once adjusted to an achromatic gray, is not yellowish. 
But could it thinly (and thus thickly) look yellowish anyway? After all, the banana object is a realistic 
depiction of a banana. It looks like one. Suppose bananas were to count as paradigm exemplars of 
yellow or yellowish objects. If so, the case could be made that the banana object stands in a sufficient 
number of visually relevant similarity relations with paradigm exemplars of yellowish objects—
bananas. It could look yellowish even though it is not. In that case, Brewer might be able to endorse 
one of Hansen et al.’s central interpretive claims: the banana object, once it has been adjusted to an 
achromatic gray, still looks yellowish to subjects.  
If this proposal were viable, Brewer would of course still have to partly disagree with Hansen et 
al.: he would have to resist their interpretation that it is the test subjects’ knowledge that bananas are 
typically yellow(ish) that makes the banana object look that way. In other words, Brewer would resist 
the interpretation of the banana case as an instance of projection effects. Instead, he would suggest 
that what makes the banana object look yellow(ish) is, as usual, the fact that visually relevant similarity 
relations obtain between the banana object and suitable paradigm exemplars. Moreover, he would 
claim that in the banana case, too, concepts, beliefs, and knowledge are involved in just the usual 
way—i.e. the way they are always involved when visually relevant similarities are being registered. 
Despite its initial plausibility, the proposal must be rejected. On it, looks-grounding similarities 
would simply be too easy to come by. If the proposal were acceptable, the following should be, too: 
suppose ravens counted as paradigm exemplars of black objects. If so, every black object would thinly 
                                                 
21  I will assume that readers are by now familiar with the case and anyway invite them to refresh their memory by looking 
back at 4.5.2.1. 
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look like a raven—an absurd consequence. More examples like this can be produced ad libitum, which 
would lead to a massive inflation of similarities and, consequently, ways things thinly and thickly look.  
In fact, Brewer opposes the proposal, too. In this context, the following passage is instructive: 
(7) [S]uppose that all the actual exemplars of red are round. That is, everything that is 
actually red happens also to be round. Presumably this entails that all the paradigm 
exemplars of red are round. So if a person is visually acquainted with a blue round 
object, then this has visually relevant similarities with paradigm exemplars of red. 
Thus, according to the (OV) account of looks, it looks red, at least thinly. This is 
surely false: except in abnormal illusory circumstances, a blue round object would not 
look red in this situation. 
Supporters of (OV) should in my view deny the move from the hypothesis that all 
the actual exemplars of red are round to the claim that all paradigm exemplars of red 
are therefore also round. Paradigms are not simply a subset of actual exemplars. […] 
[A]lthough a blue round direct object of perception has visually relevant similarities 
with every actual exemplar of red, it does not have visually relevant similarities with 
paradigm exemplars of red, for these also include, at least potentially as it were, 
possible but non-actual non-round red things. (Brewer 2011, p. 128) 
Patently, Brewer’s example is structurally analogous to the raven and the banana example. Applied 
to the these, we get the following statements: even if every raven were black, and every black object 
were a raven, that would not make every black object thinly look like a raven, because not all possible 
paradigm exemplars of black objects are ravens. Likewise, even if every yellow(ish) object were a 
banana, and every banana were yellow(ish), that would not make every banana object thinly look 
yellow(ish), because not all possible paradigm exemplars of bananas are yellowish.  
Of course, the banana object, once adjusted to an achromatic gray, is more similar to bananas, 
which are often yellow, than the objects that test subjects face in the control condition. But that neither 
makes the banana object yellowish, nor necessarily more similar to paradigm exemplars of yellowish 
objects than the objects in the control condition, and certainly not sufficiently similar to paradigm 
exemplars of yellowish objects to make it (thinly) look yellowish. Thus clarified, on Brewer’s view, the 
General Constraint on Thin Looks rules out Hansen et al.’s interpretation of the banana case. The 
banana object, if adjusted to an achromatic gray, lacks sufficiently many visually relevant similarities 
with paradigm exemplars of yellowish objects. It thus cannot look yellowish, neither thinly nor thickly. 
At this point, we may wonder what other options Brewer might have to accommodate the case. 
As we think about the experiences test subjects undergo as they look at the banana object, adjusted to 
an achromatic gray, it is clear that on Brewer’s view, those experiences acquaint the test subjects with 
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the banana object. And as they are acquainted with it, there will be visually relevant similarities that 
will (somehow) ground ways the banana object thinly looks to them. And to the extent that the test 
subjects register them, the banana object will thickly look to them these ways as well.  
Does the banana object stand in visually relevant similarity relations with paradigm exemplars of 
gray objects? Brewer, I suppose, has two options to respond. First, he could claim that the banana 
object, from the point of view and in the perceptual circumstances in which the test subjects find 
themselves, simply does not stand in such similarity relations. If so, the banana object would not even 
thinly look gray to the subjects. Alternatively, Brewer could claim the following: even though the 
banana object does stand in visually relevant similarity relations with paradigm exemplars of gray 
objects, and thus thinly looks gray to the test subjects, they fail to register these similarities. 
Both these strategies are problematic. The first one is problematic if we assume that the perceptual 
circumstances and the points of view of the test subjects in the test condition and the control condition 
do not differ significantly. On that assumption, Brewer would need to provide an explanation why 
similarities with paradigm exemplars of gray objects become visually relevant in the control condition, 
but not in the test condition. Suppose such an explanation was offered. Even then, the question would 
remain what color Brewer thinks the banana object thinly looks to be.  
As we saw above, the General Constraint on Thin Looks rules out that the banana object can 
thinly looks yellowish. But note that the same will be true of every other color. It will be true of 
everything except achromatic gray, which on our current set of assumptions is ruled out. The General 
Constraint on Thin Looks would thus saddle Brewer with the conclusion that there is no color the 
banana thinly looks to be—nor any shade of white, black, or gray. As a result, Brewer faces the exact 
same questions that we saw would arise for Fish if he decided to treat the banana case as a cognitive 
illusion (compare 4.5.2.3 above). For one, if it is true, as Fish suggests, that shape perception depends 
on color perception, Brewer lacks an adequate account of how test subjects can see the banana object’s 
shape, while remaining oblivious to its color.22 And even if this issue is bracketed, one must wonder 
                                                 
22  As we saw, Fish thinks that subjects who suffer from cognitive illusions believe (inaccurately) that the banana object 
is (or, as in optical illusions: looks) still yellow(ish) and that they have an experience with an appropriate 
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how far the test subjects’ putative inability to see the banana object’s color extends over the course of 
the experiment and how Brewer can explain what it is that test subjects, as they keep adjusting the 
object’s color, respond to and why they eventually stop adjusting. 
The second strategy is problematic as it requires that Brewer provide an explanation why test 
subjects do not register the relevant similarities with paradigm exemplars of gray objects. If they cannot 
register the object’s color and since there cannot, by the General Constraint on Thin Looks, be any 
other color or shade of white, black, or gray that the banana object can thinly look, there cannot, 
accordingly, be any color the object thickly looks, either. Again, then, one must wonder how the 
banana object can thinly look gray to the subject, as it must, how this can be a matter of the subject’s 
being consciously acquainted with the object, and how it is yet the case that even though the test 
subjects’ explicit task is to focus on and adjust the object’s color, they cannot register that it is gray. 
It seems to me that the simplest and most straightforward way to dodge these problems is to side 
with Hansen et al. and accept that the banana object does indeed look yellow(ish) to the test subjects 
once it has been adjusted to an achromatic gray, and that their experiences do have the relevant 
phenomenal properties. Brewer’s view, however, makes pursuing this strategy impossible. 
Again, Brewer accepts the General Constraint on Thin Looks and since thick looks are defined 
in terms of thin looks, it applies to thick looks as well. As we saw, he also holds that the conceptual 
phenomenology constitutive of thick looks cannot occur in isolation. Like Fish, Brewer is thus barred 
from suggesting that an erroneous deployment of conceptual capacities—e.g. of capacities associated 
with the ability to recognize yellowish items—may be that which gives rise to a phenomenology 
associated with yellowish looks. For him, the only way to side with Hansen et al. would be to introduce 
a third layer of phenomenology. However, doing so would be at odds with his insistence that the way 
things look is the way things look. Moreover, it would undermine the motivation underlying 
Constitution since in contrast to the first and second layer of phenomenology, i.e. the layers 
                                                 
phenomenology. Brewer does not discuss illusions of that kind, but could adopt Fish’s general strategy. After all, 
without such beliefs in place, the test subjects whose task it is, after all, to adjust the banana object’s color, would 
surely have to face the fact that—oddly enough—they cannot see the banana object’s color. 
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corresponding to thin and thick looks, this layer of phenomenology would not depend on the presents 
of suitable mind-independent items. Finally, if it is already unclear how to understand ways of thinly 
looking and in what sense they constitute the phenomenal dimension of experience, things do not get 
any clearer if yet another layer of phenomenology is thrown into the mix—let alone two! 
5.7 CONCLUSION 
Like Fish, Brewer, too, seeks to understand the notion of experiential phenomenology in terms of the 
subject’s being acquainted with mind-independent objects. Ultimately, both thin and thick looks 
depend on the presence of such objects, and on the similarity relations they are said to stand in with 
various further kinds of objects. But like Fish’s account, Brewer’s account, too, left us with many 
unresolved questions. Importantly, neither provides an account of Constitution that allows us to 
understand how exactly experiential phenomenal is taken to depend on mind-independent items and 
what the identity conditions are that govern experiential phenomenology.   
With respect to the other part of our guiding question, i.e. the question whether relationalist views 
can accommodate various phenomena that instantiate the Doxastic Variability of Experiential 
Phenomenology (DVEP), so far, our result is sobering. Both Fish and Brewer assign a prominent 
role to conceptual capacities (and the beliefs having which the possession of such capacities may 
require) when it comes to explaining the phenomenal properties or ways things (thickly) look. The 
former takes it that conceptual capacities enable acquaintance and, thus, for experiences to have 
phenomenal properties in the first place. The latter takes it that conceptual capacities enable 
registration of visually relevant similarities, which in turn is said to be a phenomenal matter. However, 
initial appearances notwithstanding, on neither Fish’s nor Brewer’s account, the role these capacities 
are supposed to play is clear enough to yield a satisfactory account of expert vision. Moreover, as the 
discussion of the banana case brought out, neither of them can accommodate projection effects, nor 
do they provide resources that are sufficient for offering an alternative way of dealing with such cases. 
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For Brewer, like for Fish, the banana case—and cases like it—thus pose formidable challenges, 
challenges that their respective accounts are currently unable to meet. To conclude our consideration 
of relationalist accounts, I turn, in the next chapter, to a last variant of the relationalist view—James 
Genone’s Property View.
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6.0 RELATIONALISM III: GENONE’S PROPERTY VIEW 
One of the main aims James Genone sets for himself is to show that the relational view, if suitably 
developed, can deal with misleading appearances. In this chapter, I show that like the other 
relationalists whose accounts we looked at, Genone, too, lacks a convincing account of experiential 
phenomenology. His account of misleading appearances, however, is structurally interesting. The 
resources it affords, I argue, are more powerful than even Genone himself realizes. More specifically, 
I suggest that if a suitable account of experiential phenomenology were available, Genone’s account 
of misleading appearances could be developed in such a way as to accommodate expert vision. The 
account also seems well-suited to improve over Fish’s and Brewer’s accounts in the following 
important respect: it might serve to explain away putative projection effects in a relationalist-friendly 
fashion. 
To get a sense of Genone’s relationalist commitments, consider the following passage: 
(1) According to these philosophers [i.e. proponents of the relational view], perception 
is a relation of direct awareness to objects in the surrounding environment such that 
objects and their properties are constitutive of perceptual experience, and allowing 
this fact to play its explanatory role is incompatible with representationalism. (Genone 
2014, p. 341) 
Moreover, and similarly:   
(2) [Proponents of the relational view insist] on the idea that the epistemological and 
phenomenological features of perception should be explained entirely in terms of 
perceivers standing in a relation of direct sensory awareness to mind-independent 
objects and their properties. This approach pursues a broadly empiricist line of 
thinking, which holds that perceptual experience must be understood as a 
psychological state that is in important respects more primitive than states such as 
belief, imagination, and memory, if central features of these latter states are to be 
explained as deriving from perception. (Genone 2014, p. 345) 
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Finally: 
(3) [T]he relational view does not obviously possess the resources to account for 
experiences in which perceived objects do not have the properties they appear to have 
(illusions), or in which we do not perceive any objects at all (hallucinations). After all, 
if perception is just a relation of direct awareness to objects and their properties, how 
could it involve these sorts of errors? (Genone 2014, p. 342) 
The first two passages reflect commitments to each of the three claims that I suggested are 
characteristic of the relational view: Acquaintance, No Content, and Constitution (cf. 3.1). 
Acquaintance shows up in passages (1) and (2) as the idea that experience is a conscious relation of 
direct sensory awareness of mind-independent objects in the perceiver’s environment and (particular 
instantiations of) the properties they possess (cf. also: Genone 2014, p. 349). This relation, Genone 
contends, is epistemically more basic than propositional knowledge of that object, where, as he puts 
it, “sensory awareness contrasts with the sort of cognitive, propositional awareness one might have of 
an object on the basis of testimony” (ibid., p. 346).  
If we assume that he endorses the relational view that he presents, Genone, like Brewer, thus 
appears to endorse a version of Basic Acquaintance.1 He also joins both Brewer and Campbell in 
including the subject’s point of view among the relata of the perceptual relation. Like Fish and 
Campbell, he maintains that besides mind-independent objects, the mind-independent relata of the 
acquaintance relation also include properties. And finally, he, too, holds that which objects and 
properties enter the perceptual relation, and how these objects appear to the subject, is co-determined 
by the distribution of the subject’s attentional resources.2 
                                                 
1  In contrast to Brewer, Genone appears to think of acquaintance as an epistemic relation, but as the most basic one 
(for a pertinent characterization, see Genone 2016, p. 6).  
2  The way attention comes in slightly differs between Fish’s and Brewer’s accounts. On the former, attention constrains 
which facts enter the presentational character of the subject’s experience. On the latter, attention becomes relevant in 
two different ways: for one, it co-determines which of the surrounding objects the subject is acquainted with in the 
first place. For another, attentional processes will be part of what governs which thin looks that these objects are said 
to have the subject subsequently registers. That said, Fish, too, might assign additional roles to attention downstream 
of the selection of presentational facts, such as the role of highlighting particular aspects of one’s experience’s overall 
phenomenology. As I will suggest below, attention may play an important role in Genone’s account of expert vision.  
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A rather general version of Constitution shows up explicitly in passage (1) as the claim that 
objects and their properties are constitutive of perceptual experience. Also, Constitution is 
presumably what undergirds a claim issued in passage (2): 
Explanatory Completeness  
All epistemological and phenomenological features of perception should be explained 
entirely in terms of the acquaintance relation. 
No Content, finally, appears implicitly in both passage (1) and passage (2) as the rejection of 
representationalism. It naturally goes hand in hand with the relationalist commitment to Explanatory 
Completeness. For to endorse Explanatory Completeness is to believe that there is no explanatory 
role some putative content of perceptual states could play. Accordingly, it is natural for relationalists 
to suggest that we eschew the idea that it has such content entirely.3 
We need not dwell on No Content any further. For our guiding question, i.e. the question 
whether Genone provides a potentially helpful account of experiential phenomenology and whether 
his account manages to accommodate DVEP, it is of no particular importance. But as our previous 
discussion brought out, relationalists differ significantly in how they construe Acquaintance (and the 
mind-independent relata of the acquaintance relation) and Constitution. Indeed, looking at a 
relationalist’s take on these two claims is arguably a good way of bringing out what is distinctive of his 
or her respective view. Importantly, these two claims form an essential part of what, on the view under 
consideration, the notion of phenomenology amounts to. Acquiring a sense of what individual 
relationalists think about Acquaintance and Constitution is thus a crucial prerequisite for 
understanding their respective notion of experiential phenomenology. Hence, it is also a prerequisite 
for assessing the extent to which their respective positions may allow accommodating putative cases 
of DVEP, as is taking note of their respective accounts of illusion and hallucination. 
As for the latter, note that in passage (3), Genone concedes that at least prima facie, relationalism 
is ill-poised to provide such an account. And though he sets aside total hallucinations, he acknowledges 
                                                 
3  It is compatible with endorsing Explanatory Completeness to hold on to the idea that perceptual experience has 
content anyway. However, on such a view perceptual contents could not be construed as serving any explanatory 
role—such as accounting for the ways things appear. Accordingly, since it would be unclear what these contents 
should be and what role they could play (cf. Genone 2014, p. 350), applying Occam’s razor would seem appropriate. 
145 
 
that it is a major criterion of adequacy for relationalist accounts that they provide an account of 
illusion. The following passage contains two claims that indicate Genone’s view on what shape such 
an account should take: 
(4) [A]ppearances are not properties of psychological states, but rather are mind-
independent properties instantiated by objects in the surrounding environment. […] 
[P]erceptual illusions can be understood as experiences that tend to produce false 
judgments. (Genone 2014, p. 340) 
In our discussion of Brewer’s account, we wondered how to place his notion of looks. Are looks 
properties of experiences, we asked, or of objects, or—somehow—of both? As the first sentence of 
passage (4) indicates, Genone clearly positions himself with respect to what he takes appearances to 
be: mind-independent properties instantiated by specific objects in the subject’s environment. This 
assertion is refreshingly straightforward. I discuss it in 6.1, where I take a closer look at his notion of 
appearances.  
The most pressing issues arise in the context of the question what role appearances may play in a 
Genonean account of Constitution. Given the relationalist commitment to Explanatory 
Completeness, the ability to provide such an account should be an important criterion of adequacy 
for any relationalist view. I focus on this issue in 6.2. However, the discussion there will be brief; 
unfortunately, there is very little Genone offers in this regard.4  
In 6.3, I turn to his account of misleading appearances. I will argue that it is interesting in its own 
right and that it would provide powerful resources that might allow relationalists to deal with putative 
cases of DVEP if a suitable notion of experiential phenomenology were available. That said, I also 
show that the account is currently underdeveloped and leaves many important questions unaddressed, 
so that developing it further is something relationalists should seriously consider.  
                                                 
4  Genone’s account is much less developed than the accounts discussed previously. As Genone puts it, it is “by no 
means exhaustive, but […] provides a starting point for addressing the various different kinds of cases of misleading 
appearances” (Genone 2014, p. 362). Ultimately, I think that even this modest statement is too optimistic. As I argue 
below, his account of misleading appearances contains features that are structurally interesting. But as I will also argue, 
pending fuller accounts of Constitution and of how judgments can be based on one’s being acquainted with 
appearances, it remains unclear how being related to appearances puts us in a position to issue judgments—misleading 
or not—about how things are. 
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In 6.4, I sum up the discussion of the relationalist positions. Let us turn next to Genone’s account 
of appearances.5 As I will suggest, the notion gives rise to a number of clarificatory questions that 
would need to be answered in order to make it fully intelligible. 
6.1 APPEARANCES AS MIND-INDEPENDENT PROPERTIES 
Qua relationalist, Genone maintains that through perceptual experience, subjects are acquainted with 
mind-independent objects and with the properties they instantiate. Curiously enough, he provides no 
account of what he takes the specific role of acquaintance with objects to be. For all one can determine, 
objects, on his account, merely serve as the bearers of properties.6 But patently, Genone assigns a 
special importance to the perception of what he calls appearance properties or, for short, appearances. As 
we saw in passage (3) above, he maintains that appearances are not properties of psychological states, 
but entirely mind-independent properties of objects.7 Moreover, he insists that appearances are not 
individuated in terms of experiences or any other mental state they may (typically) cause in subjects 
that are perceptually related to them. Accordingly, Genone rejects a position suggested by Sidney 
                                                 
5  A very different relationalist notion of appearance properties has recently been suggested at by Ori Beck. According 
to him, appearance properties are properties of subjects, viz. the property of being appeared to in a certain way, which 
in turn are completely determined by the subject’s neuro-computational properties (cf. Beck 2018, pp. 18-19).  
Appearance properties, Beck suggests, do not completely determine perceptual phenomenology. Instead, the 
latter is fixed by instantiations of the appearance relation, schematically: x perceptually appears W to S relation, where x 
is a variable satisfied by for a mind-independent object and W a predicate associated with a suitable appearance 
property (cf. ibid., p. 20).  I cannot discuss Beck’s view here, not least because he, too, offers it only as a sketch. 
Instead, I simply note the following: Beck claims that if two experiences e1 and e2 are such that they involve the same 
appearance properties, but only one of them is a perception, e1 and e2 differ phenomenologically. But he provides no 
explanation of how this phenomenal difference is to be construed. More generally, Beck, just like all the relationalists 
whose views we have analyzed, owes us an account of what the phenomenology of experience is so that appearance 
properties and the subject’s standing in certain appearance relations can be said to co-constitute it. 
6  This marks a difference to Fish’s account. For Fish, recall, the identity of phenomenal properties depends in part on 
which specific objects constitute the presentational character of the perceiving subject’s experience. 
7  Patently, Genone presupposes a pre-theoretical understanding of what appearances are and then suggests that 
whatever he takes to be antecedently understood needs to be characterized in a novel way: as mind-independent 
properties of objects. Arguably, most problems with his account trace back to the fact that he never spells out what 
that antecedent understanding is. This fact, combined with his way of characterizing what it is for appearances to be 
mind-independent that I will discuss shortly, makes it hard to see what the appearance properties his account so 
heavily relies on are supposed to be. 
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Shoemaker, who construes appearances as dispositions objects may possess to cause various kinds of 
experiences in perceivers (Shoemaker 2006). Instead, Genone offers the following suggestion:  
(5) [A]ppearances are [relational] properties of objects they possess in virtue of their 
intrinsic properties, properties such as shape, size, and (as I will assume for present 
purposes) colour […] [,] and various environmental conditions such as illumination 
or the medium of light transmission. […] [A]ppearances are not themselves 
dispositions, they are the manifestations of dispositions, and part of what is involved in 
an object possessing certain intrinsic properties is being disposed to appear various 
ways in various conditions. (Genone 2014, p. 357) 
According to Genone, appearances, thus, are entirely mind-independent relational properties of 
objects, manifestations of dispositions to appear various ways in various environmental conditions 
that objects have anyway, which in turn is a matter of their having certain intrinsic properties. And 
since they are entirely mind-independent, he claims that “which appearances an object has is entirely 
independent of the discriminative capacities of perceivers or their inclinations to make judgments 
about the intrinsic properties of an object on the basis of its appearances” (Genone 2014, p. 358).  
Let us add two further data points. First, Genone claims that subjects may fail to discriminate 
between two different appearances (Genone 2014, p. 358). Such indiscriminability, he suggests, can 
be due to facts about the subjects’ sensory physiology. Presumably, it can also rest on the distribution 
of subjects’ attentional resources while perceiving the relevant objects and the appearance properties 
they anyway have. Second, Genone asserts that numerically distinct objects can be the same with 
respect to their (intrinsic) observable properties. If so, he holds, the two objects will be the same with 
respect to their appearance properties also (ibid., fn. 26). On his view, thus, sameness of (intrinsic) 
observable properties apparently is, or yields, sameness with respect to appearances. 
At this point, various questions arise. Consider, first, the claim that appearances are entirely mind-
independent relational properties that objects manifest, in certain circumstance, in virtue of the 
intrinsic properties they possess. What kind of property is an appearance?8 And what is it for an object 
                                                 
8  Note that the first sentence in passage (5) is somewhat ambiguous. On one reading, size, shape, and color are examples 
of appearance properties. On another reading—which, I assume, is the one Genone intends—size, shape, and color 
are examples of intrinsic properties of objects in virtue of which, Genone claims, objects possess (or instantiate, or 
manifest) their appearances. On the first reading, appearances could just be observable properties of objects. If the 
second reading is right, appearances could be properties objects manifest in virtue of having certain observable 
properties (which leaves it still unclear what kind or properties appearances are). 
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to manifest one? Also, which environing circumstances serve as the stimulus conditions in which 
objects manifest appearances? For an object, o, to appear some way or other—must there be some 
observer around that o appears to? Genone holds that we should distinguish between an object having 
a particular appearance, and a subject perceiving the object’s appearance on a given occasion (Genone 
2014, p. 358). This can be read as the suggestion that objects can have (or manifest) their appearances 
regardless of whether they are perceived or not. If so, then it seems that part of what it is for 
appearance properties of objects to be entirely mind-independent is for the objects to simply manifest 
these properties in suitable circumstances, where the latter may include illumination and the medium 
of light transmission, say, but not the presence of suitably equipped or positioned observers. 
To bring out this out more sharply, we can ask how Genone would have us think about objects 
in worlds in which no observers exist. Suppose, for instance, some universe-wide catastrophe wiped 
out all life in the universe and made the development of life in it impossible for all time to come. After 
the catastrophic event, would objects stop manifesting their appearance properties? Or would Genone 
insist that they keep manifesting them—unperturbed, as it were, by the current and future absence of 
observers? In a parallel fashion, we can consider a very early state of the universe that is impossible 
for us (or anyone else) to observe. Did objects manifest appearance properties then? If so, would they 
have manifested them if observers had, for contingent reasons, never developed or if it had been 
impossible for observers to ever develop? 
The following response seems perfectly intuitive: the objects figuring in such hypothetical 
scenarios would manifest certain appearances if—per impossibile—suitably equipped and positioned 
observers were around (and, arguably, different appearances if the observes were equipped and/or 
positioned differently) and attended to these objects. Note, however, that on this intuitive view, the 
presence of suitable observers is among the stimulus conditions that govern the manifestation of the 
disposition that objects are said to anyway have to appear in various ways: objects thus cannot manifest 
the relevant appearances unless suitable observers are around. Arguably, stimulus conditions are part 
of the identity conditions of dispositions and, as such of what individuates an object’s disposition to 
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appear in certain ways.9 But if so, then so does the kind of observer listed among those conditions—
and, presumably, the kind of mental state caused in them as they perceptually relate to the respective 
objects. And if what appearance an object manifests depends on the kind of observer that is present, 
the relevant appearance property, too, is individuated at least in part by reference to the kind of 
observer involved, and, presumably, to the kind of mental state caused in them as they perceptually 
relate to the object.  
Genone, however, must resist this intuitive view. After all, he insists that for objects to have or 
manifest an appearance is one thing, for an observer to perceive it quite another. Apparently, he wants 
to reject that there are conceptual ties between the notions of an appearance and that of (kinds of) 
observers completely. The problem, however, is this: if these ties are indeed severed, it becomes 
somewhat mysterious what the appearances are that Genone is talking about. It seems, for instance, 
quite consistent with the view as we have reconstructed it that objects permanently manifest 
appearances that would and indeed could not appear to anyone. However, without any reference to 
(possible) observers and some psychological or phenomenal states that their being appeared to brings 
about, it remains unclear what such appearances, or appearances generally, should be. Relatedly, it 
remains mysterious how to distinguish properties that are appearances from properties that are not. 
Pending an account that shows how Genone thinks what appearances are and how to distinguish 
them from other properties, I contend, we should treat his claim that appearances are entirely mind-
independent with caution. At the very least, it remains open to us to claim that if objects can manifest 
properties that are properly labelled appearances, the presence of a suitable observer should be listed 
among the stimulus conditions that trigger the relevant dispositions, i.e. the dispositions to appear 
various ways (to observers that are both suitably equipped and positioned) in various circumstances.   
                                                 
9  The question how to characterize the identity conditions and how to individuate properties, especially dispositions, 
is, of course, a vexed one and I cannot here fully engage with it (nor does Genone). That said, note that a common 
distinction between kinds of properties is the distinction between pure and impure properties, where the identity of 
latter, but not the former, is fixed by reference to a particular. With respect to appearance properties, one can thus 
wonder whether they are supposed to be pure or impure properties in this sense. Genone remains silent about this 
issue. But since he wants to accommodate the idea that different objects can have the same appearance property, it 
stands to argue that Genone must take appearance properties to be pure properties. Presumably, thus, an appearance 
property will be a property of appearing [some way] and not [some specific object]’s property of appearing [some way]. 
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A further question is how we are to understand the relation Genone thinks obtains between the 
entirely mind-independent appearance properties that objects are said to manifest in certain 
environmental conditions and the ways things look to (certain kinds of) subjects. Again, to say that 
appearances are properties of objects, manifestations of dispositions to appear various ways, and to 
construe such manifestations in terms of objects’ presenting certain looks to suitably equipped and 
positioned subjects seems at odds with the idea that appearances are individuated independently of 
how objects look to (certain kinds of) subjects. But if we suggest that appearances manifest as ways 
things look to perceivers, appearances again appear to be properties of experiences, not of objects. 
The first upshot of our discussion, then, is that Genone leaves us without a fully satisfactory 
account of what appearances are. And without an account of Constitution, we have no sense of how 
the mind-independent appearances that objects anyway manifest are supposed to determine or 
constitute ways things look to subjects. The problem we are facing is thus one that is familiar from our 
brief discussion of Campbell’s view: it is simply not obvious how appearances, construed as entirely 
mind-independent properties that objects anyway manifest, relative to certain environing conditions, 
could also be properties of experiences—if that is what ways things look to subjects are. For if we take 
seriously what Genone insists on, i.e. that appearances of objects are not individuated in terms of 
psychological states of perceivers, it remains an open question how appearances, so construed, relate 
to such states. If so, it also remains unclear how considerations about such states—i.e. considerations 
pertaining to how objects look to subjects as subjects are acquainted with these objects and the appearances 
they anyway manifest—have any bearing on whether appearances and observable intrinsic properties 
of objects are distinct, as Genone seems to suggest. 
Further questions abound. What, for example, determines which of the appearances that objects 
anyway manifest a subject’s experience relates her to? As we saw above, Genone appears to credit 
attention with some role: he claims that which objects and properties enter the perceptual relation, 
and how these objects appear to the subject, is co-determined by the distribution of the subject’s 
attentional resources. Presumably, then, Genone thinks that which among the appearance properties 
that an object anyway manifests a given subject’s experience relates her to depends on what she attends 
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to. That attention selects which features of an object enter the perceptual relation, and how, and that 
this may in turn affect the way the object appears to the subject can readily by granted. But again, as 
things stand, it is unclear how the notion of an object’s appearing, or looking, to a subject is to be 
construed. Accordingly, what exactly the role is that Genone thinks attention plays in generating how 
objects appear or look to subjects remains an open question as well. 
Another question, one directly pertinent to our guiding question, is this: could what the subject S 
believes or knows and what conceptual capacities S possesses play a role, too, in settling which among 
the appearance properties that an object o anyway manifest S’s experience of o relates S to? Could an 
object—an x-ray tube, say—manifest certain appearance properties (anyway) that are discriminable 
only to experts? Could false beliefs about the perceived object, or the actualization of inappropriate 
conceptual capacities, prevent observers from being acquainted with appearance properties that if 
being perceived might put them under some rational pressure to revise their beliefs? On the 
assumption of Explanatory Completeness, a subject’s beliefs cannot, on Genone’s view, affect the 
phenomenal features of perception directly—whatever the account of such features may be. Rather, 
such features would have to be explained entirely in terms of the acquaintance relation. The only way 
for knowledgeable beliefs to affect the phenomenology of experience would thus be in a way that is 
mediated via the acquaintance relation.  
Suppose Genone allowed that such effects are possible. If so, his account would appear to have 
some similarities with Fish’s account, on which conceptual capacities enable environing facts to feature 
in the presentational character of the subject’s experience.10 On Genone’s account, the role attributed 
to such capacities would then be to govern which of the appearances objects anyway manifest can 
enter the perceptual relation.  
Recall, however, that Genone endorses Basic Acquaintance. If so, one may doubt that the idea 
is available to him that for subjects to sometimes—let alone generally—be acquainted with appearance 
properties requires (either sometimes or generally) the possession of certain conceptual capacities—
                                                 
10  By the same token, it would differ from Brewer’s account, since on it, thin looks are considered belief-independent. 
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and thus what subjects know or whatever epistemic abilities possessing the relevant conceptual 
capacities may in turn require. If so, however, then it may also be doubtful that he can accommodate 
the phenomenon of expert vision.11 
Before I discuss what little Genone has to say about the Constitution of perceptual experience 
in 6.2, let me briefly return to one of the data points listed above. Recall that according to Genone, 
objects that are identical with respect to their observable properties instantiate the same appearances 
in the same environmental conditions.12 Next, consider two objects—o1 and o2—and two subjects—
S1 and S2—whose sensory physiologies differ. More specifically, let us stipulate that relative to the 
sensory physiology of S1, o1 and o2 have the same observable properties, while relative to the sensory 
physiology of S2, they do not. Suppose both S1 and S2 undergo experiences that perceptually relate 
them to o1 and o2 in identical environmental conditions. Now let us ask: are the appearances that o1 
and o2 manifest, respectively, the same or different in both cases?  
Pretheoretically, a tempting response might be this: o1 and o2 manifest the same appearances to 
S1, but different ones to S2. Unfortunately, Genone’s contention that identity in observable properties 
yields identity in appearance properties falls far short of constituting a full account of how observable 
properties and appearance properties are related. Without further restriction, the contention is for 
instance consistent with the idea that objects that differ in what observable properties they have may 
nevertheless manifest the same appearances.13 Either way, observability is surely a property objects 
have relative not just to environing conditions, but also to kinds of observers. And if what observable 
properties an object possesses at least co-determines what appearance properties an object manifests, 
then what appearance properties an object manifests will also be relative to kinds of observers. If so, 
                                                 
11  The situation need not be hopeless. I return to the issue in 6.3.2.  
12  In the context of the issues discussed earlier, this claim provides some evidence that Genone thinks that objects have 
their appearance properties (somehow) in virtue of their observable intrinsic properties after all. If so, then perhaps, 
his dropping the qualification ‘observable’ in passage (6) above is just an oversight. Even then, however, it remains 
still open what exactly appearance properties are, how they are supposed to be grounded in an object’s intrinsic 
properties—observable or not—, and how they relate to how things look to (certain kinds of) subjects.   
13  In other words, the appearance properties an object manifests could supervene on its intrinsic properties (observable 
or not) in such a way that a difference in appearance properties of two objects entails a difference in their intrinsic 
properties, while a difference in their intrinsic properties does not, or not always, necessitate a difference in their 
appearance properties. 
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however, then on an assumption relationalists will surely endorse—namely that features of objects 
that are observable for a certain kind of subject are those features that tend to bring about certain 
psychological states in that kind of subject (given suitable circumstances)—it appears, yet again, that 
pace Genone, appearance properties, so construed, would be individuated relative to psychological 
states of (kinds of) perceivers after all. 
Presumably, however, Genone is more likely to insist that o1 and o2 differ in what appearances 
they anyway manifest. He might e.g. suggest the following: o1 and o2 differ in what intrinsic properties 
they have in such a way that they differ in which observable properties they have relative to different 
observers. Let an object’s overall observability be characterized in terms of the set of all the observable 
properties the object possesses relative to all different kinds of possible observers. On that 
assumption, o1 and o2 differ in their overall observability. If we assume again that an object’s observable 
properties co-determine its appearance properties, then o1 and o2 could well differ in what appearances 
they manifest overall. 
This suggestion, note, fits Genone’s stipulation that objects that differ in what appearances they 
manifest can be indiscriminable to perceivers. Applied to the present case, Genone could thus suggest 
that S1’s sensory physiology is not as sensitive as the corresponding physiology of S2. Accordingly, S1 
does less well when it comes to discriminating various appearances that objects anyway manifest than 
S2. Hence, to S1, o1 and o2 look the same, though their appearances differ, whereas to S2, they do not.  
However, note that on this proposal, too, the appearance properties an object manifests are still 
relative to the observable properties it possesses relative to kinds of possible observers. Assuming, 
again, that features of objects that are observable for a certain kind of subject just are those very 
features that tend to bring about a certain set of psychological states in that kind of subject, appearance 
properties are thus still individuated relative to psychological states of (kinds of) perceivers. 
In sum, Genone’s contention that sameness in observable properties is sameness in appearance 
properties is suggestive as it indicates that he thinks that there is some tight link between these kinds 
of properties. If, however, we take this suggestion seriously, we are again face-to-face with the question 
what the entirely mind-independent appearance properties are supposed to be.  
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I do not purport to have knock-down arguments against Genone’s notion of appearance 
properties. Perhaps he can clarify the notion further, shed light on the relation between appearances 
and observable intrinsic properties, and on the way appearances determine how things look to (certain 
kinds of) subjects. Perhaps he will suggest that both an object’s observable properties and it 
appearance properties depend on its intrinsic properties, and spell this out in such a way that the 
appearance properties do not truly depend on observable properties. Even so, I contend that at least 
currently, his notion of entirely mind-independent appearances remains less than fully clear. Moreover, 
even if we grant that appearances are in some interesting sense entirely mind-independent, the 
question remains how such objective properties relate to how things look to subjects, i.e. to the 
phenomenology of the subject’s experience. I turn to this issue next.14 
6.2 GENONE’S (MISSING) ACCOUNT OF CONSTITUTION 
Recall Campbell’s claim that mind-independent qualitative features of objects constitute the 
phenomenal features of experience. Given that he appears to understand constitution in terms of 
identity, we wondered (with Fish and others—relationalists and representationalists alike) how the 
qualitative features of objects could possibly be (the phenomenal) properties of experiences. Genone 
sometimes appears to equate the appearance properties an object manifests with ways things look to 
subjects. And though it is tempting to construe the expression ‘ways things look to subjects’ as a way of 
characterizing the subject’s experiential phenomenology, such a view, if Genone endorsed it, would 
raise the same question as Campbell’s. 
But Genone repeatedly denies that appearances are properties of experiences and keeps insisting 
that they are objective, mind-independent properties of objects. Further, they are said to be 
                                                 
14  If Genone’s account of appearances is unclear already, this should strongly constrain how intelligible his account of 
experiential phenomenology can possibly be that such appearances are said to constitute. It is quite striking that 
though Genone accepts Explanatory Completeness, he has so little to say about Constitution, which is why I 
decided to devote a brief and frustratingly confusing section to the topic. 
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manifestation of dispositions that objects anyway have, properties objects display in suitable environing 
circumstances (Genone 2014, p. 357), properties of objects subjects may (fail to) perceive (ibid., p. 358, 
p. 364, and passim) or experience (ibid., p. 366, fn. 34), properties subjects can attend to (or not) (ibid., p. 
366), and that perceivers may (fail to) be able to discriminate or tell apart from each other (ibid., p. 363). 
Either way, if appearances are not properties of experience, but properties of mind-independent 
objects, the question how they give rise to the phenomenal features of experience becomes pressing. 
Given Genone’s professed commitment to Explanatory Completeness, we should expect him to 
provide some relationalist account that shows how the phenomenology of perception can be explained 
entirely by reference to acquaintance relations subjects stand in with mind-independent 
items.Unfortunately, it is hard to get a fix on Genone’s view on this issue, as a quick survey brings out 
of the passages in which he touches upon it. As we saw in passage (1), he endorses the general claim 
that perceptual experience is constituted by mind-independent objects and properties. He also makes 
the following more specific claims about appearances: appearances, he suggests, “are partly 
constitutive of” the phenomenology of experience (Genone 2014, p. 343), which, as he puts it, “is 
[generally] constituted by the phenomena encountered therein” (ibid.; also: Genone 2016, p. 13).15 
Suppose the phenomena one encounters in a given perceptual experience, including appearances, 
constitute or co-constitute that experience’s phenomenology. If so, how are we to think about 
constitution and about what is thus constituted? If appearances are not themselves properties of 
experience, is it fair to think about the phenomenology of an experience in terms of properties it 
                                                 
15  This latter claim is a statement about the phenomenology of experience, not of perception, where ‘perception’ may be 
taken to refer to the successful case, while ‘experience’ may also refer to cases of illusion and hallucination (sometimes 
Genone makes this distinction explicit, e.g. in Genone 2016, p.16). In other words, Genone’s claim that appearances 
are partly constitutive of the phenomenology of experience is compatible with the idea that acquaintance with 
appearance properties is fully constitutive of perceptual phenomenology. Sometimes that is what he seems to say, e.g. 
when he asserts, without qualification, that the appearance properties an object manifests “constitute the way the 
object appears in those environmental conditions” (Genone 2014, p. 366). Sometimes, however, he adds 
qualifications, e.g. when he claims that “perceptual experience [but not, or at least not explicitly, its phenomenology] 
is [only] partly constituted by awareness of particular appearances” (Genone 2014, p. 358, fn. 28), which may indicate 
that he thinks that other factors are in play after all. Given Explanatory Completeness, I think that he should want 
to assert that the phenomenology of perception (but not of experience more broadly construed) is indeed fully 
constituted by the appearance properties the subject’s experience relates her to. Unfortunately, he never does. 
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possesses? If so, how do appearances constitute such properties?16 Perceptual experience, on 
Genone’s relational view, is a relation with mind-independent objects. But is it also a psychological 
state? On the one hand, one may think that affirming the latter resonates with Genone’s (somewhat 
obscure) remark that “appearances figure in the psychological states of perceivers” (ibid., p. 358, 
emphasis added). On the other hand, it is not obvious how a relation that is partly constituted by 
mind-independent objects could also be a psychological state of a subject.  
Sometimes Genone expresses the view that the traditional notion of the phenomenology of 
experience—if construed as the phenomenal character of experience, or in terms of the property of 
what experience is like—is problematic. It fails, he asserts, to capture the putative fact that mind-
independent objects and properties are experienced as immediately present (Genone 2016, p. 13). Of 
course, without a clearer sense of how to think about that traditional notion of phenomenology, this 
charge is hard to assess. But even if it had force—even, that is, if Genone were right that the notion 
of phenomenal character is “descriptively flawed when it comes to characterizing the phenomenology 
of perception” (ibid.)—we are still completely in the dark as to what Genone’s relational alternative 
account of experiential phenomenology is supposed to be.17  
Some passages support the contention that according to Genone, experiential phenomenology is 
not—or perhaps not just—a psychological state. For one, Genone states that he rejects “the idea that 
phenomenology by definition encompasses only psychological phenomena” (ibid., p. 356, fn. 23). For 
another, he claims that “[a]n explanation of the total phenomenology of experience can constitutively 
                                                 
16  Note that if Genone thinks about the phenomenology of experience as being constituted by the mind-independent 
appearance properties that one encounters in that experience, on his view, like on Fish’s, it may be difficult to 
accommodate a notion of phenomenal identity, i.e. a notion on which two experiences that involve relations to 
different appearance properties can be phenomenally the same. 
17  As Genone indicates, his concern about the traditional notion rests one issues having to do with transparency, i.e., 
roughly, the idea that as we try to attend to features of our experience, all we seem to be able to focus on are the 
properties of what is experienced, whereas the putative properties of experience themselves remain transparent (the 
claim that experience is transparent has been coined by, and is often attributed to, Moore 1959; see Gupta 2019, 
chapter 5, for an argument to the effect that Moore did not endorse it). As Genone concedes, it is unclear that the 
introspective impression one may have that one’s experience is transparent distinguishes veridical from illusory or 
hallucinatory experiences, which are, arguably, constituted in a way that differs from the way perceptual experiences 
are constituted. Regardless of whether the phenomenon of transparency is taken to cast doubt on the traditional 
notion of experience, however, it remains the case that as long as the relationalist alternative is not fully on the table, 
one cannot assess whether it is any more convincing. 
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(as opposed to causally) involve elements independent of the subject’s mind.” (ibid., p. 368, fn. 36). 
Presumably, these passages are supposed to make room for the thought that experiential 
phenomenology may encompass appearances and may be explained in a way that constitutively 
involves them, though they are not themselves psychological phenomena.18 But unfortunately, 
Genone’s claims are hardly more than promissory notes of an account. For again, in absence of an 
account of Constitution and of how to think about the phenomenology of experience so constituted, 
the claim that appearances are (partly) constitutive of the phenomenology of experience remains 
opaque, as does the contention that the phenomenology of experience can be explained in a way that 
constitutively involves appearances.19 
The situation is thus at least mildly frustrating, but structurally similar to the one we encountered 
when discussing Fish’s and Brewer’s respective views. Fish left us without a clear account of how 
properties and conceptual capacities are to be individuated in a way that enables them to play the role 
he thinks they do. Brewer left us without a clear account of the similarity relations that are said to 
obtain between objects and paradigm exemplars of various (possible) kinds of objects. And Genone, 
too, leaves us without an entirely clear notion of entirely mind-independent appearance properties. 
Likewise, Fish leaves us in the dark as to how acquaintance with facts relates and grounds phenomenal 
properties (across different individuals, and in a way that respects the idea that experiences of different 
objects can share phenomenal properties). Brewer leaves us in the dark as to how similarity relations 
are supposed to ground thin looks (and what these are). And Genone, too, leaves us without an 
account of how appearances, perhaps in conjunction with other factors, constitute the 
phenomenology of perception and/or experience.  
                                                 
18  In a different context, Genone asserts the following: “How things appear to a perceiving subject, however, is another 
way of talking about an experience’s phenomenology” (Genone 2016, p. 9). Presumably, what he means to say is that 
talk about how things appear to subjects is talk about phenomenology. But as long as we have no idea how to get from 
a notion of mind-independent appearances to a notion of how things appear to subjects, this assertion remains 
uninformative. 
19  Nor does changing the imagery help. For when Genone suggests that the phenomenology of experience might 
encompass appearances, or that appearances can figure in subjects’ psychological states, what exactly is being asserted is 
not any clearer.  
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Given Genone’s explicit commitment to Explanatory Completeness, this is a highly 
unsatisfactory result. The dissatisfaction, however, is not limited to Genone’s account. Instead, it 
carries over to the competing relationalist accounts of experiential phenomenology, too. 
At the outset of this chapter, I noted that one of Genone’s main aims is to show that relationalists 
are in a good position to accommodate misleading appearances. Given the worries raised so far, we 
are, in effect, without a fully satisfactory account of what appearances are, of how they can be 
properties of objects, and how they can be at the same time something that is somehow available to 
the subject and that could serve any of the epistemic or semantic roles that Genone might wish to 
attribute to them. Genone’s relationalist account, in sum, is incomplete at best. As it stands, it can 
neither be fully assessed nor accepted.  
Despite these misgivings, I think that his account of misleading appearances is structurally 
interesting. In what follows, I will assume—for the sake of the argument—that some relationalist 
notion of appearances and some notion of experiential phenomenology is available. I will assume, that 
is, that there are phenomenally distinct ways of being aware of various mind-independent appearances 
that jointly ground a notion of experiential phenomenology. Up to now, none of the relationalists 
whose views we considered has been able to provide such an account, including Genone. 
Nevertheless, I think that looking at Genone’s account of misleading appearances is instructive. It 
affords a novel strategy of how, as a relationalist, one could seek to accommodate phenomena 
putatively falling under DVEP—a strategy, curiously, that Genone himself overlooks. 
In the following section, I argue for the following conditional claim: if a coherent relationalist 
account of appearances and the phenomenology of experience were available, the structural features of 
Genone’s account of misleading appearances might provide relationalists with a way to accommodate 
not just cases of expert vision, but also with resources powerful enough to achieve a remarkable feat, 
viz. to devise a strategy for explaining away projection effects. 
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6.3 MISLEADING APPEARANCES AND DVEP 
In perceptual experience, Genone holds, the world always is the way it appears to the subject as being. 
As we saw in the previous two sections, Genone takes appearances to be entirely mind-independent 
relational properties of objects, properties they manifest given certain environing conditions. Of 
course, if appearances are indeed entirely mind-independent properties of objects, and thus form part 
of what the world is anyway, the claim that the world always is the way it appears is rather unsurprising. 
As I argued in 6.1, Genone’s account of mind-independent appearances remains obscure. Moreover, 
given the survey conducted in the previous section, that the world always is the way it appears to subjects 
is an even less perspicuous claim, at least as long as an account of the constitutive relation between 
appearance properties of objects and ways things appear to subjects that entails it is pending. 
These issues are serious, and to repeat, I do not think that Genone’s account can be accepted 
unless they are resolved. That said, as indicated, in this section, I shall bracket them and simply suppose 
that they can somehow be addressed. What, then, are we to make of Genone’s claim that perceptual 
experience, as the relationalist construes it, can involve misleading appearances? 
6.3.1 Misleading Appearances 
Qua relationalist, Genone cannot accommodate the idea of misleading appearances by accepting the 
thought that such appearances involve inaccurate representations. He develops his alternative account 
by way of considering doxastic approaches to perception. On such approaches, Genone reports, 
appearances—misleading or not—are to be explained “in terms of the propensity to cause various 
beliefs,” in terms of “the way one is inclined to judge things to be on the base of experience,” or in terms of 
“the judgments one would make on the basis of perceptual experience” (Genone 2014, p. 253). From 
Genone’s point of view, the appeal of doxastic accounts rests on the following fact: proponents of 
such views can assert that appearances can be misleading—by way of causing or inclining one to issue 
false beliefs or judgments—and at the same time reject that the idea that the property appearances can 
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have of being misleading must rest on some property appearances also possess: that of representing 
things as being some way they are not. For all that proponents of doxastic accounts claim is that 
appearances have the propensity to (somehow) bring about states that have representational content 
in the perceiving subject. But this claim is perfectly compatible with the idea that appearances 
themselves have no representational content at all.  
As Genone points out, doxastic accounts face counter-examples. As e.g. the phenomenon of 
known illusion shows, appearances cannot simply be explained in terms of the judgments we would 
make on the basis of the experience involving them. For illusions, once recognized, incline subjects 
to making different judgments than they did prior to their being so recognized. But if appearances 
were explained in terms of the judgments we would make on the basis of the experience involving 
them, it seems that illusions, once know, should acquire a different appearance. Given that many 
illusions are fairly robust, this consequence is counterintuitive. And though defenders of doxastic 
approaches are not entirely without resources to address such cases, Genone ultimately rejects such 
accounts for a different reason, albeit one that we have already encountered: he wants to keep the 
individuation of appearances independent of facts about what psychological states they may (typically) 
cause in suitable perceivers. Whether he succeeds in doing so is of course an issue we have already 
raised. Either way, since clearly, on doxastic accounts, appearances are individuated in terms of beliefs, 
judgments, or propensities to cause them, doxastic approaches are at odds with Genone’s insistence 
on the idea that appearances properties are entirely mind-independent.   
That said, Genone suggests that one can simply drop the claim that appearance properties are 
individuated by the mental states they tend to cause, while holding on to the idea that for perceiving 
subjects to perceive certain kinds of appearance properties may lead them to form certain beliefs or 
judgments.  
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The idea, apparently, is roughly the following: if a subject S’s experience relates S to a given object, 
o, that has certain kinds of appearance properties, then S may20 judge, on the basis of her perception 
of these properties, that things are a certain way. In this context, the following passage is instructive: 
(6) [W]hat determines whether or not a subject can judge accurately on the basis of an 
experience is her implicit understanding of the relationship between appearances and 
the intrinsic properties of objects in various environmental conditions. […] 
Perceptual experiences are misleading when we are insufficiently familiar with the 
environmental conditions surrounding the objects we are perceiving, such that their 
appearances lead us to draw false conclusions. We need not be misled, however, if we 
are attuned to the relations between the appearances of objects and their intrinsic 
properties. […] What I am proposing is that whether or not a perceived appearance 
is misleading depends on the subject’s understanding of the relationship between 
appearances and intrinsic properties in different contexts. (Genone 2014, pp. 363-4). 
Patently, Genone thinks that whether subjects lack or possess the capacity to issue accurate 
perceptual judgments in response to their experience depends on their implicit understanding of how 
the appearances an object o manifests in various circumstances relate to o’s intrinsic properties.21 
Whether the perceptual judgments one can issue in response to a given experience are correct thus 
depends, in a broad sense, on whether the beliefs are correct that form the set of one’s (implicit and 
explicit) doxastic context.This dependence on background beliefs is a crucial and, I think, powerful 
feature of Genone’s account. It is powerful because it allows him to accommodate the idea that the 
same appearance, if encountered by subjects who differ with respect to what they believe, can lead 
them to endorse different beliefs and judgments.  
To bring this out, let us briefly consider an example that Genone discusses as well—the Müller-
Lyer illusion. Suppose you are unfamiliar with it. If so, you might be misled upon seeing an instance 
of it by taking the way things look to you as indicating that the two horizontal lines the illusion involves 
differ in length.22 In such a case, the appearance you perceive is misleading in the following sense: as 
you form a judgment or a belief on the basis of perceiving it, your judgment or belief is false. 
                                                 
20  How the modality involved here is to be understood points to an issue I will return to below. 
21  Again, in this subsection I take it that appearances are something that subjects are phenomenally aware of.  
22  Surely, something must be said about what it is for an appearance to indicate something. That appearances ‘might 
seem to indicate’ something—presumably the obtaining of certain facts—is an expression Genone himself employs 
in his discussion of the Müller-Lyer (Genone 2014, p. 363). Unfortunately, he does not explain it. I return to this and 
related issues below. 
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Conversely, suppose you know the illusion. If so, you may still concede that the appearance the two 
lines manifest is such that things look to you such that in other contexts, you might be misled so as to 
form, on the basis of you experience, the false judgment or belief that the lines differ in length. 
However, given that you are familiar with the illusion, you will, in the context at hand and on the basis 
of your experience, judge correctly that the lines are of equal length. In this case, your background 
beliefs are such that upon perceiving the appearance, you are (somehow) enabled to form, on the basis 
of perceiving it, judgments that are correct. In the context of a background view that is sufficiently 
correct, the appearance is no longer misleading.  
But let us also note the following: that appearances are not misleading in the sense specified does 
not entail that the correct judgments that subjects may form based on perceiving them will be properly 
justified. Relatedly, for an appearance not to be misleading in the sense specified does not require the 
background view to be correct. This comes out once we acknowledge that false and irrational 
background beliefs can conspire in such a way as to yield true perceptual judgments. Suppose, for 
example, one erroneously believed that today is Tuesday and also held the irrational belief that only 
on Tuesdays, the appearance manifested by the Müller-Lyer illusion (in the circumstances at hand) is 
an appearance of two lines that are equal in length. A subject S who currently holds these beliefs and 
who perceives the appearance manifested by the Müller-Lyer may well be led, on the basis of her 
experience, to issue what we, too, would endorse as a true perceptual judgment, i.e. that the two lines 
are equal in length. But arguably, its justificatory status is deficient. It is ill-justified or—as we may 
perhaps say—ill-founded. For it arises because S’s background view, which governs how the 
perception of various appearances relates to perceptual judgments that S is inclined to issue in 
response to her experience, involves false and irrational beliefs.  
For present purposes, the crucial upshot is this: the claim that what judgments subjects issue on 
the basis of their experience depends on their background beliefs allows Genone to accommodate the 
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following idea: perceptual experience itself is never erroneous.23 Perceptual error, he holds, is never a 
matter of perception itself, but always the result of some mistaken background beliefs—beliefs about 
what the objects are like in one’s environment that give rise to the appearance one perceives.  
Such mistakes, let us note, may come in various flavors. One can be mistaken about which 
appearances objects that possess certain intrinsic properties are disposed to manifest in various 
environing circumstances, including the circumstances one finds oneself in. As a result, one may, upon 
perceiving a given appearance, issue a mistaken judgment about what kind of object the appearance 
one perceives is an appearance of. Similarly, one can be correct about which appearances certain objects 
are disposed to manifest in certain conditions, but unaware that other objects can exhibit such 
appearances as well. Alternatively, one can be wrong about the environing conditions one finds oneself 
in. Further, one could be right about all of the above, but attend to the appearances the objects one 
faces manifest in a suboptimal way so as to mistake what appearance one perceives for another one.  
The kind of error mentioned last may seem to differ from the previous ones. For while 
committing it, the fault appears to rest at least in part on the fact that one’s perception is, as it were, 
degraded. However, even cases in which perception is for some reason or other degraded are such 
that the judgments one bases on them can be correct (or at least not false). One could, for instance, 
know that while having the relevant perceptual experience, one’s attention is suboptimal and 
consequently refrain from endorsing any potentially false judgments, perhaps even issue a correct 
judgment as to what the degraded perception may have been an experience of. In other words, 
perception that is in one way or other degraded in and of itself need not lead to perceptual error—if 
it does, the reason is that in issuing one’s perceptual belief, one (perhaps implicitly) relies on false 
beliefs, e.g. on beliefs about whether or not one’s current perceptual experience is degraded.  
 
                                                 
23  Indeed, their commitment to No Content and their ability to accommodate the idea that experience itself is never 
erroneous are the two main respects in which Genone takes relationalist to differ from representationalist accounts 
(cf. Genone 2014, p. 345). 
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With Genone’s account of misleading appearances on the table, let us ask, next, whether it affords 
the resources to deal with putative cases of DVEP. As I will argue in 6.3.4, in its current shape, the 
account of misleading appearances is underdeveloped in various ways. Even so, the prospects it 
affords for accommodating putative cases of DVEP are quite promising. 
6.3.2 Genonean Expert Vision 
Let us stay with the idea we just discussed: what judgments subjects issue on the basis of perceiving a 
given appearance can vary with what they believe. Consequently, if our beliefs change in a suitable 
way, illusions can cease to mislead us—as the Müller-Lyer example illustrated.24 Likewise, acquiring 
new beliefs can make subjects prone to have new illusions. It is a common phenomenon that when 
one is excited about a fact one has just recently discovered, or a belief one has acquired, one tends to 
see it everywhere. Consider, for instance, a scientist who has just discovered that a certain set of 
phenomena can be neatly accounted for in a certain way. He might become so excited about this 
discovery that he begins to apply his explanatory strategy to various other phenomena as well.25 Doing 
so can be very productive. However, his excitement may also get the better of him. Upon perceiving 
appearances that mistakenly strike him as sufficiently similar to the ones his account allows him to 
successfully explain, he may be inclined to issue false judgments—which prior to his discovery, he 
would not have done. 
There is nothing in this example Genone should object to. He would insist, however, that as far 
as perceptual experience is concerned, changes in one’s background view and, accordingly, in what 
judgments one might accordingly issue based on one’s experience, cannot affect what appearances 
objects anyway manifest. And if appearances (somehow) constitute how things look to subjects, such 
changes cannot, at least not eo ipso, change how things look to subjects, either. As far as the case of 
                                                 
24  Again, the views such changes yield need not be correct or justified.  
25  Similarly, if one somehow acquires the belief that an alien race of shape-shifting reptilians secretly runs the world, one 
can become prone to see them at work everywhere. 
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the overly excited scientist is concerned, what changes, thus, is just which judgments he is inclined to 
make upon perceiving the appearance, not what appearances he perceives. As the appearances he 
perceives come to be misleading, they do not thereby change.26 
In 6.1, I indicated that the feature just mentioned may seem to make it difficult for Genone to 
accommodate cases of expert vision. As we focus on cases of expert vision, let us recall, first, the idea 
expressed in passage (6), i.e. that the relation between appearances and what perceptual judgments a 
subject may make on the basis of perceiving them can be modified along with changes in the subject’s 
background view. It is this idea that allows Genone to easily accommodate cases that have the 
following two features: a) there are no phenomenological differences between the respective 
perceptions of an expert and a layperson, and b) the expert and the layperson differ in what judgments 
they may make or in which beliefs they may form upon perceiving a certain appearance.27 For if the 
perception of appearances can be hooked up with different judgments, it is perfectly conceivable—if 
not to be expected—that one and the same perceptual experience may give rise to different judgments 
in the expert and the layperson, respectively.  
Upon seeing, say, a colored line appear in a bubble chamber, all the layperson may be able to 
report is just that: “Look, a colored line is just now appearing in the bubble chamber!” Contrast the 
expert: due to her training and due to what she knows, upon perceiving the same appearance, she may 
well be in a position to issue, maybe almost automatically, a judgment to the effect that there is 
currently an electron passing through the bubble chamber. The expert, if asked, would not reject the 
layperson’s judgment. But the way perceived appearances are hooked up with the expert’s set of beliefs 
may well be such that upon perceiving the appearance the bubble chamber manifests to her, the 
                                                 
26  We may feel some resistance against characterizing the scientist’s post-discovery perceptions as illusory. At least 
pretheoretically, we may think that in illusions, things do not appear the way they are. Genone, however, cannot 
accommodate this pretheoretical intuition and must indeed reject it as mistaken. For again, on his account, things 
always appear the way they are. Unless further criteria are introduced that show how illusions involve more than one’s 
being led to issue false judgments on the basis of perceiving an appearance, the case of the scientist should qualify as 
a case of illusion as well. 
27  For simplicity, I am assuming that the sensory physiologies of the expert and the layperson are relevantly similar and 
that on the account of Constitution Genone would endorse, this would entail that upon perceiving the same 
appearances, the phenomenology of their respective experiences will be the same. If one is suspicious of 
intersubjective comparisons of experiential phenomenologies, one may assume that the expert just is the layperson, 
but 20 years in, say.  
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layperson’s judgment is not the first one that comes to her mind. Indeed, unless she is suitably 
prompted, it may not come to her mind at all—due to her training, she might jump to the judgment 
to the effect that an electron is passing by directly. 
As we have both described this case and the excited scientist’s case, the difference in background 
beliefs does not yield phenomenological changes. It is helpful to distinguish cases that do not involve 
such changes from cases that do. Call the former cases of expert judgment, while only cases of the 
latter kind are cases of expert vision proper. Given what we just said about the bubble chamber 
case, Genone can easily accommodate cases of expert judgment. How about cases of expert vision 
proper? 
Suppose that which among the appearance properties that a given object anyway manifests a 
perceiving subject’s experience relates her to depends in part on the perceiving subject’s distribution 
of attention. Take reversible pictures as an example. Presumably, Genone will hold that in any given 
set of environing circumstances, there is a determinate set of appearance properties that an object, e.g. 
the depiction of a duck-rabbit, will manifest. Here are two ways Genone could treat such cases. First, 
like Brewer, who thinks that the depiction thinly looks both like a rabbit and like a duck, Genone 
could suggest that the depiction manifests several appearances at the same time—one that, if attended 
to by a suitable observer, is likely to prompt the judgment that she sees a depiction of a rabbit, and 
another one that, if attended to by a suitable observer, is likely to prompt the judgment that she is 
facing a depiction of a duck. Alternatively, Genone could hold that in the given circumstances of 
perception, there is only one appearance the depiction of the duck-rabbit manifests and that the way 
in which the subject attends to this appearance plays a crucial role in constituting the phenomenology 
of her experience.28 
Obviously, such details will depend on the shape of Genone’s account of Constitution, which 
we presently lack. However, suppose he accepts either of the two strategies suggested. If so, Genone 
                                                 
28  Genone would probably insist that we should not individuate mind-independent appearances with respect to what 
mental states they cause in the observer. But while he may thus resist the idea that reversible figures manifest several 
appearances and pursue the alternative option, he could also defend that while such figures do manifest several 
appearances, these are to be individuated in some other way.  
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could easily accept that there is a phenomenological difference between perceiving what appearances 
the depiction of the duck-rabbit manifests in a way that leads to the judgment that it depicts a duck 
and perceiving them in a way that leads to the judgment that it depicts a rabbit.  
This approach could be extended to cover cases of expert vision more generally. If so, Genone 
could also suggest that what accounts for the difference between the phenomenology of the 
experiences of the expert and the layperson is not primarily a matter of what conceptual capacities the 
subject possesses. Instead, he could insist that the difference is ultimately one of attention, one 
accounted for by which of the multiple appearances that an object anyway manifests the subject attends 
to—or, in line with the alternative strategy, by the way in which the subject attends to the appearance 
that the object anyway manifests. If it were then argued, further, that a subject’s ability to attend to 
objects in certain ways is in principle independent of what concepts the subject possesses, Genone 
would seem to be in a good position to accommodate cases of expert vision without giving up on 
Basic Acquaintance. He could of course grant that certain attentional patterns which serve to 
acquaint subjects with certain appearance properties—or with one appearance property, in a specific 
way—are more likely to be exhibited by experts who know what and how to attend to the objects of 
their expertise. At the same time, Genone could insist that in principle, laypersons, too, may exhibit 
these patterns, even if they may in fact do so less frequently, or just as a matter of coincidence. They, 
too, that is, could perceive like the expert, even if typically, they may not. 
Let us take stock: to develop a relationalist account that can accommodate both cases of expert 
judgment and cases of expert vision proper, the fundamental issues Genone needs to address remain. 
First and foremost, he must provide an account of appearances. Given the options we discussed, such 
an account should also settle whether in a given set of circumstances, a given object can manifest 
different appearances at the same time, some of which, perhaps, only experts can perceive. Moreover, 
Genone needs to provide an account of Constitution. Again, given our discussion, to accommodate 
cases of expert vision proper, developing such an account may require that Genone specify the role 
attention is said to play in constituting the perceiving subject’s experiential phenomenology. However, 
if such accounts were developed, accommodating both phenomena that involve expert judgment and 
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phenomena that involve expert vision proper could well be within reach. If we abstract from the 
specifics of Genone’s view and look back on the discussion of the various relationalist proposals we 
examined, it appears that relationalists should generally be optimistic with respect to providing an 
account of expert vision (proper). Experts, relationalists will say, simply relate differently to what is 
there anyway. As such, they are able to get acquainted with special facts (Fish), register similarity 
relations not everyone can detect (Brewer), or attend to appearance properties laypersons may not be 
able to regularly or easily attend to—or perhaps attend to them in ways characteristic for experts 
(Genone). What makes the idea that expert vision might involve effects on the subject’s 
phenomenology in principle palatable to relationalists is precisely this: these effects could in principle 
be accounted for by way of referring to some suitable (aspects of) mind-independent items which at 
least typically, experts, but not laypeople, are able to latch on to. Of course, on close inspection, each 
of the accounts we examined turned out to be at best underdeveloped. But largely, the problems we 
encountered arose in the context of a more general difficulty relationalists have with specifying the 
mind-independent items experience is said to relate subjects to and with giving an account of 
experiential phenomenology. 
Looking at the accounts through the lens of the question whether they could accommodate 
phenomena of DVEP proved useful in bringing these issues into focus. But if the more general 
difficulty just mentioned could somehow be addressed, there is no principled reason for relationalists 
to think that the phenomenon of expert vision could not be accommodated. For importantly, it does 
not collide with one of the relationalists’ most central tenets—the claim that the role of experience is 
to relate us to environing mind-independent items. 
With respect to projection effects, however, the situation is fundamentally different. Ex hypothesi, 
in such cases, no mind-independent fact, similarity relation, or appearance property is available that 
could serve to account for the relevant effects on the subject’s experiential phenomenology. The 
presence, even the possibility of such effects, thus threatens to undermine the account of the role 
relationalists assign to experience, the account of what experience is. Accordingly, their default 
response to putative cases of projection effects is likely to contrast with their default response to cases 
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of expert vision: instead of being generally optimistic with respect to accommodating such effects, 
relationalists should be inclined to try and explain them away. As we continue our discussion of 
Genone’s view and ask how he might deal with projection effects—illustrated, as before, by the banana 
case—let us thus explicitly note the following: like Fish and Brewer, Genone, too, will be barred from 
claiming that in the banana case, there could be any actual modification to the subject’s perceptual 
phenomenology that rests on the perception of appearance properties and that would serve to explain 
why the banana object, once adjusted to an achromatic gray, still looks yellowish to the test subjects.  
Again, according to Genone, appearance properties are entirely mind-independent. And whatever 
that comes to exactly, it is surely intended to entail that what the perceiving subject believes cannot 
modify these appearances. Moreover, given Genone’s commitment to Explanatory Completeness, 
on any account of Constitution Genone could possibly endorse, the phenomenology of perceptual 
experience must be explained entirely in terms of the subject’s standing in acquaintance relations with 
appearances. With respect to putative projection effects, there are, accordingly, only two options 
Genone could pursue. First, he could deny that projection effects occur and develop an account that 
explains them away. Second, he could accept that they do occur and try to accommodate them in a 
different way.  In the next two sections, I focus on these two options, considering them in reverse. 
6.3.3 The Banana Case—Strategy 1: Phenomenal Pluralism 
Near the end of 5.6 I indicated that Brewer could suggest the following: he could hold that the total 
phenomenology of a subject S’s experience may not be exhausted by perceptual phenomenology. An 
experience’s total phenomenology, so construed, could thus contain aspects that are not and cannot 
be accounted for by S’s standing in a perceptual relation to suitable mind-independent objects. If 
Brewer made room for an extra layer of experiential phenomenology, he could account for the kind 
of phenomenological effects that Hansen et al. think explains how in the banana case, test subjects 
adjust the banana object’s color. Genone makes a similar suggestion. He thinks that to accommodate 
clinical conditions such as schizophrenia, damage to the visual system, and perceptual impairment due 
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to sleep deprivation or drugs, an account on which the phenomenology of (total) experience is 
(somehow) just constituted by mind-independent appearances does not suffice (Genone 2014, p. 368). 
In drug-induced illusions, for example, objects might appear distorted in shape or color as the subject’s 
visual system is impaired. Experiences of subjects suffering such illusions may well relate them to 
objects in the environment. However, such experiences, Genone suggests, may also involve qualities 
that must be attributed to the subject’s awareness of properties that are not properties of objects, but 
properties of the experience itself. Here is what Genone says: 
(7) [Properties of experience itself] […] may in some cases be mistaken for properties of 
objects in the environment. In such cases, the phenomenology of experience may be 
accounted for partly in terms of the appearances of perceived objects, and partly in 
terms of properties of the experience itself. [footnote about blurry vision omitted] 
Nevertheless, error in judgment resulting from such experiences will not be 
perceptual errors. What is presented to a subject as a result of perceptual awareness 
will simply be objects and properties in the surrounding environment. Although 
additional cognitive and physiological factors may influence the subject’s overall 
experience, these influences will not impact the basic structure of perception. 
(Genone 2014, pp. 368-9)29 
When elsewhere, he briefly discusses top-down effects cognitive states may have on perception,30 
Genone makes a similar suggestion: 
(8) Naïve realists [including relationalists] can distinguish between a subject’s total 
experiential state, which might include contributions from various sources, from the 
contributions that are provided strictly by perception. Such a view would amount to 
a sort of phenomenal pluralism, holding that what an experience is like can be determined 
by both perceptual and cognitive influences, where this is distinct from how 
perception is characterized independently. (Genone 2016, p. 16) 
For our purposes, these two passages are particularly interesting: in passage (7), the list Genone 
offers of possible factors that may influence the subject’s overall experience is not limited to the 
physiological factors that are plausibly involved in explanations of the clinical conditions mentioned 
above. Instead, he accepts that “additional cognitive factors” may be at play as well. In passage (8), his 
suggestion as to how relationalists could accommodate top-down effects from cognitive states is 
                                                 
29  This passage also serves to illustrate Genone’s commitment to the idea discussed near the end of 6.3.1: that even in 
cases of degraded perception, perceptual error is a matter of mistaken judgment. 
30  Genone concedes that the relational view “offers no clear framework for integrating cognitive influences with 
perceptual phenomenology” (Genone 2016, p. 15). 
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explicitly phrased in terms of experiential phenomenology: relationalists, Genone maintains, could 
endorse a sort of phenomenal pluralism.31 In making this concession, Genone goes well beyond both Fish 
and Brewer. On Fish’s view, recall, the phenomenology of a subject S’s experience e is solely 
constituted by S’s being acquainted with the facts that feature in e’s presentational character. And while 
Fish grants that S’s conceptual capacities—and thus, in many cases, what S believes—will co-
determine what these facts are, he refuses to allow that cognitive states can affect or bring about any 
aspect of the subject’s experiential phenomenology directly, i.e. without being mediated via the 
subject’s being acquainted with facts that do in fact obtain. Indeed, it is a central feature of Fish’s 
account of hallucinations—one also at work in his account of cognitive and optical illusions—that 
hallucinations (and cognitive and optical illusions) do not actually have a phenomenology that 
corresponds to what subjects believe they see. Instead, Fish takes it that as subjects hallucinate (or 
suffer a cognitive or optical illusion), they merely believe, albeit erroneously, that they are in a state 
whose phenomenology matches the phenomenology of an experience they would have if their 
experience did in fact acquaint them with the kind of facts of which they only believe, as they are 
hallucinating, that they do obtain. Again, on Fish’s view, hallucinating just is having mistaken beliefs 
of this peculiar sort. In short: for Fish, the presence of experiential phenomenology requires that the 
subject be perceptually related to suitable facts. Regarding Genone’s suggestion that a subject’s total 
experience could involve a layer of phenomenology that does not meet that requirement, Fish would 
thus have to demur. 
By comparison, Brewer’s view is somewhat more liberal. To accommodate expert vision, recall, 
he allows that registering thin looks—which, he thinks, gives rise to thick looks—yields an additional 
layer of phenomenology. As we saw, it remains unclear how this second phenomenological layer is 
supposed to be construed—let alone how it combines with the alleged phenomenology of thin looks. 
Yet crucially, on Brewer’s view, this additional layer of phenomenology, too, is governed by what I 
                                                 
31  Note that Genone here uncritically employs the characterization of experiential phenomenology in terms of what the 
experience is like. This is surprising, since in the same paper, he also offers the reservations with respect to this traditional 
and allegedly flawed way of characterizing experiential phenomenology that we already noted above (cf. 6.2).  
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dubbed the Constraint on Thin Looks: no mind-independent object can look some way (thinly or 
thickly) unless it stands in visually relevant similarity relations with suitable paradigm exemplars. 
Ultimately, thus, Brewer’s second phenomenological layer, too, remains crucially tied to the presence 
of suitable and suitably propertied mind-independent items. Without the presence of such items, the 
corresponding phenomenology cannot occur.  
Genone’s suggestion that the phenomenology of experience may be affected by cognitive states 
thus stands in square opposition to Fish’s view. Moreover, given Brewer’s insistence on the claim that 
the way things look is the way things look, Genone’s suggestion to introduce ways of looking that do 
not depend on how ways things in fact are is also at odds with Brewer’s view and opposed to the spirit 
that motivates his Constraint on Thin Looks. Nevertheless, for Genone to accept phenomenal 
pluralism would appear to yield the following advantage: for one, it would enable him to insist that in 
the banana case, too, whatever part of the test subjects’ total experiential phenomenology is due to 
their being perceptually related to the banana object’s appearance properties remains unaffected. 
Crucially, phenomenal pluralism allows that the total phenomenology of a subject’s experience need 
not be exhausted by the perceptual phenomenology involved. Instead, it may in part be accounted for 
by drawing on influences on the subject’s experiential phenomenology that are due to cognitive states, 
including (perhaps even knowledgeable) beliefs about what color bananas typically are. Accordingly, 
Genone can side with the explanation of the effect provided by Hansen et al. He can, that is, accept 
that test subjects adjust the color of the banana object not to an achromatic gray, but to a slightly 
bluish hue, precisely because the phenomenology of their experience is shifted in the requisite kind of 
way. 
Does Genone’s account offer a satisfactory relationalist strategy of accommodating the banana 
case, then? There are at least three considerations that speak against pursuing it. The first rests on 
what I mentioned at the end of the previous subsection: relationalists hold that the role of experience 
is fundamentally to relate its subjects to mind-independent items in the world—this is, after all, what 
experience is, according to them: a relation to such items. Therefore, for them to accept items that 
cannot serve this role into their account of experiential phenomenology undermines that account of 
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the role of experience. In response, Genone could insist—as he does e.g. in passage (7)—that allowing 
additional influences on experience does not change the fundamental structure of perception. And 
indeed, if we take the term ‘perception’ to be reserved for the good case, in which the subject’s 
experience does in fact relate her to suitable mind-independent items, this can be granted. However, 
enriching the notion of experiential phenomenology in the way Genone suggests is likely to constrain 
the ways in which experience can serve whatever epistemic and semantic purposes relationalists may 
wish to assign it—particularly given that at least typically, with respect to any given feature of the total 
experiential phenomenology, its causal pedigree is not obvious.  
Plainly, the extent to which introducing such constraints is indeed problematic will depend on 
the details of the relationalist proposal under consideration. Discussing these issues here would lead 
us too far astray. But even if such potential issues are bracketed and if we grant also that 
accommodating cognitive effects does not alter the fundamental structure of perception itself, the 
following second issue arises. For such cognitive effects, if they were to occur, would seem to affect 
the test subject’s perception of the banana object in a rather puzzling way.  
Consider the appearance property that on Genone’a account, the banana object actually 
manifests—i.e. whatever it is that, if perceived, would lead subjects in other contexts (such as the 
context provided by the control condition) lead to judge that the object they face is e.g. gray. On the 
account of the banana case that we are considering, i.e. an account that draws on phenomenal 
pluralism, the perception of this appearance property appears to play absolutely no role in the 
constitution of the subject’s experiential phenomenology at all. However, recall that as per the 
experimental set-up, the test subjects’ primary task is precisely to attend to the banana object’s color 
and to then adjust it. In such a context, it should be particularly puzzling if the subjects were said to 
somehow fail to direct their attention to the relevant appearance property the banana object anyway 
manifests, in such a way as to prevent that property from being perceived.  
Perhaps it could be suggested that test subjects do attend and perceive the banana object’s 
appearance property, but that the perceptual phenomenology such perception would ordinarily give 
rise to is somehow masked out, overwritten, or outweighed by effects that arise due to the influence 
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of the test subjects’ cognitive states. But even if so, we face the (familiar) third issue: we are left without 
an account of how this would go. It would be a virtue of Genone’s account if it managed to allow that 
the phenomenology of experience can be partly accounted for by influences of cognitive states. 
Moreover, perhaps there are ways to resolve the vexed issue of how a relationalist endorsement of 
phenomenal pluralism can be squared with the epistemic and semantic roles they may wish to attribute 
to experience (or perhaps: just to perception). However, as it stands, Genone’s suggestion to endorse 
phenomenal pluralism is unsatisfactory for the same reason it would have been unsatisfactory to add 
yet another layer of phenomenology to Brewer’s account. After all, on Genone’s view, both the notion 
of perceptual phenomenology and the notion of the appearance properties that he thinks constitute it 
are unclear already. The suggestion that relationalists should endorse phenomenal pluralism does not 
help make things any clearer. Instead, it just serves to add further questions that need to be answered—
e.g. questions about how these different strata of phenomenology combine, compare, interact in case 
of conflict, etc. Briefly put: since Genone owes us a clear account of perceptual phenomenology 
anyway, throwing in another notion of phenomenology only makes things worse. 
Of course, neither the resistance Genone must expect from fellow relationalists nor the 
considerations just presented speak decisively against the strategy to adopt phenomenal pluralism. 
Still, I content that these considerations suffice to establish the following:  whether relationalists can 
and should endorse phenomenal pluralism is far from obvious. Thus, if relationalists wish to pursue 
such a strategy, the burden is on them to develop an account of the phenomenology of experience 
that shows how it can be done. 
6.3.4 The Banana Case—Strategy 2: Appearance-Judgment Relations Shifted 
At the outset of this chapter, I claimed that Genone’s account of misleading appearances is interesting 
and may be more powerful than even Genone himself realizes. It earns these epithets, I think, because 
in the absence of further constraints, the account appears to afford unlimited flexibility with respect 
to how perceived appearances and perceptual judgments can be related or, as it were, hooked up with 
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one another. Interestingly, this feature of the account is not just crucial to the alternative strategy I 
will suggest Genone can pursue to address the banana case. It also marks a striking parallel between 
Genone’s view and Hanson’s: for on both, how the phenomenal and the conceptual hook up can be 
modified with changes in the background view. 
To illustrate, consider again the case of Tycho and Kepler. Imagine that they are looking at the 
sun at dawn in sufficiently similar circumstances. Further, let us suppose that their experiences are 
phenomenally identical (after all, the drawings they would produce of what they see are congruent) 
and that accordingly, there is no difference between their experiences that would make the scenario 
count as a case of expert vision proper.32 As we saw, Hanson insists that what Tycho and Kepler see 
the sun as differs, as well as which judgments they thus issue on the basis of their respective 
experiences. More specifically, these things will differ along with differences in what beliefs and 
expectations they hold, respectively, about what the thing they believe they face. In other words, to 
the extent that upon having a phenomenally identical experience they differ in what judgments they 
are inclined to issue on the basis of undergoing it, there must be a difference in how, in their respective 
background views, the phenomenology of their experience hooks up with such judgments.33 
Genone could characterize the case in a largely analogous way. Given his account of appearances 
as mind-independent, he would most certainly insist that the appearances that the sun anyway 
manifests and that both Tycho and Kepler perceive are the same. And given the current assumption, 
i.e. that the case does not count as a case of expert vision proper, Genone is also likely to grant that 
perceiving these appearances constitutes the same perceptual phenomenology in both: the sunrise, 
briefly put, looks the same to both. Genone, too, will have an explanation as to why both scientists 
will, on the basis of their respective experience, be inclined to issue different judgments. The case is a 
                                                 
32  Given the possibility of e.g. differences in how the elements of their respective fields pull together, this need not be 
so. Presently, we will assume that it is. 
33  Differences between background views of two observers may also occur further removed from the judgments they 
would issue on the basis of their experience. More specifically, two observers could be very much alike in what 
judgments they are inclined to issue on the basis of undergoing their phenomenally identical experiences and yet differ 
(to some extent) in what else, given their further beliefs, they do, should, or may (not) believe in virtue of issuing these 
judgments. I return to such issues in chapter 8. 
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simple case of expert judgment. Tycho and Kepler differ in what they believe (and know). Thus, 
they also differ in what judgments they are likely to issue on the basis of their respective experience. 
For like Hanson, Genone, too, will maintain that the difference in their judgments is to be explained 
in terms of differences in their respective background views, which (somehow) yield a difference in 
how possible perceived appearances and perceptual judgments are hooked up.34  
Note also that Genone’s account can be interpreted as accommodating one of Hanson’s 
fundamental tenets: for experience to be epistemically significant, concepts must be involved. 
Remarkably, he does so while at the same time eschewing an idea that is central to Hanson’s favored 
proposal as to how concepts come in: Content.35 As a relationalist, Genone endorses No Content 
and thus hooks up judgments not with the actualizations of concepts that are involved in episodes of 
seeing as and that are (somehow) amalgamated with the phenomenal dimension of experience. Instead, 
he hooks up judgments directly with appearances, or rather, with ways things look to subjects as they 
perceive such appearances.36 Of course, Genone owes us a clear account of what appearances are—
but so does Hanson. Relatedly, recall that Hanson leaves us in the dark as to how, in experience, the 
alleged amalgamation of the phenomenal and the conceptual comes about, and how it can be altered. 
As I will suggest in 6.4, Genone’s and Hanson’s views are similar in this regard as well: Genone faces 
an analogous problem. 
                                                 
34  If the case is characterized as one that involves expert vision proper, the situation is more complicated because in 
that case, the assumption must be dropped that the experiential phenomenology of Tycho and Kepler is (sufficiently) 
similar. But even in such a case, both Hanson and Genone might well endorse the following counterfactual: if either 
Tycho or Kepler were to have an experience with a phenomenology that matches that of the experience of the 
respective other, the judgments each would be inclined to issue on the basis of their experience might well differ 
precisely because the differences in their respective background views also encompass differences in how the 
phenomenology of experience and perceptual judgments are linked. 
35  Incidentally, Hanson can also agree that at least as far as the phenomenal aspect of experience is concerned, it is never 
erroneous. The possibility of error requires that concepts be involved. Furthermore, since the seeing as locution does 
not form sentences, it does not have truth values. Accordingly, Hanson, too, can agree that experiences, though they 
have content, have no truth values. One can of course see something as what it is not, but this can happen for all 
sorts of reasons and, crucially, while being fully aware of the fact that things are not what one sees them as—playfully, 
as when we see a cloud as a horse, or when one cannot but wince upon seeing a 3D-image of a tiger jumping at one. 
Seeing something as what it is not may occasionally be characterized as inaccurate seeing. Still, it is only in endorsing 
that things are as one sees them that error enters the scene. 
36  In this respect, Genone’s view is very similar to the one Gupta proposes (cf. chapter 9). 
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Returning to the account of misleading appearances, let us ask: could this account serve to 
accommodate the relationalist intuition that putative cognitive effects on the phenomenology of 
experience such as the banana effect ought not be accepted as real, but rather be explained away? 
Remarkably, Genone never entertains a suggestion of this shape. As we saw in the previous section, 
in response to the task of accommodating putative effects cognitive states such as e.g. the subject S’s 
beliefs may have on the phenomenology of S’s experience, Genone is ready to endorse phenomenal 
pluralism. However, I think that in doing so, he overlooks a potent alternative strategy, one that 
exploits the flexibility his account of misleading appearances already affords with respect to how 
perceived appearances and judgments can be hooked up with one another. 
More specifically, I contend that Genone could address the banana case as follows. First, he could 
insist that throughout the test condition, subjects do indeed perceive nothing but whatever appearance 
properties the banana object actually and anyway manifests. Doing so, note, straight away removes a 
problem that we saw besets Genone’s preferred strategy: viz. that it is puzzling how in a context in 
which subjects are explicitly tasked to attend to a given object’s color, they nevertheless consistently 
fail to do so. Second, and relatedly, phenomenal pluralism could be rejected. Accordingly, the total 
phenomenology of the subjects’ experience may well be exhausted by its perceptual phenomenology. 
Plainly, rejecting phenomenal pluralism renders moot all the questions that would arise with respect 
to how one is to think about the constitution of a total experiential phenomenology which comprises 
phenomenal elements or layers that differ in how they come about—though questions pertaining to 
the constitution of perceptual phenomenology itself remain of course pressing.  
On the view we are now considering, when the color of the banana object has been modified to 
an achromatic gray; it still has the appearance properties objects anyway have in the relevant 
conditions—properties that if perceived, are typically associated with judgments to the effect that the 
object is gray. To adopt this strategy is thus to fully resist the idea that an explanation of what subjects 
do in the test condition must draw on some alleged modification of the phenomenology of the test 
subjects’ experiences. Rather, and this is the crucial step, the central suggestion is that something else 
is modified: in the test condition—but not in the control condition—the way perceived appearances 
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are hooked up with perceptual judgments that test subjects are inclined to make on the basis of 
perceiving them is systematically shifted.  
Consider the specific appearance property, A, that objects, let us assume, have in virtue of having 
a specific color. Now assume that ordinarily—e.g. in the control condition—the perception of A 
serves as the basis for the test subjects’ judgments to the effect that the perceived object is gray. In 
the test condition, however, the way perceived appearances and judgments are hooked up, is 
systematically shifted. As a result, in the test condition, the perception of A is hooked up with a 
different judgment, viz. the judgment that the object is (slightly) yellowish. Similarly, while the 
perception of another specific appearance property, B, would ordinarily—e.g. in the control 
condition—serve as the basis for the subject’s judgment that the relevant object is slightly blue, in the 
test condition, it leads to the judgment that the object is gray. Plainly, this explanatory strategy can be 
applied to each perception of the banana object for which, on Genone’s preferred strategy, some extra 
phenomenal element would have to be introduced. It invites us to accept that shifts in the relation 
between perceived appearances and judgments can occur. However, as we saw in 6.3.1, this idea is a 
crucial element of Genone’s account of misleading appearances anyway. Indeed, the banana case, on 
the proposed account, is a case in which due to some factor, the appearance properties the banana 
object possesses in virtue of its color properties, become misleading. Presumably, the explanation is, 
roughly, that test subjects recognize the object as a banana. Accordingly, their firm background belief 
that bananas are yellow is particularly salient. This in turn gives rise not only to certain expectations 
as to what they see, but, the idea goes, indeed shifts the way how perceived appearance properties and 
judgments hook up. 
To apply this strategy broadly, i.e. to all putative projection effects, allows relationalists to deny 
that projection effects are possible. More modesty put, it allows them to insist that one need not 
assume that such effects exist to be able to explain what subjects do in cases in which projection 
effects seem to occur. 
Moreover, at least in principle, this strategy is more likely to be palatable to Genone’s fellow 
relationalists. Recall that Fish’s and Brewer’s accounts lacked the resources to deal with the banana 
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case. Like Genone, they insist that no suitable mind-independent items are available that could 
possibly explain why the banana object, once adjusted to an achromatic gray, might still look yellowish 
to the test subjects. But in the context of both Fish’s and Brewer’s view, the subsequent denial that 
the banana object looks yellowish had an odd consequence. For Fish, recall, the banana object’s 
property of being e.g. gray could not make it into the presentational character of the subject’s 
experience. For in the relevant perceptual situation, the conceptual capacity that would have to be 
(passively) deployed to bring the relevant fact into the presentational character was not in play. 
Similarly, Brewer was forced to say that throughout what are quite possibly large chunks of the test 
condition, the test subjects (somehow) fail to register the thin looks (somehow) corresponding to the 
banana object’s actual color. On both views, it thus seemed to follow, oddly, that throughout what are 
quite possibly large chunks of the test condition, the test subjects’ experiences of the banana object 
lack a (consciously available) phenomenological aspect associated with color altogether. This in turn 
left it mysterious what test subjects could be responding to while adjusting the banana object’s color, 
and what might account for the fact that eventually, they stop.  
On the proposal under consideration, a corresponding problem does not arise. Again, on this 
view, the experiences subjects undergo as they adjust the banana object’s color do have a 
phenomenology associated with judgments related to the object’s color. As in every other perception, 
this phenomenology is (somehow) fully constituted by the subjects’ perception of the mind-
independent appearance properties that the banana object, in the context at hand, anyway manifests. 
Throughout the entire test condition, there is thus something that subjects can be taken to be 
responding to as they adjust the banana object’s color: the various appearance properties the banana 
object subsequently and anyway manifests. But since in the test condition, on the proposal we are 
considering, the way judgments and perceived appearances are hooked up has been shifted in a 
systematic fashion, the resulting response pattern is such that test subjects adjust the object’s color 
not to an achromatic gray, but to a slightly bluish hue.  
Again, Genone never considers pursuing this strategy as a response to putative cognitive effects 
on the phenomenology of experience. But arguably, given the flexibility his account of misleading 
180 
 
appearances already provides, it is the most conservative strategy for him to pursue. Also, pursuing it 
would give him an advantage over competing relationalist accounts that cannot accommodate such 
effects, without having to enrich his account of the phenomenology of experience in ways that his 
fellow relationalists are likely to frown upon. However, as I will discuss in the next section, for Genone 
to pursue this strategy, further questions need to be addressed. For currently, though promising and 
potentially powerful, his account of misleading appearances is underdeveloped in various respects.  
6.4 OPEN QUESTIONS 
As I have emphasized throughout, for Genone to be able to make any of the accounts sketched in 6.3 
work requires that he resolve the issues versions of which, as we saw, each relationalist faces: he needs 
a) a clear account of the mind-independent items that he takes experience relates subjects to and b) an 
account of how these in turn constitute the phenomenology of the subject’s experience. These are 
fundamental challenges. Arguably, if relationalists cannot address them, their views are doomed. But 
suppose Genone could somehow address them. Moreover, suppose that he accepted the strategy to 
deal with the banana case I suggested in 6.3.4. Even then, I contend, at least three further issues arise: 
first, phenomenal pluralism may still be an option relationalists must consider (6.4.1). Second, the 
flexibility Genone’s account of misleading appearance affords may be in tension with the epistemic 
role relationalists assign to acquaintance (6.4.2), and third—relatedly—an account is needed of how, 
on Genone’s view of misleading appearances, judgments and perceived appearances are supposed to 
be hooked up (6.4.3).  
6.4.1 Phenomenal Pluralism After All? 
Note that it could well be that whereas the strategy discussed in 6.3.4 has some plausibility with respect 
to the banana case, it is less plausible in other cases in which cognitive states such as the relevant 
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subjects’ beliefs are taken to affect the phenomenology of their experience. The empirical literature is 
rife with such cases.37 With respect to each of these other cases, it may well be an open question 
whether the claim central to the strategy I suggested Genone could pursue to address the banana 
case—i.e. that in it the phenomenology of the test subjects’ experience remains unaltered—is plausible 
for them as well. Moreover, and plainly, the strategy I suggested Genone might pursue needs to be 
fleshed out and developed further. At the very least, one would like to have an explanation of how it 
is that some set of beliefs—the belief that bananas are typically yellow, say—can bring about the 
relevant shift in the relation between perceived appearances and judgments that the strategy 
presupposes occurs. In general, we need an account of how to think about such shifts—ideally, one 
that allows predictions as to when such shifts should be expected. The advantage of having such a 
view should be clear: it might allow one to expect and counteract such shifts where necessary, just like 
in the case of the Müller-Lyer, and as such to reduce the number of misleading appearances overall.38 
If relationalists were able support the strategy suggested by providing such an account of what 
these shifts are and how they come about, this would certainly be an impressive achievement. Similarly, 
it would be quite an achievement for someone who pursued Genone’s own favored strategy to provide 
an account of how the putative extra phenomenal elements are supposed to occur and why. Of course, 
neither is currently available. But for aspiring relationalists, I suggest, developing either of these 
accounts further may be worth attempting. 
Incidentally, the following is also conceivable: suppose rationalists employed the strategy 
suggested to explain away every single putative doxastic effect on experiential phenomenology in the 
literature. Even then, there might still be some residual pressure to accommodate an additional layer 
of the subject’s total phenomenology—pressure that arises from the need to accommodate the clinical 
                                                 
37  See Scholl & Firestone (2016) for a (critical) overview. 
38  Some of the pertinent cases discussed in the literature fall under the category of implicit bias and concern e.g. 
judgments subjects are inclined to issue on the basis of seeing facial expressions of people whose faces bear features 
strongly associated with race or gender. Accordingly, an account of how differences in one’s background views—and 
perhaps more broadly: in one’s various cognitive and affective background states—may lead to shifts in how the 
perception of such features and judgments are related might also be particularly helpful in addressing the question 
how to counteract implicit bias. 
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conditions that Genone refers to when motivating phenomenal pluralism in the first place. Consider, 
for instance, drug-induced distortions of how things look to subjects, or reports people issue about 
their experience of living through schizophrenic episodes. With respect to either, one may well doubt, 
like Genone, that they can be fully accounted for by characterizing what happens in terms of shifts of 
what judgments, beliefs, and conclusions people are inclined to endorse on the basis of perceiving the 
mind-independent appearances objects anyway manifest.  
From a relationalist perspective, it would be no small feat to be able to explain the banana case—
and similar cases of putative cognitive effects—without having to postulate the existence of some 
additional layer of phenomenology. However, given these other cases, postulating the existence of 
such an additional layer may still be necessary. If so, questions as to how the total phenomenology of 
experience is constituted and how the different layers of experiential phenomenology interact would 
still be pressing.39 
6.4.2 Flexibility—an Epistemic Downside? 
Some relationalists hold that acquaintance provides, is, or is a source of, a kind of knowledge of mind-
independent objects or properties. Depending on how this commitment is spelled out, relationalists 
may be uncomfortable with the importance that according to the strategy suggested in 6.3.4 is assigned 
to the background view. To see why, let us note, first, that at least as far as that strategy has been 
presented, it is indeed just the background view that ultimately determines how perceived appearances 
and judgments are hooked up. But background views can vary strongly—both inter- and, over time, 
intrasubjectively. Accordingly, there appears to be unlimited flexibility in how the relations between 
perceived appearances and judgments could be set up. 
                                                 
39  If phenomenal pluralism is accepted as what is required to address some cases, so that hard questions pertaining to 
the constitution of total phenomenology would have to be addressed anyway, relationalists of course may well decide 
on a case-by-case basis whether accepting an explanation of putative cases of cognitive effects on experience in terms 
of additional phenomenology is called for. Accordingly, even for relationalists who do not reject phenomenal 
pluralism, the strategy of explaining cases in terms of temporary shifts in how perceived appearances and judgments 
are hooked up might be a useful addition to their explanatory toolkit. 
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So far, this flexibility has been characterized as one of the view’s decisive strengths. For one, it is 
this flexibility that creates the conceptual leeway Genone needs to accommodate misleading 
appearances (see 6.3.1), It is also this feature of the view that allows it to easily accommodate cases 
of expert judgment (see 6.3.2). Likewise, this flexibility is what brings into view the possibility that 
with respect to how perceived appearances and judgments hook up, the kinds of shifts may occur 
which in turn would allow Genone to explain away projection effects (see 6.3.4). In what sense, then, 
is the very same feature of the view also be potentially problematic? 
Consider any given appearance property. Can perceiving it be hooked up with any conceivable 
judgment? Or are there restrictions? If so, how do they arise? One can see why implementing 
restrictions might be desirable once one acknowledges that there is only a very restricted set of 
circumstances in which perceiving an appearance A will lead to knowledgeable judgments. Among 
the countless possible combinations of A with judgments that, in the context of some background 
view, subjects might issue based on perceiving A, only a select few will be true. Moreover, as we saw 
in 6.3.1, the following is possible: background views that contain false or irrational beliefs can be 
combined with perceived appearances such that the latter are not, in Genone’s sense, misleading and 
yet lead to beliefs or judgments that, while true, are ill-founded. For arguably, true judgments may 
arise at least in part due to false or irrational beliefs in one’s background view that (somehow) govern 
how perceived appearances and judgments are hooked up with one another. Plainly, true judgments 
that result in such circumstances cannot qualify as knowledgeable. Accordingly, among the true 
judgments that subjects could base on perceiving a given appearance (given some background view), 
only some will also be knowledgeable, while others will not.  
Importantly, thus, on the view under consideration, whether or not the perception of appearance 
properties leads to beliefs or judgments that are not just true, but knowledgeable, depends heavily on 
the status of the beliefs that co-constitute the background view.40 More specifically, for the judgements 
a subject may issue on the basis of her experience to be both true and knowledgeable, the background 
                                                 
40  A background view may contain more than just beliefs. For now, I ignore this complication, but flag that it will 
become rather important in the chapter 9.2. 
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view must be such that in it, perceived appearances and judgments are hooked up in just the right kind 
of way. Consequently, on the view under consideration, knowledge may seem hard to come by unless 
some restrictions are put in place—restrictions that limit the ways in which the perception of 
appearance properties and judgments that can be made on the basis of such perception can be 
combined or, perhaps, restrictions that limit the ways in which the relevant relations can be brought 
about or altered. 
Note that having no such restrictions in place may be acceptable to relationalists who merely 
insist on the rather modest claim that acquaintance with mind-independent items can be a source of 
knowledge. For such relationalists could accept that acquaintance leads to knowledge only when the 
perceiving subject’s background view meets certain conditions, i.e. by being sufficiently correct. 
However, relationalists who want to defend a stronger view, e.g. that acquaintance does provide 
knowledge, at least typically, or that it is a kind of knowledge—perhaps one that is in an important 
sense more basic than propositional knowledge—need to provide a story as to how this is to be 
understood, and how perceived appearances and judgments are, or get to be, hooked up in such a way 
to yield their desired account.  
Summing up the second issue, the worry is this: the flexibility Genone’s account of misleading 
appearances affords with respect to the relation between perceived appearances and judgments that 
subjects may issue based on perceiving them gives rise to the question how it is that appearances and 
judgments get (and remain) to be hooked up in the right kind of way so as to fit the relationalists’ 
commitments with respect to the role they think acquaintance plays in acquiring knowledge. 
Depending on what precise epistemic role relationalists attribute to acquaintance, the account of 
misleading appearances must thus be developed into a full account of how appearances and judgments 
hook up that shows how acquaintance can actually play that role. 
As far as Genone is concerned, he does not give us such an account. He appears to use the 
expression ‘knowledge by acquaintance’ approvingly, endorses Basic Acquaintance, and hints at the 
possibility that in the context of articulating a foundationalist theory of knowledge, acquaintance may 
helpfully serve “as a kind of epistemically basic mental state” (Genone 2014, p. 346). That said, he 
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offers no worked-out proposal of the epistemic role of acquaintance, so that it would be incumbent 
on him to present one and to show how his account of misleading appearances can be developed in a 
way that dovetails with that account. 
Generally, the question how to think about the epistemic (and semantic) role of acquaintance is 
an issue with respect to which individual relationalists differ considerably. Our main concern here, 
however, is to investigate whether relationalists can accommodate putative cases of DVEP. On 
Genone’s favored strategy discussed in 6.3.3, they can accommodate such cases, but only at the price 
of further complicating the question how to understand the phenomenology of experience. On the 
alternative strategy discussed in 6.3.4, they cannot accommodate such cases, but explain them away.  
Again, whether either of these strategies is likely to succeed is conditional on whether they can 
develop a satisfactory account of appearances and of the phenomenology of perceptual experience. 
And as we see now, relationalists who wish to pursue either of the strategies suggested also need to 
make sure that they develop it in such a way as to fits into the broader relationalist epistemological 
picture as they see it. Plainly, investigating the various relationalist accounts with respect to what this 
would require would lead us too far afield. Instead, I will rest content with flagging the potential 
tension and leave it as a task for relationalists to explore whether Genone’s account of misleading 
appearances can be suitably developed to serve their purposes.  
Holding off on such an investigation is also well-advised for the following reason: for arguably, 
before we can meaningfully ask how the proposed account of shifts in the relations between perceived 
appearances and judgments might fit into a broader relationalist framework, we should make sure that 
we have a good grip on what exactly the account of misleading appearances is on which it rests. We 
should e.g. be able to say how, on the proposed account, appearances and judgments are supposed to 
relate in the first place. As we will see next, Genone’s answer to this question is far from clear. 
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6.4.3 Appearance-Judgment Relations 
The following, recall, are some of the claims Genone adopts from the doxastic accounts of appearance 
that he rejects: perceived appearances are related to or linked with the perceiving subject S’s judgments 
and beliefs in such a way that on the basis of having an experience in which S perceives certain 
appearances S will be led (perhaps erroneously) to issue certain judgments, form certain beliefs, or draw 
certain conclusions. And since which judgments, beliefs, or conclusions S will be led to endorse on the 
basis of her experience depends on S’s background view, differences in S’s background view may lead 
to differences in what judgments, beliefs, or conclusions S will be led to endorse.  
Plainly, these claims raise pressing questions—most importantly: how are we to think of 
appearances as being hooked up or linked with beliefs and judgments? As he presents doxastic 
accounts of appearances, Genone states that according to them, appearances are to be characterized 
as having the propensity to cause certain beliefs, as inclining one to form certain beliefs or as such that one 
would, on the basis of one’s experience, form certain judgments. Suppose we grant that appearances are 
not to be individuated in terms of the mental states that one’s perception of them may yield and, 
moreover, that they lack content. If so, we must ask how the perception of appearances can lead one 
to form certain judgments or beliefs. Relatedly, in what sense can perceiving appearances function as 
that on the basis of which we make certain judgments or form certain beliefs? Furthermore, if Genone 
asserts that upon having a certain experience, we draw certain conclusions, what is the form of the 
inference involved and how, if in any way, do perceived appearances figure in such inferences?  
In general, one must wonder whether the relation between perceived appearances and judgments 
is supposed to be broadly epistemic or rather causal-dispositional. Some of the expressions Genone 
uses indicate the latter, others are at best ambiguous. Consider, first, a broadly causal-dispositional 
reading. On it, in the presence of suitable further factors—such as e.g. what other beliefs the subject 
S holds—perceiving certain appearances might serve as part of a stimulus condition that brings about 
the manifestation, in S, of certain beliefs, judgments, or conclusions. Presumably, S would need to 
have numerous such dispositions, enough to account for the numerous responses to the various 
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perceptions of the different appearances S is able to distinguish. Moreover, to accommodate the fact 
that what judgments, etc. S is led to endorse upon perceiving certain appearances is supposed to 
depend on S’s background view, we must imagine that the relevant dispositions to respond to various 
such perceptions are suitably malleable; they must change along with changes in the subject’s 
background view.41 Finally, a story would have to be told what the epistemic import of such causal 
linkages between perceived appearance and judgments is—a story that Genone does not provide. 
To consider the broadly epistemic interpretation, considering Genone’s claims to the effect that 
perceiving appearances leads to judgments and beliefs, that in the context of a given background view 
such judgments and beliefs are formed on the basis of perceiving appearances, and that upon having a 
certain experience we draw certain conclusions. Such claims need not be read as having causal 
connotations, but invite a broadly epistemic reading. Consider the last of the three claims. How, one 
can ask, does perceiving appearances allow the subject to draw certain conclusions? Note that if, pace 
Genone, the experiences that perceiving appearances (somehow) constitute were endowed with 
representational content—content that either is propositional in form or has a format that can be 
easily exploited to extract propositional content—the answer to this question would be comparatively 
straightforward: experience could make available experiential premises. But since Genone endorses 
No Content, perceived appearances must feature in, enable, or give rise to inferences in some other 
way. But how? Genone does not say. 
Moreover, presumably, given some background view, upon perceiving a certain appearance, 
issuing certain judgments, for instance, will be normatively appropriate—at least by the lights of that 
view—while issuing others will not be. But how are we to construe this notion of normative 
appropriateness in light of a perceived appearance? And further, are we to suppose that those 
judgments, beliefs, and conclusions, which, by the lights of the relevant background view, are 
(somehow) correct responses to the relevant perceptions, align with those that the subject, upon 
perceiving a given appearance, is in fact inclined to endorse?  
                                                 
41  It may be that such dispositions differ in robustness. I return to considering this possibility in chapter 8.1.4. 
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Furthermore, even a judgment that is correct by the light of some view need not be normatively 
appropriate in a stronger sense. In particular, it need neither be reasonable, true, nor knowledgeable. 
Accordingly, we are again faced with the question how a view like the one Genone sketches may fit 
into the broader relationalist epistemological framework. Does it fit, for instance, with Brewer’s claim 
that the mind-independent objects one’s experience acquaints one with are themselves reasons?42 If so, 
would they play the role of serving as reasons in the subject’s deliberations no matter what, or only if 
the subject’s background view is sufficiently correct? 
Finally, besides the question how to specify the relation between perceived appearances and 
judgments, beliefs, and conclusions subjects are said to draw on the basis of their experience, Genone 
owes us an account of how this relation in turn depend on one’s background view. As evidenced by 
passage (7), Genone suggests that what a given appearance leads one to judge depends on one’s 
implicit understanding of how the appearances objects manifest in various circumstances are related 
to the intrinsic properties of these objects. As the brief discussion of the Müller-Lyer example brought 
out, one consequence of this idea is the following: if one’s beliefs about the environment become 
more accurate, perceived appearances can lose their status of being misleading. Conversely, I suggested 
that given suitable changes in one’s background view, cases should be possible in which appearances 
acquire that status. In fact, the strategy I suggested relationalists might pursue to accommodate the 
banana case treats the latter as an instance of such a case: in the test condition, an appearance property 
that in other contexts leads to the judgment that the object is gray leads to the judgment that it is 
yellowish. But if the relation between perceived appearances and judgments depends on the 
background view, should we expect that shifts that lead to inappropriate judgments can be undone? 
Suppose, for instance, one were to prime the test subjects, prior to the experiment, with images of 
purple or red bananas. Should we expect that the effect will be reduced? In general, how are we to 
think about modifications in how appearances and judgments hook up? How are we to characterize 
them and how they come about? Why do they occur in some cases and not in others? These, I think, 
                                                 
42  Again, see Brewer 2011, chapters 6 & 7; Brewer 2018. 
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are some fruitful questions that relationalists who are sympathetic to Genone’s suggestion need to 
think about. But as long as answers to these questions are pending, I contend, we must reject Genone’s 
view as unsatisfactory.  
6.5 LEAVING RELATIONALISM BEHIND 
Let us take stock. In this and the previous chapters, we closely examined three variants of the 
relationalist view, each of which provided a different way of elaborating on the central relationalist 
tenet, according to which experience is a (suitably qualified) relation of acquaintance between subjects 
and mind-independent items and thus plays the crucial role of putting us in touch with these items.  
One of the ways in which these views differ concern what their respective proponents take the 
relevant mind-independent items to be. According to Fish, these items are facts—construed as object-
property couples. According to Brewer, experience relates subjects to objects that in turn stand in 
similarity relations to paradigm exemplars of various kinds of objects. And according to Genone, 
finally, these items are entirely mind-independent appearance properties that mind-independent objects 
manifest anyway, relative to various environing circumstances.  
Another difference between the views concerns the account of Constitution they contain. On 
Fish’s view, the phenomenal dimension is constituted by the subject’s being acquainted with facts the 
subject brings into the presentational character of her experience, in virtue of passively deploying her 
conceptual capacities. On Brewer’s view, the phenomenal dimension has two layers that he labels thin 
and thick looks, which are said to be (somehow) constituted by the (visually) relevant similarity 
relations objects stand in with paradigm exemplars of various kinds of things and by registering such 
relations. On Genone’s view, finally, things are less clear, but presumably, the phenomenal dimension 
of experience is taken to be constituted by the phenomena that the subject encounters in experience, 
which, according to Genone, are a) the entirely mind-independent appearance properties that the 
environing mind-independent objects manifest b), occasionally, properties of experience itself, and 
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c) phenomenal states that caused by cognitive and psychological states. Each of these views turned 
out to be problematic in various ways. Neither provides a sufficiently clear account of what the mind-
independent items are, how they constitute the phenomenal dimension of experience, and how, 
accordingly, we are to think about this dimension in the first place. Given their explicit commitment 
to Constitution and, in Genone’s case, Explanatory Completeness, the ability to provide an 
account of experiential phenomenology constitutes an important criterion of adequacy for relationalist 
accounts. By their own lights, the fact that they are currently unable to meet this criterion should be a 
particularly dissatisfying result.  
Relatedly, to the extent that the project of examining various relationalist accounts of experiential 
phenomenology was motivated by the hope that these accounts might provide resources that are 
suitable to develop Hanson’s account further, such hopes, it turns out, were in vain. This is so also 
because, currently, neither of the views we examined can deal with phenomena falling under DVEP. 
For one, neither account offers a satisfactory account of expert vision. On Fish’s view, problems 
arise in the context of the question how properties and conceptual capacities are to be individuated so 
as to yield what he wishes to accommodate, i.e. the idea that experiences of experts and laypeople 
have something perceptually in common. If Brewer’s view appears to have room for expert vision by 
affording a notion of thick looks and a specific phenomenology that registering thin looks gives rise 
to, he leaves us with next to no account of this specific layer of phenomenology, nor of how it 
combines or interacts with the layer he takes thin looks to constitute. Accordingly, his account remains 
seriously underdeveloped. Genone, finally, offers no account of expert vision at all. And though I 
suggested two ways in which such an account could be developed, both can only succeed on the 
following condition: he must provide an intelligible account of appearance properties and an account 
of how these—presumably in tandem with processes of attention—give rise to the phenomenology, 
i.e. to the ways things look to the perceiving subject. 
For another, neither of the views is currently well-developed enough to satisfactorily 
accommodate or explain away projection effects. As the discussion of the banana case revealed, both 
Fish and Brewer are committed to the implausible claim that throughout what may be large chunks 
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of the test condition, the experiences that the test subjects subsequently undergo lack phenomenal 
aspects associated with color altogether. Given that it is precisely the banana object’s color that the 
test subjects are supposed to attend to and, subsequently, manipulate, this is a particularly puzzling 
result. Relatedly, neither Fish nor Brewer provide an explanation of what it is that subjects respond to 
as they adjust the banana object’s color.  
Genone’s view seemed more promising. Clearly, the suggestion he favors—i.e. that the total 
phenomenology of experience is not exhausted by perceptual phenomenology, but can contain elements 
that are due to effects of cognitive states such as beliefs—enables him to accommodate the banana 
case. However, for him to allow that some elements of experiential phenomenology are not 
constituted by mind-independent items is to undermine the core relationalist tenet: that experience is 
a relation to mind-independent items. Accordingly, from a relationalist perspective, this proposal thus 
has little appeal—arguably, both Fish and Brewer would reject it. For Fish, it collides with his idea 
that for any bit of experiential phenomenology, its occurrence presupposes that the subject be 
acquainted with suitable facts. For Brewer, it runs counter to the spirit motivating his General 
Constraint on Thin Looks and, relatedly, his slogan that the way things look is the way things look. 
Also, it gives rise to difficult questions, some of which Brewer faces as well: i.e. how it is that the 
putative different layers of phenomenology combine and interact.  
At first blush, the alternative suggestion I developed on Genone’s behalf, i.e. that he might extend 
his account of misleading appearances to the banana case, too, seemed more palatable. It allows 
Genone to dodge some of the problems Fish and Brewer face. Notably, he can insist that throughout 
the test condition, subjects do in fact perceive the appearance property the banana object has in virtue 
of its having certain color properties. Instead of claiming that the phenomenology of experience is 
affected, he can insist that the relevant changes are changes in what the perceptual judgments are that 
subjects are led to endorse upon perceiving the various appearance properties the banana object 
anyway manifests. As I suggested, the flexibility Genone’s account affords with respect to how the 
phenomenal dimension of experience—i.e. perceived appearances—and judgments, beliefs, etc. can 
be hooked up is a powerful feature of his account, one he shares with Hanson’s account.  
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Nevertheless, I suggested that it may well be that Genone cannot fully escape the assumption that 
extra phenomenal elements are needed. Moreover, I argued that without an account of how the 
relations between appearances and judgments are to be construed, how they can be modified, and in 
what way they depend on the subject’s background view, it remains at least an open question whether 
the account of misleading appearances can be developed in such a way as to both accommodate the 
banana case and similar cases and fit into the relationalists’ broader epistemological framework, on 
which acquaintance is supposed to be, provide (typically), or be the source of, knowledge.  
As indicated before, Genone’s view shares certain strengths with Hanson’s, but as we can now 
see, it also shared certain of its weaknesses. For just like Hanson, Genone, too, says too little to help 
us understand how the phenomenal and the conceptual are supposed to relate. On Genone’s view, 
the issue manifests as the question how perceiving appearances is related to conceptual items in such 
a way that the former leads subjects to endorse judgments, beliefs, or conclusions of inferences, and on 
how this relation in turn depends on the perceiving subject’s background view. On Hanson’s view, it 
appears as the question of what governs the relations between the phenomenal and the conceptual 
dimension of experience, so that in the context of a given background view, they are amalgamated 
such that having an experience with a certain phenomenology is a case of seeing something as F, and 
not as G, say.  
Either way, while Hanson explicitly purports to make room for doxastic effects on experience, 
my final verdict on the relational view is the following: currently, it is unable to accommodate such 
phenomena. Moreover, it lacks a convincing account of the mind-independent items that experience 
is said to relate us to and of how these items constitute the phenomenology of experience. This is not 
to say that the relational view is inevitably doomed. But currently, it is shot through with problems 
and the challenges it faces are significant.  
It is thus time to change gears and leave the analysis of relational views behind. Accordingly, I 
will, in the next chapter, discuss a view that shares Hanson’s commitment to the idea that experience 
has content—Siegel’s (Rich) Content View. In particular, I will look at Siegel’s attempt to 
accommodate cases of doxastic variability of experience, i.e. the position she develops in her recent 
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book, The Rationality of Perception. As I will argue, her Content View, too, faces serious challenges. And 
the account she proposes in her most recent book involves commitments to various ways of 
construing experience that are not only highly revisionary and counterintuitive, but that turn out to be 
entirely unnecessary if we drop her implicit commitment to a certain conception of what role 
experience plays for us. In what follows, the discussion of Siegel’s view serves an important function. 
For one, it provides us with a series of problems that in subsequent chapters need to be addressed. 
For another, it contains a number of commitments many of which—in a progression that begins at 
the end of the next chapter and that continues through the chapters that follow—I suggest we can 
drop.
194 
 
7.0 SIEGEL’S RICH CONTENT VIEW 
Our extended examination of the relational view yielded the following result: it is ill-equipped to 
provide an account of experiential phenomenology and to accommodate or explain away certain 
instances of what I called the Doxastic Variability of Experiential Phenomenology (DVEP). For 
as we assessed the various relationalist views with an eye to their ability to accommodate phenomena 
that would instantiate such variability—e.g. expert vision and projection effects—we found that these 
phenomena, especially the latter, pose a serious challenge to relationalist positions.  
As we noted, it is not overly surprising that projection effects are difficult for relationalists to 
accommodate. After all, relationalists are committed to the idea that the nature and the primary role 
of experience is to put subjects in touch with mind-independent items. Arguably, this conception of 
the role of experience also undergirds their strong intuition that the phenomenology of perceptual 
experience must be fully constituted by, and explained in terms of, the perceiving subject’s being 
suitably related to such items. Against the background of such commitments, it is understandable—if 
not to be expected—that relationalists should generally be wary of cases in which beliefs or other 
cognitive background states appear to modify experiential phenomenology. After all, in such cases, 
suitable mind-independent items that relationalists could draw on to account for the relevant 
modifications are absent. 
Perceptual experience, if construed as a relation, is said to put us in touch with mind-independent 
objects. But whatever further epistemological and semantic roles relationalists may want to attribute 
to it, perceptual experience will have to be construed as providing us with something that can be 
exploited so as to make it intelligible how experience can play such roles. Since on relationalist 
accounts, experience has no representational content, it appears that experience must play such roles 
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due to its having a phenomenology. If so, then for an assessment of the prospects of relationalist 
views, the verdict we reached over the course of the previous chapters is highly significant. According 
to this verdict, the relational notion of experiential phenomenology is flawed—not just because it 
cannot easily accommodate the kinds of doxastic effects we discussed, but because in the context of 
discussing why doing so is difficult, we found that in each case, the purported constitution relation 
between mind-independent items and experiential phenomenology remains unclear. But once we 
concede that the relationalist notion of experiential phenomenology is dubious, we must also admit 
that such a notion can hardly serve as a suitable candidate for grounding whatever semantic and 
epistemic roles relationalists may think experience ought to play. Providing a satisfactory account of 
experiential phenomenology, one that is both intelligible and powerful enough to deal with the cases 
we have been considering, is thus not just some minor task—one among many others that 
relationalists should wish to eventually address. Rather, for the entire relationalist project to get off 
the ground, it is crucial that such an account be developed. As long as it is pending, the relational view 
must thus be firmly rejected. 
In this chapter, I examine the account of visual perceptual experience and its rational role offered 
by Susanna Siegel. Siegel defends a version of representationalism, i.e. a view on which conscious 
visual experience is essentially a matter of representing things as being some way or other. On her 
account, the content visual experience can have in virtue of representing things as being some way 
can be rich; conscious visual perception, she maintains, can present all sorts of complex properties as 
instantiated, including kind properties, causal properties, and identity properties. 
For our purposes, Siegel’s view is particularly interesting because it combines the following two 
features. First, it is the most recent and arguably the most sophisticated attempt to develop a 
representationalist position that explicitly seeks to accommodate cases in which cognitive background 
states affect the perceiving subject’s experience. Paradigmatically, these states are beliefs and 
expectations, but Siegel also considers further influencing factors: e.g. desires, fears, moods, and 
attitudes.  
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Second, the account she develops in her most recent book, The Rationality of Perception, is an attempt 
to respond to the kind of epistemological worries such cases raise for standard representationalist 
accounts of experience more broadly. Accordingly, we can exploit Siegel’s work to bring out the shape 
of these general worries, and then examine the specific response she offers.  
Here is how I proceed: I begin by analyzing the account of experience Siegel develops and defends 
in Siegel (2010)—the Content View (7.1). I argue that we need not accept the argument Siegel 
provides for this account and that the account itself leaves some pressing questions unanswered. Most 
importantly, Siegel assumes that visual experiences have determinate contents and that phenomenal 
states are non-arbitrarily related to their contents. However, she provides little in terms of an account 
of how experiential content is determined and leaves us without an account of Non-Arbitrariness. 
This, I argue, is rather unfortunate. For without a full account of how the content of phenomenal 
states is determined, it remains unclear how Siegel (or any representationalist who holds a similar view) 
thinks experience can play the epistemological role representationalists standardly attribute to it: that 
of justifying or providing evidential support for perceptual beliefs.1 In 7.2, I present Siegel’s account 
of putative cases in which cognitive background states affect visual experience, outline Siegel’s 
approach of framing and responding to the epistemological problem that accommodating such cases 
                                                 
1  It has been suggested to me in discussion that as I criticize, in 7.1, Siegel’s Content View, I treat Siegel’s 
view unfairly for the following two reasons: first, I am said to complain that Siegel does not provide answers 
to questions that are pretty much the hardest questions in the vicinity. Second, and relatedly, I am taken to 
demand answers to questions that Siegel does not even purport to answer.  
I agree that e.g. the question how phenomenal states are related to the properties that according to 
many representationalists they are taken to represent is a hard one. Moreover, I agree that Siegel’s primary 
aim is not to answer such questions. That said, I think it is important to acknowledge that neither Siegel’s 
notion of experience nor the argument for the Content View that she provides are as compelling as she 
takes them to be. Also, I wish to point out that though I illustrate the problems of Non-Arbitrariness and 
Experiential Content by way of criticizing Siegel’s view, I take these problems to be pressing not just for 
Siegel, let alone for Siegel in particular, but for many, if not most representationalists. For again, without a 
way of addressing them, it remains unclear how experience can play the role representationalists think it 
does. Especially with respect to 7.1.4, I thus ask those readers who are sympathetic to representationalism 
to abstract from the specifics of Siegel’s account and ask themselves how they think the problems of Non-
Arbitrariness and of Experiential Content can be solved. 
In the chapters that follow, I hope to be providing some considerations that point us in the direction 
of how these issues can be addressed productively. As will transpire, I think that addressing them need not, 
but may happen in the context of a representationalist account—albeit a non-standard one.  
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poses within a representationalist framework, and close by raining some problems for her approach. 
In 7.3, I propose an alternative way of framing and responding to the problem that is compatible with 
the Content View, with representationalism more generally, but that drops some of Siegel’s more 
revisionary assumptions, viz. a) that experiences have epistemic powers that vary with their etiology 
and b) that subjects are irrational if they respond to experiences in what must strike them as the rational 
thing to do and provided that the contents of these experiences have been influenced by psychological 
or cognitive precursors in a way that seems epistemically pernicious. My alternative way of framing 
the issue crucially depends on endorsing an alternative and, I suggest, completely general conception 
of the role of experience. On it, experience makes rational view-dependent transitions to judgments, 
beliefs, and actions. 
7.1 THE CONTENT VIEW 
According to Siegel’s Content View, visual experiences have contents, which Siegel understands as a 
kind of condition under which experiences are accurate. For experience to have such contents, on her 
view, is for experience to represent properties or—as she also says—for properties to be presented as 
instantiated, or attributed, by and in experience, to some objects.2 It is in virtue of having such contents 
that experience can play its main epistemological function, viz. that of providing or conveying 
information (cf. Siegel 2010, p. 7), that of bestowing propositional justification, and that of affording 
evidential support for beliefs or judgments (cf. ibid., p. 8-10).   
These claims need to be unpacked further. The discussion of the epistemic function of experience 
will be deferred to later (until 7.2). In this section, I first lay out Siegel’s notion of visual experience as 
she develops it in her 2010 book The Contents of Visual Experience (7.1.1), present her view that the 
                                                 
2  Siegel claims that her view can easily be reformulated in terms of e.g. trope theory and that the position can also be 
developed so as to accommodate the idea that experience presents not just properties, but also centering features, or 
that it presents properties under (Fregean) modes of presentation (cf. Siegel 2010, pp. 55-58). For our purposes, such 
complications can be ignored.  
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bearers of experiential contents are the visual phenomenal states themselves (7.1.2), and lay out and 
criticize the argument she presents in favor of the Content View: her Argument from Appearing (7.1.3). 
I then show that we cannot, from Siegel’s view, extract an account of how the content of phenomenal 
states are determined nor an account of how specific phenomenal states are related to the contents 
they are said to bear, and argue that for us to lack such accounts poses a serious issue (7.1.4). 
7.1.1 Siegel’s Notion of Visual Experience 
Having experiences, Siegel holds, is a matter of being in a (typically complex, multi-faceted) conscious 
mental state that by its very nature has a felt character (cf. e.g. Siegel 2010, p. 14). If we consider some 
such state, e.g. the experience one may undergo while waterskiing, we may note that such a state is 
typically temporally extended, involves inputs from various sources such as multiple sensory 
modalities (which may or may not be coordinated), proprioception, but also from feelings, moods, 
and so forth. Having a visual experience, Siegel stipulates, is to be in some such potentially complex 
conscious state that has visual facets, so that one’s overall experience involves being in some visual 
phenomenal states. Here is what Siegel says about phenomenal states:  
(1) Let’s say that phenomenal states are individuated by what it is like to be in them. To be 
in the same phenomenal state on two different occasions, what it’s like to be in that 
state has to be the same both times (Siegel 2010, p. 20).  
Relatedly, this is how Siegel characterizes the notion of visual phenomenal character: 
(2) A visual experience is one of the states (among many others) that you are in when you 
see things. There is “something it is like” to have a visual experience, and what it’s 
like varies with what you see, what you pay attention to, and your perceptual 
idiosyncracies, such as astigmatism, colorblindness, whether your cornea is scratched, 
whether you are wearing corrective lenses, and so on. All of these factors contribute 
to the specific conscious or phenomenal character of a visual experience, or 
equivalently, to what it is like to have it. We can call this visual phenomenal character, or 
visual phenomenology, for short. (Siegel 2010, pp. 3-4) 
From these passages we learn that Siegel’s notions of visual phenomenology and (visual) phenomenal 
state rest on the idea that there is something it is like to have a visual experience: the experience’s 
phenomenal character. Phenomenal states—or rather: kinds of such states—are said to be individuated 
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by their phenomenal character. Moreover, the phenomenal character of an experience and, hence, 
what concrete phenomenal state one is in while undergoing one’s experience, can vary with various 
factors. 
Apart from these passages, Siegel 2010 provides no further characterization of what phenomenal 
states are. Accordingly, her characterization of the phenomenal dimension of experience is very thin. 
Note also that the factors listed in passage (2) do not include beliefs or other background states. As 
we will see below, Siegel explicitly allows that such background states can modify a subject’s visual 
experience, too. What exactly the target of such modification is, however, that is something we will 
need to discuss. 
Since Siegel is particularly interested in visual phenomenal states, she suggests two strategies for 
arriving at the specifically visual aspects any given experience may involve. To distinguish them, Siegel 
introduces the notion of phenomenally conscious states (cf. Siegel 2010, p. 20). Such states, she stipulates, 
are such that necessarily, to be in them, one has to be in a phenomenal state. Trivially, then, 
phenomenal states are phenomenally conscious states, as are states of seeing objects, states of seeming 
to see objects, of seeing (or seeming to see) something as something or that something is the case.3 
With the notion of phenomenally conscious states in hand, Siegel suggests that one can arrive at 
the specifically visual aspects of a given experience by considering some overall experience, construed 
as the overall phenomenal state one is in during the stretch of time during which one is undergoing a 
certain experience. Next, one is to zoom in on, and thus single out, its visual components, arriving at 
the specific visual phenomenal states the relevant experience involves—at what Siegel calls the narrow class 
of visual experiences. Alternatively, she suggests, one can start from the overall experience, construed 
not as an overall phenomenal state, but as a collection of phenomenally conscious states. Next, one is 
to ignore the non-visual ones, thus arriving at what Siegel classifies as belonging to the broad class of 
visual experiences. And whereas the narrow class of visual experiences comprises solely phenomenal 
                                                 
3  Siegel explicitly focuses her discussion on purely visual experiences and thus brackets multimodal experiences that 
have visual experiences as parts. Among visual experiences, some are, for the most part, sidelined as well, e.g. the 
visual experience one has when facing a light source with one’s eyes closed or the visual experience on has when one 
closes one’s eyes without a light source present (cf. Siegel 2010, p. 24).  
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states, the broad class may include a range of ontologically distinct elements, such as episodes, actions, 
and states of various sorts—most importantly: states of seeing (cf. Siegel 2010, pp. 20-21). But how 
are states of seeing and phenomenal states related? Since states of seeing are phenomenally conscious 
states, every state of seeing (and of seeming to see) is such that necessarily, subjects who are in such a 
state are also in some visual phenomenal state or other. Seeing someone—Jim, say—thus essentially 
involves being in some visual phenomenal state or other. But Siegel indicates that there is no unique 
visual phenomenal state one must be in to see Jim, to see him as sad, or even as sad in very specific 
circumstances. Conversely, she claims, there is no unique phenomenal state such that if one is in it, 
one must be seeing Jim, him as sad, or him as sad in very specific circumstances (cf. Siegel 2010, p. 
20, also p. 23). States of seeing, Siegel insists, are not identical with phenomenal states. 
In part, this is to explicitly reject a claim that at least some relationalists would endorse. Recall 
that according to Fish, having an experience with a phenomenal character requires that the subject be 
acquainted with some facts, i.e. with some mind-independent object-property couples. Having an 
experience with a specific phenomenal character, on his view, just is a case of seeing specific object-
property couples, from a specific location, in certain lighting conditions, etc. Moreover, recall that for 
Fish, the phenomenal character of experiences is individuated by which object-property couples the 
experiences acquaint one with. Accordingly, undergoing two subsequent experiences of numerically 
different, but qualitatively identical items is to have two experiences with different phenomenal 
characters. On such a view, phenomenal states are, pace Siegel, identical with states of seeing.4 
Siegel favors what she calls internalism about phenomenal states. By this she means that phenomenal 
states are not individuated externally, i.e. by way of referring to the mind-independent items that may 
give rise to them. Instead, and again, such states are individuated solely by what it is like to be in them. 
                                                 
4  Brewer would maintain that the visual phenomenal state an experiencing subject is in will be characterized in terms 
of the various ways things thinly and thickly look to the subject, in that experience. If so, then given that looks are 
said to rest on similarity relations, and given that different objects can stand in the same similarity relations, Brewer 
will presumably maintain the following: like Fish, he will hold that every visual phenomenal state is a state of seeing 
some specific object. However, in contrast to Fish, he will accept that seeing different kinds of objects can be a matter 
of being in identical phenomenal states. Therefore, he will not think that there is a one-to-one correspondence 
between (kinds of) phenomenal states and (kinds of) states of seeing specific objects.  
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And this “something it is like,” the idea goes, can be the same across various experiences—such as 
experiences of numerically different, but qualitatively identical items, hallucinations, perhaps even 
across experiences of different items with different qualities that are had in different circumstances.5 
With this outline of Siegel’s notion of visual experience in hand, let us ask how to understand her 
claim that experience has content.  
7.1.2 Content-Bearing Phenomenal States 
In her introduction to Siegel 2010, Siegel states that she seeks to explore the question “how things 
may look to us in our visual experiences of them […] by asking which properties are represented in 
visual experience” (Siegel 2010, p. 4). The main idea underlying her Content View, thus, is this: 
experiential contents are to be construed in terms of properties that experience represents, presents 
                                                 
5  Does Siegel argue for internalism about phenomenal states? In chapter 1 of Siegel 2010, she announces that in chapter 
6, she will argue that no states of seeing are phenomenal states (Siegel 2010, p. 23). In the introduction to that chapter, 
she reiterates the claim that no phenomenal states are identical with any states of seeing (cf. Siegel 2010, p. 148) and 
indicates that she will reach this conclusion in section 6.6. Curiously, the book does not contain such a section 
(according to p. 162, fn. 13, it was also to contain a now missing argument against the idea that there are phenomenal 
types specific to hallucination).  
Moreover, the position Siegel reaches in 6.5, the final section of the chapter, is explicitly inconclusive. There, she 
suggests that internalists about phenomenal states have an explanation for how it is that veridical experiences, illusions, 
and hallucinations can have matching phenomenal characters. According to this explanation, such experiences share 
phenomenal properties (as we saw in 4.3, Fish feels the force of this idea, but ultimately rejects it). Disjunctivists of 
various stripes, on the other hand, have a much harder time accounting for the phenomenal similarity between 
matching veridical and non-veridical experiences—or so Siegel argues. After discussing and rejecting a few proposals, 
Siegel focuses on casting doubt on Martin’s and Fish’s suggestion that disjunctivists may appeal to the claim that non-
veridical experiences are indiscriminable from veridical ones (drawing on arguments developed more fully elsewhere, 
e.g. in Siegel 2004). Briefly, Siegel claims that for certain illusions, there may be no veridical perception from which 
the entire illusory experience would be indiscriminable. She also points out that the notion of indiscriminability seems 
inapplicable to creatures who have experiences, yet lack the cognitive resources to discriminate between them (cf. 
Siegel 2010, pp. 171-173, and Siegel 2008 for discussion of Fish’s view in particular). Her conclusion is that 
disjunctivists who take hallucinatory and non-hallucinatory experiences to be phenomenally distinct must provide an 
account of how they can match anyway. Disjunctivists who think that such states are not distinct, but characterize the 
merely hallucinatory case by referring to the non-hallucinatory case, she suggests, need a better account of why it is 
that these cases belong to the same phenomenal state than an account that merely appeals to indiscriminability 
properties.  
Again, Siegel ends section 6.5. by conceding that her considerations do not conclusively favor internalism about 
phenomenal states. Despite her repeated announcements to the contrary, she thus does not establish that no 
phenomenal states are identical with any states of seeing. Instead, she settles for motivating internalism about 
phenomenal states by raising issues for alternative views, and ends by essentially bracketing the issue, asserting that 
questions about its truth are anyway irrelevant to questions about the contents of experience (cf. ibid., p. 174). 
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as instantiated, or attributes to objects. Moreover, she holds that when subjects have an experience, 
the contents of that experience are conveyed to the subject by the experience (cf. Siegel 2010, p. 28). 
Due to having contents, visual experiences, on this view, are importantly similar to beliefs (cf. ibid, p. 
27). For that properties are represented in experience gives rise to a notion of accuracy conditions, 
which in turn are in many ways like truth-conditions of beliefs (cf. ibid., p. 4). Most importantly, like 
the contents of beliefs, contents of experiences are true or false (cf. Siegel 2010, p. 28). But unlike 
beliefs, experiences themselves are neither true nor false. Instead, they are either accurate or not.  
Accuracy, Siegel notes, comes in degrees, for a given experience may succeed in representing 
some properties accurately, but fail in representing others accurately. Accordingly, a given experience 
e is fully accurate with respect to some situation s iff in s, things are exactly as e represents them to be. 
Put in terms of truth, it is possible that relative to some situation s in which a certain experience e is 
had, some of e’s contents are true, whereas others are not. If I see a yellow half-sphere head-on, for 
example, it could be, on this view, that in virtue of the properties my experience presents as 
instantiated, it has the true content that would be expressed by the sentence “there is something yellow 
in front of me,” but also the false content expressed by the sentence “there is a sphere in front of 
me.” Plainly, such an experience would not be fully accurate. For a completely accurate experience is 
free from error, relative to some situation s, in the following sense: every content the experience has 
in virtue of (re)presenting various properties as instantiated is true of s.6 
In our earlier discussion of Hanson’s account, we asked how on his view, the phenomenal, non-
conceptual dimension he takes experience to involve is supposed to relate to its conceptual dimension. 
A structurally analogous question arose in the context of Genone’s view. With respect to the latter, 
we asked how it is that on his view, the perception of appearance properties is related to the judgments 
                                                 
6  Cf. Siegel 2010, p. 32. Note that an experience can be completely accurate with respect to the situation in which it is 
had, and still be neither what Siegel calls strongly veridical nor completely successful. Examples of completely accurate 
experiences that are not strongly veridical are hallucinations that are completely accurate with respect to the situation 
in which they are had, but not because in them, the perceiver actually perceives her environment, but due to some 
amazing coincidence. They are veridical, but not of any items seen. Examples of completely accurate experiences that 
are not completely successful are examples in which an experience is completely accurate, strongly veridical, but such 
that some of the environing circumstances or properties do not play the right causal role in bringing about the 
experiential contents that accurately represent them (cf. Siegel 2010, pp. 36-37, for discussion). 
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or beliefs that subjects, he says, may base on them. However, both Hanson and Genone ultimately 
left us without a satisfactory account of the relevant relations. Hanson treats the two dimensions of 
experience as logically separable, but also claims that epistemically significant seeing—seeing as—
essentially involves both: in his terms, it essentially involves both linguistic and pictorial elements. 
More specifically, he suggests that in epistemically significant seeing, the phenomenal and the 
conceptual are (somehow) amalgamated. However, as we saw, he leaves us without an account of 
Amalgamation. Genone, on the other hand, leaves us without an account of the sense in which the 
perception of appearance properties gives rise to perceptual judgments or beliefs, in what sense such 
judgments or beliefs are (thus) based on such perceptions, and of the way in which one’s background 
views may modify which judgments or beliefs a subject may base on what she perceives. 
If we ask how on Siegel’s view the dimension of content and the phenomenal are taken to be 
related, it is instructive to begin by looking at her short discussion of what she calls two-factor views of 
visual experience. On such views, as she characterizes them, visual experience comprises two factors: 
a phenomenal state and another, independent factor: a judgment, perhaps, or something judgment-
like that does the representing. That on such views the two factors are taken to be independent from 
one another is to say that either factor could exist in the absence of the other. The phenomenal state 
could be had on its own, and the item that serves the function of representing certain contents could 
occur without a phenomenal state accompanying it. Moreover, it is compatible with such a view that 
one and the same phenomenal state could be associated with different representing items (cf. Siegel 
2010, p. 21). For example, as one looks at a cloud, one could see it either as a crocodile or as a hotdog 
while the visual phenomenal state remains the same. Similarly,  
(3) if the person you’re talking to looks a bit like a monkey, perhaps, in some sense you 
see her differently when you see her as a monkey, even though your visual 
phenomenal state stays the same. (Siegel 2010, pp. 21-22) 
From our discussion of Hanson’s view, we are familiar with one of the ideas endorsed by 
proponents of two-factor views (as Siegel characterizes them): some experiences may be exhausted by 
their phenomenal aspect. Hanson, as we saw, concedes that such experiences are possible, even 
though they are not, according to Hanson, epistemically significant in the sense that they can directly 
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bear on our beliefs.7 From Hanson’s discussion, we are also familiar with cases in which we see one 
and the same item as different objects. It is, however, at least doubtful whether Hanson would 
comfortably assent to the characterization of such cases that Siegel offers on behalf of the two-factor 
view. Recall his discussion about what happens as one recognizes an object or as one moves from one 
way of seeing it to another. As things snap into perspective, he claims, the elements populating the 
subject’s visual field pull together and cohere differently than before. Patently, Hanson thinks that such 
effects are due to the beliefs and expectations regarding the things we believe we see. As we recognize 
what we see as something, or as something else, the respective beliefs and expectations become salient, 
as it were, which, presumably, brings about the kind of effect he refers to. Again, in this kind of effect, 
the elements of the visual sphere are said to remain the same. But it can be doubted that the relevant 
effect leaves the phenomenology of the subject’s experience completely unaltered.8  
Siegel’s characterization of two-factor views may thus not fit Hanson’s view exactly. This is true 
also with respect to the notion of experiential content she takes such views to involve. For both 
Siegel’s own construal of experiential content and the one she attributes to proponents of two-factor 
views differ from Hanson’s in that on the former, but not on the latter, the contents that experiences 
are said to convey to the subjects that undergo them are, like judgments, propositional in form. 
However, ‘seeing as’ does not form propositional contents (though, of course, we saw that for an 
instance of seeing as to be intelligible, commitments to various propositional contents must be in place). 
It is easy enough to extract propositional contents from episodes of seeing as—contents which, given 
suitable circumstances, the subject may then choose to endorse. Nevertheless, on Hanson’s view, the 
contents of experiences themselves are non-propositional. Instances of seeing as neither involve 
judgments, nor anything judgment-like.9 
                                                 
7  As we saw, Hanson thinks that experiences that are purely phenomenal, as it were, are hard to bring about. 
Nevertheless, he also thinks that trying to do so may serve the purpose of freeing one’s experience from 
preconceptions, so as to perhaps arrive at new ways of seeing things, which may in turn be epistemically fruitful.  
8  As we saw in 2.3.2, Hanson himself appears to be uncertain how to place such effects. Hence the possible discomfort. 
9  Note also that Hanson characterizes experiential content as linguistic. In the first chapter, we interpreted this as a 
commitment to the idea that concepts figure in experience itself. Siegel, on the other hand, talks about experiential 
content, but in terms of properties instantiated; she mostly avoids talk about concepts entirely. 
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For Siegel’s discussion of two-factor views, however, what matters is something else: on such 
views, she claims, the Content View is non-surprisingly true. If the factor that does the representing is 
taken to be a judgment, or something judgment-like, then the Content View is true of experience 
because of the presence, in experience, of this factor. After all, she observes, “[i]t is no surprise that 
judgments have contents” (Siegel 2010, p. 22). And if at least sometimes, this factor represents 
complex properties as well, which it well may, it follows that experiences can have content that is rich. 
Now, if the Content View were interpreted as requiring that experiential contents be true or false, 
then it would be false of Hanson’s view. For if experiential contents, as he suggests, are non-
propositional, they cannot be true or false. But Hanson, too, can agree that experiences can be more 
or less accurate of what is seen, depending on whether the objects seen are indeed what they are seen 
as. Moreover, he would be happy to concede that one can see something as an x-ray tube, as caused 
by the recent heavy rainfall, or as identical with the guitar player Al Di Meola, say. Hence, if separated 
from the construal of experiential contents as propositional, the Content View is true of Hanson’s 
view as well. And, if, like Siegel, we take the Rich Content View to be the stronger thesis that some 
visual experiences present complex properties as instantiated, such as kind properties, causal 
properties, or identity properties, then the Rich Content View is true of Hanson’s view as well. 
Siegel’s own view, however, diverges from two-factor-views. The more interesting thesis, Siegel 
contends, and the one she seeks to defend, is at odds with it. For according to her view, the bearer of 
experiential content is not some independent factor, such as a judgment or something judgment-like. 
Rather, it is the phenomenal state itself. On her view, the representational content of experience is not 
separable from the phenomenal states, nor do phenomenal states occur without a representing 
factor.10 For it is these very states themselves that do the representing—each and every one of them 
does. 
                                                 
10  In a forthcoming response to Harmen Ghijsen (cf. Siegel fthc.), Siegel insists, against Ghijsen, that rather than 
insisting, as Ghijsen does, that the phenomenal character is something “over and above” representational content, we 
must acknowledge that presentational phenomenal character is “too closely tied to representational content to provide 
a distinct feature.” As I will argue below, it is one of the issues Siegel never addresses how this relation of being closely 
tied is to be understood. 
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Accordingly, Siegel’s Content View is the following thesis:  
Content View:  
All visual phenomenal states (also labelled ‘visual perceptual experiences,’ or ‘experiences’ for 
short) have contents (cf. Siegel 2010, p. 22).  
And since, as we saw, she thinks that the content of experience can be rich, Siegel also holds: 
Rich Content View: 
Some visual phenomenal states have content that are rich; they represent 
complex properties such as kind properties, causal properties, and even personal 
identity (cf. e.g. Siegel 2010, p. 22). 
In large swaths of the contemporary philosophical literature on perceptual experience, Siegel 
contends, the Content View is simply presupposed (cf. Siegel 2010, p. 28). Siegel, however, seeks to 
present an argument for it, the Argument from Appearing. As I will argue in the next section, this 
argument is not compelling. Its crucial premise begs the question. 
7.1.3 The Argument from Appearing 
The argument Siegel presents for her view, the Argument from Appearing, runs as follows:  
(4)   
(i) All visual perceptual experiences present clusters of properties as being 
instantiated.  
(ii)  If an experience E presents a cluster of properties F as being instantiated, then: 
Necessarily: things are the way E presents them only if property-cluster F is 
instantiated.  
(iii) If necessarily: things are the way E presents them only if property-cluster F is 
instantiated, then: E has a set of accuracy conditions C, conveyed to the subject 
of E, such that: C is satisfied in a world only if there is something that has F 
in that world.  
(iv) If E has a set of accuracy conditions C, conveyed to the subject of E, such that 
E is accurate only if C, then: E has a set of accuracy conditions C*, conveyed 
to the subject of E, such that E is accurate iff C*. 
(C) All visual perceptual experiences have contents. (Siegel 2010, p. 45)11 
                                                 
11  Obviously, for the argument to go through, contents must be identified with accuracy conditions that are conveyed 
to the subject. 
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For our purposes, the crucial premise is the first one. As we begin to consider it, recall that on 
Siegel’s proposal, visual perceptual experiences are visual experiences in the narrow sense: visual 
phenomenal states. Accordingly, premise (i) expresses the claim that all visual phenomenal states 
present clusters of properties as being instantiated.  
Why should one accept this premise? Given their commitment to No Content, it seems that 
proponents of the relational view would have to resist it. And given Hanson’s contention that at least 
some experiences may be purely phenomenal and as such not involve seeing as at all, he would reject it 
as well, or at least restrict its scope to epistemically significant experiences.12 Again, thus: why, then, 
should we accept premise (i)? In response, Siegel offers the following consideration: 
(5) Typically, our visual perceptual experiences are cases of seeing objects, where the 
category of objects includes ordinary objects such as cars, cups, and pencils. Why 
think that properties are presented in such experiences? Consider the claim […] that 
there is no such thing as a “bare particular”—that is, an object shorn of all of its 
properties. Premise (i) is motivated by the idea that it is not possible for us to represent 
objects as so shorn in our visual experience. When we see (or even when we merely 
seem to see) ordinary objects, such as a cube, bare particulars do not figure in visual 
phenomenology in any way. Properties enter the picture as well. For you to see a cube 
at all, it must be part of your visual phenomenology that the cube has certain 
properties: having a certain number of facing edges and surfaces, having a certain 
color, location, and so on. (Siegel 2010, p. 46) 
As passage (5) indicates, the argument Siegel offers in support of premise (i) runs as follows:  
(P1) All visual perceptual experiences are cases of seeing or cases of merely seeming 
to see objects. 
(P2) If in such experiences, clusters of properties are not being presented as 
instantiated, the experience presents only bare particulars.  
(P3) It is impossible for our experience to be such that it presents only bare particulars. 
(C) All visual perceptual experiences present clusters of properties as being 
instantiated. 
                                                 
12  Might Siegel agree with such a restriction? After all, are there not some broadly visual experiences that she explicitly 
excludes from the Content View (see fn. 3 above)? No. Removing any kind of phenomenal state from the scope of 
the first premise would in effect weaken it, bring Siegel’s view closer to two-factor views, and raise the question in 
virtue of what it is that some phenomenal states have contents, but not others—or perhaps: why it is that phenomenal 
states have contents in some contexts, while in other contexts, they do not. Instead, Siegel argues that the states she 
sidelined have contents, too, but content that differs from ordinary contents in that they do not represent properties 
and objects as subject-independent and as perspectivally connected (see Siegel 2010, chapter 7). 
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Given the nature of the views Siegel opposes, this argument is rather puzzling. Let us consider it 
more closely. As for (P1), Siegel does not state it explicitly in the passage. But plainly, establishing the 
conclusion—i.e. premise (i) of the Argument from Appearing—requires there to be a universal 
generalization among the premises (as opposed to a mere typicality claim). Accordingly, we should 
extrapolate (P1) from the typicality claim passage (5) starts with and the parenthetical remark about 
seemings further below. (P2) then adds a conditional, whose antecedent is the negation of the desired 
conclusion. And since the negation of its consequent is implied by the impossibility claim expressed 
by (P3), we can use this negation and apply modus tollens to (P2), which yields the conclusion. 
Perhaps one could argue against (P1) and insist that some cases in which one undergoes a visual 
experience are neither seeings nor seemings. In Hanson’s terms, in some cases, visual experiences 
might not be cases of seeing as—the visual experience involved as one stares mindlessly at the passing 
landscape through the window of a moving train could be an instance in which it seems at least strained 
to say that while having such experiences, one is seeing or seeming to see anything. But perhaps Siegel 
could insist that that even such experiences are such that one sees the objects and properties that are 
passing by. One is, after all, visually related to them. As one undergoes such experiences, one may fail 
to exploit the fact that in them, certain properties are being presented as instantiated. But for all intents 
and purposes, they are cases of seeing nonetheless.  
Suppose we accept this and grant that there is indeed no need to regiment the notion ‘seeing’ in 
such as to require that for one to be in a state of seeing one must exploit that state in any way. So 
construed, (P1) might also well be acceptable both to proponents of two-factor views and to the 
relationalists whose views we examined. Fish and Brewer, for instance, could well endorse the 
generalized disjunction (P1) involves, even though they would also maintain that no phenomenal state 
satisfies the second disjunct. To be in a phenomenal state, they would insist, one must be acquainted 
with at least some mind-independent items. Since in the case of vision, such acquaintance requires 
being visually related to such items, being in any visual phenomenal state requires that one be visually 
related to some mind-independent item or other. Like Fish and Brewer, Genone, too, might accept 
(P1). But unlike them, he might also grant that some phenomenal states satisfy the second disjunct. 
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After all, he is willing to entertain phenomenal pluralism. Thus, he can grant that some phenomenal 
states are brought about not by the subject’s being related to suitable mind-independent items, but in 
some other way—due to cognitive effects, say, or an impairment of the subject’s visual system.  
As for (P3), Hanson would accept it, too. According to him, each visual experience that has 
content is a case of seeing something as something. Moreover, seeing something as something, he 
thinks, essentially involves seeing it as having (or lacking) various properties. Indeed, on Hanson’s 
view, it would be unintelligible what seeing some object as F could possibly be unless such seeing 
occurred in a context in which being F is articulated in terms of having or lacking various properties. 
As for proponents of other two-factor views, let us assume that they, too, accept (P3)— there do not 
seem to be any pressing reasons against it.13 Relationalists, finally, accept (P3) as well. Given their 
commitment to No Content, they hold that in visual experience, nothing is represented or presented 
as being instantiated—including particulars, no matter whether bare or not. Hence, when Siegel claims 
that it is impossible for us to represent bare particulars in visual experience, they may happily agree.14  
However, it seems overwhelmingly plausible that relationalists would reject (P2). For it is clear 
that as Siegel understands the idea, for experience to present something just is for it to be such as to 
have accuracy conditions that yield her notion of content. Abstractly put, the conditional (P2) 
expresses has the following form: if visual perceptual experiences, construed as phenomenal states, 
lack something that is ready to be exploited to be a content of kind A, they have something that is 
ready to be exploited to be a content of kind B.  
Patently, everyone who is committed to No Content must reject this claim.15 Surely, some 
relationalists, e.g. Fish and Genone, will accept that experience relates us to properties or even that 
                                                 
13  Proponents of the two-factor view might either insist that experience, construed narrowly as the phenomenal state, 
does not represent anything, including bare particulars. Even if ‘experience’ is construed broadly so as to comprise 
both the phenomenal state and the representing factor, they may well agree with Siegel that the latter never serves to 
represent bare particulars.  
14  Some relationalists may think that it is not impossible for experiences to have content. As we saw, Genone suggests 
that it is consistent with relationalism to hold that experiences could have contents that lack an explanatory function. 
However, even relationalists who for some reason accept that experience has such contents may reject, with Siegel, 
the idea that such experiences could represent bare particulars.  
15  Even relationalists who think that it is possible for experience to have functionally inert contents may reject the 
inference. For it would be open to them, too, to suggest that some experiences may have no contents at all. 
Incidentally, Siegel acknowledges, in a footnote, that premise (i) of her argument is at odds with Fish’s view (cf. Siegel 
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properties are presented to us in experience. And though Brewer officially subscribes to a nominalist 
position, he, too, draws on similarity relations between objects to ground his notion of looks. 
Arguably, standing in various similarity relations is a property an object can either have or lack. 
Moreover, as Siegel points out as well, similarity relations between objects have to hold in virtue of 
something—to wit: in virtue of the relevant objects’ properties. Accordingly, one can argue that 
Brewer, too, will have to accept that in visual experience, properties are being perceived (cf. Siegel 
2010, p. 66).  
Finally, it is also true that some relationalists will say that it is due to our being related to mind-
independent items that experiences have phenomenal properties—Fish certainly would (Genone, 
however, may reject talk of phenomenal properties as flawed). However, that subjects, when having 
an experience, are related to properties or that their experiences themselves have certain (phenomenal) 
properties need not and—as relationalists will insist—must not be understood the way Siegel does. In 
particular, it must not be understood as entailing that in experience, properties are represented, 
presented as instantiated, or attributed to objects in such a way as to yield contents that could be 
characterized by drawing on some abstract objects: propositions. After all, it is, as Genone puts it, one 
of the fundamental tenets of relationalism that in visual experience, properties do not figure as abstract 
representations.16  
                                                 
2010, p. 49, fn. 19. Premise (i), recall, is this: all visual perceptual experiences present clusters of properties as being 
instantiated). The reason she adduces for the alleged incompatibility is that on Fish’s account, hallucinations lack 
phenomenal character. If visual hallucinations are nonetheless visual perceptual experiences, she claims, they will be 
counterexamples to (i) (again, for her critique of Fish’s account of hallucination, see Siegel 2008).  
As I see it, however, the incompatibility is by no means restricted to cases of hallucination. It is of course true 
that according to Fish, every non-hallucinatory experience has its specific phenomenal character due to the subject’s 
being acquainted with various objects and their properties that figure in what he calls the presentational character of 
experience. However, given his commitment to No Content, Fish must resist the idea that having an experience with 
a given phenomenal character is eo ipso to have an experience that itself presents or represents certain properties as 
instantiated. If so, however, then on his view, not just hallucinations, but every visual experience is a counterexample 
to premise (i). Accordingly, whatever the merits may be of Siegel’s critique of Fish’s account of hallucination—by 
itself, it does not address the fundamental disagreement between her view and Fish’s, i.e. the disagreement with respect 
to the question whether in experience, properties are represented as instantiated.  
16  In section 2.5 of Siegel 2010, Siegel seeks to establish that relationalists, too, must accept the Content View. However, 
throughout, she assumes that for one to be perceptually related to properties entails that these properties are 
represented in experience. This comes out, for example, when she claims that the only version of the relational view 
that would be at odds with premise (i) is what she calls Radical Naïve Realism—the view that “[a]ll non-hallucinatory 
experiences consist in a perceptual relation to a worldly item, and properties are not among the things the subject is 
perceptually related to” (Siegel 2010, p. 65). But the point, again, is not whether relationalists accept or reject the idea 
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For similar reasons, proponents of two-factor views of experience, too, including Hanson, will 
reject (P2). Visual experiences, as they figure in the argument under consideration, are phenomenal 
states. But as Siegel pointed out herself, on two-factor views, not phenomenal states, but some other, 
judgment-like factor does the representing. Accordingly, proponents of two-factor views, like Hanson, 
will deny that from the fact that phenomenal states do not present clusters of properties as instantiated, 
it follows that phenomenal states present bare particulars.  
A further problem with premise (i) brings us back to the kinds of cases that may be states of 
seeing in the minimal sense that they require that the subject be visually related to some mind-
independent items, but that are also such that according to Hanson, they lack epistemic significance. 
The problem arises in the context of Siegel’s claim that to be contents, the properties visual 
experiences present as instantiated and the accuracy conditions experiences are said to have in virtue 
of such presentation are conveyed to subjects by their experiences. As the following passage indicates, 
Siegel thinks that there are three different ways in which a content can be conveyed to the subject by 
her experience: 
(6) First, a content is conveyed by experience if it would be a content of explicit beliefs 
that are natural to form on the basis of visual experience. Second, a content is 
conveyed to the subject by her experience if it enables the experience to guide bodily 
actions. For instance, suppose you see the door but don’t form any explicit beliefs 
about the shape of its doorknob, yet you adjust your grip in advance of touching the 
doorknob as you reach for it. This could be a case of visual experience guiding action. 
Finally, a content is conveyed to the subject by her experience if it is manifest to 
introspection that it is a content of experience (Siegel 2010, p. 51). 
The problem is that with respect to neither of these senses of what it is for a content to be conveyed 
to the subject of an experience, it is obvious that the visual phenomenal state one is in while staring 
mindlessly through the window of a moving train serves to convey any determinate content to the 
subject. It is far from clear that there are judgments that it would be natural to form based on the 
visual experience of mindless staring, and what they would be. Nor is it obvious that there is a sense 
                                                 
that experience relates us to properties and, in that sense, presents such properties to us. Rather, the point is the 
following: relationalists will insist that accepting this idea is not tantamount to accepting that properties must figure 
in experience in the way premise (i) requires, i.e. by way of being presented as instantiated, or represented, or, more 
generally, in a sense that allows to generate Siegel’s notion of accuracy conditions. 
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in which mindless staring is action-guiding. And finally, the project of introspecting on one’s visual 
experience while staring mindlessly seems rather impossible. Whatever introspection is supposed to 
be, it seems that by the very act of engaging in it with respect to one’s staring, such staring could no 
longer be truly mindless. And even if one could engage in such introspection, it still remains far from 
obvious what the putative content manifest to one while doing so should be. 
In sum, as an argument for the Content View, Siegel’s Argument from Appearing remains 
ineffective. It begs the question against relationalists and proponents of two-factor views (including 
Hanson). For none of these will accept its crucial first premise, nor the argument Siegel adduces in 
support of it. Since the argument for the view that all phenomenal states present properties as 
instantiated rests on a claim that relationalists and proponents of two-factor views are set to deny—
viz. that phenomenal states, if they do not represent properties, represent something else (e.g. 
objects)—it is hard to see how anyone who does not already believe that phenomenal states represent 
something could be swayed by it. If there are further arguments that speak directly in favor of premise 
(i), Siegel does not provide them. Given that she is keenly aware of the fact that the Content View 
stands or falls with the answer to the question whether properties are presented in experience (cf. 
Siegel 2010, p. 76), this may strike one as surprising. As we will see next, the view (like, presumably, 
many other versions of representationalism) faces an even more difficult issue: it remains rather 
unclear how on it, phenomenal states relate to the contents they are said to bear. 
7.1.4 Which Properties do Phenomenal States Represent? 
Let us take it, then, that the Argument from Appearing by itself does not establish the Content View 
because it rests on a premise on how properties figure in visual experience, narrowly construed in 
terms of phenomenal states, that Hanson, the relationalists we considered, and proponents of what 
Siegel calls two-factor views of perceptual experience will reject. Even so, perhaps the argument could 
still serve the purpose of motivating the view for fellow representationalists who are already willing to 
concede that it is the phenomenal states themselves that do the representing. Such representationalists 
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could be moved to accept that if there is indeed something that phenomenal states represent, this will 
include properties (with this, Hanson would concur). It may also still serve to explicate a sense in 
which properties, if they are taken to be presented as instantiated in experience, are fit to be contents 
of experience. At any rate, we do not need a water-tight argument that establishes the Content View 
to assess it with respect to our main question: whether the view can accommodate cases of doxastic 
variation. Still, to properly assess it, we do still need a better understanding of what the view is. 
Hanson, recall, distinguishes two different ways in which beliefs may affect experience—either 
by way of affecting its content or by way of affecting its phenomenology. If Siegel takes it that the 
phenomenal states themselves do the representing, and on the assumption that background beliefs 
could affect experience in either of these ways, an obvious question that arises is how on Siegel’s view, 
these two kinds of effects would interact. Raising this question highlights the need to address another 
one first: what is the relation Siegel takes to hold between specific (kinds of) phenomenal states and 
contents? How tightly linked are they? Would putative effects on the phenomenology of an experience 
e automatically be effects on e’s content? How about the reverse direction? Would putative effects on 
e’s content automatically be effects on its phenomenology? In asking how, on Siegel’s view, 
phenomenal states relate to the contents they are said to represent, we remain, in a sense, focused on 
premise (i) of Siegel’s argument. But in contrast to our previous discussion, we now ask not what may 
speak in its favor, but, rather, how it is to be understood. More specifically, we ask which properties a 
given phenomenal state is supposed to present as instantiated.  
Having presented her argument for the Content View and given that her main aim is to establish 
the Rich Content View, Siegel spends much effort on addressing the question what kinds of properties 
phenomenal states may in principle represent. Accordingly, she argues at length for the claim that 
phenomenal states can represent complex properties such as kind properties, causal properties, and 
even identity.17 Moreover, she also distinguishes various kinds of contents that phenomenal states may 
                                                 
17  Cf. Siegel 2010, chapters 4-5. She also briefly raises the question what kinds of abstract objects contents could be, 
“corresponding to different kinds of propositions” (Siegel 2010, p. 77). That said, she then sidesteps the issue by 
contending that on any of the competing suggestions, properties will figure in these contents in one way or another 
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bear, arguing that experiences can bear both singular and non-singular contents (and different varieties 
thereof) and proposing, inter alia, that at least some contents experience may have, namely singular 
ones, are individuated by the objects we see.18 
But if we ask how, on Siegel’s view, phenomenal states and the contents they are said to present 
are related, it is difficult to get a fix on her position. Since she never addresses this question directly, 
we need to try and extract her answer by drawing on some scattered remarks.  
7.1.4.1 Non-Arbitrariness and Expert Vision Our first data point is an assertion Siegel makes 
as she introduces her method to argue for the Rich Content View, the method of phenomenal contrast: 
“contents of visual experiences are non-arbitrarily related to their phenomenal character” (Siegel 2010, 
p. 88). Relying on this assumption, let us officially dub it Non-Arbitrariness, Siegel then proceeds to 
propose that in some cases, contrasts in which visual phenomenal states two overall experiences 
involve are best explained in terms of the hypothesis that the two experiences differ in content. More 
specifically, she suggests that they differ in the content represented by the visual phenomenal states 
involved. Roughly, then, the idea is this: given Non-Arbitariness, a difference in the phenomenal 
character of two experiences that are had in otherwise similar circumstances typically is indicative of 
a difference in the two experiences’ content. Unless plausible competing explanations of such a 
contrast are provided, that the two experiences differ in content counts as the best explanation for its 
occurrence. 
Siegel’s attempt to establish the Rich Content View by drawing on the method of phenomenal 
contrast is instructive with respect to her take on expert vision. Her account of expert vision has the 
                                                 
(cf. ibid.). Note that in this context, too, the only kind of contents Siegel considers as candidate experiential contents 
are propositional contents.  
18  Singular contents are such that they are accurate only if the property presented by the experience as instantiated is 
indeed instantiated by the exact object the given experience attributes it to. In this sense, the singular experiential 
content “Franco is sad” is accurate only if it is indeed Franco who is sad, not his identical twin, say. In contrast, for 
the content “someone is sad,” to be accurate, there is no requirement that anyone in particular be sad. Experiences, 
Siegel claims, have several contents at the same time. For example, she suggests that plausibly, an experience that 
conveys that Franco is sad plausibly also conveys that someone is sad. If so, one and the same experience can have 
both singular and non-singular contents. Siegel draws further distinctions, e.g. the distinction between objectually and 
predicatively singular contents (cf. Siegel 2010, pp. 154ff.). I will return to this distinction shortly. 
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following shape: as subjects gradually develop their recognitional capacities, the appurtenant changes 
in their recognitional dispositions bring about changes not just in their beliefs about what they see, 
but also phenomenal changes (cf. Siegel 2010, p. 99). Siegel provides two examples: First, she suggests 
that there is a phenomenological difference between seeing a page of Cyrillic text prior to and after 
having learned to read Russian.19 Second, she suggests that as one learns to recognize and spot pine 
trees, these gradually become visually more salient to one. With respect to both cases, the following, 
Siegel holds, is intuitive: the difference in the degree to which one’s recognitional disposition is 
developed “is reflected in a phenomenological difference between the visual experiences had before 
and those had after the recognitional disposition was fully developed.” (Siegel 2010, p. 100). 
Siegel’s account of expert vision has some similarities with that provided by Fish. Like on Fish’s 
view, expert vision involves a change in phenomenology, which in turn is associated with the 
development of the experiencing subject’s recognitional capacities. Moreover, both Fish and Siegel 
agree that the experiential difference between the layperson and the expert has to do with which 
properties are presented in the experiencing subject’s experience. This, however, is where the 
similarities end. For Fish’s view, recall, is this: if due to the subject’s possession of certain recognitional 
capacities, certain facts—i.e. object-property couples—are lifted into the presentational character of 
the subject’s experience, the result is that the experiencing subject gets acquainted with the relevant 
objects and properties, which in turn serves to co-constitute the phenomenal character of the 
experience. If the recognitional capacities of a subject change, so does, accordingly, the phenomenal 
character of their experience. Siegel, however, takes it that the way properties are presented in 
                                                 
19  Some such effect should be easy to reproduce, even if we consider only one word. Take a word written in Cyrillic: 
‘кошка’. If you don’t know Cyrillic, you will be unfamiliar with the third letter of that word (bold). Moreover, you 
may not know how to pronounce the letters, or what the word means. Note, next, that the third letter is pretty much 
the same as English ‘sh,’ that the entire word is pronounced, roughly, like English speakers would pronounce ‘caush-
c’uh,’ and that the word means ‘female cat.’ Moreover, suppose you also learn that in Russian, the word for ‘male cat’ 
is ‘кот,’ and realize that this is a rather obvious cognate of the English (gender-neutral) ‘cat,’ German “Kater,” Spanish 
‘gato,’ French ‘chat,’ plausibly also of Arabic ‘qitt’ and Nubian ‘kadis.’ If you now look at the word ‘кошка’ again, the 
idea goes, clearly, something has changed. As Siegel would put it, you have begun to become disposed to better attend 
both to (all) the orthographic and even to the semantic properties of the word. Consequently, Siegel would claim, the 
phenomenology of your experience has changed. Now, arguably, semantic properties of words are not among the 
genuinely visual properties. Accordingly, it may well be that the changes that are purely visual are fully accounted for 
by changes in the perceiver’s attention patterns. And while these may well be affected by what beliefs or recognitional 
capacities a subject possesses, the possibility for them to be exhibited need not depend on them. 
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experience is such that they are presented as instantiated, which in turn gives rise to a notion of 
content. Accordingly, her view seems to be this: a difference in a subject’s recognitional capacities in 
otherwise identical experiential circumstances brings about a difference not just in the phenomenology 
of the subject’s experience, but also a difference in experiential content. 
Now, conceivably, expertise could modify just which properties a given phenomenal state 
presents as instantiated, while leaving the phenomenal state unaltered. However, in the dialectical 
context at hand, Siegel seeks to establish that the phenomenal difference in the experience of the 
layperson and the expert is best explained in terms of a change in content. Accordingly, the possibility 
of cases in which what expertise alters is not the phenomenal state itself, but just which properties the 
unaltered state presents as instantiated does not become salient. It is thus an open question whether 
expert vision that involves a modification of the experiencing subject’s phenomenal states is the only 
kind of expert vision Siegel deems possible or whether she would allow that expert vision can assume 
further forms, including forms that leave the phenomenal states unchanged. 
Note that if Siegel were to allow these latter forms of expert vision, doing so would establish 
some similarities between her account and Genone’s account of misleading appearances. For as I 
suggested above, Genone could claim that some cases of expert vision are such that expertise affects 
not which appearance properties the subject perceives, but what the judgments or beliefs are that the 
subject may issue on the basis of her experience. Expert vision, so construed, affects not experiential 
phenomenology itself, but rather how experiential phenomenology and contents are associated. 
Clearly, Siegel and Genone would have to disagree in how to think about this association. For Genone, 
this association, however it is to be construed exactly, is one between separate items: experience and 
its phenomenology on the one hand, beliefs and judgments on the other. For Siegel, on the other 
hand, the association would have to be more intimate. After all, on her view, it is the experience itself 
that bears the relevant contents. Nevertheless, in taking this kind of expert vision to affect the 
association between phenomenology and contents, whatever that association is taken to be, the 
treatments would be structurally analogous. That said, whether Siegel would be willing to 
accommodate such cases depends strongly on how tightly she thinks kinds of phenomenal states and 
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contents are related. In other words, it depends on how exactly the notion of Non-Arbitrariness is 
construed. 
Returning to the cases Siegel does discuss, let us suppose, with Siegel, that differences in what 
phenomenal states two experiences involve (in otherwise identical experiential settings) are sometimes 
explicable in terms of differences in their content. But it is one thing to say that phenomenal 
differences between two experiences can reflect differences in their content, quite another to insist 
that differences of the former kind always reflect differences of the latter kind. The former, weaker 
claim is compatible with believing that sometimes, different phenomenal states may have the same 
content. Let us ask again, thus, how on Siegel’s view phenomenal states and contents are related. 
7.1.4.2 Phenomenal States and Their Contents In her argument for the claim that phenomenal 
states can present kind properties as instantiated, a crucial premise Siegel adduces to establish her 
conclusion is a conditional that connects a difference in the phenomenal character of two given visual 
experiences to a difference in their content. More specifically, Siegel takes ‘E1’ and ‘E2’ to stand for 
two specific experiences—e.g. the experience of seeing a pine tree before learning to recognize pine 
trees, and the experience of seeing a pine tree after having acquired the capacity to recognize pine 
trees—and then motivates the following conditional: if there is a phenomenological difference 
between E1 and E2, then E1 and E2 differ in content (Siegel 2010, p. 101). For our purposes, what 
matters is that in the context of motivating this premise, Siegel makes the following remark:  
(7) Premise (2) [i.e. the conditional under consideration] is a consequence of the more 
general claim that […] any phenomenal change is a change in content of the 
phenomenal character of a sensory experience. But premise (2) itself is much more 
limited. It just makes a claim about the phenomenal change in our pair of cases” 
(Siegel 2010, p. 109).  
As the passage shows, Siegel is well aware of the stronger claim that every phenomenal change is 
a change in content. However, instead of either committing to it or rejecting it, she side-steps the issue 
by emphasizing that the claim she needs to defend to establish her conclusion is just the weaker one 
that in specific cases, differences in phenomenology are best explained in terms of differences in 
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content. What, then, are we to think? Can different phenomenal states represent the same content? 
And conversely, can the same phenomenal state represent different contents?  
If we engage in a bit of fairly common philosophical science-fiction, we can imagine a case in 
which a subject, Pia, undergoes a procedure that leads to an inversion of how her visual phenomenal 
states figure in her color perception. In such a case, a proponent of a view like Siegel’s might perhaps 
suggest that for Pia, a phenomenal state that to her, prior to her undergoing the procedure, presented 
the property of being green as instantiated may after the procedure present—or after some time come 
to present—the property of being red as being instantiated. Conversely, a state that prior to Pia’s 
procedure presented the property of being red as instantiated may after the procedure present, or after 
some time come to present, the property of being green as instantiated.20 If acceptable, this example 
can be taken to suggest not only that the same content can be presented by different (kinds of) 
phenomenal states in different contexts, but also that conversely, in different contexts, the same kind 
of phenomenal state can present different contents as instantiated. 
To have a different example for the latter kind of situation, let us again consider the Müller-Lyer 
illusion. Arguably, the illusion is fairly robust, which is to say that regardless of whether we know it, 
the kind of visual phenomenal state we are in as we look at it (in suitably similar circumstances) remains 
rather stable across belief contexts. On this assumption, consider Mia, who does not know the illusion. 
A proponent of a view on which phenomenal states present properties as instantiated could well agree 
that the phenomenal state Mia is in as she is looking at the illusion for the first time presents the two 
                                                 
20  A structurally similar and fairly ordinary kind of case can be made by way of drawing on the fact that for many of us, 
it is a sad truth that as we age, our eyesight slowly and often unnoticeably degenerates. Assuming Siegel’s general view, 
one should find it rather plausible that as this process unfolds, the phenomenal states that attribute to objects the 
properties of having specific colors change as well, though the properties attributed need not. To make this vivid, 
imagine Pete, a young widower, who every morning looks lovingly at the golden urn that contains the ashes of his 
deceased partner. Since he keeps the urn in excellent condition, its actual color properties do not change. Over time, 
Pete’s eyesight slowly degenerates. Accordingly, the phenomenal states he is in upon seeing the urn in various lighting 
conditions change as well. And yet, it would seem rather odd to insist that there is also a change in the color properties 
his changed phenomenal states present as instantiated.  
Moreover, imagine that Pete undergoes surgery that drastically improves his eyesight. As a consequence, he may 
well notice that what it is like to look at the urn after the surgery is different from what it was like prior to it. The 
phenomenal state he is in upon seeing the urn has changed. Still, Pete need not insist that the phenomenal state he is 
now in upon seeing the urn presents different color properties. Instead, he may well say that it presents exactly the 
same properties as before, just better. 
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horizontal lines the illusion involves as having the property of being different in length (though they 
do not have that property). After all, that the two lines differ in length appears to be the belief that, 
on the basis of her experience, it is, in the context of what Mia knows, natural for Mia to form. It will 
also be the content that guides her subsequent actions. Finally, if some notion of introspection is taken 
to be viable, it may also be the content manifest to her as she introspects on her experience. That the 
two lines differ in length, in short, could well be the content that is conveyed to her, given Siegel’s 
characterization of the idea of conveying content (see 7.1.3 above, passage (6)).  
But suppose that Mia realizes in some way or other that the belief she initially formed upon seeing 
the Müller-Lyer is mistaken. Suppose, further, that she finds the illusion fascinating, devotes some 
time to studying it thoroughly, and eventually becomes maximally familiar with it. Ex hypothesi, this 
knowledge does not affect what phenomenal state she is in while looking at the illusion. But is it not 
plausible that the content of her experience changes? More specifically, is it not plausible to assume 
that after becoming maximally knowledgeable about and familiar with the illusion, the phenomenal 
state she is in while looking at the illusion comes to be such that to Mia, it attributes the property of 
being the same in length to the two horizontal lines involved? If on the kind of view that we are 
considering, this is intuitive, then it is intuitive that the same phenomenal state can present different 
properties as instantiated.21  
Perhaps some will be inclined to reject such examples—perhaps one is skeptical that inversion 
cases are possible22 or perhaps one thinks that the phenomenology of the Müller-Lyer is not as robust 
as the example presupposes.23 However, there is some evidence for the claim that Siegel, too, thinks 
that the same phenomenal state can present different contents as instantiated. For one, this claim is 
entailed by what she says about the content of hallucinations. For according to her, hallucinations, as 
                                                 
21  Patently, this would be an instance of a case of expert vision that works akin to Genone’s account of misleading 
appearance, as suggested in the previous section. 
22  For a helpful overview of inversion scenarios and their problems, see Byrne (2016). Another reason for rejecting the 
example could be that one favors one of the various suggestions to the effect that contents of experience, beyond 
properties, may also involve further features, such as centering features or Fregean modes of presentation. See Siegel 
2010, pp. 55-58 for discussion. 
23  Whether and in what sense the illusion is robust and what mechanisms explain it is the subject of a longstanding 
debate both in philosophy and vision science. For a recent review and further references see Kopiske et al. (2017).  
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opposed to their non-hallucinatory counterparts, cannot have what she calls objectually singular 
contents. To elaborate, note that as per Siegel’s stipulation, in general, for any content that is singular 
with respect to some object o, whether that content is true in an arbitrary world w depends on how 
things are with o in w (cf. Siegel 2010, p. 153). Moreover, if o figures in the experience as that to which 
a property is attributed, then in the resulting content, o figures objectually. If, alternatively, o figures in 
the experience as part of the characterization of the property that is attributed to some object, then in 
the resulting content, o figures predicatively. Finally, Siegel stipulates that “contents of states that are 
singular with respect to an object o by virtue of o’s being seen” are objectually singular contents, while 
“contents of states of seeing that are singular with respect to an object o by virtue of o’s figuring in a 
property attributed to the object seen” are predicatively singular contents (ibid. p. 154).  
Siegel’s suggestion, then, is this: hallucinations, e.g. that of Jim being sad, can be predicatively 
singular with respect to Jim. It is part of the hallucination that it attributes to the hallucinated figure 
the property of being identical with Jim. However, Siegel contends, the hallucinatory content could 
not be objectually singular with respect to Jim. On the one hand, this follows from the characterization 
of objectually singular contents: hallucinating Jim is not a case of seeing him. Moreover, recall, 
according to the constraints Siegel puts on the notion of content, contents are conveyed to the subject 
of the experience. But, Siegel claims, objectually singular contents could not be conveyed to the subject 
by her experience if that experience is a hallucination. For even veridical hallucinations, she maintains, 
could not reliably guide actions or movements with respect to Jim. Nor could such hallucinations 
make the belief the hallucinating subject may base on her hallucination of Jim being sad be a belief 
that is properly about Jim, as opposed to a belief about the hallucinated figure that looks like him. 
Arguably, whether one accepts this last line of reasoning depends on further assumptions on what 
it takes to form beliefs that are properly about what they purport to be about. We need not take a 
stand on such issues here. Still, given that Siegel repeatedly expresses her commitment to internalism 
about phenomenal states (see the passages referred to in 7.1.1, also Siegel 2010, p. 207), on her view, 
one and the same (repeatable) phenomenal state can have different contents: if a phenomenal state is 
part of a state of seeing, it can have objectually singular content. If the same state is part of a 
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hallucination, its contents can be predicatively singular, but not objectually singular. In the context of 
considering internalism about phenomenal states, the claim that no state of seeing is identical with a 
particular phenomenal state, the following is also plausible. Suppose that the state of seeing Jim, for 
example, is not identical with any phenomenal state. After all, different phenomenal states can 
represent Jim as present, as sad, or as sad in very specific circumstances, say. If so, it appears that 
different (kinds of) phenomenal states can represent the same content. 
The resulting picture, so far, is this: on the one hand, Siegel assumes Non-Arbitrariness—an 
assumption that she draws on in presenting her argument for the Rich Content View. On the other 
hand, on Siegel’s view, too, different (kinds of) phenomenal states can bear the same contents and the 
same kind of phenomenal state can bear different contents. 
There are two further data points to consider. First, Siegel lists it as a “substantial objection” 
against two-factor views that according to them, “two experiences could be phenomenally the same, 
while varying enormously in which contents it would be natural to believe on the basis of the 
experience” (cf. Siegel 2010, p. 72). Siegel does not elaborate on why such a view would be 
objectionable. But the mere fact that she takes it to be so is telling; at the very least, it serves to 
underscore her commitment to the assumption that the relation between phenomenal states and 
contents is non-arbitrary.24 But it also brings us face-to-face with the fact that she provides no account 
of how Non-Arbitrariness is to be spelled out. Second, consider the following concession that Siegel 
makes in a footnote:   
(8) Discovering which properties figure in experience is difficult and in many cases 
introspectively reflecting on an experience does little to help one decide whether a 
property is presented in visual phenomenology, or farther downstream. For example, 
introspection alone does not seem to tell us whether visual phenomenology presents 
an object as Franco (and so not as his twin), or as someone with certain facial features 
that Franco’s twin could equally share, or […] merely as a human-shaped entity that 
[missing, presumably: “has features that”] a non-human alien could equally share. (Siegel 
2010, pp. 52-53, fn. 24).  
                                                 
24  That Siegel considers this a serious objection may suggest that she should reject the way I characterized the Müller-
Lyer example provided above. For on the interpretation offered, it seemed plausible that in the context of different 
background views, for Mia, the same phenomenal state can have contents that contradict each other, i.e. the two 
horizontal lines are different in length vs. the two horizontal lines are the same in length.  
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Moreover, note the following claim: 
(9) [O]ur initial uncertainty about which contents experiences have is also uncertainty 
about their exact phenomenal character. The phenomenal character is no more 
accessible to introspection than are the contents of experience. We are thus […] 
precluded from using the phenomenal character to reidentify experiences. (Siegel 
2010, p. 85)25 
Taken together, passages (8) and (9) reflect the following three commitments. First, the question 
which properties figure in a given experience, or what content a given experience has, is difficult to 
answer. Second, the exact phenomenal character of an experience, too, is difficult to assess 
introspectively. Third, even if it may be difficult to discover which content and what phenomenal 
character a given experience has—i.e. what the properties are that the perceived object (if any) looks 
to have to the perceiver, and what looking that way is like—there are facts of the matter that settle 
these questions.26 
In passage (8), Siegel also claims that introspection is not always helpful when it comes to deciding 
what content a given experience has. Briefly put, the argument she offers for this claim runs as follows: 
neither is it fully clear how one should proceed to introspectively determine the contents of one’s 
experience, nor is it clear how one should determine that the putative verdicts introspection delivers 
are indeed verdicts about experience—as opposed to verdicts about some other kind of state, e.g. 
one’s perceptual judgments. Moreover, given the widespread disagreement in the literature about what 
contents experience can represent, it does not seem plausible that even if we had an introspective 
capacity that targeted visual experience in particular, it would be reliably accurate. After all, if we did 
possess such a capacity, we should not expect to see as much disagreement as we do (cf. Siegel 2010, 
pp. 79-83).  
That said, Siegel nevertheless concedes that introspection can take us part of the way:  
                                                 
25  This claim appears in the context of Siegel’s argument to the effect that naturalistic theories of content cannot serve 
to discover the contents of experience either. Cf. Siegel 2010, pp. 83-87. 
26  Patently, if there were no such facts, both Siegel’s talk about discovery and the use of the determinate article—e.g. in 
talking about the (exact) phenomenal character of an experience—would be inappropriate. 
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(10) It seems plain that in seeing the fruit bowl (or even in merely hallucinating), one can 
know by introspection that one is not having an experience as of a busy airport or of 
an undifferentiated expanse of blue. (Siegel 2010, p. 80) 
Though intuitive, passage (10) raises questions. For in principle, it is quite conceivable that upon 
seeing or hallucinating a fruit bowl, a being that differs from me or you in its physical make-up could 
be in a phenomenal state that is exactly like the one you or I are in as we look at an undifferentiated 
expanse of blue, or at a busy airport.  
Moreover, perhaps we, too, could be manipulated in such a way as to enter such phenomenal 
states whenever we look at or hallucinate a fruit bowl. Consider the following variation of the color 
inversion scenario mentioned earlier. Perhaps a scientist could affect my visual apparatus in such a 
way that whenever I see a fruit bowl, I enter the kind of visual phenomenal state I am in now when I 
look at a busy airport (whatever state that may be). Over time, as I adapt to the situation, it could 
become perfectly natural for me to take it that the phenomenal state that originally presented the 
property of being a busy airport as instantiated now presents as instantiated the property of being a 
fruit bowl—or perhaps the disjunctive property of either being a fruit bowl or of being a busy airport. 
It might then become natural for me, upon having such an experience in suitable contexts, to form 
the belief that I am currently in the presence of a fruit bowl. If so, it seems possible for that state to 
be such as to convey the relevant content to me. Patently, analogous scenarios could easily be 
contrived with respect to numerous kinds of phenomenal states and contents.  
Of course, such scenarios are speculative. Moreover, it may be adduced, and quite plausibly 
perhaps, that intuitively, some phenomenal states—albeit in a sense that would need to be explained—
are richer than others and that such richness places constraints on which or how many properties a 
given phenomenal state could present as instantiated. Drawing on such considerations, one might be 
able to explain, for example, why the phenomenal state that is typically associated with seeing an 
undifferentiated expanse of blue would be ill-suited to present as instantiated the various properties 
that would have to be instantiated in a busy airport. Nevertheless, whatever constraints may govern 
the relation between phenomenal states and contents, they would have to be spelled out. 
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Again, if one thinks that phenomenal states can present properties as instantiated, the claim Siegel 
expressed in passage (10), i.e. that introspection can provide us with knowledge about what the 
contents of our experience are not, seems quite plausible. But what plausibility the claim has rests on 
the presupposition that we can take it for granted that certain phenomenal states do not—or cannot—
serve to present certain properties as instantiated. In other words, it presupposes an account of Non-
Arbitrariness.  
As we have seen, Siegel provides an argument for why phenomenal states that figure in 
hallucinations cannot have objectually singular contents. If successful, this argument illustrates at least 
one general constraint that Siegel thinks governs the putative relation between phenomenal states and 
(kinds of) contents. But there is no obvious route that leads from that general constraint to the kind 
of constraint that might in turn explain how introspection could serve to rule out certain contents as 
what properties a given phenomenal state can represent. Accordingly, if introspection is to provide us 
with beliefs—and knowledgeable ones at that—about what the contents of a given experience are or 
are not, some account is needed that explains how introspection can play that role.  
The question Siegel owes us an answer to, thus, is what determines which content a given 
phenomenal state may have. What settles, for instance, whether a given experience represents an 
object as Jim or as his twin? Presumably, regardless of whether a given experience is said to represent 
an object, o, as Jim or as Jim’s twin, it might, by the same token, be understood as also representing o 
as having less determinate properties, i.e. the property of being someone with certain facial features 
that Jim’s twin could equally share, or that of being a human-shaped entity whose features a non-
human alien could equally share. One and the same experience could be said to have, and convey, all 
these contents at the same time.27 But again, if one faces the initial question whether what is 
represented by a given phenomenal state is the property of being Jim or the property of being Jim’s 
                                                 
27  Siegel concurs: “If you see Franco and your experience represents him as sitting down, it is natural to believe on the 
basis of your experience that Franco is sitting down. It is also natural to believe that someone with a certain appearance 
is sitting down. These are both ways for contents to be conveyed to a subject. So both options result in accuracy 
conditions that have a good claim to being conveyed to the subject by her experience.” Siegel 2010, pp. 54-55. See 
also the comments on singular and non-singular contents in the previous footnote. 
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twin, or the property of being a cleverly disguised Jim impostor, say, the question what settles the 
answer remains open. Incidentally, this question does not arise just with respect to complex properties. 
It arises with equal force for something as simple as color or shape properties. Adopting an example 
from Brewer, note that on the kind of view Siegel is suggesting, it seems possible that one and the 
same phenomenal state could either represent as instantiated the property of being a white piece of 
chalk looked at in red light, a red piece of chalk looked at either in regular sunlight or in red light, or, 
say, a yellow piece of chalk looked at through a magenta filter. To take an example concerning shape, 
in suitable circumstance, circles can look like ellipses and ellipses can look like circles. What, then, 
settles whether a given experience represents the property of being a circle, the property of being an 
ellipsis, or some other property, e.g. that of being some amorphous squiggle that from the position 
looked at happens to look just like a circle would if looked at head-on? In a nutshell: if phenomenal 
states are said to present properties as instantiated, then regardless of whether these properties are 
simple or complex, for every token phenomenal state, the question: “And which ones?” should have an 
answer. 
Perhaps Siegel could suggest that there is no need to decide, with respect to a suitable experience, 
whether it presents the property of being identical with Jim as instantiated, that of being Jim’s twin, 
or that of being some Jim impostor. Above, we already drew on the idea that a given experience might 
present some disjunction of properties as instantiated, i.e. that of being either a fruit bowl OR a busy 
airport. Similarly, it could be held, for example, that a given experience can present as instantiated the 
property of being Jim OR his twin OR a Jim impostor, AND the property of being someone who has or shares Jim’s 
features OR the property of being someone who does not share Jim’s features, but is cleverly disguised as Jim, AND the 
property of being sad OR the property of looking sad, etc.  
However, given that experiential contents might involve a potentially rather large number of 
disjuncts, they could quickly become unwieldy. And while this would not need to pose a problem in 
general, recall that according to Siegel, experiential contents are conveyed to the subject of the 
experience. But it simply seems phenomenally inaccurate that as one undergoes experiences, these 
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typically convey to one some large disjunctions or conjunctions of contents.28 Nor does it seem viable 
for Siegel to suggest that what properties a given experience presents as instantiated is determined 
merely externally. Patently, in some broadly causal sense, every phenomenal state can be said to 
represent that which causes it. But if the properties of the environing objects that cause a given 
phenomenal state were also taken to be the properties which that phenomenal state represents, it 
would become rather unclear how experiences could ever be inaccurate.  
Furthermore, externalist accounts, too, risk running afoul of Siegel’s claim that the contents of 
experiences are conveyed to the subjects who have them. Suppose the contents of a phenomenal state 
P were determined fully externally, perhaps by involving the objects, and the properties had by them, 
that populate the environment in which P is had and with the presence of which P, let us assume, 
covaries reliably.29 Moreover, suppose we completely bracketed the concern that rather different sets 
of conditions might each bring about the same kind of phenomenal state and made the rather strong 
concession that each phenomenal state reliably covaries with exactly one set of external conditions. 
Even then, it could still happen that the experiencing subject lacks the conceptual resources to 
entertain beliefs that have as contents the properties that P presents as instantiated, the ability to 
recognize, upon introspection, that P has such contents, and the practical capacity to have her actions 
be guided by such contents. In other words, it seems quite possible that the experiencing subject lacks 
everything that, according to Siegel, would be required for the putative contents of P to be conveyed 
                                                 
28  One can of course imagine that upon being asked what she sees, a subject—in a somewhat philosophical mood, 
perhaps—might well respond that she sees either x, y, z, possibly t, u, or w, or, should circumstances be extraordinarily 
unusual, perhaps even r or s. However, it would be highly unusual if something like this were her response to every 
experience she undergoes. Just like every other regular person, our philosophically-minded subject, too, will typically 
settle for a non-disjunctive characterization of what she sees. As she does, she arguably does not thereby somehow 
misrepresent her experience. (Indeed, were a person always to respond to her various experiences the way we imagine 
our philosophically-minded subject to respond, one would have reason to believe that something is very wrong with 
the way she forms judgments based on her experience.) At any rate, all that the philosophically-minded subject’s 
response may indicate is that in the context at hand, she is able and willing to consider a rather large set of scenarios, 
each of which could serve to bring about the phenomenal state she finds herself in. But it need not be taken to indicate 
that at the time when she responds by providing a disjunctive answer, she somehow has a better or fuller access to 
what content her experience anyway represents than others, who in sufficiently similar circumstances do not consider 
as many different scenarios. 
29  Siegel considers accounts of that shape in Siegel 2010, pp. 83-87. However, she does not ask our question, i.e. whether 
such accounts could help settle what content a given phenomenal state has. Rather, she considers the question whether 
such accounts could allow us to find out what the content of a given phenomenal state is—which, she argues, they 
cannot. 
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to her. In sum, since Siegel insists that it is a requirement on contents that they be conveyed, and since 
there are possible cases in which externalist accounts yield contents that do not meet that requirement, 
Siegel must reject such accounts.30 
A much more appealing theoretical option, I think, would be to hold that it is at least in part the 
experiencing subject’s background beliefs that determine which properties a given visual experience 
represents. For one, if what properties a given phenomenal state represents were to depend on details 
of the subject’s background view, an experience could not present, and thus not convey, properties as 
instantiated picking up on which is beyond what the subject’s conceptual resources allow her to do. 
Also, on such a view, it would be hardly mysterious how the properties a given experience presents as 
instantiated can be conveyed to the subject and how they could be inaccurate. After all, if possible 
experiential contents of a subject’s experience are constrained by the subject’s conceptual and doxastic 
resources, it is not surprising that a content that the experiencing subject can handle is also a content 
that her experience can convey to her.31 Moreover, such constraints would also provide an explanation 
                                                 
30  Thinking about the conveyance constraint raises further questions. Suppose that hallucinations cannot, like Siegel 
claims, convey objectually singular content. If so, the content that a hallucination, e1, conveys to some subject, S, must 
differ in at least some respect from that of a matching veridical experience, e2. Suppose the difference in content were 
noticeable to S. After all, one might think that if the content of one’s experience is conveyed to one by one’s 
experience, it should be clear what it is that is being so conveyed. If so, however, S should be able to tell apart e1 and 
e2 based on the content each conveys. This seems implausible. Next, suppose that the difference between the contents 
conveyed by e1 and e2 is not noticeable to S. If so, it seems that it could be natural for S to form the same beliefs based 
on undergoing e1 and e2, respectively. It may also be that e1 and e2 guide S’s actions in the same way and, finally, that 
the content manifest to S upon introspection appears to be exactly the same, no matter whether what she introspects 
is e1 or e2. If all of this is conceivable, however, it becomes quite unclear in what sense the contents conveyed by e1 
and e2, respectively, are indeed different.  
As we saw above, Siegel seems to think that hallucinations and matching veridical experiences cannot be reliably 
action-guiding in the same way. However, this simply raises the question what it is for an experience to count as 
reliably action-guiding in the relevant sense. Also, though the reliability constraint seems to be doing some work in 
distinguishing objectually singular from objectually nonsingular contents, it is at least remarkable that when Siegel 
introduces the notion of conveying content, such a reliability constraint is not even mentioned.  
Finally, it could be doubted that the notion of guiding actions reliably serves to distinguish hallucinations from 
their non-hallucinatory counterparts. For suppose that in a certain possible world (which may well be ours), people 
inevitably die right after undergoing a certain visual phenomenal state, but only if that phenomenal state is part of a 
non-hallucinatory experience and thus has a certain objectually singular content. If so, it seems odd to say that the 
hallucinatory counterpart fails to reliably guide the subjects’ actions in the right kind of way. For though the non-
hallucinatory experience leads to certain events, i.e. the subjects’ sudden death, it does not guide the subjects’ actions 
at all. 
31  The idea that the background view co-determines experiential content might also help further develop the option that 
the content of any given experience is indeed disjunctive—perhaps massively so. Suppose one suggested that the role 
of the subject’s background view is to eliminate irrelevant disjuncts. Some of these disjuncts could be eliminated 
because the subject knows, or believes, that the circumstances in which she finds herself are not as they would have 
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why the content of one’s experience can be inaccurate. The content of Tycho’s experience of the sun, 
for example, could be taken as inaccurate precisely because Tycho holds false beliefs about the sun, 
which in turn determine what the properties are that his experience presents as instantiated. 
Finally, such a view would also help answer the question why it is that introspection could play 
the role Siegel attributes to it. For suppose that the associations between kinds of phenomenal states 
and contents these may bear in various circumstances were an integral part of the background view. 
If so, this could explain why it is that subjects, on introspecting their experience (on some account of 
what doing that would amount to), can be in a position to rule out that the experience they are having 
is an experience of certain specific scenarios. Whether such a procedure would yield true results would 
of course depend on the precise shape of the background view, on how rich it is, on the conceptual 
and doxastic resources it provides, and on how accurate it is. Moreover, it would also depend on the 
background view whether the procedure would yield a determinate result, a disjunction of possible 
scenarios, or no scenario at all. If the conceptual resources the view affords are poor, it could be that 
all that the subject can assert is that she is having an experience, but not what the experience is an 
experience of. And if the subject’s conceptual resources are even poorer—if, say, the subject lacks the 
concept of experience altogether—she may not even be able to make that assertion.  
Clearly, the idea that the background view plays a significant role in determining the content of a 
given phenomenal state would have to be spelled out further.32 But it is worth emphasizing what is at 
                                                 
to be for the properties featuring in various disjuncts to be in fact instantiated. Other disjuncts could fail to come into 
view altogether because the subject lacks the relevant conceptual resources. Perhaps something like the following 
view could then be suggested: while any given experience’s actual content is disjunctive, and thus potentially rather 
rich, the content the experience conveys to the subject may be variously constrained, e.g. by the subject’s beliefs, 
conceptual, and attentional resources. Pursuing this strategy would remain at odds with Siegel’s view, however, since 
it dislodges the notion of content from the conveyance constraint by insisting that experiences may have contents 
that are not being conveyed. 
32  At least in Siegel 2010, it appears at times as if Siegel is hesitant to accept the proposal that beliefs co-determine what 
contents a specific experience has. In a footnote, she asserts the following: “Since we bring plenty of standing 
representations to bear on perceptual beliefs, one can’t infer from the fact that one believes that (say) somebody is 
Franco that the property of being Franco is presented in visual phenomenology” (Siegel 2010, p. 52, fn. 22). This 
assertion is compatible with the idea that, if conjoined with further beliefs, the relevant belief does entail that the 
property of being Franco is presented in visual phenomenology after all. However, Siegel gives no indication that this 
is what she thinks. Instead, she sidesteps the issue by emphasizing that what she is interested in is inferences in the 
other direction, i.e. from facts about which properties an experience represents to attributions of such properties to 
items seen. 
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issue: the issue is in part how to understand what the content is that a given phenomenal state has. In 
our discussion of Hanson’s view, we saw that what it is to see an object as the sun can vary significantly 
with how the concept ‘the sun’ is articulated in the experiencing subject’s background view. It is an 
interesting question what role the subject’s background view may play in settling what the semantic 
features of a given experiential content are, what else it is taken to imply, or what it in turn is implied 
by. And it is true that Siegel, in contrast to Hanson, provides no account of Experiential Content 
that allows us to answer such questions.  
The issue we have just been considering, however, is arguably even more basic. For it does not 
concern the question how to understand the role the background view may play in determining what 
it is for an experience or, for that matter, anything to have a specific content. Rather, it concerns the 
question whether and how the background view plays a role in settling which particular content a 
particular phenomenal state bears in particular circumstances. And this question can arise even on the 
assumption that the background plays no role in determining what that content is. In suggesting, as I 
have, that Siegel owes us an account of Non-Arbitrariness, it is this latter question that I have been 
pressing.  
7.1.5 Implications 
Suppose Siegel does indeed owe us an account of Non-Arbitrariness. Why should we care? In 
response, recall that in 3.1.3, I suggested that both the relationalists and Hanson face structurally 
similar challenges. Both owe us accounts of the phenomenology of experience, of how it relates to 
the mind-independent items in the subject’s environment, and of how it relates to conceptual items 
such as beliefs or judgments. As our discussion of the various relationalist proposals revealed, their 
notions of phenomenology and, in particular, their responses to the question how the mind-
independent items the subject is said to be related to in her experience constitute that phenomenology, 
remain massively unclear. And as our discussion of Genone brought out, the same holds for the 
relation that putatively obtains between perceived appearances and the perceptual judgments that 
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subjects may base on their experience. As indicated above, Siegel’s notion of phenomenology, too, is 
rather thin. Apart from her claim that phenomenal states are said to be individuated by what it is like 
to be in them, and her claim that such states present various properties as instantiated (including 
complex properties), we learn nothing about what phenomenal states are.33 
Arguably, there is really only one major role experiential phenomenology plays on Siegel’s 
account: that of being the bearer of various (kinds of) contents. As we saw, Siegel’s argument for the 
claim that phenomenal states bear content is not compelling. But even if this problem is bracketed, 
the fact that she owes us an account of Non-Arbitrariness poses a serious problem. For in the 
absence of such an account, it remains unclear which properties any given phenomenal state presents 
as instantiated. And it remains unclear how facts about which properties a phenomenal state presents 
as instantiated are settled. Accordingly, we are left in the dark as to how we can determine what the 
contents of a given experience are in general. But if we have no way of telling which contents an 
experience has that we are undergoing, we also have no way of telling what beliefs or judgments that 
experience could possibly serve to justify. 
Patently, the complaint that Siegel owes us an account of Non-Arbitrariness is structurally 
analogous to the complaint we raised against Hanson, i.e. that he lacks an account of Amalgamation. 
At a slightly more abstract level, it is also structurally similar to the complaint raised against Genone, 
i.e. that he does not provide an account of how the perception of appearance properties hooks up 
with the beliefs and perceptual judgments that he thinks subjects may base on their experience, and 
of how this relation is in turn governed by the subject’s background view. 
As a result, I contend that the Content View is at least as problematic as the relational view.  
Relationalists, recall, endorse No Content and must thus hold that whatever epistemic or semantic 
roles experience may play, it plays them due to having a specific phenomenology. If the argument 
presented in the previous chapters is correct, their notion of phenomenology must be rejected as 
                                                 
33  Incidentally, one may think that what it is like to have an experience could at least in part depends on what content it 
conveys. To accept this thought is to put pressure on the idea that the same phenomenal state could have different 
contents. If one rejects it to make room for the latter possibility, more needs to be said about what the expression 
‘what it is like’ is supposed to pick out than Siegel does. 
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unsatisfactory. Accordingly, their epistemic and semantic accounts, whatever they may turn out to be, 
cannot get off the ground. Qua representationalist, Siegel endorses Content. Nevertheless, she, too, 
thinks that the phenomenology of experience is vitally important, insisting that it is the phenomenal 
states themselves that bear the content. However, since she provides neither a full account of the 
phenomenology of experience, nor an account of how contents and phenomenal states are related, 
her epistemological account, whatever it may turn out to be, will struggle to get off the ground as well.  
Returning to our guiding question, i.e. whether Siegel can accommodate phenomena that would 
fall under the heading of what I have labeled the doxastic variability of experience, let us see what 
implications our discussion so far has for the assessment of Siegel’s position. As I argued above, Siegel 
clearly seeks to accommodate cases of expert vision, cases in which both the phenomenology of the 
expert’s experience and which content her experience bears differ from their counterparts in the 
layperson. Whether Siegel would also allow cases in which the phenomenal state remains unaffected 
and in which expert vision is solely a matter of which properties an otherwise unaltered phenomenal 
state presents as instantiated cannot be determined with certainty from what she says. To determine 
her answer, we would need the account of Non-Arbitrariness that, again, she does not provide. For 
similar reasons, we cannot assess her view with respect to the question raised near the outset of this 
chapter, i.e. how effects on the phenomenology and effects on the putative content of experience 
might relate to each other. Could expert vision sometimes occur as an effect just on the phenomenal 
character of the experience? Could it sometimes occur as an effect just on which properties a given 
phenomenal state presents? For answering such questions, Siegel’s account affords no resources. 
Recall that on Hanson’s view, one way in which experience is doxastically variable has to do with 
the fact that according to him, what the concepts that figure in experience mean is essentially a matter 
of how they are articulated in the subject’s background view. We have touched upon this issue near 
the end of the previous subsection. In short, it is not obvious how Siegel would position herself with 
respect to this issue. For one, in contrast to Hanson, Siegel does not explicitly endorse the idea that 
the attribution of properties in experience is a matter of concepts figuring in experience itself. But even 
if she were to reject the view that experiential content is to be construed in terms of conceptual content, 
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she might still be sympathetic to the suggestion offered in the previous subsection. She might, that is, 
accept that which properties a given experience presents as instantiated is settled (at least in part) by 
the subject’s background view. If so, it would also be open to Siegel to side with Hanson and hold, 
for example, that the property of being the sun that is attributed in Tycho’s experience differs from the 
property of being the sun attributed in Kepler’s experience precisely in virtue of the difference in how 
the concept ‘sun’ is articulated in their respective background views and which property (or sets of 
properties) the concept of being the sun is thus taken to pick out. If she were to accept the doxastic 
variability of experiential content in this sense, she would endorse a position that we can dub Variable 
Content View, a position on which the content a given experience represents would depend on the 
subject’s background view in two distinct ways. First, on such a view, the background view would help 
settle which properties a given phenomenal state presents as instantiated.  Second, it would help settle 
what it is for an experience, or for anything, to have that specific content.34 
As for projection effects, we have not here discussed them. But we can note that the question 
whether such effects could occur independently of changes in experiential content also depends on 
how much flexibility Siegel’s missing account of Non-Arbitrariness would afford. On the one hand, 
one might suspect that since Siegel thinks—in contrast to proponents of two-factor views (at least as 
Siegel characterizes such views)— that phenomenal states and contents are non-arbitrarily related, she 
might also hold that projection effects will go hand in hand with effects on experiential content. But 
patently, this need not be so. For suppose a given subject believed or even knew that in certain 
circumstances, the occurrence of certain projection effects is at least likely. Suppose, further, it were 
accepted that beliefs of that sort can affect what content a subject’s experience presents. Consider, 
next, an experience involving a projection effect that is had in circumstances in which the subject 
knows or at least takes it to be very likely that such effects may occur. If so, it could be that in such 
cases, the projection effect occurs and that the subject’s knowledge or belief that such effects are likely 
affects the content of her experience. More specifically, her background view could affect her 
                                                 
34  It would not settle, of course, whether a given phenomenal state has objectually singular content or not. 
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experiential content in such a way that the phenomenal state that—as a result of the projection 
effect—she is in ends up representing a content that is no different from the content of the 
phenomenal state that she would have been in had no projection effect occurred. However, and again, 
without an account of what settles which properties a given phenomenal state presents as instantiated, 
how Siegel would position herself with respect to such possibilities cannot be conclusively assessed. 
In the next section, I will examine how Siegel deals with cases in which cognitive background 
states affect the putative content of experience and in particular how she responds to the 
epistemological worries such cases give rise to. So far, I have argued that the Content View she 
proposes is not sufficiently motivated and that it leaves us without an account of what determines 
which properties a given phenomenal state presents as instantiated, and, given the lack of an account 
of Experiential Content, what these properties are. In the next section, I turn to her proposal of 
how to accommodate the possibility that cognitive background states such as beliefs may affect 
experience. It crucially depends on the idea that experience has representational content and on the 
conception of the default rational role of experience as serving to justify beliefs. In a sense, then, her 
proposal is only as compelling as the Content View. But even if this issue is bracketed, further issues 
arises. For as I will emphasize, her proposal entails unsatisfactory consequences. 
7.2 THE RATIONAL ROLE OF SIEGELIAN EXPERIENCE 
In this section, I outline (7.2.1) and then criticize (7.2.2) Siegel’s view of the rational role of experience. 
In 7.3, I will offer a suggestion that will be crucial for the remainder of the book: we can drop the 
counterintuitive and revisionary elements of Siegel’s view, since as soon as we adopt a different 
conception of the general role of experience, the motivation for including such elements goes away.  
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7.2.1 Irrational Experiences and Reduced Epistemic Powers 
The account Susanna Siegel proposes in her most recent book, The Rationality of Perception, is based on 
two assumptions: a) the primary role of experience is to provide justification, e.g. for everyday beliefs 
about ordinary things (cf. Siegel 2017, p. xiii), and b) if everything else is held fixed, one’s beliefs, 
hypotheses, knowledge, desires, fears, traits, moods, preferences and prejudices, and evaluative 
attitudes—in short: one’s outlook on the world—could influence the way things look to one (cf. ibid, 
p. xiv, p. 3, p. 7).  
The second assumption, if true, entails some version of the thesis that experience is doxastically 
variable. And arguably, the first assumption is a default assumption regarding the rational role of 
experience, one widely shared among representationalists of different stripes. Accordingly, if in 
combination, the two assumptions were to give rise to an epistemological worry, such a worry would 
be likely to arise not just in the specific context of Siegel’s Content View, but in the context of various 
competing versions of representationalism as well. And indeed, such a worry does arise. Siegel glosses 
it as follows: “if prior beliefs could influence your experience, how could your experience go on to 
strengthen those very beliefs?” (ibid., p. xiv).  
Applied to the banana case and phrased in terms of Siegel’s Content View, the issue is this: 
suppose we construe the banana case in line with Hansen et al.’s suggestion, i.e. as involving an effect 
the test subjects’ background beliefs have on their respective experiences. Suppose, further, that the 
experiences the test subjects undergo fully retain their putative ability to justify e.g. beliefs that match 
the content they convey. If so, the test subjects’ experiences of the banana object, which present it as 
having the property of being yellowish, appear to invite the test subjects to illicitly strengthen their 
respective beliefs that the banana object is indeed yellowish.35 If so, the experience of the banana 
object as yellowish seems to confirm what clearly should not be confirmed: a false belief, a close 
                                                 
35  A variant of the problem that concerns the question of whether experience that has been affected by background 
beliefs can support universally generalized beliefs is expressed as the worry that lest we allow badly circular reasoning, 
we should not think that seeing a specific banana as yellow can strengthen the generalization that bananas are yellow 
if the latter is in part what gives rise to the former. Cf. Siegel 2017, p. 7.  
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variant of which was causally responsible for bringing about the experience in the first place.36 If we 
suppose that the primary role of experience is to justify beliefs and also allow that background states 
such as beliefs can influence the content experience is said to have, there are thus possible cases in 
which experience appears to justify what it should not and cannot justify. 
Before we look at the shape of Siegel’s solution, let us note right away that for Siegel to entertain 
that the kind of cases mentioned in the second assumption are possible is to make an assumption that 
so far, we had not yet been able to attribute to her. As we saw in the previous sections, she leaves us 
without an account of how the content of a given experience is determined. Accordingly, the 
underlying claim that which properties a given experience presents as instantiated can at least party be 
influenced by the experiencing subject’s background beliefs is instructive. That said, for Siegel to 
endorse the assumption that beliefs (and other states) may play such a co-determining role falls far 
short of providing an account of what determines the putative content of a given phenomenal state 
in general. For we are still left in the dark as to what the content of the phenomenal state would be if 
influences like those the test subjects’ background beliefs are said to have on the test subjects’ 
respective experiences of the banana object were completely absent. And if it is suggested that 
intuitively, the answer should be something like ‘there is a gray banana object in front of me,’ we 
should still want to know what exactly it is that settles that the phenomenal state in question, had in 
those particular circumstances, would get to have that content in particular, as opposed to some other 
content, and what it is for it to have that content. 
Note also that Siegel characterizes the relevant effects as modifications of how things look to one. 
However, this notion is ambiguous between at least two interpretations. On one interpretation, ‘how 
things look to one’ is a reference to the phenomenal character of one’s experience, which, on Siegel’s 
                                                 
36  The kinds of effects Siegel considers have come to be known in the literature as cases of cognitive penetration. The 
exact characterization of cognitive penetration, whether the relevant effects need to be direct effects on experience 
or whether they can also be mediated via attention, and how exactly we are to think about the target of such effects 
in the first place, all these are contentious issues. For discussion, see e.g. Siegel 2008, Stokes 2013, Macpherson 2015, 
2017; Lupyan 2015; Raftopoulos & Zeimbekis 2015. It is also a contentious issue how wide-spread such effects 
actually are (see again Scholl and Firestone 2016). In the following, I side with Siegel in bracketing such questions and 
in assuming that it is independently interesting to evaluate how well different accounts of experience would be able 
to deal with such effects.  
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view, is what individuates phenomenal states. On such a reading, the banana case, construed as 
involving effects on how things look to one, involves projection effects, i.e. effects that modify what 
phenomenal state the experiencing subject enters. However, recall Siegel’s assumption that the primary 
role of experience is that of justifying beliefs. Further, presumably, the relevant experience of the gray 
banana object will be at least a candidate for something that could serve to strengthen the belief that 
the banana object is yellow(ish). To be such a candidate, the relevant projection effects would have to 
be accompanied by a change in the properties the experience presents as instantiated as well.  
On an alternative reading, effects on how things look to one are mere changes in which properties 
an otherwise unchanged phenomenal state presents as instantiated, and, thus, changes in what content 
it conveys. As we noted previously—in the context of discussing expert vision—such a proposal 
would be structurally similar to Genone’s account of misleading appearances. For on such a proposal, 
the effects background beliefs are taken to have on the subjects’ experience would be such as to leave 
the subjects’ phenomenal states unaltered. Instead, the effects would just modify which contents are 
(in some sense) associated with the phenomenology that the test subjects’ experiences possess 
anyway.37 However, as before, in the absence of an account of Non-Arbitrariness, we cannot 
determine whether Siegel’s view would permit just the former, or both these options.38 
                                                 
37  If Siegel were to accept this proposal, she could of course take a step further and assert that one need not even assume 
that projection effects do in fact occur. To do so would, in effect, be to pursue a strategy analogous to the one I 
suggested above Genone might wish to pursue in order to explain away projection effects entirely. Qua relationalist, 
Genone should find a strategy that avoids phenomenal pluralism appealing. After all, endorsing it would appear to 
enable him to maintain Constitution for experience quite generally, i.e. not just for perception. Since Siegel does not 
share the relationalists’ commitment to the idea that experience just is such a relation, Constitution need not hold any 
particular appeal either. But if so, then prima facie, a commitment to rejecting the possible or actual occurrence of 
projection effects need not have any particular appeal, either. 
38  In Siegel 2017, pp. 9-10, Siegel lists a number of things that could be happening when subjects arrive at an inaccurate 
classification of what it is that they see due to what their background states are. These are: Disbelief (subjects disbelieve 
the content of their perceptual experience), Bypass (subjects do not respond to their experience at all, but respond to 
something else, e.g. by way of being primed), Cognitive penetration (subjects respond to their modified experience), 
Attention (subjects are primed in such a way as to attend to features specific features of the object seen that look like 
an object that it is not an instance of, while disregarding others), Introspective error (subjects introspectively misidentify 
their experience), Haste (subjects get mixed information and classify the object seen in accordance with how they have 
been primed), and Disowned behavior (subjects’ behavior is guided by their being pried, not by what they see, but they 
realize their mistake immediately). What I am suggesting, in effect, is that there are at least two ways in which Cognitive 
penetration could be interpreted – once as an effect on the phenomenology and a (somehow) corresponding effect on 
its alleged content, once as an effect on the alleged experiential content alone. 
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Either way, in considering the epistemic quandary posed by the possibility that background states 
such as beliefs could affect how things look to one, Siegel identifies two kinds of pressures to 
respond—pressures, she notes, that push in different directions. On the one hand, she acknowledges 
that it seems hard to blame subjects who undergo such experiences for taking them at face value and 
thus as providing further support for the very beliefs that—unbeknownst to them—contributed to 
bringing about their experiences in the first place. Relatedly, it may seem perfectly rational for these 
subjects to believe their eyes. After all, what else are they supposed to do, given the evidence their 
experience presents? On the other hand, Siegel also feels the urge to say that as they take their 
experiences to provide such support, the subjects are in some sense acting irrationally. Indeed, such 
cases appear to illustrate that epistemic blamelessness and rationality can come apart.  
After presenting various scenarios—including cases involving the biased perception of hiring 
committees, biased perceptions of researchers who are strongly committed to certain theories and the 
accompanying expectations, and fearful perceivers, whose perception is affected by their irrational 
fear—Siegel states the following: 
(11) In all of the cases, the challenge is to assess whether the ultimate conclusions are 
epistemically appropriate […] and to either explain away the appearance of an 
epistemic flaw in the conclusion, if there isn’t one, or else identify the epistemic flaw, 
if there is one. (Siegel 2017, p. 8) 
The way Siegel phrases the challenge is noteworthy. For it suggests that in asking whether a 
subject, in trusting her eyes, is rational, the criterion Siegel intends to draw on is provided by the 
epistemic or, more broadly, rational status of what results: judgments, beliefs, perhaps even actions.39 
If the latter turn out to be epistemically (or rationally) deficient, the flaw must be identified. And given 
that the beliefs, judgments, and actions under consideration are said to be based on the content of the 
relevant subject’s experience, the idea that in many cases, the flaw may be inherited from the 
experience and, as such, may be present in experience already, can seem quite natural.  
                                                 
39  Further below, beginning in 7.3, I will suggest, in effect, that accepting the Content View does not force one to 
interpret the challenge in this particular way. For there is an interesting alternative way of thinking of the primary 
rational role of experience, on which the challenge does not even arise—a way of thinking that proponents of the 
Content View, too, could accept.  
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Siegel’s response to the two pressures outlined earlier can be interpreted as a way of spelling out 
this natural idea. In a nutshell, her response is based on the following claims: a) like beliefs, experiences 
have an epistemic status—an epistemic charge40, b) the epistemic charge of any experience e is to be 
construed in terms of e’s epistemic power to justify beliefs, c) the epistemic power of any experience 
e depends on how e has been formed, in short: on e’s etiology, and d) contents of experiences can have 
the status of being rational or irrational—a status that determines the experiences’ epistemic charge 
and that they inherit from the rationality or irrationality of the way in which the relevant experience 
was formed.41 Simply put: an experience that has been formed in epistemically or rationally non-kosher 
ways is thereby irrational and does not have its regular power to justify beliefs. Beliefs and judgments 
that are formed on the basis of such experiences inherit the irrationality of the latter and are, as such, 
ill-founded.42 
                                                 
40  Note that the notions of epistemic charge and of epistemic power are relativized to contents. Moreover, Siegel 
distinguishes Reason-Power, the power to give reason to believe, from Forward-looking Power, the power to serve 
in the formation of well-founded beliefs, and grants that if experience has the power to provide baseline justification, 
i.e. justification that suffices to make the resulting belief well-founded, it may well be that it does not do so on its 
own, but only by way of being part of a minimal unit that provides such justification. For present purposes, nothing 
hinges on these distinctions, so I suppress them here. See Siegel 2017, chapter 4.1 for discussion. 
41  As Siegel reports in the preface to her book, what convinced her that perceptual experiences themselves can be 
epistemically weakened by their psychological precursors were political cases. An example of such cases are cases of 
implicit bias, in which to a subject, members of a certain racial or societal category look to have properties that they 
do not possess precisely because of the presence, in the subject’s outlook, of internalized cultural narratives, beliefs, 
biases, or fears. Consider an experience had by a biased subject S, in which a black young man looks dangerous to S 
precisely because S’s implicit biases silently influence her experience. On the one hand, one could think that S’s 
experience is epistemically as powerful as it would be in the absence of such biases (and in the presence of a young 
black man who does indeed look dangerous, however such a look may be construed). Siegel, however, suggests that 
it is exactly such cases that make the general intuition more compelling that the subject’s experience, if affected by 
irrational precursors, is made epistemically less powerful.  
One can of course agree that there is something irrational about the biased subject. But one can do so while 
rejecting Siegel’s idea that the locus of that irrationality is experience itself. Siegel concedes that her proposal that 
experiences themselves can be rational or irrational is highly revisionary, in that, as she puts it, it “overturns the 
entrenched assumption that perceptual experience stops at the threshold of the house of reason” (Siegel 2017, p. 
xxiv). But she insists that the reasons for resisting the idea that experience can itself be rational or irrational are less 
powerful than is commonly held and that it is anyway worth to explore what the epistemology of perceptual experience 
looks like if the idea is endorsed (cf. ibid., p. xxv; see also pp. 31-37 for her attempt to dismantle objections to the 
effect that experiences cannot have a rational status).  
42  The resulting view does not entail that every effect background states could possibly have on a subject’s experience 
is epistemically insidious. For it is compatible with the view that e.g. states that are characteristic of expertise can 
affect how things look to the subject without reducing the resulting experience’s epistemic power. Expertise, in other 
words, may well involve rational ways of generating experiences that do not reduce the experience’s epistemic charge 
and, hence, its power to justify beliefs. On Siegel’s view, epistemically appropriate precursors can even raise the 
epistemic power above the baseline required for justification (see Siegel 2017, chapter 7). We already noted that 
expertise, if combined with a tendency to overgeneralize, may have harmful effects as well. Siegel could concur with 
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To make things more concrete, let us frame the following discussion by way of considering one 
of the examples Siegel provides—the case of Vivek, a vain performer: 
(12) To [Vivek], the faces in the audience range in their experession from neutral to 
pleased. Remarkably, no one ever looks disapproving. […] Vivek’s vanity or 
diffidence influenced the character of his perception. Depending on his self-
conception, how a scene looked to him differed, even when all other conditions stayed 
the same. […] 
Vivek’s vanity might reach all the way to the appearances themselves. Vivek’s 
perceptual experience is the conscious part of perception that Vivek is responding to, 
when he forms his judgment. If his vanity influences his perceptual experience, then 
there’s no need for him to jump to conclusions from the visual appearances. If he just 
believes his eyes, he’ll end up believing that the people are pleased. That’s how their 
faces look to him. If you saw the faces, in contrast, you’d most likely think they were 
just neutral. Unless you admire Vivek as much as he admires himself, you’re not 
motivated to see the faces as approving (Siegel 2017, p. 3-4). 
With our outline of Siegel’s position in hand, the case of Vivek can be characterized as follows: 
upon looking at his audience, there are some determinate ways things look to Vivek. Among these is 
the following: to him, the members of his audience invariably look somewhere between neutral and 
pleased. In the terms we encountered in the last section, his experiences attribute—perhaps to the 
face of each individual member of his audience, perhaps to faces of the audience as a whole—some 
property or other that ranges somewhere between being neutral and being pleased. Accordingly, there 
is something it would be for Vivek to just believe his eyes. Upon seeing his audience, for him to just 
believe his eyes would be to just endorse the content his experience anyway conveys to him. His 
audience’s response to his performance, he might thus come to believe, is somewhere between being 
neutral towards it and being pleased by it.  
However, as Siegel presents the case, which particular properties Vivek’s experience presents as 
instantiated, and which content it accordingly conveys, is influenced by an irrational factor: Vivek’s 
disproportional vanity.43 For Vivek to just believe his eyes would thus be to endorse a content that has 
been formed irrationally and, as such, an experience that in virtue of having been so formed inherits 
                                                 
this diagnosis and suggest that in such a case, the expert’s tendency to overgeneralize is precisely the kind of feature 
that saps her experience of its power to justify.  
43  Since I am primarily interested in the doxastic variability of experience, I assume, with Siegel, that Vivek’s vanity is at 
least in part a matter of what he believes, e.g. about what people think about him, about himself, his skills, and his 
ability to impress audiences by way of performing (cf. Siegel 2017, p. 17).  
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the property of being irrational.44 According to Siegel’s suggestion, an experience whose epistemic 
charge has been reduced by having been formed irrationally does not have the same epistemic power 
as an experience with matching content would have that has been formed in an epistemically harmless 
way. Accordingly, on Siegel’s view, Vivek, both in having the experience and in believing his eyes, 
would be irrational.  
In the following section, I will criticize Siegel’s account. Before I do, let me acknowledge that the 
view is much richer than I have here sketched it—Siegel fleshes it out in a number of respects. For 
instance, since she acknowledges the revisionary character of her proposal, she considers various 
objections one could raise against the idea that experience could be epistemically charged. Moreover, 
she proposes an account of inference that is intended to corroborate the following assumption: just 
like beliefs can inherit properties such as being more or less rational or well-founded from the beliefs 
they are inferred from, experiences, too, can inherit analogous properties from the various ways they 
can be produced. Finally, Siegel applies the view to cases of evaluative perception, selection effects, 
and to an upscaled version of the problem that concerns problems that arise in the context of assessing 
the epistemic status of attitudes such as racially discriminative attitudes that are culturally entrenched. 
In what follows, I will bracket the discussion of these further aspects of her view. For such issues 
are entirely downstream of what I think are the two crucial commitments Siegel makes right at the 
outset: first, a commitment to an account of epistemic powers and, second, a commitment to treating 
what is rational to do based on one’s experience as something that may often be beyond the subject’s 
ken.  
We need not, and should not, I think, follow her in these commitments since doing so comes at 
the cost of accepting a consequence I believe we should reject: experience can execute what is said to 
be its default rational role only in ideal circumstances. In non-ideal circumstances, what is rational for 
                                                 
44  Note that according to Siegel, effects on the experiential content by irrational factors are content-specific (cf. Siegel 
2017, chapter 3.3 and 4.1.2). Hence, not all contents that Vivek’s experience conveys to him need to be affected. Even 
if his experience is hijacked with respect to how his audience members look to him in terms of whether or not they 
enjoy his performance, he may, for instance, still be in a good position to form justified judgments about the color of 
their hair, the lighting conditions at the performance venue, etc. 
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the subject to believe, on the basis of her experience, may well remain completely opaque to the 
subject. Construed that way, experience often cannot and will not be the guide that we ordinarily take 
it to be. 
7.2.2 Objections 
In order to bring my objection against Siegel’s account into view, one more aspect of it needs to be 
brought out. In the previous subsection, we saw that on her view, experiences, if generated in irrational 
ways, lose their power to justify beliefs and judgments that match (or are close to)45 the content the 
experience is said to convey. Accordingly, upon having an experience that, as Siegel puts it, has been 
hijacked by one’s prior outlook, one exhibits one’s irrationality both in having it and in believing one’s 
eyes in response to it. Believing one’s eyes is not rational, she asserts, “because […] the subject’s having 
the perceptual experience detracts from his or her rational standing, and it does that because the 
experience came about through an irrational process” (Siegel 2017, p. 14). Similarly, she states that  
(13) hijacked experiences are irrational […] because they are epistemically sensitive to their 
psychological precursors, in the same way that conclusions of inference epistemically 
depend on inferential inputs. It is no more rational for these subjects [i.e. subjects that 
undergo hijacked experiences] to believe that the world is the way their hijacked 
experiences present it as being, than it is for them to believe something on the basis 
of assumptions that are themselves irrational. (Siegel 2017, pp. 21-22) 
A natural question that arises in this context is the following: if upon having a hijacked experience, 
believing her eyes would be irrational, what, then, would be the rational thing for the subject to do? 
What, for example, would be the rational thing for Vivek to do? 
                                                 
45  This parenthetical remark is supposed to indicate that Siegel wants to keep room for the possibility that the contents 
of experience are so unlike contents of beliefs that beliefs and experiences cannot have the same contents. 
Nevertheless, as Siegel puts it “some contents of belief will be closer to the contents of experience than others” (Siegel 
2017, p. 63). Note that if it is held that belief contents and experiential contents are different in a strong sense, the 
problem posed by the lack of an account of Non-Arbitrariness becomes multiplied. For on such an account, it is 
not only an open question how contents of experience are related to the phenomenal states that are said to bear them, 
but also how experiential contents relate to contents of belief. 
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Siegel’s response is that subjects who undergo hijacked experienced “are not in a position to 
know, on their own, what the reasonable reaction to their experience is.” With respect to Vivek in 
particular, she holds that although Vivek is not in a position (all by himself) to know it, “the reasonable 
response is to suspend judgment on […] whether the audience is pleased” (Siegel 2017, p. 14).  
In a footnote, Siegel acknowledges that “with enough distinctions,” one can, like e.g. Jackson 
2011, defend the view “that Vivek is at the same time rationally required to believe his eyes, given that 
he has the experience and no reason to discount it” (ibid., p. 15, fn. 1). In response to Jackson, she 
contends that one may not need to draw on something as strong as requirements of rationality in 
order to explain why it would be reasonable for Vivek to believe his eyes and adds that coherence 
requirements would at most supplement, not challenge the idea that perceptual experiences can be 
rational or irrational.  
As will become clearer below, I think that the latter claim is false. I confess that I find it very hard 
to side with Siegel’s suggestion that the reasonable thing to do for Vivek—i.e. given his experience and 
his doxastic circumstances—is to suspend judgment. By comparison, from his perspective, believing 
his eyes appears much more reasonable. And I think that if we want to get a proper sense of the role 
that experience plays in our rational and epistemic endeavors, we should not assess the role it plays in 
a way that ignores the perspective of the experiencing subject. 
To spell out this worry further, let us begin by emphasizing that to the extent that we agree that 
for Vivek, suspending judgment is indeed the reasonable thing to do, such agreement appears itself 
appropriate only from the vantage point afforded by our doxastic context, a context that in crucial 
respects differs from the one Vivek inhabits.  
There is, of course, nothing wrong with opting to characterize what would be reasonable to 
believe or do against the backdrop of the best doxastic context (rationally and epistemically) available 
to one. And certainly, as we consider the case of Vivek, the doxastic context we inhabit is better than 
his. After all, we are aware of the effects his vanity has on his experience, whereas Vivek is not. Indeed, 
were he aware both of his vanity and of the possibility that it could affect how he experiences his 
audience, then for him, too, suspending judgment should be a response to his experience that is well 
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worth considering. Indeed, the more evidence supporting the possibility of such effects we imagine 
Vivek as possessing, the more we feel compelled to blame him for not taking such evidence into 
consideration. And such blame would be apt due to the fact that Vivek, instead of making his beliefs 
accord with his evidence, irrationally ignores it or favors evidence that serves his already inflated ego 
by feeding into and thus sustaining his vanity.  
In the absence of such evidence, however, such blame is ill-placed. More importantly, if we agree 
that it is appropriate to characterize what would be reasonable to believe or do against the backdrop 
of the best doxastic context (rationally and epistemically) available to one, the same should hold for 
Vivek as well. After all, on Siegel’s way of putting it, his experience presents the faces of the members 
of his audience as somewhere between neutral and pleased. Moreover, ex hypothesi, his doxastic content 
contains nothing that provides him with a reason to mistrust his experience. Were he indeed to 
suspend judgment, he would, if asked, be in no position to say why he did. Indeed, to him, suspending 
judgment would have to seem erratic, irrational, and inappropriate as a response, given his beliefs and 
what his experience conveys to him. Accordingly, while against the backdrop of a more informed 
doxastic context in which Vivek’s condition is known, it is clearly correct to say that Vivek, in forming 
the belief that his audience is pleased, say, is not fully rational and that he would be more rational 
overall were he to suspend judgment, it is also clear that from Vivek’s own perspective, doing the 
former must appear much more rational than doing the latter.  
Generally, assessments of rationality must be relative to some standard. But where should such 
standards come from if not from the doxastic contexts we inhabit and what, given these contexts, we 
take to be true? If your and my doxastic contexts differ, an action that seems rational to you, in a given 
situation, need not seem rational to me. Perhaps I know less than you about the situation at hand, or 
more, or different things. Perhaps I am aware of fewer or more options for action than you are. Or 
maybe I hold different beliefs than you do about how the various agents (including you and me), the 
circumstances that shape the situation, and the various options for action that are in principle available 
to the relevant agents ought to be evaluatively characterized.  
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The same holds for assessments that concern not actions, but forming beliefs. If your background 
view differs from mine, so may what we take to be rational to believe, upon having a certain 
experience. If I am like Tycho and you are like Kepler, then upon seeing the sunrise, you may find it 
rational to form the belief that that the Earth’s horizon is spinning away from the sun. I, on the other 
hand, may find it rational to form the belief that the Earth is standing perfectly still, while the sun is 
engaging in its diurnal journey around the stationary Earth. In yet another doxastic context, it may 
have seemed rational to believe, upon seeing the sunrise, that Helios, the god of the sun, is beginning 
his daily journey across the sky, setting out from Mount Olympus, riding a chariot drawn by four 
horses of fire, accompanied by his sister Eos (who would soon transform into Hemera and, eventually, 
into Hespera), and eventually hiding in his golden cup, thus bringing about nightfall.  
Today, the latter view strikes us as archaically fantastic, Tycho’s view as naïve, perhaps, at least as 
overly committed to a specific religious and pre-scientific world view. Of course, both views were, at 
some point and within certain communities, part of the so-called common sense. But over time, along 
with our beliefs, common sense shifts, sometimes dramatically, as do standards of what is deemed 
rational to believe.  
As she assesses the rationality of the judgments and beliefs that Vivek forms based on his 
experience, Siegel appeals to information that is external to Vivek’s own doxastic context. And again, 
relative to a vantage point which includes such information, it is obvious that Vivek’s experience could 
not serve to justify the beliefs he forms on its basis, nor would his response, relative to such a vantage 
point, seem rational. But that does not detract from the fact that in the context provided by what 
Vivek knows and believes, and given his experience, there remains a rather strong temptation to think 
that for him to form the relevant belief is completely innocuous and at least rationally permissible.  
Indeed, if we take his doxastic context into account, we should actually fault him for suspending 
belief, were that what he did. And we should do so not because we think that suspending judgment 
would not be the most rational thing to do—which we may well think it is—but rather, because what 
we think matters little. What matters, rather, is that against the background provided by his doxastic 
context, suspending judgment would seem irrational. Were he to do it anyway, he would seem 
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rationally impaired, whereas if he did what in light of his experience and his beliefs is rational, he 
would not. Why, then, does Siegel resist the idea that Vivek’s most rational response would be to 
endorse the content his experience conveys?  
The reason, I think, rests on the fact that there is really only one alternative to her proposal that 
she considers and rejects. We already encountered it in our initial illustration of the banana case in 
7.2.1. Siegel’s dismissal of that view comes out when she notes that traditional approaches to the 
epistemic role of perceptual experience predict that Vivek’s hijacked experiences “can provide just as 
much epistemic support for believing that […] the audience is pleased […] as non-hijacked experiences 
could.” (Siegel 2017, p. 22) Analogous to what we saw in our brief discussion of the banana case, on 
such a picture, Vivek’s experience would appear to provide him with additional justification for his 
mistaken belief that his audience is pleased, yielding the untoward consequence that Vivek’s experience 
justifies what it should not and cannot justify: an irrational belief.  
On Siegel’s view, in contrast, Vivek’s ill-formed experience is sapped of its justificatory power. 
Therefore, her proposal succeeds in blocking the untoward consequence. In 7.3, I will suggest that 
even within the confines of the Content View, an alternative is available, one that both blocks the 
untoward consequence and that, as I show in the subsequent chapters, allows us to give a fully general 
account of the rational role of experience—an account on which experience plays its rational role 
without exception—even in cases like Vivek’s, in which one’s experience is hijacked.  
Stepping back for a moment, let us acknowledge that Siegel takes possible cases of doxastic 
variation of experience very seriously. That she does, I think, is an advantage of her position. Creating 
the conceptual leeway required to accommodate such cases gives her view a decisive leg up on 
relational views. Proponents of the latter, I argued, must try to explain away such doxastic effects on 
experience. If that fails, there is significant pressure on them to integrate, in their account, a notion of 
non-perceptual phenomenology. However, such a notion threatens to undermine both their account 
of Constitution and the idea that motivates it, viz. the idea that the primary role of experience is to 
put subjects in touch with mind-independent objects. And if they resist phenomenal pluralism, it is 
not obvious that alternative strategies are available. For while I suggested that a generalized version of 
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Genone’s account of misleading appearances may in principle be promising and potentially powerful, 
it remains an open question whether it can be developed in such a way as to fit into the relationalists 
general epistemic framework.  
That said, Siegel’s account is problematic as well. For in accepting it, we would be saddled with 
the consequence that experience is a potentially rather unreliable guide, whose rational credentials are 
generated behind the scenes, in ways that often, if not standardly, remain completely opaque to the 
subject. Relatedly, it would appear that experience plays what is alleged to be its default rational role—
that of serving to justify perceptual beliefs and judgments—only in choice circumstances. In others, 
i.e. in all those cases in which it is sapped of its justificatory powers, it is epistemically treacherous. For 
in such cases, experience presents the subject with, and invites her to endorse, contents which—
though there is nothing about them that would indicate as much—it would be irrational for the subject 
to endorse. 
The problem posed by hijacked experiences could be rather massive. Even if in the actual world, 
doxastic effects on experiential contents were limited, in other possible worlds, the situation may be 
considerably worse.46 But even in the actual world, it is unclear whether a general optimism would be 
                                                 
46  Siegel suggests that an experience’s phenomenal character—in line with the Content View understood as involving 
the presentation of properties as instantiated—provides that experience with epistemic charge. In the context of 
making this suggestion, she takes it for granted that it is very often reasonable to believe one’s eyes and other senses 
(cf. Siegel 2017, p. 46) and suggests that an acceptable account of epistemic charge may need to respect this intuition 
and accordingly construe the default epistemic charge of experiences as positive (i.e. as powerful enough to justify 
perceptual beliefs). Siegel also indicates that her account is compatible with views that think that there are self-
justifying experiences, that experiences that are positively charged could serve to immediately justify perceptual beliefs. 
The view, accordingly, is compatible with, though does not entail epistemological foundationalism, at least not without 
additional assumptions.  
However, and importantly, to dispel the worry that the properties one’s experience presents as instantiated may 
often be the result of irrational processes, more needs to be said about what determines what these properties are. 
Suppose, for instance, that something like Hanson’s broadly holistic semantic picture of experiential content is right. 
If so, then which properties a given experience presents to a significant extent depends on the experiencing subject’s 
background beliefs: the latter play an essential role in determine what the properties instantiated are. Depending on 
how the holistic account is spelled out further, it may even be that false and irrational beliefs that form part of the 
background view inevitably shape the properties experience is said to presented in epistemically pernicious ways. In 
such a case, perceptual hijacking would be massive and indeed ubiquitous. To be able to block such possibilities, 
Siegel would need to provide what, as we saw in 7.1, she still owes us: a full account of how phenomenal states are 
related to the properties they are said to present, of what settles which properties a given phenomenal state presents 
as instantiated, what these properties are, and of how these accounts yield what she takes for granted, i.e. that the 
putative content of some, even many phenomenal states can in fact serve to justify corresponding beliefs. In Siegel 
2017, Siegel discusses, in passing, Bayesian account of content determination (see chapters 6.2.1 and 6.2.2). However, 
as she does, her aim is not to argue in favor of such a view, but to illustrate how on such views, the content of 
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warranted with respect to the putative rational status experiential contents standardly have. For surely, 
as we respond to our various experiences, there are many occasions in which the judgments we issue 
and the beliefs we form are false—in ordinary circumstance, in the sciences, and even more so in the 
realm of social interactions.47  
For instance, upon seeing visual illusions like the Müller-Lyer for the first time, we may issue the 
false judgment that the two horizontal lines it involves differ in length. Upon seeing the sunrise, we 
may judge that the sun is in fact moving. For the longest time, we miscategorized whales as fish, saw 
fire as a process involving phlogiston (at least some scientists did), ignored what is in fact the Golgi 
apparatus since we saw it as a result of improper staining, etc.  
We also go astray—arguably quite often—as we engage in relationships with others, as colleagues, 
as friends, lovers, or as we just interact with others socially. We frequently, sometimes gravely, 
misinterpret utterances and actions of others that are directed at us (and sometimes we interpret them 
as being directed at us though they are not). On Siegel’s Rich Content View, recall, the contents of 
experience can be rather rich. Accordingly, it is conceivable that on it, cases in which we misread social 
                                                 
experiences could be negatively influenced by prior beliefs in various ways. Accordingly, her notion of Experiential 
Content remains pending. 
47  Not every such case must be explained in terms of flawed experiential contents. In one kind of case, subjects may 
simply discount the content their experiences anyway have. In another kind of case, subjects may erroneously take 
the content presented—p, say—as entailing false or irrational propositions—e.g. q and r—thus ending up forming 
these beliefs in response to their experience (this may, but need not involve conscious inference). In either of these 
kinds of cases, experience does not get to execute its alleged primary role properly.  
In the first kind of case, this is not because the subject’s experience could not in principle be exploited in such a 
way as to enable it to play that role, but rather because the subject fails to properly exploit it. It could thus be suggested 
that at least in the first kind of case, the experience does provide the subject with propositional justification for the 
content the experience represents. It does not, however, provide her with doxastic justification since we are assuming 
that the subject does not actually endorse the experiential content—or if she does, she does not do so on the basis of 
her experience.  
The second kind of case is harder to assess. For whether or not experiences that belong to that kind of cases 
count as hijacked will depend on one’s account of experiential content (which Siegel, as I keep insisting, does not 
provide). On a broadly holistic view of experiential content such as Hanson’s, what a given content is taken to entail 
is an essential part of what makes that content the specific content that it is. After all, the content associated with the 
expression ‘being the sun’ differs precisely in this respect between Tycho and Kepler. On a kind of view that in 7.1.5 
I dubbed Variable Content View, the experiential content of cases that belong to the second kind would thus be 
influenced by false or irrational beliefs. Arguably, they can thus count as hijacked by the subject’s outlook. In contrast, 
on an account of experiential content on which the content of experience is not co-determined by the subject’s beliefs 
or further background states, but in some other way, it could be argued that cases that belong to the second kind of 
cases would be like cases that belong to the first kind of case, in that they also provide propositional justification for 
the content the experience represents, but not doxastic justification. 
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interactions could be construed as involving our seeing others as performing actions under specific 
evaluative characterization.48 As we interact with others, we might thus see them as e.g. plotting against 
us (though they may not be), as friendly towards us (even though they are just acting politely), as 
indifferent towards us (though they are in fact trying to help us), as harboring feelings towards us that 
they do not in fact harbor, or, generally, as acting under descriptions they would fiercely reject as 
inaccurate.  
On Siegel’s Rich Content View (and on Hanson’s view, too), and given that the entire account 
she develops in The Rationality of Perception rests on accepting the idea that one’s background view can 
modify how things look to one, it thus seems possible that many of these cases could be construed as 
cases in which it is the putative content of our experiences itself that is influenced by our outlook, by 
our fears, suspicions, and by our false or irrational beliefs.49 By the same token, many of these cases 
could thus be classified as cases of hijacked experience. If so, however, then on Siegel’s view, and in 
the absence of further restrictions, it would be as irrational in such cases for us to believe our eyes as 
it would be irrational for Vivek to believe his eyes when to him, his audience looks pleased. Moreover, 
in such cases, our experience would not serve to justify the beliefs we form on its basis (alone) and 
would thus fail to properly execute its default rational role. As a result, in many of our social 
                                                 
48  This is in fact Siegel’s actual view. After all, she spends a lot of effort of considering cases in which e.g. racial biases 
may influence subjects’ experiences. As she does, she asserts, inter alia, that subject’s experiences can present people 
as having the property of being dangerous (I will draw on a similar scenario in chapter 8).  
49  It may seem as if I am relying here on the idea we saw operative in Hanson, i.e. that each false and irrational belief in 
the subject’s background view co-determines (through being related to it via subjunctive conditionals), and thus 
potentially hijacks, the content of a given subject’s experience (which may or may not have effects on its phenomenal 
character, too, which an account Non-Arbitrariness would have to settle). However, arguably even a less 
thoroughgoing holistic account of content determination that allows background views to co-determine content in 
some ways, but not fully, would raise similar issues. Siegel could try to defend a notion of how experiential content is 
determined on which the individuation of such content is shielded from at least some false or irrational beliefs that 
figure in our background view. At least currently, such an account is pending. 
Perhaps Siegel could also respond by accepting a broadly holistic account of content determination and then 
state that not every such effect will be significant enough to reduce the epistemic power of the experience so as to 
drag it below the baseline required for justification. In that case, an account would be required that illuminates what 
it takes for false and irrational background beliefs to be bad enough to drag the resulting experience below the baseline.  
I suspect that Siegel may not accept a broadly holistic account of content determination and be more sympathetic 
to an account on which phenomenal states whose contents have not been modulated by inference have an intrinsic 
content that is somehow determined by the objects and properties of the environing items that the subject sees and 
that give rise to the relevant phenomenal states in standard conditions. At any rate, and again, in the absence of a full 
Siegelian account of Experiential Content, it is impossible to determine what her response would be. 
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interactions with others, we should, instead of responding in a way that seems rational from our 
perspective, suspend judgment. Arguably, such concerns are further amplified if we consider what 
story one would need to tell, on the kind of view Siegel proposes, about the progress we made in 
transitioning from world views that appeared to license believing in, say, a nature populated with gods, 
spirits, and personified forces of nature, in the existence of ill-wishing witches, in a geocentric world-
view, or in the moral, cultural, intellectual, racial, and overall supremacy of white males, to today’s 
world view—with all the errors, imperfections, and overt and hidden inconsistencies that the latter 
may still contain. Analogously, consider the individual progress each of us makes as we respond to 
our experience of others, as we (if things go well) slowly come to learn how to see their actions for 
what they are intended to be, as opposed to what we wish, suspect, or fear them to be.  
With respect to both these developmental trajectories, on Siegel’s view, the story to be told will 
involve numerous irrational experiences, experiences that unbeknownst to the respective agents were 
formed irrationally, were accordingly sapped of their justificatory powers, and could thus not in fact 
justify the beliefs that were formed on their basis. In hindsight, i.e. from a vantage point that, 
presumably, provides more accurate standards of rationality, it would thus seem as if both in our 
individual history and throughout the cultural, intellectual, and moral evolution of contemporary 
society, experience played its alleged primary role only rarely. After all, on the view under 
consideration, it will have played it (and still does) only in ideal conditions, which for all we know may 
obtain only infrequently. If so, it begins to seem rather puzzling how these irrational experiences and 
responses could have played an important role in helping us make progress, overcome many 
prejudices, fears, ill-directed wishes, hopes, and desires, and false conceptions of the world and of the 
self. In short: if, as Siegel holds, endorsing the putative content of an irrational experience counts as 
epistemic and rational failure, the question arises how a story that may involve, and not just at its 
inception, numerous failures of that sort could be at the same time the story of epistemic and rational 
progress. 
Perhaps such worries could be dispelled. But to see how, I contend, what we need from Siegel is 
not a better conception of how experiential content could be influenced by irrational processes. 
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Rather, we need a conception that shows that even if hijacking were, or had been, pervasive, 
experience could still serve as what helps us overcome false and irrational beliefs. We need a 
conception of experience on which it could serve us even when our background views are fairly poor, 
maximally false or irrational, so that many of our experiences are hijacked. In the next section, I will 
suggest that in a sense to be explained, Siegel’s view is unstable, and then sketch the alternative 
conception of the rational role of experience that I recommend we adopt. 
7.3 THE GENERAL ROLE OF EXPERIENCE 
As we saw in the previous section, the reason Siegel rejects traditional approaches to the epistemic 
role of experience is that they predict that Vivek’s hijacked experience provides further evidence for, 
and serves to justify, the irrational belief that his audience is pleased with his performance. It is to a 
large extent because she holds, quite plausibly, that such a consequence should be rejected that her 
own proposal begins to look more attractive—after all, it does not entail the untoward consequence.  
7.3.1 Dropping the Standard Representationalist Conception of the Role of Experience 
There is an alternative way of blocking the consequence that Siegel does not consider. It, too, involves 
breaking with traditional approaches, yet in a way that differs from Siegel’s suggestion. As we will see 
in the next chapters, acknowledging it brings into view a range of possible positions some of which 
are quite compatible with much of Siegel’s own view. For instance, these positions can absorb Siegel’s 
claim that subjects, by having experiences that have been hijacked by irrational outlooks, manifest 
their irrationality. Moreover, these positions are fully compatible with a part of Siegel’s account that 
we have not discussed, i.e. her specific elaboration of the claim that experiential contents can indeed 
251 
 
be influenced by the subject’s psychological precursors in a way that Siegel characterizes as a kind of 
inference.50  
Here, then, is the suggestion: drop the conception of the default rational role of experience that 
Siegel shares with the proponents of the traditional approaches that she rejects. We should, that is, 
drop the idea that the default role of experience is that of serving to justify beliefs. 
First, note that this conception of experience as serving to justify beliefs is deeply entrenched in 
contemporary literature. If one brackets views (relatively few in number) on which the role of 
experience is merely causal or on which episodic experience is a confused notion that should be 
dropped altogether,51 it is not an overstatement to say that the conception of experience as playing the 
normative role of constraining our views by providing justification is the default view—even though 
there is massive dispute about how the details of such a view are to be spelled out.  
The conception is so widely shared that it is sometimes drawn on to motivate representationalist 
views of experience.52 We can see a precursor of this in Hanson. For Hanson, recall, to be epistemically 
significant, experience must be able to bear on our views. And if we ask, next, what it is for experience 
to have such a bearing, then pointing to the putative justificatory role of experience is one popular 
way to answer. And if experience is taken to represent things as being thus and so—if it has, as Siegel 
suggests, accuracy conditions—it becomes immediately intelligible how experience could serve the 
role of justifying beliefs. To assume that this is what experience does for us is to endorse “a natural 
next idea” (Siegel 2017, p. 60). That said, justification is not the only way in which experience could 
                                                 
50  More specifically, on the broad notion of inference Siegel defends, it is not necessary for subject who engages in an 
inference to consciously reckon that some information supports the conclusion (though inferences may, of course, 
involve such reckoning, and often do). This view creates the conceptual leeway for the proposal that experiential 
contents can be generated by unconscious inferences—in short: by way of the subject’s engaging in inference without 
reckoning. Siegel develops this account of inference in Siegel 2017, chapter 5. 
51  Both Davidson and Quine fall into the former, Rorty and Brandom in the latter category. I return to Brandom’s view 
in 10.3.1 
52  It is worth noting, though, that the view that experience serves to justify is not just shared by proponents of 
representationalist accounts of experience. In the contemporary literature on evidentialism, for example, many (but 
not all) take it for granted that experience serves as a source of evidence for one’s beliefs (see e.g. Feldman and Conee 
1985, Conee & Feldman 2004; and McCain 2014 for discussion). However, not every evidentialist is also a 
propositionalist, such as e.g. Kvanvig 2007, who thinks that experience, to serve as evidence, must have propositional 
content. Instead, evidentialism can be paired with views on which experiential states can be justifiers even if they have 
no content at all. 
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bear on our beliefs. Moreover, neither representationalism nor Hanson’s view of how concepts figure 
in experience entail a conception of the default role of experience as serving to justify beliefs. The 
Content View, Hanson’s View, and representationalist views more broadly can be dislodged from it.  
Dropping the idea that providing justification is experience’s default rational role, I contend, need 
not be as much of a deviation from Siegel’s view as it may seem. After all, as I suggested in the last 
section, it is precisely part of the point of her view, that in cases of hijacked experience, experience 
cannot play that role (not, that is, in virtue of the part of its content that is hijacked). Moreover, if on 
Siegel’s Rich Content View it is indeed possible, if not likely, that at least in the past, our experience 
was hijacked rather frequently, and maybe still is in many circumstances, it follows that experience 
may play that role only rarely.53 This is, of course, not to say that it could never play that role. If 
circumstances are right, it may. But if such circumstances do not always obtain, or obtain only rarely, 
then even in the context of Siegel’s own view, rejecting the idea that providing justification is 
experience’s default rational role is not entirely unmotivated and the resulting view can still be quite 
friendly to her view and retain the Content View.54 
If we consider what it might be to reject this conception, we soon realize that it is only if we accept 
it that the specific problem that Siegel thinks is posed by cases of hijacked experience, and to which 
her account is a response, so much as arises. Only on the assumption that the default role of experience 
is indeed to provide justification for the beliefs or judgments that subjects form on the basis of it, it 
                                                 
53  Again, how pressing this issue is hinges on the account of content determination one endorses and that Siegel does 
not provide. 
54  For something to be the primary role or function of something, it need not play that role always. The primary function 
of a knife could be cutting, even if it does not always cut. Likewise, that experience does not play the role of justifying 
beliefs always—perhaps often not, or only in choice circumstances—does not entail that justifying beliefs could not 
still be held to be its default role.  
Taken together with the fact that will transpire shortly, viz. that on Siegel’s view, hijacked experience has no role 
to play, the problem of rational story-telling sketched above, and the fact that on the alternative view I will 
recommend, the implication that Siegel, too, acknowledges as counterintuitive—i.e. that Vivek, in believing his eyes, 
is irrational, but would be rational if he did what for him must seem highly irrational—does not arise, I take it that 
the view I recommend is much more attractive. As I will show, it avoids each and every one of the issues just 
mentioned, has the conceptual leeway for accommodating the idea that the justification of beliefs is one role experience 
may sometimes play, provides a way of characterizing the conditions in which it would play it, and at the same time 
does without the revisionary assumption that experience has epistemic powers that are opaque to the subject.  
In any event, what I am after is a conception of a role of experience on which experience never fails to play it. 
And clearly, on Siegel’s view, the role of providing justification for one’s beliefs does not fit that particular bill. 
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follows that Vivek’s experience provides justification for an irrational belief that it should not and 
cannot justify. But once this assumption is dropped, the untoward consequence no longer follows. 
Accordingly, one may well choose to remain committed to Siegel’s claim that experience, in virtue of 
having content, has epistemic powers that in cases of hijacking are diminished. But once the 
conception of the default role of experience as serving to justify beliefs is dropped, such a commitment 
becomes at best optional. 
The situation, thus, is this: by looking at how Siegel’s view classifies various experiences, i.e. as 
hijacked and thus to be ignored, we can extract some motivation for the idea that one could drop the 
conception of the default role of experience as that of justifying beliefs altogether. If one does drop 
the conception, however, some other parts of her account become less motivated, e.g. the idea that 
experiences have epistemic powers to justify beliefs that could be modified by their cognitive and 
psychological precursors. Note also that if we drop the standard conception of experience’s primary 
role as providing justification, yet another part of Siegel’s account becomes less motivated. Consider 
the following question: what, if any, might the positive role of a hijacked experience be? Remarkably, 
on the view Siegel proposes, the answer to this question appears to be: none. Hijacked experiences, it 
seems, are both epistemically and rationally inert. For again, on Siegel’s view, experiential contents 
that unbeknownst to the subject have been sapped of their epistemic powers are irrational. The subject 
is irrational in having experiences with such contents and would be irrational in endorsing them. For 
such a subject, the rational response to her hijacked experience, Siegel suggests, is suspending belief, 
which in effect amounts to the suggestion that one’s hijacked experiences, or rather: their hijacked 
parts, are to be ignored.  
As I suggested above, such a response must seem highly irrational from the perspective of the 
experiencing subject. Moreover, if hijacking were indeed widespread, which in e.g. social interactions 
it may well be, then believing one’s eyes would, on Siegel’s view, often be irrational. Finally, even if 
one knew that one’s current experience may be hijacked, there does not seem to be any positive role, 
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on Siegel’s view, that a hijacked experience could play in such contexts.55 Above, we noted the strong 
temptation to say that in the absence of defeating considerations that are accessible to Vivek, believing 
his eyes is rationally permissible, perhaps even rational. As we saw, Siegel, too, acknowledges the pull 
of this idea, but cannot accept it. Yet patently, what prevents Siegel from endorsing a more positive 
conception of the role of hijacked experience just is the very conception of the default role of 
experience that I suggest we can drop. For dropping it paves the way towards the possibility of 
defending a kind of view that combines the following claims:  
Irrationally Hijacked Subject  
The fact that a subject has a hijacked experience indicates that something about 
her psychological or cognitive configuration is irrational.  
Rational Endorsement of Hijacked Experience 
In endorsing the putative content of her hijacked experience, subjects need not 
be irrational, but may act in ways that are rationally permissible, perhaps even 
rational. 
On Siegel’s view, Rational Endorsement of Hijacked Experience is false and Irrationally 
Hijacked Subject is supplemented with two further ideas: a) as per the (Rich) Content View, 
hijacked experiences have (possibly rich) experiential contents and b) the hijacked experiential 
contents are themselves irrational—a feature they inherit from their psychological and cognitive 
precursors.  
In chapter 9, I will present a view which illustrates that these further ideas are completely optional. 
But if, for now, we keep them in place, my recommendation is the following: we should drop the 
conception of experience Siegel shares with the opponents she considers. Once we do, on the resulting 
                                                 
55  Siegel considers cases in which the epistemic effect irrational beliefs have on the conclusion one draws based on them 
can wash out in the presence of suitable further beliefs (see e.g. Siegel 2017, p. 42, p. 109). Analogously, she might 
perhaps accept that that instead of saying that generally, hijacked experiences are sapped of their epistemic powers, 
in some cases, the ways in which their irrational contents may negatively affect the well-foundedness of the beliefs 
that subjects base on such experiences could similarly wash out due to the presence of suitable further beliefs in the 
subject’s background view. A hijacked experience, in other words, could be part of the minimal unit that provides 
baseline justification, e.g. for the belief that in current circumstances, one should suspend one’s judgment. Note, 
however, that if this is accepted, the assumption that in such cases, the experiential content itself is sapped of its 
epistemic powers seems entirely otiose, since the work this assumption is supposed to do is actually done by the 
further beliefs contained in the subject’s background view. My own proposal, to be revealed shortly, can be 
understood as taking such cases not as exceptions, but as illustrating what is the case generally. 
255 
 
Siegelian view, nothing stands in the way of accepting Rational Endorsement of Hijacked 
Experience as well. For if being rational in one’s response to the content of one’s experience is no 
longer narrowly construed as requiring that this content serve to actually justify that response, 
endorsing the putative content of a hijacked experience can be rational. In other words, dropping the 
conception of the default role of experience as justifying beliefs brings into view the possibility of an 
account that keeps much of Siegel’s position intact and at the same time respects the overwhelming 
intuitive plausibility of the idea that Vivek, in believing his eyes, may well act rationally.   
7.3.2 No Defensive Measures Necessary 
Before we consider what a better alternative conception of experience’s rational role may be, let us 
rephrase the results of the previous subsection in a slightly different way. As I suggested, the problem 
that Siegel’s account of epistemic powers is supposed to address only arises in the context of the 
default conception of experience as providing justification. Accordingly, I contend that we should 
construe the idea that hijacked experiences are sapped off their epistemic power as a strongly defensive 
move—one that is designed to protect the conception of experience as providing justification that Siegel 
shares with other standard representationalists from yielding untoward consequences.  
Something similar holds true for the idea that the rational thing to do in response to hijacked 
experience is to suspend judgment. In effect, this idea is nothing but an injunction to the effect that 
what cannot be drawn on to provide justification should not be drawn on. Both measures—the 
account of epistemic powers and the injunction—taken together are thus defensive measures whose 
sole purpose is to ensure that hijacked experiences are taken out of the business of epistemic 
justification and that who draws on them anyway acts irrationally and can be dismissed. But in devising 
such measures, whatever positive role hijacked experiences may be able to play is ignored. Moreover, 
to do so is to run the risk of failing to capture the following fact: in an important sense, the rationality 
of a subject who responds to her hijacked experience in the only way that from her perspective seems 
rational to her is completely unimpaired.  
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Incidentally, let us note the following: if we see implementing these measures as a defensive move 
that is intended to protect the standard conception of experience as providing justification, this 
explains in a rather straightforward way why the measures—questionable anyway—immediately lose 
what appeal they may have had once we drop the standard conception. For if protecting that 
conception is what they are designed to do, then eschewing it makes them lose their defining function.  
Siegel’s original position, I contend, is unstable in the following way. In an attempt to protect the 
standard conception of the rational role of experience, she implements measures that ensure that in 
cases where it should not play that role, experience does not play it, whereas experiences that do play 
that role have no untoward epistemic effects. At the same time, implementing these measures brings 
it about that the experiences they target do not play any rational role at all.  
Above, I have been pushing the thought that there could well be, in fact were, and probably still 
are contexts in which our experience is very likely to be massively hijacked—perhaps contexts 
characteristic of certain areas of discourse or kinds of social interactions, or contexts that may have 
been much more common in our cultural and intellectual past. In such contexts, the defensive 
measures must do a lot of work. But the more work they are taken to do, the more the idea that the 
default role of experience could indeed be that of justifying beliefs loses its appeal. But if so, then the 
consideration of cases in which the measures Siegel implements work hard and well invite us to doubt 
that the conception of the rational role of experience that these measures are supposed to protect is 
attractive. 
7.3.3 The Alternative 
If the rationality of one’s response to one’s experience is not construed in terms of justification, how 
else could Siegel-friendly representationalists construe it? Here is the proposal: whether a subject in 
endorsing the putative content of her experience is rational or not is neither a matter of the epistemic 
status of the putative experiential content, nor a matter of the epistemic status of the resulting belief 
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or judgment. Rather, it is a matter of whether forming and endorsing such beliefs and judgments is 
rational—given and by the lights of the subject’s experience and her background view.  
The general role of experience, according to the conception that I adopt from Anil Gupta, is to 
make rational view-dependent transitions to beliefs, judgments, and other responses, e.g. actions or 
activities such as suspending belief.56 Crucially, this conception of the rational role of experience is 
absolutely general. In other words, experience plays this role without exception, regardless of whether 
one’s experience is hijacked or not.  
To illustrate, note that on this conception, Vivek, in believing his eyes, does not act irrationally. 
For in light both of Vivek’s experience and of his background beliefs, for him to transition to the 
belief that the response of his audience to his performance is somewhere between neutral and pleased 
is perfectly rational. Both some of his background beliefs and the belief he transitions to may well be 
false or irrational. However, given that Vivek inhabits the doxastic context he does and that he has 
the experience that he does, making the relevant transition is not. Of course, on the conception I am 
proposing, it remains true that Vivek, in responding to his experience by believing his eyes, forms a 
judgment that is irrational. As we saw above, Siegel takes the fact that a belief formed on the basis of 
a given experiences is epistemically flawed as a reason to seek an epistemic flaw in the experience itself. 
On an alternative Siegel-friendly view, we could accept that in undergoing the experience that he does, 
Vivek manifests his irrationality. At the same time, we need not locate the flaw primarily in the 
experience itself, but in what accounts for his having the experience in the first place: his irrational 
antecedent view. We can also grant that the content of Vivek’s experience inherits some of this 
irrationality. But doing so does not prevent us from insisting that in the following important sense, 
Vivek’s rationality is not impaired: he responds to his experience in a way that given both the 
experience and his antecedent view is perfectly rational. 
                                                 
56  Gupta first develops this idea in Gupta 2006 and, in much more detail, in Gupta 2019, chapter 4. He claims that 
experience, if conjoined with a background view, also makes rational other things besides judgments and beliefs, e.g. 
ostensive definitions. I address, slightly modify, and further develop parts of Gupta’s view in chapter 9. 
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As he responds to his hijacked experience, Vivek’s epistemic situation does not improve. But it 
could. Suppose that Vivek, perhaps in response to a well-meaning friend’s careful criticism, begins to 
entertain it as a possibility that his current experience is hijacked. Once he does, his doxastic context 
will have changed. Accordingly, it may no longer be rational for him, upon having a further suitably 
hijacked experience, to endorse its content. Rather, it may be more rational to suspend judgment and 
get a second opinion—his friend’s, perhaps, or that of select audience members. As a consequence of 
fielding their opinions, his epistemic position may improve. He might even decide to make an effort 
and pay special attention to his audiences. And it may be that as a consequence of entertaining it as 
possible that his experience may often be hijacked, the grip his vanity used to have on his experiences 
gradually diminishes. Perhaps he could learn to see the members of his audience more clearly, and 
assess their responses more accurately, which would further improve his epistemic position and make 
him less irrational overall. 
Again, on the alternative and, as I insist, fully general conception of the rational role of experience, 
we are not taking Vivek’s experience to provide additional justification for his irrational belief that his 
audience is pleased. Moreover, we grant that as he responds to his hijacked experience by way of 
endorsing that irrational belief, his epistemic situation does not improve. Does it get worse? Yes. For 
if prompted to provide reasons for his general irrational belief that his audiences are always pleased 
with him, Vivek will now have one more experience he draws on. More precisely, he will use the belief 
he formed on the basis of his experience as additional evidence to support his general irrational belief. 
In doing so, he may, from within his point of view, proceed quite rationally. But since to him, his 
general irrational belief appears to be strengthened, he is epistemically worse off.  
The root of the problem is, of course, that appearances are misleading. For in taking his 
experience as evidence that provides, or assists in providing, justification for an irrational belief, Vivek 
goes wrong. His general irrational belief is not really strengthened, he just takes it to be. Though in 
the context of his background view, his experience makes it rational for him to transition to the belief 
that his audience is pleased, making rational transitions is different from conferring justification. 
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Relatedly, we can agree that by repeatedly endorsing his hijacked experiences, Vivek can get 
himself into positions that from an epistemic perspective are increasingly worse. Responding to one’s 
experience can have such an effect. But we can insist that what explains such an epistemically 
pernicious trajectory is not that for Vivek to repeatedly transition to beliefs that match the putative 
contents of his hijacked experience must itself be irrational. Moreover, we can insist that we cannot 
explain the occurrence of the epistemically pernicious trajectory simply by pointing to Vivek’s 
experiences. For given a suitable background view, having an experience with a content that is hijacked 
need not make it rational to transition to a belief that matches the hijacked content. Accordingly, a 
crucial element of what explains the epistemically pernicious trajectory is that the irrational elements 
in Vivek’s background view by whose lights transitioning to irrational beliefs is rational are never 
addressed of removed. And there may well be opportunities for him to do so that Vivek ignores. 
Ignoring such opportunities can be irrational and indeed pathological. For suppose, again, that 
Vivek is told by a critic that as she experienced things, some or all of his audience members were bored 
or displeased. His vanity might lead him to disregard such comments. Suppose, further, that as a 
consequence of his bad performances, his audience keeps shrinking. Again, his vanity could prevent 
him from even entertaining the thought that this is due to the quality of his performances. Instead, he 
might lament the alleged fact that discerning audiences are increasingly hard to find.  
Plainly, what would make Vivek irrational in such a scenario is not that upon having the 
experiences he undergoes, he believes his eyes. Rather, what makes him irrational is that his vanity is 
so dominant that it prevents him from entertaining it as possible that his critics may be right and that 
the leaving members of his audience are more discerning than he gives them credit for. 
If, on the other hand, Vivek listens to his critics, suspending judgment on his hijacked experience 
may well come into view as the most reasonable response to his hijacked experience. But crucially, it 
comes into view as the most reasonable response within Vivek’s own doxastic context. This would become 
possible if Vivek’s vanity is not too pathological to prevent him from being properly responsive to 
what others tell him. For through being so responsive, he may gradually come to inhabit a doxastic 
context that makes it rational for him to respond to his experience in a way that may, in one sense, be 
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as rational as it was when he simply believed his eyes. But in a different, yet compatible sense, is more 
rational overall in that it also yields beliefs and judgments that are more rational overall. Note that the 
conception of the primary role of experience I recommend has Siegel-friendly versions also in that the 
role is general enough to allow representationalists like Siegel to hold on to the thought that assisting 
in justifying beliefs is an interesting role that experiences can and perhaps do play often. However, 
pace Siegel, what enables experience to play this role is not determined by the rational status of 
experience itself, or its alleged epistemic powers. Rather, whether a given experience can play that role, 
in a given context, depends on the rational and epistemic status of the experiencing subject’s 
background view. In other words, if, in the context of a given experience, the background view that 
the subject brings to bear on that experience is sufficiently correct, rational, and justified, the subject’s 
experience will make it rational for the subject to form beliefs that are indeed justified.57 And if the 
subject is sufficiently aware of the possibility of hijacking, this can be so even if the experience in 
question is massively hijacked. 
Note also that the conception I recommend solves another issue—one that I suggested, in the 
previous section, besets Siegel’s original view. For consider again the trajectory that may have led from 
initially fantastic, false, and irrational world views to the (presumably) less irrational world view that 
we inhabit today.58 Moreover, consider the individual trajectory that may have led from our initially 
murky vision of others and our social interactions with them to an improved way of seeing who they 
are and what they do. On the conception I suggest, both may well be trajectories that for the most 
part involve responses to one’s experience that are rational in the broad sense that I have sketched.59 
On that note, if we recall the scenario in which Vivek manages to overcome the negative effects 
of his vanity, we can see the importance that on the conception I recommend attaches to one’s being 
and remaining responsive to what others have to say, to one’s paying proper attention to who they are 
                                                 
57  Still, whether a belief is indeed justified in some absolute sense may well be a matter that is extremely hard to settle.  
58  The assumption that there is one world view that we all inhabit is an idealization. The situation is much more complex 
in that individual world views differ, at times massively.  
59  I thus take it that the conception I am recommending is better suited than Siegel’s to serve as an approach to rationally 
reconstructing e.g. the trajectory of scientific and of individual moral progress. 
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and what they do, and to one’s remaining flexible in entertaining as possible different ways of seeing 
both them, ourselves, their and our own actions. On this conception, making epistemic and rational 
progress, both individually and as a community, is a deeply social enterprise. In this enterprise, the 
willingness to listen to others, to acknowledge and try to understand the motivations and the rational 
credentials of their ways of seeing things—which may well differ from our own—becomes a crucial 
prerequisite for improvement. For remaining open to alternative interpretations of experience and 
paying close attention to how others respond to theirs promise the fruit of getting a better 
understanding both of who they are, of who we are, of what it is that we do and believe and what 
weeding out false and irrational components of our cognitive and psychological context may require. 
Relatedly, I suggest that accepting the idea that our experiences may be hijacked and be affected 
by our psychological and cognitive outlooks should instill in us both humility and compassion. For 
one, it suggests that to assess whether someone acts rationally, we must consider not just how we see 
the actions in questions. On the view I am recommending, when others act in ways that we find 
objectionable, their actions may nevertheless be rational responses to their experience, given the 
doxastic context they inhabit. To the extent that we take them to go astray, acknowledging that they 
may nevertheless act rationally should instill compassion. Conversely, acknowledging that the vision 
of others may be clearer where ours is murky should keep us humble.60 
                                                 
60  I adopt the language of clear vision, humility, and compassion from Iris Murdoch (cf. Murdoch 1970). In this context, 
pursuing this topic further would be too much of a digression. But I think that the conception of the role of experience 
I recommend resonates exceptionally well with Murdoch’s idea that moral progress involves a purification of vision, 
and may even serve to motivate it (for one development of this idea, see Rosenhagen ms-a., for another that draws 
on Buddhist conceptions of compassion, see Rosenhagen ms-b).  
Incidentally, I also take it that the suggestion that we should treat other experiencing agents with compassion 
captures an important aspect of an idea that Robert Brandom develops in his reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit 
(cf. Brandom ms): the idea that in treating others, we need to magnanimously forgive them when they apply norms 
to particular cases in ways that we see as deficient. Doing so involves trying to find a broader purpose that the deficient 
application can be seen to have contributed to. Appreciating the ways in which others may be responding rationally 
to their experience, even if we disagree with the background view against which such responses are rational, I contend, 
can be part of what finding such a purpose involves. The notion of humility, on the other hand, roughly corresponds 
to Brandom’s (Hegelian) notion of confession, which is construed as the subject’s acknowledgement of the fact that her 
own way of seeing and judging things may in turn be deficient and thus be such as to require forgiveness by others. 
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7.3.4 Taking Stock 
In this section, I took my cues from Siegel’s own concession that in cases of hijacked experience, 
experience does not play what on the conception that she shares with her representationalist 
opponents is its alleged default role: that of justifying beliefs and judgments.  
I then suggested that we can drop this conception of the default role of experience altogether. 
This move, I suggested, is in part motivated by looking at Siegel’s own view. Moreover, doing so 
allows us to devise a Siegel-friendly view that keeps many of Siegel’s other claims intact. That said, I 
also argued that if we drop the standard conception, the revisionary and counterintuitive elements of 
her view lose their appeal. They lose their defining function: that of protecting the standard 
conception. Dropping the standard conception thus paves the way towards a family of views some of 
which can take many of Siegel’s commitments on board. At the same, doing so reduces the appeal of 
accepting Siegel’s more revisionary moves, i.e., first, the idea that experiences have epistemic powers 
and, second, the claim that subjects who upon having a hijacked experience believe their eyes, must 
in doing so act irrationally. 
On the alternative conception I recommend, the fully general role of experience is to make 
rational background-view dependent transitions to (accepting) beliefs, judgments, and other actions 
or activities such as suspending belief. I claimed that this conception if fully general und showed that 
accepting it allows us to address some of the issues that arise for Siegel’s account. Finally, I indicated 
that the conception can be used to highlight the social dimension of cultural, intellectual, and moral 
progress and the importance for such progress of intellectual flexibility, humility, and compassion. 
In the next two chapters, I will gradually move away from Siegel’s view even further. This will 
bring into view other accounts that can accommodate the conception I recommend. More specifically, 
I will show that the conception of the general role of experience I recommend does not only allow us 
to recouch Hanson’s view (chapter 8), but is compatible with views on which experience has no 
content at all (chapter 9).
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8.0 HANSON REVAMPED 
In the previous chapters, we examined various competing conceptions of experience—two 
representationalist, and three relationalists ones. After finding fault with Hanson’s representationalist 
proposal, I argued that we should reject relationalist proposals as well as the standard 
representationalist proposal offered by Siegel. 
Let us briefly recap one of issues we encountered in the course of our analysis of the latter. Siegel’s 
view entails, recall, that experience does not always serve to justify beliefs. If hijacked experiences lose 
their epistemic powers and when subjects, upon having such experiences, believe their eyes, their 
experience does not play that role. If we drop the default conception or experience as justifying beliefs 
completely, we pull the rug under the assumption that hijacked experiences are problematic in that 
they appear to illicitly provide additional justification for false or irrational beliefs. Consequently, doing 
so removes the need for Siegel’s defensive measures, her account of variable epistemic powers of 
experience and the injunction that hijacked experiences are to be disregarded. It is then open to us to 
suggest an alternative conception of the role of experience, one that takes seriously the intuition Siegel 
disregards. For on this conception, we can concede that in endorsing the contents of a hijacked 
experience, subjects may be transitioning to beliefs that are irrational. But at the same time, and 
importantly, we can insist, against Siegel, that in the context provided by their experience and their 
doxastic setting, this may be a perfectly rational thing for subjects to do. 
I suggested we endorse a conception (first offered in Gupta 2006), according to which the rational 
role of experience is to make rational view-dependent transitions to, inter alia, beliefs, judgments, and 
actions. This conception of the role of experience, I claimed, is completely general. It is never 
undermined, not even in cases in which the subject’s experience is hijacked. Moreover, the conception 
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is compatible with the possibility that in the context provided by a suitable background view, subjects 
can respond even to thoroughly hijacked experiences by way of transitioning to beliefs in a way that 
is not only rational, given their experiences and their view, but that also yields justified beliefs. 
Relatedly, I suggested that if combined with Siegel’s Content View, the conception allows us to hold 
on to the idea that in suitable doxastic circumstances, experience may well serve to justify beliefs, viz. 
in circumstances in which the subject’s background view is sufficiently correct, rational, and justified. 
In the next section, I argue that we can move even further away from Siegel’s view by a) dropping 
Siegel’s Content View, b) adopting to a Hansonian account of experience, thus c) dropping the idea 
that the content of experience is true or false. As I will illustrate, the conception of experience as 
making rational view-dependent transitions to beliefs, judgments, etc. is compatible both with a 
Hansonian account of experiential content and with his account of empirical constraint, on which 
one’s experience can lead to a change in one’s background view, which in turn may alter one’s 
experience.  
As I do, I distinguish various ways in which changes in the subject’s background view could affect 
her (Hansonian) experience. Among such effects, I suggest, are changes in Amalgamation. 
Amalgamation, in other words, need not be construed as permanent. Furthermore, how experiential 
phenomenology and instances of seeing as are amalgamated, in a given subject’s mental economy, can 
be heavily context-dependent. Also, relations of amalgamation can vary in robustness. But as I will 
argue, even in cases in which suitable changes in the subject’s background do not affect the subject’s 
experience at all, it will still be the case that such changes may affect which transitions to judgments, 
beliefs, etc. having that experience makes rational. Moreover, as on the Siegelian view we discussed in 
the last section of the previous chapter, given the right circumstances, experience may still play a vital 
role in arriving at beliefs that are in fact justified.  
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8.1 A HANSONIAN VARIABLE CONTENT VIEW 
In 7.3.3, I sketched a view that adopts the conception of the general role of experience I recommend 
and at the same time keeps much of Siegel’s view intact, notably the Content View. This view, I 
suggested, solves some of the problems that beset Siegel’s view, such as promising to provide a better 
account of individual and rational progress and dropping revisionary or counterintuitive claims. It 
does not, however, solve all of Siegel’s problems. Notably, it, too, leaves us without an account of 
experiential content and does not address the issue of Non-Arbitrariness. As we consider a version 
of Hanson’s view that is supplemented by the conception of the rational role of experience I 
recommend, it will thus be opportune to keep in mind the Hansonian counterpart of this issue: the 
problem of Amalgamation.  
In what follows, I proceed as follows. First, I draw attention to the fact that moving from Siegel’s 
account and the Siegelian account sketched in 7.3 to a Hansonian account puts us in a better position 
with respect to addressing the issue of experiential content (8.1.1). Next, I show that Hanson’s account 
of empirical constraint can be characterized in terms of the conception of the general role of 
experience I recommend (8.1.2). Then, I sketch an account of changes in the subject’s background 
view might affect her subsequent experience. In doing so, I provide a partial account of how ways in 
which phenomenal states and instances of seeing as are amalgamated may be modified by changes in 
the subject’s view, which yields the Hansonian Variable Content View. (8.1.3) Triggered by a brief 
comparison between Modifiable Amalgamation and Genone’s view, I propose that we may think 
about the relation between phenomenal states and instances of seeing as in terms of what I will call 
dispositions of amalgamation (8.1.4). In the final section (8.2), I suggest that to model the behavior 
experiencing subjects actually exhibit, we can add a further level of dispositions—dispositons to transition. 
Summing up, I list various ways in which the view needs to be developed further, and emphasize both 
its advantages over Siegel’s view and the fact that it, too, affords the conceptual leeway required for 
the idea that experience can contribute to justification. 
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8.1.1 Experiential Content 
Like for Siegel, for Hanson, too, experiential content can be rich. As we saw, Siegel construes such 
richness in terms of the variety of properties that experience can present as instantiated. For Hanson, 
on the other hand, richness is a matter of which concepts can complement the seeing as locution.1 
Recall that in contrast to Siegel’s account, it is an important facet of Hanson’s account of the 
theory-ladenness of observation that he seeks to provide the resources for addressing the question of 
how to understand experiential content. For Hanson, this question became salient in his attempt to 
find a way of explaining the following kind of case: as Tycho and Kepler see the sun in identical 
environing circumstances, see it as the sun, and may even have experiences that are exactly alike in 
their phenomenology, they may still see different things. As our discussion in the first chapter brought 
out, the solution Hanson offers is a broadly holistic account of conceptual content. On it, what the 
concepts complementing the seeing as locution are, for the experiencing subject, is construed in terms 
of the ways in which they are inferentially articulated in that subject’s background view.2 Recall that 
on this account, theory-ladenness, construed as a semantic relation, is not a contingent feature of 
                                                 
1  Since the ‘seeing as’ locution can be complemented by all sorts of predicates, there are, arguably, only very few 
constraints on what such contents could possibly be. There is, for instance, no restriction to contents that are taken 
to pick out properties that are observable to the human eye. In a physics classroom, dots and squiggles on the 
blackboard can be seen as representing moving neutrinos, even though neither neutrinos and their movements, nor 
the property of representing something unobservable can be literally seen. Recall also that ‘seeing as’ can be 
complemented by e.g. evaluative predicates such “a good/dangerous/nosy/cowardly person,” or by identity 
predicates such as “identical with Nero.” It would at least be contentious to characterize all such predicates as picking 
out observable features.  
Generally, restrictions as to what such complements could be will plausibly derive from the background view in 
which they are articulated and the commitments this view involves with respect to which predicates are robustly 
incompatible. For example, given that we think that nothing can be green and red all over—indeed, we take this belief 
to be a crucial part of our concepts of red, green, and, presumably, colors in general—nothing can be seen as green 
and red all over, nor could anything be seen as a round square, or as F and not F in the same respect. Note that some 
predicates that appear incompatible can turn out to be compatible after all. After all, it is, on Hanson’s account, 
through seeing things as behaving in ways that previously (and perhaps erroneously) were deemed unlikely or even 
impossible that modifications of the background view are triggered. As experience exerts its empirical constraint, and 
if we respond to it rationally, then if things go sufficiently well, experience may thus assist us in eventually gaining a 
better understanding of which predicates are in fact incompatible. 
2  This was part of the point of Hanson’s claim that seeing as is intelligible only in terms of seeing (and merely believing) 
that. 
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experiential content. Rather, the inferential articulation of concepts with other concepts is a feature 
that is essential for understanding what such content is.  
As we saw, in Hanson, the details of the broadly holistic account of concepts that he appears to 
endorse are not fully spelled out. He is, for instance, completely silent on the issue whether he also 
thinks that experiential phenomenology or referential relations between concepts and mind-
independent items could be part of what constitutes a concept’s content as well. Even so, once we 
grant, with Hanson, that its inferential articulation is at least co-constitutive of what a concept is, this 
allows us to explain how for Tycho and Kepler, seeing something as the sun could be instances of seeing 
the sun as different things: for ‘being the sun,’ as it is articulated in Tycho’s background view, is a 
different predicate than ‘being the sun’ as it is articulated in Kepler’s. 
As we saw, on Siegel’s view, things are much less clear. Suppose both Tycho and Kepler see the 
sun in identical environing circumstances. Moreover, suppose—as presumably Siegel would as well—
that both their experiences present the property of being the sun as instantiated. But what, exactly, is 
this property? What determines what this property is? Is it the same property in both experiences or 
are the properties presented as instantiated in Tycho’s and Kepler’s respective experiences different? 
If the former, how comes that both experiences present the same property as instantiated? And if the 
properties presented as instantiated differ, how is that to be explained? 
That Siegel remains silent with respect to such questions invites drawing a parallel between her 
proposal and Fish’s. For as we considered the latter, we ran up against the issue that he leaves us 
without an account of how to construe and individuate the properties that he thinks are lifted into the 
presentational character of experience by the passive exercise of conceptual capacities (and without a 
corresponding account of the conceptual capacities that are said to do such lifting).3 In the last chapter, 
I pointed out that Siegel leaves it unclear how to understand which properties a given phenomenal state 
is said to present. But this complaint comes in two flavors. One concerns what I dubbed the problem 
of Non-Arbitrariness—a problem that we can characterize by asking the question of what settles 
                                                 
3  This came up in the context of my attempt, in 4.4, to spell out how Fish could make good on his contention that 
experts and laypeople may have something perceptually in common. 
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how, given a set comprising determinate properties and a set containing kinds of phenomenal states, 
these two sets relate. The second is strikingly similar to the problem we raised for Fish: on Siegel’s 
view, it remains unclear how the properties that are said to be in some way presented in experience 
are individuated in the first place. In this latter respect, I contend, Hanson’s account is more 
illuminating than both Fish’s and Siegel’s. Consider again Tycho and Kepler looking at the sun at 
dawn. On Fish’s view, what the properties are that each lifts, through a passive deployment of their 
conceptual capacities, into the presentational character of their respective experiences, and how such 
properties are individuated, remains unclear. The reason, ultimately, is that it is unclear how we must 
think about the conceptual capacities operative in them. Are they the same in both, are they different? 
How? Likewise, on Siegel’s account, too, it remains completely unclear what determines what the 
properties are that Tycho’s and Kepler’s respective experiences present as instantiated.  
For Hanson, on the other hand, the situation is much better. He does not think about experiences 
as presenting properties as instantiated, but as involving the operation of concepts. And by virtue of 
claiming that the concepts figuring in a subject S’s experiential content derive an essential part of their 
meaning from the way they are inferentially articulated in the subject’s background view, he provides 
an answer to the question what individuates experiential contents and thus succeeds where both Fish 
and Siegel fail: in characterizing the difference between the experiential contents of Tycho’s and 
Kepler’s respective experiences. What enables him to do so, in part, is that in contrast to both the 
relationalists and Siegel, his stance towards the doxastic variability of experience is not defensive. 
Rather, and again, he accepts doxastic variability of this semantic kind as a necessary requirement on 
the intelligibility on experiential content. Accordingly, as we adopt Hanson’s broadly holistic account 
of Experimental Content (with the caveat that it may need to be supplemented further) we do not 
only address a problem that besets both Siegel’s and Fish’s accounts. We also take a much less 
defensive stance towards doxastic variability more generally than most of the philosophers who 
partake in the contemporary discussion about such issues. As will transpire, I will eventually suggest 
that we can eschew this defensive stance altogether. 
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8.1.2 Empirical Constraint Recouched 
In 2.4, I showed that according to Hanson, the possibility of doxastic effects on one’s experience, 
construed as semantic effects that one’s background belief have on what the concepts are that 
supplement the seeing as locution, does not rule out the possibility that experience can afford empirical 
constraint. That the latter remains possible was explained as follows: suppose we accept that the way 
the relevant concepts are articulated in the subject’s background serves to individuate an essential part 
of what these concepts mean, to the experiencing subject. Even so, the relevant background cannot 
plausibly determine what the mind-independent items seen are, nor how they behave. Nor need they 
fully determine the phenomenology of the subject’s experience. Even if projection effects, too, are 
possible, it is one thing to accept that such effects are possible, or actual, and quite another thing to 
also hold that our background views must systematically determine our experience in such a way that 
the beliefs we form on its basis will always keep the hijacking effects in place. 
Let us consider a concrete case. To begin with, suppose that Elijah’s background beliefs hijack 
his experience in such a way that he typically sees young black men as dangerous. He is biased. For 
ease of exposition, let us assume that the hijacking state is an irrational racially discriminatory generic 
belief that Elijah has adopted (and that he may not be fully aware of)—the belief that young black 
men are dangerous. Assume, further, that in Elijah’s case, the hijacking involves projection effects: the 
phenomenal dimension of Elijah’s experience is affected by his irrational belief in such a way that to 
him, all the young black men he encounters look such that he sees them as dangerous (whatever that 
may come to, phenomenally).4  
Clearly, Elijah’s background beliefs cannot determine who these men in fact are or what they do. 
It may thus well be that none of the young black men Elijah ever sees are in fact dangerous. Moreover, 
it may well be that he never witnesses any of them act in a dangerous way towards him—or, for that 
                                                 
4  I am, for now, operating under the assumption that for Elijah, there is a kind of phenomenal states that he enters 
upon seeing young black men and that such states are robustly amalgamated with his concepts such that entering such 
states just is for him to see these men as dangerous. I consider different ways of think about amalgamation in the next 
subsection. 
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matter, towards anyone else. But just as it would be absurd to think that his beliefs could determine 
who they are and what they do, one would have to make rather strong assumptions about Elijah’s 
mental state to make it plausible that his irrational belief will systematically manage his experience so 
as to keep that belief completely shielded from any rational pressure to revise it.  
How strong the relevant assumptions would have to be comes out even more clearly if we allow 
that quite plausibly, Elijah’s experience of young black men is not the only source he can draw on.5 
Suppose, for instance, that upon seeing a young black man, he judges, and tells his nearby friends, that 
he sees a dangerous-looking young black man. But suppose Elijah’s friends are less biased. Further, 
suppose they point out to him that their own experiences do not fit Elijah’s characterization and, 
perhaps, even suggest that his experience could well be affected by some implicit bias.  
In such a scenario, it seems fantastic to suppose that Elijah’s irrational belief will systematically 
determine his experience (in this case both his aural and his visual experience) in such a radical and 
pathological way that it alters what he sees and hears his friends as saying—e.g. by making him see 
and hear them as saying something that, rather than alerting him to the possible irrationality of his 
belief, makes it rational for him to transition to the belief that they said something that actually 
confirms his irrational belief.6 Thus, if at least in non-pathological cases, a subject’s background views 
will not systematically determine his or her experience in such a radical fashion, and if we assume that 
Elijah, though he holds an irrational racially discriminatory belief, is not pathologically irrational, the 
                                                 
5  The following considerations are structurally analogous to some of the considerations we issued with respect to 
Vivek’s case in the previous chapter. In Vivek’s case, too, we imagined his well-meaning friends or critics to serve as 
an important resource that allows Vivek to eventually loosen the grip his irrational vanity has on him. I will not here 
argue for a claim that I think is both true and was recognized by Aristotle as well: that for making epistemic and moral 
progress, friendship is vitally important (see Rosenhagen fthc. for discussion). 
6  That such cases can occur need of course not to be ruled out as impossible. It could be, that is, that Elijah’s irrational 
belief, perhaps supported by further auxiliary beliefs, systematically hijacks his experience so as to keep the irrational 
complex of beliefs intact. He could, for instance, form the belief that his friends are too frightened to speak the truth, 
or that they are being threatened to say only good things about the dangerous man. The point is that if Elijah’s 
irrational belief were to have such effects on his experience, we would take Elijah to be exceptionally delusional. In 
other words, the simple assumption that one’s background beliefs may be strong enough to affect one’s 
phenomenology is much weaker than the assumption that these beliefs are also super-strong hijackers such that the 
one’s complete experience of the world must systematically conform to them. In Elijah’s case, attributing to him that 
his irrational belief is a super-strong hijacker is to attribute to him that his mental economy is pathologically irrational 
and renders him incapable of revising the irrational racially discriminatory generic belief at hand. The assumption that 
an irrational belief may affect the phenomenology of Elijah’s experience does not involve such an attribution. 
Regardless, in having experiences that are so affected, Elijah may well be said to manifest his irrationality. 
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following is possible: Elijah may come to realize that the young black men he sees as dangerous never 
in fact act in ways that based on his belief he would expect them to. He may realize that even though 
he keeps, for the time being, seeing young black men as dangerous, it is not rational for him, in light 
of what he sees them as doing, to transition to beliefs such as that they are in fact dangerous, that they 
act in a dangerous fashion, that he thus should avoid them, etc.7  
Elijah could become aware of the tension between his irrational belief and the expectations that 
accompany them and the beliefs that he is rational to transition to (given his experience and e.g. his 
beliefs about what dangerous actions are) on his own or by listening to and taking seriously the 
comments of his friends. Either way, once he does become aware of the tension, such awareness will 
exert some rational pressure on him to modify his background view so as to resolve it. And one way 
in which this could be achieved is by way of entertaining the possibility that the way he experiences 
young black men may be the result of an irrational generic belief. Suppose this happens. If so, this 
newly acquired belief will in turn modify what beliefs and judgments, etc. it will be rational for him to 
transition to in response to his future experiences of young black men.8  
Structurally, then, we can characterize what happens in such a case as follows: Elijah is alerted to 
a possible tension between the beliefs that his experience makes rational for him to transition to and 
                                                 
7  Since racial stereotyping is omnipresent in popular culture, matters will typically be more complex. For one, racist 
beliefs and biases are arguably shaped, and perhaps strengthened, by one’s encounters with fictional characters in 
literature, movies, etc. For another, racially biased individuals like Elijah may live in a context in which the fact that 
such biases are possible or that racially discriminatory beliefs are false or irrational is either little known or regularly 
discounted. Either way, I am not suggesting that overcoming one’s false or irrational beliefs or one’s biases must be 
an easy thing to do. And if we recall Hanson’s remark that “thirteen centuries of expert observation failed to disclose 
the error in Galen’s contention that the septum between the ventricles of the heart is perforated” (PD, p. 168), we 
may come to appreciate that the same applies not just to matters of discrimination, but is plausible in areas as well, 
e.g. in the area of scientific thinking. What I am suggesting, however, is that happening upon inconsistencies that may 
obtain between one’s beliefs and one’s experiences, though perhaps difficult, is possible even if one’s experience is 
hijacked. Moreover, the realization of such inconsistencies should rationally motivate a modification of one’s view 
that removes the inconsistency. That said, whether the latter is done in a rational or irrational way will of course 
depend on further factors such as the details of one’s background view and one’s psychological make-up. 
8  On the resulting view, experience may allow subjects to overcome both false and irrational beliefs and implicit biases 
as long as it is assumed that the subject’s background view is not pathologically rigid, as it would be if it fully 
determined the subject’s experience. Such a process may be long and arduous. But as I suggested in the previous 
chapter, making progress may be more likely if we remain humble and compassionate. To develop this line of thinking 
further would be to suggest—with virtue epistemologists and, more specifically, virtue responsibilists—that epistemic 
virtues may include both self-regarding and other-regarding ethical virtues. See Turri and Alfano fthc. for discussion, 
also Kawall 2002 for an argument for the claim that virtue epistemologists tend to neglect the importance of other-
regarding virtues. 
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a standing belief, i.e. that young black men are dangerous. For Elijah to be rational requires that he 
respond to this inconsistency by resolving it. Given this realization, he may come to question whether 
his standing belief is indeed accurate. One way to resolve the inconsistency, thus, would be to weaken 
that standing belief or to eschew it altogether.9  
When in 2.4 we discussed Hanson’s account of empirical constraint, the case we considered 
involved a subject witnessing a conjurer’s trick: during that trick, a young lady appears to be sawed in 
half and yet, she afterwards gaily kicks her legs. That case, too, involves a such tension. The 
experiencing subject sees as happening what she believes could not possibly be happening, and which, 
given the what her subsequent observations make rational for her to transition to, she believes cannot 
have happened: a disjoinery.   
In characterizing Elijah’s case, I phrased it by drawing on the general conception of the role of 
experience I recommend, i.e. in terms of the rationality of transitions. The case of the conjurer’s trick, 
too, can be characterized in this fashion: while witnessing the trick, and given her background view, 
the subject—call her Lea—initially sees the conjurer’s saw as an ordinary saw, the sawing as an 
ordinary case of sawing, etc. Given Lea’s experience and her background beliefs, she may well be 
rational to form the belief that this is indeed what she sees. Suppose she does. Given that her 
background view now contains, inter alia, the resulting beliefs, her subsequent experience will make it 
rational for her to transition to the judgment that the young lady has been sawed in half. However, 
presumably, this belief strongly conflicts both with what Lea believes could possibly happen in the 
circumstances at hand and with further judgments that—given her subsequent experience and her 
background view—it is rational to transition to as well: after the sawing, the young lady gaily kicks her 
legs, thus indicating that despite all appearances to the contrary, she is alive and well.  
                                                 
9  If what is responsible for the hijacking is implicit bias, the characterization may have to look somewhat different. 
Since whether implicit bias has a belief-like structure is contentious, the inconsistency between Elijah’s bias and the 
beliefs he forms based on his reflection, or his drawing on other sources of information may not be one that obtains 
between beliefs. For recent discussion on the nature of implicit bias, see Brownstein & Saul 2016. In it, cf. Holroyd 
& Sweetman 2016 for an argument that implicit bias may be a rather heterogeneous category. 
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As she faces this tension, Lea must respond. She resolves the tension by holding on to the belief 
that she is most firmly committed to, i.e. that the young lady could not actually have been sawed in 
half. Moreover, she drops the beliefs that are incompatible with the former and that she cannot thus 
adopt as well: that a disjoinery took place and, perhaps, that an ordinary saw was used, an ordinary act 
of sawing was involved, etc. Were she now to see the trick again, she might thus no longer see it as 
involving such things in the first place. 
Both Elijah’s and Lea’s case illustrate that in the context of a given background view, one’s 
experience can make rational transitions to judgments that are incompatible with some parts of that 
view. This is what makes empirical constraint possible. For if the subject realizes such incompatibilities 
(which need not always happen, since incompatibilities can be hard to spot), there is some rational 
pressure on her to resolve them.10  
Again, which resolution among the potentially numerous available the subject will come to 
endorse will depend on the specifics of the subject’s background view and on which of the beliefs—
including, but not limited to, the incompatible ones it contains—the subject is most strongly 
committed to.11 Either way, any such resolution, even if it only amounts to a suspension of belief, will 
involve some modification of the background view. And given that on the conception of the general 
role of experience that we are considering, what having a given experience makes rational to transition 
                                                 
10  I acknowledge that I take it for granted, and will assume without further defense, that it is part of what it is to be 
rational that as one realizes that one holds incompatible commitments, one is under a rational obligation to at least 
try and resolve the incompatibility. It may be suspected that without such a requirement in place and on the 
assumption that from a contradiction everything follows, an entitlement to knowingly hold incompatible beliefs would 
seem to entail the entitlement to hold any belief whatsoever, which seems absurd. For an interesting proposal 
regarding the requirement to resolve such incompatibilities, see Brandom 2009, chapter 1, pp. 35ff. According to it, 
the relevant requirement is part of a conception of judging as involving the taking up of a distinct task-responsibility, 
including that of integrating newly acquired beliefs into a unified whole. 
11  That there will always be several ways of resolving such conflicts is part of the so-called Duhem-Quine thesis, also 
emphasized by Feyerabend and also illustrated by Neurath’s image that our web of belief is like a boat that we 
continually rebuild whilst staying afloat on it. On Michael Devitt’s characterization of this image “[w]e can rebuild any 
part of the boat but in so doing we must take a stand on the rest of the boat for the time being. So we cannot rebuild 
it all at once. Similarly, we can revise any part of our knowledge but in so doing we must accept the rest for the time 
being. So we cannot revise it all at once.” (Devitt 2002, p. 32). The point highlighted by the Duhem-Quine thesis, 
however, is not that the boat cannot be rebuilt all at once, but rather, that in rebuilding the boat, there are, like in the 
case of revising our beliefs, always various incompatible ways of proceeding. See Devitt 2002 and Stanford 2017 for 
further discussion of the Quine-Duhem thesis. It should be noted, however, that just because several ways of resolving 
conflicts are always possible in principle, in the context of a given background view, it may well be that only one way 
of resolving a given conflict is acceptable. 
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to depends on the background view the subject brings to bear on it, the same experience, if had again, 
may, in light of the modified background view, make rational transitions to different beliefs, 
judgments, etc.  
Note that as Hanson characterizes Lea’s case, the relevant change in the subject’s background 
view will modify not merely what belief the subject, if she witnessed the same trick again, would be 
rational to transition to. It also modifies what she will subsequently see things as. As we will see shortly, 
though changes in the subject’s background view may, they need not lead to a modification of what 
one sees things as. Moreover, given the variety of effects on experience that Hanson thinks are in 
principle possible, a modification of what the subject sees things as could be brought about in different 
ways. We consider this in the next subsection.  
As for this section, I contend that it illustrates the following: Hanson’s account of empirical 
constraint can well be couched in the terminology suggested by the conception of the general role of 
experience I recommend. Doing so allows us to see that his account of empirical constraint highlights 
an important possibility that the conception of the general role of experience I am recommending 
must and can accommodate: that the beliefs, judgments, etc. that a given experience, in the context of 
a background view, can make rational to transition to can be in conflict with some parts of that view. 
If the subject acknowledges it, it is put under rational pressure on her to revise her view in some way 
so as to resolve the conflict. 
8.1.3 Amalgamation 
In the previous section, we noted that the empirical constraint exerted by experiences of seeing things 
or people as behaving in ways that defy our expectations can ultimately trigger the revision of one’s 
view. In this section, let us consider how changes in the background view might in turn affect the 
subject’s subsequent experiences.  
Returning to the case of Elijah, suppose Elijah realizes that what he habitually sees young black 
men as, i.e. as dangerous, does not match what he typically sees them as doing, i.e. actions that are 
275 
 
characterizable as dangerous. Alternatively, there could be some other way in which he is alerted to 
the possibility that his experience may be in part a result of a biased irrational belief, e.g. by being 
confronted with diverging assessments of others. Next, recall that Hanson insists that background 
beliefs can affect experience in various ways, including its phenomenology. Such effects may be what 
is operative in certain cases of expert vision—such as effects that involve elements of the visual field 
cohering in specific ways—and will be involved in projection effects. Suppose, then, that as a result 
of Elijah’s realization that his irrational racially discriminatory generic belief might be unwarranted, 
the hijacking effect of that belief are reduced. Consequently, the phenomenology of his experiences 
of young black men is modified. This modification could be such that the phenomenology that Elijah’s 
experience has upon seeing young black men comes to be no longer that of experiences of seeing them 
as dangerous, but, perhaps gradually, that of experiences of seeing them as perfectly harmless, neutral, 
friendly, or indifferent, say.  
We can distinguish two ways in which this could happen. Recall that on the characterization of 
Elijah’s experience that derives from Hanson’s view, the non-conceptual dimension of Elijah’s 
experience will be amalgamated in some specific way with the conceptual dimension. Presumably, 
Hanson would thus assume that there is some phenomenology that, qua Amalgamation, in Elijah’s 
subjective life, is the phenomenology of experiences of seeing someone as dangerous. Analogously, 
there would be some phenomenology that in Elijah’s subjective life, is the phenomenology of 
experiences of seeing someone as harmless, say.12 Against the backdrop of this view, the scenario we 
are currently imagining is the following: Elijah’s newly acquired belief leads, perhaps gradually, to a 
reduction of the hijacking effect exerted by his weakened irrational belief and to a subsequent 
systematic shift in his phenomenology. His phenomenology transforms into one that is anyway 
amalgamated in such a way with experiential contents that upon encountering young black men, he 
comes to see them more and more as harmless—or at least as no more or less dangerous than other 
                                                 
12  Such amalgamation will be context-dependent. In other words, for any given subject, one and the same 
phenomenology need not be amalgamated with just one sort of content, but may be amalgamated with different 
contents in different contexts. In suitable doxastic circumstances, phenomenally identical experiences can be 
experiences that involve rather different instances of seeing as.   
276 
 
people. The projection effect, in other words, disappears, perhaps gradually.13 If so, then Elijah, were 
he to form beliefs based on the assumption that things are the way he now sees them as, would, upon 
encountering young black men, no longer be rational to transition to the belief that they look 
dangerous. Instead, he might transition to the belief that they are harmless, neutral, friendly, or perhaps 
just indifferent. An in the absence of further reasons to the contrary, transitioning to such beliefs 
should be a perfectly rational thing for him to do. 
Note that in the scenario just considered, the way phenomenal states and kinds of seeing as are 
amalgamated was taken to be stable. But that need not be so. Dropping the assumption that 
Amalgamation must be stable brings into view a second way in which Elijah could cease to see the 
young black men as dangerous. For suppose that in response to acquiring the belief that his experience 
may be hijacked, the phenomenology of Elijah’s experience does not change at all. Even so, since he 
will now have been alerted to the possibility that the phenomenology of his experience could be 
affected by an irrational belief, having experiences with a phenomenology that previously were 
experiences of seeing black young men as dangerous may—perhaps gradually—come to be 
experiences of seeing them as not dangerous, but harmless, say.  
What we are now imagining, thus, is the following: the change in Elijah’s background view does 
not remove whatever effects his irrational background belief may have on his phenomenology. 
Conceivably, if doxastic effects on the phenomenology of experience are allowed, it could be that in 
some kinds of cases, such effects may be difficult to remove. And given that implicit biases (whatever 
they are, exactly) seem to be difficult to overcome, effects that rest on such biases may well be of that 
sort. That said, on the current proposal, the modification of Elijah’s background view still does have 
an effect: it alters the way his phenomenology is amalgamated with instances of seeing as.  
Providing a fully satisfactory account of Amalgamation would need to involve an account of 
how amalgamation is set up initially.14 But regardless of how one takes the initial configuration to 
                                                 
13  In a less optimistic scenario, the projection effect could be replaced by a different projection effect. 
14  How this works may be a question for psychologists to address. Either way, if both the relationalists and Siegel are 
entitled to assume that some story can be told as to how having experiences that have a certain phenomenology come 
to be ways of looking F, or to involve the presentation of specific properties as instantiated, then a Hansonian, too, 
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come about, there is no need to assume that amalgamation must be stable. It could be modifiable. On 
a Hansonian account that also accommodates Modifiable Amalgamation, the subject’s background 
view would thus not just semantically determine, to a large extent, what a given experiential content 
is—by providing the doxastic context in which the concepts that figure in the subject’s experiential 
content are inferentially articulated.15 Rather, it also governs, at least in part, how kinds of phenomenal 
states are amalgamated with instances of seeing as. It is a Hansonian version of the Variable Content 
View the possibility of which was hinted at already in 7.3. 
8.1.4 Modifiable Amalgamation, Genonian Misleading Appearances, and Seeings As as  
 Dispositional States 
The account of Modifiable Amalgamation shares some features with Genone’s account of 
misleading appearances (see the discussion in 6.3.1). More specifically, it is somewhat akin to Genone’s 
idea that one’s background beliefs may affect what judgments or beliefs one may form on the basis of 
perceiving appearance properties. Important differences do remain, however.  
For one, at least if we bracket Genone’s tentative endorsement of phenomenal pluralism, in 
contrast to Genone’s view, the view we are currently considering entails no commitment to the 
relationalist idea that the phenomenology of the experience that the subject responds to is constituted 
exclusively by the subject’s being related to entirely mind-independent items. After all, in the case of 
Elijah, we are operating under the assumption that the phenomenology of his experience is in fact 
irrationally influenced by some of its irrational cognitive and psychological precursors. A Hansonian 
who accepts the conception of the general rational role of experience I recommend can readily grant 
that experience may put us in touch with such items, and that it may indeed do so quite often. 
                                                 
should be entitled to assume that it is part of the natural process of acquiring one’s first language that some 
connections between the phenomenology of one’s experience and concepts are being set up.  
15  Again, such articulation will not settle every question one might raise with respect to what kind of content the 
experience has. For example, it will not settle the question whether a given content is indeed objectually singular (see 
the discussion in chapter 5). 
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However, she has no need for the additional assumption that experience must play this role 
generally. For as she will point out, and as the case of Elijah illustrates, even in cases in which 
experience does not (at least in part) put us in touch with such items, it can still play its general rational 
role, viz. that of making rational view-dependent transitions to e.g. beliefs, judgments, or actions. 
Moreover, in the process of experience playing this role, the following can occur: it can happen that 
the subject becomes aware of the hijacking factors. If so, her background view will be revised. If this 
happens, this may (but need not) lead in turn to a reduction of the influence that the hijacking factors 
exert on the subject’s experience.  
Another difference between the Hansonian view we are considering and Genone’s account is that 
on the former, the background view does not just govern which beliefs or judgments a subject may form 
based her experience. Instead, the background view may also influence which kinds of seeing as having 
an experience with a specific kind of phenomenology is amalgamated with. And an instance of seeing 
as is neither a judgment nor a belief.  
Third, recall that on Genone’s view, it remains unclear how to interpret the modality involved 
when he states that background beliefs govern which ‘beliefs and judgments the subject may form 
based on her experience’ and, relatedly, what it is for such beliefs and judgments to be based on the 
relevant experience. As I argued, Genone’s talk about how perceiving appearance properties relates to 
the beliefs and judgments that are said to be formed on the basis of such perceptions is ambiguous 
between causal and epistemic readings. A Hansonian, I will suggest next, can be more specific.  
A Hansonian can, for instance, suggest that the various kinds of seeing as are conceptually 
contentful, but doxastically non-committal states that experiencing subjects are disposed to enter as 
they have experiences with various kinds of phenomenology. Instances of seeing as, so construed, are 
manifestations of dispositions to respond to the phenomenology of one’s experience. And 
Amalgamation, on such a view, concerns what a subject, upon having an experience with a specific 
phenomenology, is disposed to see things as. 
Note that such dispositions of amalgamation, as we may dub them, can be heavily context-dependent. 
In different contexts, experiences with the same phenomenology can be amalgamated with different 
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kinds of seeing as. Moreover, if we allow that Amalgamation is modifiable, these dispositions are not 
set in stone. Instead, some dispositions of amalgamation may be sensitive to modifications of one’s 
background view and change along with it.16  
8.1.5 Stable Amalgamations 
A last possibility to consider is the following: it could be that in some cases, a weakening of an irrational 
belief does not lead to a change in what things are seen as. It could be, for instance, that neither the 
phenomenology of Elijah’s experience nor the dispositions of amalgamation that tie kinds of phenomenal 
states to instances of seeing things as can be easily modified.  
Hanson, recall, rejects two-stage accounts of experience. According to him, and on the 
dispositionalist reading just suggested, instances of seeing as are being triggered instantaneously, not 
after, somehow, taking in the phenomenology of one’s experience first. Theories, Hanson thinks, are 
there in the seeing, right from the start. If we think of instances of seeing as as being triggered quasi-
automatically and of the relevant dispositions of amalgamation as potentially varying in how stable 
they are, it becomes conceivable that changes in one’s doxastic context may not always lead to changes 
in the relevant dispositions immediately.17 It may even be that some dispositions are so stable that they 
cannot be changed at all.18 
                                                 
16  Hanson’s case of the conjurer’s trick can be construed as a case involving a modification of Amalgamation as well—
namely if we assume that upon witnessing the trick a second time, the phenomenology of the witnessing subject’s 
experience does not change. Just like Elijah’s background, once it has been enriched by the belief that his experience 
of young black men may be hijacked, may result in a change not in the phenomenology of his experience, but in what 
he sees such men as, the change in Lea’s background view could result in a change not in the phenomenology of her 
experience, but in what she sees as happening. 
17  Were we to take the notion of response to imply that responses cannot be instantaneous, it would thus be misleading 
to talk about manifestations of instances of seeing as as responses to one’s experience.  
18  In this context, recall that one can knowingly see something as what it is not—one can see what one knows is a cloud 
as a horse, or what one knows is in fact a 3-D projection as an attacking tiger, say. As one considers the latter, it is 
plausible to think that at least some of the relevant dispositions may have a long evolutionary history. That said, in 
stages of our evolutionary history that predate the advent of language, the relevant dispositions to see things as some 
way or other may not have involved responses that should be characterized as conceptual. Instead, it seems more 
appropriate to characterize them as dispositions to act in certain practical ways. One’s account here will depend on 
what minimal requirements one thinks must be met to consider the practice of a certain species as involving concepts. 
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Suppose, then, that the disposition triggered in Elijah to see the young black men he encounters 
as dangerous is comparatively stable. Recall, further, that we are thinking of instances of seeing as as of 
non-committal states. Finally, recall that as per our assumption, Elijah’s background view has been 
modified so as to make him alert to the possibility that things may not be the way he sees them as. 
Accordingly, even if upon encountering young black men, neither his phenomenology nor the kind 
of seeing as it triggers is modified, it may no longer be rational for him to simply believe that things are 
the way he sees them as. Depending on how strong Elijah’s conviction is that his experience is hijacked 
by his biases, he may even take his seeing a young black man as dangerous as indicating that quite 
probably, his experience is hijacked and that the young man in question is not dangerous at all.19  
Note that what in part, what makes this latter kind of case particularly interesting is that it 
accommodates a case that on Siegel’s view does not even come into view: a case in which a hijacked 
experience makes a positive contribution to the process of arriving at beliefs that are in fact justified. 
After all, for Elijah to respond to his stably hijacked experience of seeing a given young black man as 
dangerous by way of transitioning to the belief that the young man is not dangerous at all may not 
simply be the rational thing to do, given his background view, it may also be a transition to a belief 
that is in fact justified. 
Note also that on a view on which instances of seeing as are manifestations of dispositions, these 
instances turn out to be to some extent autonomous from the subject’s background view, since 
changes in the latter will not automatically entail changes in which instances of seeing as are triggered. 
This raises the question how, in instances of seeing as, conceptual capacities are deployed. Again, on 
Hanson’s view, in epistemically significant seeing, the seeing as involved is not just a quasi-automatic 
response to experience, where having the experience is a separable, prior event. Rather, seeing as is part 
                                                 
19  Some instances of seeing as may be accompanied by physical symptoms. If so, the realization that one is currently 
seeing something as dangerous, say, could be inferential. Upon seeing a young black man, Elijah might, for instance, 
not notice right away that he sees him as dangerous, but instead conclude that he does on the basis of noticing that 
his pulse is going faster, that he has started to sweat, or that he has an uneasy feeling in his stomach. It is a strength 
of the Hansonian account, I think, that it could accommodate an idea that Siegel, too, suggests, i.e. that the content 
of one’s experience does not always need to be introspectively accessible to the subject right away, without leaving it 
a complete mystery what this content is and what determines why this content is amalgamated with the specific 
phenomenology at hand. 
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of experience itself. Perhaps, somewhat like Fish, a defender of this Hansonian position could hold 
that in experience, concepts are deployed passively, automatically, and non-deliberately, and not—as 
e.g. on Brewer’s view of registration—actively. But if such a view were proposed, arguably, more 
would have to be said about how such a passive deployment of conceptual capacities is to be 
construed.20 
8.2 ACTUAL VS. RATIONAL TRANSITIONS & CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Surely, the beliefs, judgments, etc. that subjects actually transition to—in the context of a given 
experience and a given background view—may and perhaps often do come apart from those that it 
would be rational for them to transition to, in that context. Also, what it is that having a given 
experience makes rational to transition to, given a background view, need not be an easy thing to find 
out. Doing so may require extended reflection. Perhaps only highly rational and cognitively rather 
powerful agents would be able to unerringly do what in light of their experience and their view is in 
fact rational, or at least rationally permissible.21 
Here is one way in which, on the Hansonian account under consideration, the irrationality of less 
than highly rational and cognitively powerful subjects could be captured: as of now, we characterized 
states of seeing as in terms of manifestations of dispositions that are (instantaneously) triggered upon 
having an experience with a certain phenomenology, relative to a given doxastic context. In addition, 
                                                 
20  One way of addressing this question could be to claim, roughly along the lines suggested in McDowell 2009, that seeing 
as provides the subject with intuitional content that is generated by a passive actualization of one’s conceptual 
capacities. This passive actualization, one could then hold, is in turn triggered instantaneously as one has an experience 
with a specific kind of phenomenology. Only as the subject exploits the content thus provided to her by her experience 
by way of carving it out or articulating it, her conceptual capacities (the very same ones, as McDowell would insist) 
are deployed actively. Applied to a case of Stable Amalgamation, the idea would be that the change in the subject’s 
background view modifies what beliefs, judgments, and actions it would be rational for the subject to form or issue, 
given the hijacked content that the passive deployment of the subject’s conceptual capacities in experience makes 
available to her. 
21  As noted above, the background view need not always allow one to settle how to respond or how to resolve conflicts 
and may leave open various different options that are, as far as one can tell, on a par. Also, it could be too poor to 
allow any kind of decision apart from suspending judgment.  
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one could suggest that states of seeing as themselves are among the conditions that are characteristic of 
further dispositions, dispositions to transition, as we can dub them. Dispositions to transition, so construed, 
have states of seeing as among the manifestation conditions that are characteristic of them and manifest, 
in the subject, as the subject’s transitioning to certain responses, such as the subject’s forming certain 
beliefs, issuing judgments, or performing certain actions.22 Importantly, dispositions to transition need not 
be dispositions to transition to beliefs that it would indeed be rational to transition to, given the 
subject’s background view and her experience. Often, they may not. For often, we do not have the 
resources to act in ways in which we might if only we had the resources to figure out what is rational 
to do. In such contexts, what determines our response may depend on various other factors in our 
cognitive and psychological economy. It is these contexts to which the notion of dispositions to transition 
primarily applies.23  
Of course, dispositions to transition, too, will plausibly be heavily context-dependent. Moreover, the 
conditions of manifestation that are characteristic of such dispositions will include a variety of factors 
besides what the subject believes. Among these, plausibly, would be factors such as the subject’s 
current distribution of attention, cognitive capacities, possible time constraints, which parts of her 
background view are particularly salient to her in the context at hand, what mood or emotional state 
she is in, and to what extent she possesses the resources required to adequately contemplate her 
situation.24  
                                                 
22  This view would capture the plausible thought that as we respond to our experience, we often form beliefs, issue 
judgments, and act, quasi-automatically. Such automatisms can be, and have been recognized as, problematic. On the 
view of moral vision developed by Iris Murdoch, for example, moral progress requires overcoming such automatisms, 
which in turn is facilitated by the subject’s efforts to engage in just and selfless attention. See Murdoch 1970, Murdoch 
1992, and Rosenhagen fthc. for discussion. 
23  Finding out that one’s actual behavior is governed by dispositions of that kind may be psychologically useful. Suppose, 
for example, that you are told that in stressful situations, you unfortunately tend to respond to certain kinds of 
experiences—e.g. experiences you have when well-meaning colleagues offer some constructive feedback—by 
transitioning to beliefs to the effect that your colleagues treat you in a belittling way, and by consequently engaging in 
excessively angry behavior towards them. Receiving this information may enable you to become more sensitive, 
whenever you feel angry, to the possibility that your anger may be triggered by stress, and not an adequate response 
to a belief that is in turn a rational response to your experience. And becoming more sensitive to this possibility might 
be an important step on the way of modifying the disposition. 
24  In manifesting her actual behavior, subjects may thus not respond to their experiences in a way that is rational in light 
of their background view as a whole. Even so, their responses can still be rational relative to the parts of their 
background view that are, at the time the response is issued, particularly salient. In the context of considering subjects  
that act in ways that appear to be less than rational, or operate under various constraints, assessments regarding 
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Let us take stock. In this chapter, I sought to corroborate that the conception of experience as 
making rational view-dependent transitions to beliefs, judgments, and actions is perfectly compatible 
with Hanson’s account. 
As I illustrated by drawing on the cases of Elijah and Lea, the conception is compatible with his 
account of empirical constraint suggested in 2.4 and allows us to characterize how such constraint 
may operate. Relatedly, it can be combined with various ways in which changes in a subject S’s 
background view could in turn affect S’s subsequent experience—changes, that is, that in turn result 
from S’s way of resolving conflicts that may arise from having experiences that make it rational to 
transition to beliefs, etc. that are incompatible with some of the subject’s standing beliefs.  
As we saw, such changes could a) modify the phenomenology of S’s experience while leaving the 
dispositions of amalgamation unaltered, b) leave the phenomenology of S’s experience unaltered, but affect 
the dispositions of amalgamation or, c) leave both the phenomenology of S’s experience and the dispositions 
of amalgamation unaltered. In all cases, changes in the background view will modify what beliefs, 
judgments, etc., on the basis of having an experience, it is rational for the subject to transition to.  
Finally, we can acknowledge that subjects do not always transition to the beliefs, etc. that in the 
context they inhabit, it would be rational for them to transition to. This, I suggested could be modeled 
by way of introducing a further level of dispositions, so-called dispositions to transition, which govern 
not what it would be rational for a subject to do, but what subjects actually do in various contexts and 
under various limiting constraints.  
Incidentally, I do not claim to have provided a full account of Amalgamation. But I suggested 
that on the plausible assumption that there is some initial procedure by which various kinds of 
                                                 
whether a given subject forms beliefs, judgments, or acts in a way that is rationally blameless, given the background 
view we attribute to her and her experience, may thus depend on one’s assessment of how much of the relevant parts 
of her background view the subject could have been reasonably expected to consider in the circumstances at hand. 
Of course, on the view under consideration, neither another subject’s background view nor their experience will be 
available to the assessing subject. Accordingly, coming up with assessments of another subject’s actions that does 
justice to their situation will potentially be extremely difficult. This, I think, is a very plausible consequence of the 
view under consideration. 
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phenomenology come to be amalgamated with kinds of seeing as,25 we can develop a view on which 
such amalgamation is context-dependent and that, rather than being be set in stone, may well change 
along with the subject’s background view, even though some such dispositions may be more stable 
than others. More would have to be said, e.g. in order to explain what may determine whether a given 
disposition is more or less stable.26 But arguably, the project of developing such an account further 
would be a fruitful project to pursue.  
The result, again, would be a Hansonian version of what, in 7.1.5, I dubbed the Variable Content 
View. On the specific version of this view sketched in the previous paragraphs, the subject’s 
background view a) may, as it changes, lead to a modification of pre-existing dispositions of amalgamation 
and thus modify what content a given phenomenal state, had in a given context, is associated with,27 
and (given Hanson’s broadly holistic account of content) b) settles what it is for an experience to have 
the specific content it does.  
a), I contend, constitutes a significant step on the way towards addressing one of the major 
problems we took to beset Hanson’s view in the first chapter, the problem of Amalgamation—a 
problem that, arguably, is structurally analogous to the problem that mars Siegel’s account: the lack of 
an account of Non-Arbitrariness. As for the second feature, we were already familiar with it from 
our initial assessment of Hanson’s view. Of course, Hanson’s broadly holistic account of experiential 
content is far from complete and may have to be developed further in several respects. But as I 
suggested, by providing such an account in the first place, Hanson’s view is superior to e.g. Siegel’s 
and enables him to explain something she currently does not: how both Tycho and Kepler can see the 
sun, see it as the sun, and yet have experiences that differ in content. 
                                                 
25  Roughly put, setting up the relevant dispositions of amalgamation may be the result of the training that is a natural part of 
what is involved in becoming part of a community of language users. 
26  Moreover, and clearly, the sketched account of dispositions to transition, understood as governing how instances of seeing 
as and beliefs, judgments, etc., are actually (not rationally) related in a subject’s mental economy could to be expanded, 
too. Such an account, I suppose, could be useful in the context of analyzing various psychological conditions. 
27  Note that changes in background views can also bring about modifications of dispositions to transition. If Elijah comes 
to believe that may be irrational to believe that young black men are what he sees them as—i.e. as dangerous—this 
belief need not only change what beliefs it is rational for him to transition to upon seeing a young black man as 
dangerous. Rather, it may well modify what beliefs he is actually disposed to transition to. 
285 
 
 
Let me emphasize again that the conception of the general role of experience I recommend, if 
combined with Hanson’s account, still allows that in the context of a suitable background view, having 
a given experience can well make it rational to transition to beliefs or judgments that are in fact 
justified. In this regard, Hanson’s account of empirical content is again helpful. For if what the 
concepts figuring as complements of the seeing as locution mean to the subject is to be understood in 
terms of how the concept is inferentially articulated in the subject’s background view, the same facts 
that specify the inferential articulation of a concept are also facts about what else, from the perspective 
of the subject’s background view, would follow if things are the way she sees them as. Accordingly, if 
the background view is sufficiently correct, the way beliefs and concepts are inferentially related in it 
will largely reflect how properties of objects are actually related to each other and how facts in the 
world do actually hang together. And in the context of such a view, seeing something as something will 
be intelligible in terms of beliefs that are actually justified. And if one accepts, for good reasons, that 
in one’s current circumstances, things are the way one sees them as, then in the context of such a view, 
the beliefs one will be rational to transition to will be true and justified. That said, it may be that 
arriving at beliefs that are in fact justified is a rare feat, or one that if not rare, it is hard to recognize. 
Perhaps, some will think that a more optimistic conception of the justificatory role of experience 
should be had. But if so, I contend, the burden is on them to show how such a conception is possible 
and what, on that conception, must be in place on the part of the subject to make it possible for their 
experience to play such a role.28 
One way of proceeding from here would be to use the account of Modifiable Amalgamation 
just sketched and Hanson’s broadly holistic account of experiential content to try and supplement 
either Siegel’s own view or the view suggested in 7.3. More specifically, one might use these accounts 
as a model to develop Siegelian accounts of Non-Arbitrariness and experiential content that are 
structurally analogous to it. Rather than engaging in this particular exercise, however, I will show, in 
                                                 
28  I return to this issue briefly in my response to the Receptive Knowledge complaint in chapter 10. 
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the next chapter, that defending a conception of the general role of experience on which it makes 
rational transitions to view-dependent beliefs, judgments, etc. allows us to move yet further away from 
Siegel than the Hansonian Variable Content View does. For as the position recently developed by 
Anil Gupta illustrates, this conception allows giving up the idea that experience has content altogether. 
Moreover, Gupta’s account adds a crucially important piece to the picture: for Gupta proposes an 
account of the phenomenology of experience that, I will suggest, if slightly modified, is compatible 
with all possible cases of DVEP.
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9.0 GUPTA’S PRESENTATIONALISM1 
One long-standing dispute between proponents of representationalist views of experience and 
proponents of the relational view revolves around the question whether experience has content. If we 
ask what motivates this dispute, a plausible response is that representationalists and relationalists differ 
on what must be the case for experience to play its role.  
Both representationalists and relationalists typically think about this role in terms of providing 
justification or knowledge about the world. The former think that experience can play this role only if 
it has content. Relationalists, on the other hand, insist that to play this role, experience need not have 
content. Instead, it must make the mind-independent items we can acquire knowledge about available 
to us, so that we may refer to, think, and reason about them. Thus, relationalists think that the nature 
and the primary role of experience, that on which its epistemic function rests, is to put us in touch 
with such items, which in turn, when it happens, constitutes experiential phenomenology.2  
Representationalists may of course be happy to accept that to provide justification or knowledge, 
experience must—at least sometimes, often perhaps—be a relation to particular mind-independent 
items. But they need not think that every experience must be construed as such a relation. And even 
                                                 
1  Gupta calls his view Dual-Component Presentationalism, or Presentationalism, because on it, experience consists 
two separable components: the presentational complex and the phenomenology (cf. Gupta 2019, §209). Both these concepts 
will be introduced in due course. 
2  Again, relationalists, too, think that experience, construed as a relation, puts one in a position to gain knowledge—be 
that by way of providing knowledge by acquaintance or, as Brewer thinks, by providing reasons for belief, or in virtue 
of making the objects of such knowledge available to us. In my discussion, I have for the most part side-stepped the 
discussion of how, on relationalist construals of experience, the latter might play such a role. I was primarily interested 
in their notion of phenomenology and interested in whether relationalists can provide such an account and 
accommodate cases of doxastic variation. Since the appurtenant discussion served to cast severe doubts on the various 
notions of experiential phenomenology that relationalists propose, a discussion of the epistemic role that experiences 
construed in terms of such notions might play seemed otiose. 
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with respect to experiences that involve such relations, they may insist that the way experiencing 
subjects are related to the relevant mind-independent items must be understood not in terms of 
experiences having a phenomenology, but by way of drawing on the idea that experiences have 
content.3  
A conciliatory attempt to resolve this dialectic is to suggest that to some extent, relationalists and 
representationalists are both right. Experience may put us in touch with mind-independent items, 
often even, albeit not always. Moreover, doing so may serve to co-generate the subject’s experiential 
phenomenology. Also, experience may even represent these items as what they are, and then play an 
important role in the process of justifying beliefs or in gaining knowledge. The Hansonian Variable 
Content View sketched in the previous chapter can be understood as an attempt to provide the 
outline of such a conciliatory attempt—even though one will reasonably expect that without an 
account of the phenomenology, relationalists will not be satisfied with it.4 As for justification, the 
account affords room for the following idea: if the experiencing subject has a suitable background 
view, having an experience can make it rational for her to transition to beliefs and judgments that are 
in fact justified. Moreover, if a subject in fact transitions to what she is rational to transition to, given 
her experience and her view, the resulting beliefs and judgments will also be justified conditional on 
that view. 
As for the idea that experience puts us in touch with mind-independent items, recall that for 
Hanson, what makes the idea of empirical constraint possible is that the phenomenology of experience 
is at least in part independent of what we believe. We still lack an account of how to think about the 
phenomenal dimension of experience. But clearly, what Hanson needs is a weaker version of the idea 
that relationalists insist on as crucial. He needs an account on which the phenomenology of experience 
is brought about—at least in part, i.e. not necessarily fully—by the mind-independent items the 
                                                 
3  McDowell 2013 makes a suggestion along these lines, as does Schellenberg 2014. For a critical discussion of 
Schellenberg’s account, see e.g. Vuletić 2015. 
4  As I will suggest below, nothing should prevent us from supplementing the Hansonian view outlined in the previous 
chapter with Gupta’s presentationalist account of the phenomenology of experience. Relationalists, however, are likely 
to remain dismayed because Gupta eschews, as I think we should, the relationalist commitment to Constitution. 
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subject’s experience relates her to. As our extended consideration of various cases of doxastic variation 
brought out, problems arise regardless of whether we take it, as most relationalists do, that perceptual 
experience must be explained in terms of relations to mind-independent items, or if we take experience, 
with standard representationalists, to provide, by default, justification based on its putative content. 
As I argued, none of the relationalist views can satisfactorily deal with all conceivable cases of doxastic 
variation. As for Siegel, it is, with respect to some possible effects on the phenomenology, unclear 
whether she can accommodate them and how. And to the extent that Siegel’s view succeeds in 
accommodating cases of doxastic variability, doing so comes at the price of introducing a revisionary 
and, I suggested, unnecessary conception of epistemic powers, of endorsing a counterintuitive 
conception of what subjects are rational to do in response to their hijacked experience, and generally 
a view on which hijacked experiences seem to lack any positive rational epistemic role. 
Incidentally, note that if it is right that the conception of experience shared by standard 
representationalists is centered on a conception of the role of experience as providing justification, 
Hanson may not be a standard representationalist. He never denies that experience may serve to justify 
beliefs or knowledge. But arguably, the central problems he seeks to address are different, i.e. that of 
understanding how experience can be epistemically significant in the first place and that of how 
observations that are thoroughly theory-laden may still serve to provide empirical constraint. And as 
I showed in the previous chapter, his answers to these questions are quite compatible with the 
conception of the general role of experience that I recommend we adopt: that of making rational 
background-view relative transitions to beliefs, judgments, and actions.  
However, as the last chapter brought out as well, to develop the Hansonian Variable Content 
View further, some further work is required. For one, what is needed is a more comprehensive 
account of Amalgamation. How are the relevant dispositions of amalgamation initially set up? If they 
are modifiable, are all of them modifiable to the same extent? If not, what account should be given of 
why certain of these dispositions are more robust than others? Moreover, how are we to think about 
the way in which concepts operate in seeing as? If, with Hanson, seeing as is construed as being part of 
experience itself, an account is needed of how, in instances of seeing as, concepts are deployed 
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instantaneously and, perhaps, passively. But even if each of these issues were resolved, we still need 
an account that neither the representationalists nor the relationalists we considered had to offer: we 
still need a satisfactory account of the phenomenology of experience. 
None of these issues, I think, is unsurmountable. When in what follows, I provide an outline of 
a view recently developed by Anil Gupta, doing so serves several purposes. For one, I think that the 
detailed account of experiential phenomenology that Gupta offers is independently interesting since 
providing such an account addresses one of the major issues that we saw besets each of the views we 
have so far considered.  
Second, I think that Gupta’s account can easily be modified such as to be combined with a 
Hansonian view. For Hansonians, I think, working out such an account would both be possible and 
attractive, since it addresses one of the Hansonian view’s major weaknesses. However, Gupta’s own 
account also suggests that we can avoid some of the tasks that Hansonians face. For Gupta drops the 
idea that experience has content altogether. In this regard, Gupta’s presentationalism is simpler than 
the Hansonian Variable Content View. As I will argue later (in 9.2.3), on Gupta’s view, too, seeing 
as talk can serve a useful purpose within empirical debate. Recognizing this function of seeing as talk, 
however, does not entail a Hansonian conception of seeing as, i.e. a conception on which concepts are 
operative in experience itself. 
Third, Gupta’s account shows that the conception of the general role of experience I recommend, 
and that I adopt from him, if combined with his account of the phenomenology of experience, yields 
a powerful account of experience that achieves something none of the views we considered so far 
could: once we modify it slightly (see 9.1.2), it can fully accommodate the idea that experiential 
phenomenology may be doxastically variable, while at the same time holding on to the claim that 
experience plays its role no matter what. As we will see, Gupta’s account, too, raises further questions, 
especially regarding its central notions of presentation and linkages. And though I will not offer much 
in terms of suggestions as to how to further develop the notion of presentation, I think that with 
respect to understanding the notion of rational linkages, progress can be made (see 9.2.3).  
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In sum, I will argue that Gupta’s account is both powerful and provides interesting opportunities 
to develop it further, which may, but need not take the shape of integrating it into a Hansonian 
framework. 
Gupta’s presentationalist account is rather complex. For our purposes, it suffices to draw on two 
of its crucial elements: his account of the phenomenology, couched in terms of the notion of 
appearances, and his idea that background views contain not just beliefs, but also linkages to 
appearances. In what follows, I sketch and evaluate both these ideas with respect to our topic (9.1 and 
9.2) and then sum up the discussion in (9.3). 
9.1 APPEARANCES 
For relationalists it is, arguably, their commitment to the idea that the nature of experience is to relate 
the experiencing subject to mind-independent items in her environment that motivates them to 
develop accounts of experiential phenomenology that are based on an account of Constitution. To 
the extent that these accounts were developed, we found each of them problematic. But at least it was 
not difficult to discern what the shape of those accounts is supposed to be. 
With respect to the representationalists we considered, things were less clear. As we saw in 
chapter 7, Siegel’s notion of the phenomenology of experience is very thin; we learn very little about 
it besides the fact that experience is said to have a felt character and that phenomenal states are said 
to be individuated by their phenomenal character—by what it is like to have the experience in question. 
That Siegel does not focus much on experiential phenomenology is, to some extent, unsurprising. 
After all, on the (Rich) Content View she defends, the phenomenal states themselves are that which 
does the representing. And qua representationalist, she takes it that an experience’s content is its 
epistemologically crucial feature. Accordingly, she focuses her attention not on giving an account of 
what she thinks bears such content—the phenomenal states that, she grants, experience invariably and 
characteristically involves—but rather on developing an account of what kinds of properties may 
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constitute the content she takes phenomenal states to convey to the subject. But we learn little not 
just with respect to which properties phenomenal states are taken to present as instantiated, but also 
with respect to the question to what extent the properties thus instantiated depend on the mind-
independent items in the experiencing subject’s environment. Accordingly, on Siegel’s view, the 
relation between contents and mind-independent items remains unclear as well.5 
Hanson, too, thinks that its content is an experience’s crucial feature—after all, it is this content, 
he thinks, that enables experiences to be epistemically significant. Accordingly, like Siegel, he, too, 
spends much more energy on developing his specific notion of content in terms of seeing as. And 
though he does indicate, that he thinks of the phenomenal dimension of experience in terms of iconic 
representation and in terms of a visual field containing elements, he leaves us without a full account 
of how such iconic representations are to be construed, how they come about, how and to what extent 
they depend on the mind-independent items in the subject’s environment, and how they relate to the 
conceptual dimension of experience.6 
Gupta develops his rich account of the phenomenology of experience—which he thinks of in 
terms of appearances—in the sixth and seventh chapters of his forthcoming book on Conscious 
Experience. To get a grasp of its fundamental features, we need to get an understanding of its central 
notions: Subjective Identity, Appearance, Manifestation, and, finally, Phenomenology.7 
9.1.1 Subjective Identity, Color Appearances, Projection Effects, and Expert Vision Proper 
Beginning with Gupta’s notion of Subjective Identity, let us observe that he characterizes it as a six-
place relation—schematically: SubjIdentity(<i, p, s>; <i*, p*, s*>).8 The relation thus relates two triples, 
                                                 
5  As far as I can see, this hold with just one exception. For as we saw, Siegel claims that only veridical experiences can 
have objectually singular contents (cf. 7.1.4.2). However, this claim concerns only the role of object-concerning content. 
It teaches us nothing about the properties Siegel takes to be presented, in experience, as instantiated. 
6  As I suggested in the first chapter, some of this may be due to the dialectic setting from within which Hanson 
developed his arguments. 
7  Following Gupta’s exposition, I will, at first, use the notions of ‘appearance’ and ‘manifestation’ in an intuitive sense. 
Further details, including his definitions of these notions are provided and discussed in 9.1.2. 
8  See Gupta 2019, §144. Angle quotes are added for legibility. 
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indicated by the angle quotes, each of which contains an item (i and i*, respectively), a perceiver (p, 
p*), and a perceptual situation (s, s*). The schematic characterization, Gupta suggests, may be read as 
follows: 
(1) the presentation of item i to person p’s consciousness in perceptual situation s is 
subjectively identical to the presentation of item i* to person p*’s consciousness in 
perceptual situation s* (Gupta 2019, §144).  
Subjective Identity, so construed, is a specific relation that can obtain between two (or more)9 
instances in which some item is presented, in a specific perceptual situation, to some subject’s 
consciousness, where for an item i to be presented to the consciousness of a given subject p, in a given 
context s, is for i to manifest an appearance to p’s consciousness. And if we now let ‘AppearanceS(i, p)’ 
denote the total appearance manifested by i to p’s consciousness in situation s, Gupta stipulates, 
appearances are governed by the following principle: 
(2) AppearanceS(i, p) = AppearanceS*(i*, p*) iff SubjIdentity(<i, p, s>; <i*, p*, s*>)  
(Gupta 2019, §145, angle quotes added) 
The idea this principle captures is a familiar one: the phenomenology of two experiences can be 
subjectively identical or—as we put this earlier—phenomenally identical.10 Consider a white piece of 
chalk looked at in red light with a red piece of chalk looked at in ordinary sunlight, and a yellow piece 
of chalk looked at through a magenta filter. In suitable circumstances, to a given subject,11 all three 
                                                 
9  Since the relation is an identity relation, it is transitive, reflexive, and symmetrical. Cf. Gupta 2019, §150, fn. 4. 
10  It was one of the issues we raised against Fish’s view that it provides no obvious way of accommodating the notion 
of phenomenal identity. Since on Brewer’s view, different items can stand in the same similarity relations, Brewer’s 
view avoids the issue. With respect to Genone, matters remain somewhat less clear; his account of the phenomenology 
of experience is simply too rudimentary to assess it in this regard. If, however, the phenomenology of experience, as 
he claims, is constituted by the phenomena one encounters in them, it may be that accommodating and explaining 
phenomenal identity is difficult for him as well. (Cf. chapter 6, fn. 17.) As we will see further below, Gupta, unlike the 
relationalists, is not committed to the idea that the phenomenology of experience must be constituted solely by the 
subject’s being related to mind-independent items. Accordingly, Gupta is under no special obligation to account for 
phenomenal identity of appearances in terms of what may constitute them. That some experiences are subjectively 
identical can thus be drawn upon as a brute fact. 
11  As we saw in 4.3, Fish patently presupposes that the phenomenology of experience upon having experiences with at 
least partly overlapping presentational characters will at least partly be the same across different (time-slices of) 
subjects. Note that on Gupta’s view, there is no need for the assumption that the appearances one and the same item 
manifests, in otherwise identical conditions (including not just environing conditions, but also what subjects believe), 
to the consciousness of different (time-slices of) subjects must be the same, even if these subjects belong to the same 
species. Accordingly, while it may well be that a similarity in physiological makeup of different subjects is at least in 
part what underlies a corresponding similarity in what appearances a given item may manifest to these subjects in 
suitably similar conditions, on Gupta’s account, there is no requirement to assume that this must be so. 
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items can look exactly the same; they can, that is, manifest the same appearances to the subject’s 
consciousness. Just in case they do, the presentations of these various items to the subject’s 
consciousness yield total appearances that are subjectively identical.12 The notion of subjective identity 
between appearances, Gupta suggests, can be relativized to dimensions such as e.g. color, shape, or 
texture (Gupta 2019, §§146-7). With such relativized notions in hand, it is possible to hold that two 
appearances are subjectively identical in the dimension of color, but not in the dimension of shape, 
say. Moreover, presentations of items can stand in other relations as well, such as that of comparative 
similarity. And such relations, too, Gupta maintains, can be relativized to specific dimensions. 
Note that there is something potentially misleading about labeling certain appearances color 
appearances, shape appearances, etc.: it could tempt one into thinking that labelling them that way 
implies that the appearances in question must be appearances manifested by color qualities, shape 
qualities, etc. Gupta, however, resists this implication: 
(3) Manifestation of color appearance does not require the presence of color quality. If 
the color of an object is present, though, then the color appearance of the object is 
identical to the appearance of the color quality. (Gupta 2019, §146) 
Focus, first, on the first sentence of passage (3). It acknowledges the following: the manifestation of 
a color appearance does not require the presence of a color quality. It is, I contend, important in at 
least two respects. For one, it allows that other things besides color qualities of perceived items can 
bring about the manifestation of color appearances to the experiencing subject’s consciousness. In the 
context of our discussion, this matters because it makes the resulting position appear to be quite 
compatible with projection effects.13 For if color appearances do not require the presence of color 
qualities, it is conceivable that what accounts for its manifestation is neither the presence of a 
corresponding color quality nor, perhaps, any kind of mind-independent item at all. In some cases, it 
could be something else, e.g. some feature or condition of the subject’s visual apparatus, a desire she 
                                                 
12  As Gupta emphasizes, subjective identity differs from subjective indistinguishability. For one, two subjectively 
identical appearances can nevertheless be distinguishable—e.g. if the subject knows what she is experiencing. 
Conversely, two subjectively indistinguishable experiences may fail to be subjectively identical, e.g. if the 
indistinguishability is due to a limitation of attention or memory. Cf. Gupta 2019, §150 for discussion.  
13  As we will see below, on the account as it stands, this compatibility may have its limits. 
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harbors, a mood she is in, her distribution of attention, or, and importantly, what she believes. For 
another, and relatedly, Gupta’s acknowledgement allows us to separate so-called color appearances 
from color qualities even more radically. For the following case seems conceivable: Assume, for 
simplicity, that due to the similarity in your and my physiological and cognitive makeup, the 
appearances items manifests, in similar circumstances, to your and my consciousnesses, respectively, 
are roughly the same. Next, consider an imaginary being whose physiological and cognitive makeup 
differs from ours significantly. Further, suppose that an appearance is manifested to that being’s 
consciousness that is subjectively identical to what for us is a color appearance.14 However, for that 
being, the appearance may be one that is standardly manifested to her consciousness upon being 
presented with certain shapes. Accordingly, it could be that if you or I were to have an appearance of 
that sort, it would in ordinary circumstances15 be rational for us to transition to beliefs and judgments 
about the color of the item we see (supposing there is some such item). For our imaginary being, in 
contrast, it would, in ordinary circumstances, be rational to transition to beliefs and judgments about 
the shape of the item it sees (supposing, again, that there is one).  
Calling appearances color appearances, shape appearances, etc. thus betrays a certain bias towards 
taking the appearances in question to be appearances manifested by colors, shapes, etc. However, if 
we acknowledge, with Gupta, that having color appearances does not presuppose the presence of 
color qualities, we should also acknowledge that for Gupta to label them color appearances is a matter 
of expository convenience, not a way of judging prematurely that appearances we group into a specific 
class must generally be appearances that are typically manifested by a specific kind of item or quality.16 
                                                 
14  Gupta explicitly acknowledges that the same appearance may be manifested to two creatures belonging to different 
species that are separated by a vast stretch of spacetime (cf. Gupta 2019, §148). Moreover, he briefly considers a 
similar kind of case in the context of his discussion of the relativity of perception (cf. ibid., §159). 
15  More specifically: in circumstances in which we take circumstances to be normal. 
16  Accordingly, it is compatible with Gupta’s view that kinds of appearances that in your and my case may be tied 
together via similarity relations so as to form the set of e.g. color appearances or shape appearances, could be grouped 
differently in the consciousnesses of other beings, e.g. beings whose physiological and cognitive makeup differs from 
ours. They may even be grouped differently in members of the same species (see 9.2.3 for a brief discussion of such 
a case). In this context, note also the following passage, in which Gupta distinguishes the generality of appearances 
from that of qualities: “[s]hape appearances are not shapes, and color appearances are not colors. Appearances are 
like qualities in that they, too, are general items […]. The generality of appearances, however, is of an entirely different 
kind than that of qualities. The generality of qualities pertains to the similarities in things, in how things are. The 
generality of appearances, in contrast, pertains to the similarities in presentations of things to a subject’s consciousness. 
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Returning to passage (3), note that while the first sentence makes room for projection effects, 
the second sentence can seem to rule them out. For suppose it is true, as Gupta claims, that if the 
color quality of an object is present, the color appearance of the object is identical to the appearance 
of the color quality. If so, how then could the banana object, once adjusted to an achromatic gray, say, 
still has an appearance such that subjects form the judgment that it is yellowish?17  
The apparent problem dissolves once we acknowledge that just like other items than color 
qualities can bring about the manifestation color appearances, such factors can also be part of the 
perceptual situation in which a given color quality is presented. “In general,” Gupta holds,  
(4) appearances manifested by objects depend on a multitude of factors beyond the 
object’s properties and relations, including the state of the subject’s sense organs, the 
subject’s beliefs and desires, and the subject’s attention and actions 
(Gupta 2019, §145). 
If, as per passage (4), what appearance an item manifests can depend on e.g. one’s beliefs, then it 
can be true that the color appearance of the gray banana object is identical to the appearance of the 
color quality (where the color quality is gray), while it is also true that this appearance is such that 
subjects standardly transition to the judgment that the color of the banana object is (still) yellowish. 
For crucially, from the identity in question nothing follows with respect to what the appearance of the 
color quality must be. A fortiori, it does not follow that the appearance manifested by the gray banana 
object must be such that subjects form the judgment that the banana object is in fact gray. For in a 
perceptual situation that contains further factors—a modified visual system, color filters, funny 
lighting, or, importantly, beliefs—the color appearance of the banana object that is the appearance of 
the banana object’s color may well be such that subjects form the judgment that it is not gray, but 
some other color, say, or no color at all. Thus, if we acknowledge that appearances are appearances 
                                                 
[…] [I]f the things manifest the same appearances, then the experiences are subjectively identical. Nothing follows, 
however, about the qualitative identity of the things or even about their qualitative similarity” (ibid, §152). The last 
sentence in particular supports the reading suggested. 
Incidentally, note that the question how appearances are connected not to the items that manifest them to a 
subject’s consciousness, but to judgments concerning what they are appearances of raises an issue that is structurally 
analogous to the problems of Amalgamation and Non-Arbitrariness, respectively. I return to this issue at the end 
of 9.2.1. 
17  For ease of exposition, I am ignoring that literally, achromatic gray is not a color. 
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manifested in perceptual situations, and that the latter may contain various modifying factors, we can 
hold on to the claim that on Gupta’s view, projection effects are indeed possible. With this in hand, 
note that Gupta adds some further observations about appearances, suggesting, inter alia, that 
appearances can contain other appearances as constituents, but that there may be no specifiable class 
of appearances out of which all others can be built (cf. Gupta 2019, §148). The latter allows Gupta to 
make room for accommodating a more specific effect that we encountered in our initial discussion of 
Hanson’s view (see 2.3.2). Among the effects Hanson draws attention to, recall, is one that occurs 
when we recognize objects, or alter our way of apprehending them. As we do, the elements of the 
visual field, as Hanson puts it, can snap into perspective and begin to cohere, perhaps in new or 
different ways than before.  
Back in the second chapter, we had to leave it open whether such effects could be classified as 
effects on the experiential phenomenology proper. Hanson’s account of the phenomenology was 
simply not rich enough to settle the issue and he himself seemed undecided. However, if, like Gupta, 
we explicitly drop the idea that the identity of appearances must be construed in terms of their being 
constituted by certain atomic appearances, there is room for the idea that appearances can contain the 
same appearances as constitutive elements and yet differ in other ways, e.g. in how the constituting 
elements cohere.  
By including such effects among the possible effects beliefs could have on the phenomenology 
of the subject’s experience, and by granting, in general, that what appearance various items manifest 
can be shaped by other factors such as the subject’s standing beliefs, Gupta is thus also in an excellent 
position to accommodate cases of expert vision proper.18 Regardless of whether the expert’s beliefs 
affect the individual appearances items manifest to her consciousness or the way these appearances 
might cohere, Gupta’s view provides ample conceptual leeway to accommodate such cases. 
Contrast the relationalists. Suppose relationalists grant that expert vision proper is possible and 
that it may involve a difference between the phenomenology of the expert’s experience and that of 
                                                 
18  For the distinction between expert vision proper and expert judgment, see 6.3.2. 
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the layperson in how the elements of their experience cohere. If so, the relationalists we considered 
would have to account for such effects by way of assuming that the expert a), by passively deploying 
her sophisticated conceptual capacities, lifts special mind-independent properties into the 
presentational character of her experience (Fish), b) registers visually relevant similarities that the 
layperson does not (Brewer), or c) perceives appearance properties that typically (but perhaps not 
necessarily) escape the layperson, or—perhaps—attends to them in a way that the layperson (typically) 
does not (Genone).  
Gupta, on the other hand, is not limited to these options. He is not forced to insist, that is, that 
the difference in the expert’s experiential phenomenology must be explained by drawing either on the 
putative fact that the expert perceptually relates to different mind-independent items or on a difference 
in the expert’s attention patterns. Of course, such explanations are open to him as well and perhaps, 
they are at times quite plausible. But Gupta can also accommodate the possibility that such effects are 
brought about by other factors, e.g. the subject’s background beliefs concerning what she faces.19 
9.1.2  Appearances and Manifestation, Total Hallucinations, the Item Requirement on  
Appearance, and Projection Effects Again 
Gupta thinks that appearances figure in perceptual situations broadly construed, i.e. both in 
experiences that result from one’s being perceptually related to mind-independent items and in 
experiences that are illusions or hallucinations. Thus, unlike Fish, Gupta is not committed to the claim 
that in hallucinatory experiences, there are no appearances, but only erroneous beliefs to the effect 
                                                 
19  As Gupta points out, while it is possible that we are constituted in such a way that we can only have experiences in 
which appearances are such that their elements cohere in certain ways if we possess certain concepts (or beliefs), there 
is no need to assume that the possession of such (or any) concepts serves as a general constraint on what appearances 
could be manifested in a sentient being’s experience. Concepts and conceptual items, he thinks, may shape 
appearances, but are not constitutive of them. Cf. Gupta 2019, §170. Suppose it is true that for us, as we look at a 
photograph, the phenomenology of our experience is such that the various elements constituting it can cohere in 
specific ways only because we hold certain beliefs concerning the items depicted in the picture—e.g. that one could go 
around them and that in doing so, the phenomenology of our experience would change in predictable and 
characteristic ways. Gupta’s point, then, is that even if this were true of us, it need not be true of sentient beings in 
general. 
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that one has an experience with a particular phenomenology that one would have if one did in fact 
see what one merely takes oneself to see. Moreover, for Gupta, there is no need to construe 
hallucinatory phenomenology in terms of subjective indistinguishability. For since there is no need for 
him to endorse a relationalist account of Constitution, there is no corresponding need to treat 
appearances that are manifested in the context of a hallucination as dependent upon appearances that 
are manifested in non-hallucinatory experiences.20 As I will argue below, some work is needed to make 
Gupta’s account of hallucination fully compatible with the possibility of projection effects. First, 
however, we need to introduce some more terminology. So far, we have surveyed Gupta’s notion of 
Subjective Identity, but we have also made ample use of his notions of ‘appearance’ and 
‘manifestation.’ Here, then, are the principles that, Gupta stipulates, serve to define both these notions:  
(5) x is manifested in p’s consciousness in situation s iff, for some item i, x is a 
constituent of AppearanceS(i, p) 
x is an appearance iff, for some subject p and some situation s, x is manifested 
in p’s consciousness in situation s. (Gupta 2019, §148) 
Note that on Gupta’s stipulation, any item i is an item that is presented to a person’s consciousness. 
If so, it follows from these principles that for every appearance, there must be some item that is 
presented to the consciousness of the subject in which the appearance is manifested. Let us call this 
commitment the Item Requirement on Appearances—or IRA for short.  
IRA raises several questions. For one, it raises the question how Gupta accommodates total 
hallucinations. After all, one may well think that in such cases, no suitable items are available that 
could manifest appearances in the subject’s consciousness. In response, Gupta offers a very liberal 
                                                 
20  Local dependencies may and perhaps do often obtain. It could, for instance, be that an appearance that is manifested 
in a subject’s consciousness in the context of a hallucination is manifested in part due to an erroneous belief about 
what to expect in the context at hand. The banana case could be construed that way. Accordingly, that the banana 
object, once adjusted to what is actually an achromatic gray, manifests an appearance that in the test subjects’ mental 
economy is linked with judgments and beliefs to the effect that the perceived object is yellowish, could be explained 
in part by drawing on the following fact: having appearances associated with, and making rational transitions to, beliefs 
and judgments to the effect that the object seen is yellow is the default situation in non-hallucinatory experiences of 
bananas. To the extent that this fact about non-hallucinatory cases plays an explanatory role in what generates the 
phenomenology of the hallucination, that phenomenology depends on facts about non-hallucinatory cases. It is, 
however, equally conceivable that a subject could have a hallucinatory experience that is partly or fully constituted by 
appearance for which, in the subject’s mental economy, there are no (or no default) non-hallucinatory counterparts. 
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view on what the items that manifest appearances can be. Importantly, he claims that such items are 
not limited to external items. Rather, they can also be internal items such as mental images or brain 
states (cf. Gupta 2019, §143; §163). Moreover, he also maintains, in line with his explicitly empiricist 
outlook, that the question which elements are presented in a particular hallucination can be determined 
only empirically. “A logico-philosophical inquiry,” he contends, “must stay silent on the issue” (Gupta 
2019, §163; similary: §143). I confess that I am not sure how one would determine empirically that the 
item presented in a total hallucination is a mental image. Moreover, while I can well imagine that a 
brain state might cause a total hallucination, I am less certain how to understand the sense of presentation 
on which, in a total hallucination, a brain state could be presented to a subject’s consciousness.  
In general, Gupta spends a lot of effort on developing a liberal account of presentation. In chapter 
5 of Gupta 2019, he carefully separates ‘presentation’ from ‘acquaintance,’ argues against restrictions 
on ‘presentation’ issuing from the so-called transparency of experience, and later, in chapter 6, insists that 
the presentational directedness of experience differs from the intentional directedness of thought (for 
the latter, see Gupta 2019, §164). In light of these efforts, the worry that arises in the context of his 
suggestion how to accommodate total hallucinations can be put as follows: if presentation is construed 
as liberally as Gupta suggests, the contours of the concept ‘presentation’ become less distinct. Put 
somewhat pointedly, the more effort Gupta spends on elucidating what presentation is not, the less 
clear it becomes what remains there for presentation to be. Accordingly, when Gupta entertains it as 
an empirical possibility that the items that, in a total hallucination, are presented to the subject are 
mental images or brain states, it is not clear what that suggestion amounts to.  
Let us consider a few conceivable responses. A simple way of dodging the issue of total 
hallucinations entirely would be for Gupta to claim that total hallucinations are impossible. However, 
he explicitly rejects this strategy. For one, he acknowledges the Charles Bonnet Syndrome as possible 
evidence for the occurrence of visual hallucinations in the blind—taking it, apparently, that such 
hallucinations do not involve the presentation of external items. Moreover, and more importantly, he 
reiterates his earlier point: a logical inquiry should not take a stand on factual matters (cf. ibid., §161, 
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fn. 14).21 Here is an alternative response: it could be held that what the case of a total hallucination 
caused by a brain state indicates is that the presentation relation just is a specific subspecies of the causal 
relation, perhaps one that meets some further conditions. If so, then for a brain state to cause a 
hallucination could be perfectly compatible with its being an item that is presented in the total 
hallucination it causes. However, for this to be an informative response, we still need an account of 
what, according to Gupta, the conditions characteristic of presentation are such that brain states that 
cause total hallucinations can in doing so count as being presented to the subject’s consciousness.22 
A third response would be to drop IRA. However, since IRA follows from the definitions 
provided in passage (5), doing so would require modifying them. There are several shapes such a 
modification could take. For one, instead of suggesting, as Gupta does, the following biconditional 
(i) x is manifested in p’s consciousness in situation s iff, for some item i, x is a constituent of 
AppearanceS(i, p), 
Gupta could defend a weaker claim, such as the following conditional:  
(ii) x is manifested in p’s consciousness in situation s if, for some item i, x is a constituent of 
AppearanceS(i, p). 
Doing so would allow that appearances can be manifested in a subject’s consciousness in other 
ways than via presentation. However, for Gupta to embrace (ii) would leave him both without a 
definition of ‘manifestation’ and—given the way in which, according to passage (5), the notions of 
‘manifestation’ and ‘appearance’ are interrelated—without a complete definition of ‘appearance’ as 
well. Accordingly, a more attractive response might be to hold on to the biconditional form of (i), but 
add a further disjunct to its right-hand side.  
                                                 
21  How the Charles Bonnet Syndrome is to be characterized remains a contentious matter. Accordingly, it could turn 
out that in the relevant hallucinatory episodes, items are presented to the subject’s consciousness after all, e.g. via other 
modalities. For the purposes of the following discussion, I will bracket this concern. I anyway agree with Gupta that 
the possibility of total hallucinations is a factual matter that a philosophical inquiry should not prejudge. 
22  A related point is the following: though Gupta mentions non-existent items, fictional particulars and uninstantiated 
sensible profiles as examples that cannot be presented to a subject’s consciousness in experience (cf. Gupta 2019, 
§164, some further restrictions can be found in §204), he leaves it open what principle determines whether items can 
or cannot be presented to consciousness. In light of this fact, characterizing presentation as a specific kind of causal 
relation would already be instructive. For on the assumption that neither neutrinos, abstract objects, or a fully 
transcendent god can causally interact with us, it would then follow that neither of the above could be presented to 
consciousness, either. 
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Before we consider a suggestion of that shape, we need to introduce two further notions: that of 
the phenomenology of an experience and the notion of presentational complex Πe that it draws 
on. ‘Presentational complex’ is merely Gupta’s label for the totality of items presented to 
consciousness in an experience e. Again, his conception of what such items can be is very liberal. They 
“may be physical or mental; they may be external to the subject’s body or internal to it. Even brain 
events and processes may be presented in an experience” (Gupta 2019, §143). Here, then, is his 
characterization of ‘phenomenology.’ 
(6) The phenomenology of e (notation: Φe) may now be characterized thus: it is the 
appearance manifested in e by the presentational complex Πe: 
Φe =Df Appearancee(Πe). (Gupta 2019, §149) 
On the resulting notion, the phenomenology of an experience is constituted by the appearances 
manifested in it. And given that the notion of manifestation we get from (i) entails IRA, it follows that 
there can be no appearances in the absence of items that are presented to the subject’s consciousness. 
Consequently, there can be no experience with a phenomenology unless some item is presented to 
the subject’s consciousness. IRA is thus a distant cousin of the General Constraint on Thin Looks 
discussed in 5.3 and, more fundamentally, a way for Gupta to retain the broadly relationalist idea that 
for experiential phenomenology to occur, there must be some item the subject is related to.23 
For our purposes, this is especially significant since IRA entails a restriction on the possibility of 
projection effects: on the assumption that beliefs do not typically—or maybe in us cannot—figure 
as elements of the presentational complex, Gupta’s view, as it stands, rules out that a total hallucination 
could be such that while no items are presented to the hallucinating subject’s consciousness, the 
subject still undergoes a hallucinatory experience, one caused directly by her beliefs.24 
                                                 
23  Relationalists and Gupta spell out this idea differently, however. First, on relationalist accounts, the item in question 
must be a mind-independent item, whereas Gupta’s account of what such items could be is more liberal. Second, for 
relationalists, the relevant relation is typically that of acquaintance. For Gupta, it is that of presentation.   
24  Pending further restrictions on the notion of presentation, there may be nothing in principle that would rule out 
beliefs as elements of the presentational complex. However, if we ask how it is that beliefs may affect what 
appearances being presented with some items are manifested in the subject’s experience, there is no need to assume 
that an answer must draw on the assumption that beliefs are part of the presentational complex itself. A more plausible 
response (which Gupta confirmed in conversation) is the following: various factors may affect what appearances a 
given set of items may manifest. These may also include what beliefs one holds. Note, however, that in the kind of 
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Again, it could turn out that such hallucinations do not, or for some reason could not, occur. But 
if, with Gupta, we insist that a logical inquiry should not take a stand on factual matters, there is some 
motivation to accommodate such cases. Accordingly, there is some prima facie motivation to drop IRA. 
This brings us back to the question how (i) could be modified. Here is an example:  
(i*) x is manifested in p’s consciousness in situation s iff there is either some item i 
such that for i, x is a constituent of AppearanceS(i, p) or some non-empty set of 
beliefs B that brings about x as a constituent of Φe. 
Accepting (i*), however, is a non-conservative solution to the problem and will have further 
consequences. For one, the definition of the phenomenology of experience provided in (6) would 
have to be adjusted to accommodate the possibility that the total phenomenology may be partly or 
fully constituted by appearances caused by beliefs. ‘Φe =Df Appearancee(Πe),’ in other words, would 
have to be replaced by a suitably modified alternative, such as, e.g. ‘‘Φe =Df Appearancee(Πe) and 
Appearance(B),’ where ‘Appearance(B)’ would stand for appearances brought about by some suitable 
set of the subject’s beliefs. Relatedly, accepting this proposal may force Gupta to accept a somewhat 
bifurcated strategy of capturing the way beliefs may affect appearances in various conditions. 
Presumably, in cases where actual worldly items are being presented to a subject’s consciousness 
anyway, effects had by beliefs would be modeled by way of listing the relevant beliefs among the 
factors that jointly determine the perceptual situation. In total hallucinations caused by beliefs, in 
contrast, such beliefs would not figure in the perceptual situation parameter, but separately, and thus 
be attributed a more autonomous role.25 
This last observation leads to the fourth and, I suggest, most attractive way of addressing the 
issue. According to it, an empty presentational complex constitutes a merely formal item that can 
nevertheless be presented to a subject’s consciousness. This is the most attractive strategy since 
pursuing it is maximally conservative with respect to Gupta’s extant account. For one, it leaves all of 
Gupta’s definitions intact. And on a modified characterization of what items can be that includes an 
                                                 
case we are considering, this suggestion does not help. For ex hypothesi, in the kind of total hallucinations we are 
considering there are no items that are presented to consciousness, whose appearances beliefs could then affect. 
25  There need to be nothing wrong with pursuing such a strategy, of course. Having a uniform account, such as in the 
next suggestion, would certainly be more elegant, but good solutions need not be elegant.  
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empty presentational complex as a merely formal item, the proposal also respects IRA. At the same 
time, projection effects that result in total hallucinations are no longer be ruled out. In line with 
Gupta’s insistence that factual matters should not be prejudicated philosophically, IRA, on this 
construal, imposes no constraints on the possibility of projection effect at all. Moreover, the 
bifurcated strategy of capturing how beliefs may affect appearances that was noted in the third 
suggestion is avoided as well. For if being presented with a merely formal item—an empty 
presentational complex—is taken to yield the manifestation of an appearance as well, the beliefs that 
ultimately account for the total hallucination can be modeled as usual: as figuring in the situation 
parameter.  
Finally, if we also allow that a person’s brain states can be part of the perceptual situation 
parameter, the solution that works for hallucinations that are caused by projection effects should carry 
over to hallucinations caused by brain states as well. In other words, total hallucinations caused by 
brain states could simply be the appearances manifested by the presentation of an empty 
representational complex, which is then modified by the brain state. 
Of course, a lingering question remains: is Gupta’s account of presentation compatible with 
accommodating empty presentational complexes as items? To answer this question, arguably, a more 
explicit account of the positive features of presentation is still needed. 
This concludes our brief sketch of Gupta’s account of appearances. As we saw, as it stands it 
already accommodates a large variety of projection effects and can be modified so as to be fully 
compatible with them, i.e. also with the possibility that projection effects, too, could in some cases 
be what accounts for total hallucinations. Moreover, the view also provides room for the kind of 
effects discussed in 2.3.2—effects that concern, in Hanson’s terms, how the elements of the visual 
field cohere or pull together and that may well be a feature characteristic of expert vision proper. Like 
Hanson’s account aspires to be, Gupta’s account, if modified as suggested, thus turns out to be fully 
compatible with the doxastic variability of experiential phenomenology. What allows Gupta’s account 
of the phenomenology of experience to accommodate such effects is that, like Hanson, he is not 
committed to the relationalist idea that experiential phenomenology must be constituted solely by the 
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subject’s being related to mind-independent items. Such relations may play an important role in 
bringing about the appearances that constitute experimental phenomenology, often even, but they 
need not always do so, nor need such relations be the only factor that can play such a role.  
Unlike Hanson, Gupta provides a much richer account of how to understand experiential 
phenomenology. Crucially, unlike Hanson’s account, Gupta’s account makes it intelligible in what way 
experiential phenomenology depends on the mind-independent items in the subject’s environment, 
since in many if not most cases, it will be these items that account at least in part for the appearances 
manifested in consciousness. Accordingly, we can combine the revamped Hansonian account 
discussed in the previous chapter with Gupta’s presentationalist account of experience. Doing so is 
simple: we simply propose that the dispositions of amalgamation introduced in the previous chapter take 
as input experiences as construed on Gupta’s presentationalist account. And on the resulting view, we 
can fully cash out the notion of empirical constraint in a way that on Hanson’s original account was 
impossible. For supplementing Hanson’s view with Gupta’s presentationalist account of experience 
allows us to explain how the phenomenology of experience can develop in ways that are independent 
of the subject’s expectations. 
Gupta’s notion of presentation, I suggested, stands in need of further precisification. Still, I think 
that Gupta’s account of the phenomenology of experience is powerful, interesting, and rather versatile. 
As suggested, it can be used to supplement the revamped Hansonian view developed in 8.1, which 
remedies the last remaining deficiency we listed with respect to Hanson’s view at the outset of chapter 
8. Similarly, together with an account of Non-Arbitrariness—modeled, perhaps, on the Hansonian 
account of Modifiable Amalgamation we discussed earlier—one may try to use Gupta’s account to 
supplement the Siegelian account discussed in 7.3 or even the account Siegel suggests. As for the 
relationalist accounts, we will have to observe that Gupta’s account is incompatible with them since 
in contrast to them, he has no need for a commitment to Constitution. Moreover, on the 
modification I argued we should accept, the relationalist core tenet that experience is inevitably a 
relation between subjects and mind-independent items is dropped for good. Still, for relationalists 
who, like Genone, are willing to embrace an account of experience (not just of perception) that 
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endorses phenomenal pluralism, modeling their account of experiential phenomenology more closely 
on Gupta’s account of appearances could be a fruitful strategy to develop their views further. 
In the context of our inquiry, going back to these various views and trying to develop them further 
would be a distraction. Instead, I will end this investigation by focusing on the conception of the 
general role of experience as of making rational view-dependent transitions to beliefs, judgments, etc. 
In the next section, I sketch how on Gupta’s account, this conception operates. Doing so requires 
that we understand how Gupta addresses the question that drove Hanson to endorse an idea Gupta 
eschews—viz. that concepts must be operative in experiences themselves. This question, to wit, is the 
question how experience can be epistemically significant. To understand Gupta’s response, it will be 
crucial to understand his conception of rational linkages. 
9.2 LINKAGES 
Since the conception of the general role of experience as of making rational view-dependent 
transitions to beliefs, judgments, etc. is due to Gupta, the question we need to address in what follows 
is not primarily whether it is compatible with his account, which we will grant, but rather, how on his 
account, this conception interact with his account of appearances discussed in the previous subsection. 
How, then, is it, on Gupta’s view, that in the context of having a certain background view, for a 
subject to undergo a certain experience makes it rational to make certain transitions to beliefs, 
judgments, etc.? A crucial part of Gupta’s answer is that according to him, background views are more 
than just a set of beliefs. Here is how Gupta puts it in a footnote in Gupta (2018): 
(7) A view includes beliefs, conjectures, and other propositional attitudes. It also includes 
linkages to experience, which cannot be captured through propositional attitudes. 
(Gupta 2018, p. 35, cf. also Gupta 2019, §100) 
Such linkages, Gupta asserts are “rational” and they are “established” (Gupta 2006, p. 81) or 
“instituted by an experience” (Gupta 2018, p. 36). Similarly, he states the following: 
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(8) Because of your visual experience, a rational linkage obtained between your view and 
your judgment, which made your move to the judgment rational. The experience did 
not render your judgment rational; it rendered your transition, your move, to the 
judgment rational (Gupta 2019, §73). 
As these passages indicate, Gupta endorses the following three theses: 
Linkages in Views 
 Rational linkages are components of background views. 
 Linkage Institution 
Rational linkages are instituted by experience. 
Ineffability  
Rational linkages between views and experiences cannot be captured through propositional 
attitudes.26 
The first thing to note is that like on the Hansonian Variable Content View we considered in the 
previous chapter, on Gupta’s view, too, for experience to play its general role, whether the 
phenomenology of the subject’s visual experience has been affected is completely irrelevant. Provided 
that the subject’s view contains rational linkages that relate the relevant appearance to beliefs, 
judgments, etc. that upon having the relevant experience it would be rational for the subject to 
transition to, experience will play its rational role—no matter what the experience is or how it came 
about. 
On Gupta’s account, the concept of rational linkages has not received as much attention as, I think, 
it deserves. In the following sections, I will thus comment on the three claims listed above. In doing 
so, I hope to arrive at a better understanding of what these linkages are, how they come to be, in what 
sense we may or may not be able to talk about them, and how in views, linkages relate to beliefs.  
                                                 
26  The concept of rational linkages, I think, is interesting, but stands in need of further elaboration. In Byrne et al. 2018, 
I note, in effect, that if we accept both Linkages in Views and Ineffability and also hold, as Gupta does, that views 
can be accepted, the question arises how we are to understand what it is to accept such ineffable linkages. In response, 
Gupta suggests that to accept does not mean that we accept linkages directly. Rather, he asserts “the acceptance of 
these linkages is reflected in observational uses of concepts and in the issuance of perceptual judgments” (Byrne et al 
2018, Response to Rosenhagen). Further questions concern how linkages are related to the other components a 
background view is said to contain. Do they jointly determine which linkages a view contains or could two views be 
the same and yet contain different linkages? Conversely, does the presence of certain linkages constrain a view’s 
further components? If so, how? In 9.2.3, I offer the beginning of a response to some of these issues. 
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Let me acknowledge that the ensuing considerations remain incomplete in at least two important 
respects. For one, I do not consider all the various linkages that Gupta explicitly accommodates. In 
particular, I completely ignore his highly interesting discussion of the linkages he thinks views contain 
between experiences and ostensive definitions (see Gupta 2019, chapter 8).  
For another, the suggestion I offer in 9.2.3 of how rational linkages could be construed as being 
contained in a view remains tentative. That said, since Gupta, too, owes us an account of how rational 
linkages relate to the other components he takes views to contain, even tentative suggestions should 
count as progress. 
9.2.1 Linkages in Views 
The idea that views contain linkages to experiences is a crucial component of Gupta’s position. It is 
an essential element of his account of how experience can be epistemically significant while lacking 
content. Consider what it would be for a view to lack linkages to experiences. Suppose, that is, we 
took a view to be nothing but a body of beliefs, conjectures, suppositions, and other propositional 
attitudes. Moreover, suppose we accepted Gupta’s account of experience in terms of appearances. 
Now consider that some items are presented to a given subject’s consciousness, so that she undergoes 
an experience and has appearances manifested in her consciousness. How, then, could these 
appearances have any kind of bearing on the subject’s view? Without the notion of linkages, this would 
remain a completely open question. Just like Hanson suggested, experience, construed in terms of 
appearances, would amount to nothing but kaleidoscopy. To explain how experience can be 
epistemically significant, then, experiences and views must be linked in some way.  
Linkages, Gupta claims, are components of views. What linkages? Arguably, linkages between 
views and experiences come in various flavors. For instance, some linkages between experiences and 
views may be such that having certain experiences causally triggers view-relative transitions to certain 
beliefs, judgments, etc. Linkages of that kind would be such that the view-relative relations they 
establish between appearances and transitions to beliefs, judgments, etc. would be dispositional.  
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In this context, the following passages are instructive:  
(9) A perceptual judgment such as “that is a yellow banana” possesses […] a 
phenomenological profile: appearances whose manifestations prompt you to judge, for 
example, “that is a yellow banana” […] (Byrne et al. 2018, Response to Rosenhagen, 
emphasis added). 
(10) Manifestation of different appearances will now prompt you to issue the judgment 
“that is yellow.” Your new view is now constituted by different experiential linkages 
(Byrne et al 2018, Response to Rosenhagen, emphasis added). 
Moreover, consider the following passage in which talk of dispositions figures explicitly: 
(11) Your present view contains, for example, links between certain kinds of experiences 
and the concept “bird,” links in virtue of which you are disposed to predicate the 
concept “bird” of some objects when you undergo those kinds of experiences. (Gupta 
2019, §77, emphasis added) 
Taken together, these passages strongly support a dispositional conception of how manifestations 
of appearances in the subject’s consciousness are linked to transitions to perceptual judgments and, 
as passage (11) indicates, predications of concepts.  
If construed in dispositional terms, the relation Gupta takes to obtain between appearances and 
transitions to perceptual judgments (etc.) appears to be very much like the relation between perceived 
appearances and judgments as Genone construes it (at least on the causal-dispositionalist reading, see 
6.4.3). Likewise, it is similar to the relations between phenomenal states and beliefs, judgments, etc. 
that I suggested can be taken to obtain on the Hansonian Variable Content View discussed in the 
previous chapter. More specifically, if linkages are dispositions, then on Gupta’s account, such 
dispositions would seem to play a role that is analogous to the joint effect had by dispositions of 
amalgamation introduced in 8.1.4 and the dispositions of transition introduced in 8.2.  
To reiterate, recall that on the Hansonian Variable Content View, having a phenomenal state 
is construed as triggering, in the subject, (view- and) context-relative dispositions, dispositions of 
amalgamation, to see things certain ways. Moreover, the instances of seeing as thus triggered are in turn 
part of the set of conditions that jointly trigger context-relative dispositions of transition, whose 
manifestation in the subject includes the transition to certain beliefs, judgments, etc. Analogously, 
Gupta’s account could be interpreted as involving a commitment to the following idea: in the context 
of a given view and the (dispositional) linkages to experiences involving specific appearances that it 
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contains, having an experience with a certain phenomenology triggers transitions to certain beliefs, 
judgments, etc. Since Gupta has no need for a notion of seeing as, he may have no corresponding need 
for dispositions of amalgamation. On his view, dispositions to transition would thus take a different input than 
on the Hansonian conception. Inter alia, such inputs would involve not instances of seeing as that are 
themselves triggered by suitable dispositions of amalgamation, but rather experiences directly or—more 
specifically—the various appearances these experiences involve. Still, like proponents of the 
Hansonian Variable Content View, Gupta, too, seems to hold that dispositions to transition to certain 
beliefs, judgments, etc. are part of what governs a subject’s responses to her experience.27 For Gupta, 
however, linkages connecting views to experience could not exclusively be linkages of the dispositional 
kind just proposed. For on the interpretation just offered, linkages connect experiences and views in 
a merely causal way. As such, they may well govern what transitions experiencing subjects actually 
exhibit. If these dispositional linkages were the only kind of linkage tying views to experiences, it 
would remain unclear why Gupta characterizes linkages as rational. More generally, it would remain 
mysterious how experience could be playing what according to Gupta (and I following him, since 
chapter 7.3) is the central role of experience: to make rational view-dependent transitions to beliefs, 
judgments, etc.  
To get a notion of rational linkages, we must thus assume that having certain appearances, in the 
context of a view, not actually, but rationally prompts certain judgments, beliefs, etc. (what is actually 
prompted and what is rationally prompted may of course come apart). Let us add one more passage 
to the ones we have already noted: 
                                                 
27  It may, however, not be plausible to construe such linkages as linkages that obtain between experiences and a subject’s 
view. For recall that on the analogous account sketched in 8.2, among the conditions of manifestation, I listed not just 
beliefs, but all sorts of other factors such as desires, hopes, time constraints, cognitive resources, or moods. And at 
least according to Gupta’s standard characterizations of what a view is (see, for example, Gupta 2019, §77), some of 
these factors will not be included. A broader and to that extent more helpful notion to specify this particular kind of 
linkages might thus be the one Siegel favors: the notion of an outlook on the world—if we understand this notion to 
capture more than propositional attitudes of various kinds. The relevant linkages could then be characterized as 
dispositions to respond to an experience, given an outlook and, perhaps, further factors such as e.g. time constraints. 
I think that if we consider how experience operates in the context of other areas of philosophical thinking, e.g. when 
we think about moral perception or try to reconstruct how experience may have contributed to the process of 
conceptual and theoretical change in specific episodes from history of science, having a broader notion than that of 
a view is essential. For present purposes, however, I will bracket the issue. 
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(12)  It is the character of a view that determines which judgments are perceptually entailed 
by an experience: the view links experiences with certain judgments. It is because of 
these linkages that the occurrence of an experience renders rational transitions to certain 
judgments. (Gupta 2019, §77, emphasis added) 
This passage confirms our suspicions. In it, the relevant relation between having an experience 
and perceptual judgments cannot be merely causal-dispositional—Gupta’s reference to perceptual 
entailment forbids a construal in purely causal terms. Instead, the idea is the following: for every 
possible experience, a view contains a set of linkages that determine what, if an experience with a 
certain phenomenology were had, it would be rational to transition to.28 Accordingly, once a specific 
experience is had, there will be some response that it is rational for the subject to transition to.  
Again, recall that a view may, but need not determine one single response as the rational one, nor 
need responses that would be rational go beyond that of suspending belief or issuing the uninformative 
judgment that an experience was just had (cf. the corresponding remarks in 8.2). Furthermore, as we 
saw in our discussion of empirical constraint in 8.1.2, the responses that having a specific experience 
makes rational to transition to, in the context of a given background view, need not support that view. 
A view, in other words, also contains linkages to experiences that make it rational to transition to 
judgments, etc. that would conflict with the view. Thus, as a result of transitioning to e.g. beliefs that, 
in the context of a background view and upon having a certain experience, it is rational to transition 
to, the subject may come under rational pressure to revise the view in some way to resolve the conflict.  
Again, the important upshot of the assumption that views contain linkages of this kind to 
experiences makes it intelligible how experiences can bear on our beliefs in the first place. It is thus 
this very assumption that enables Gupta to respond to Hanson’s implicit challenge—the challenge 
that on views on which experience lacks content, it is mysterious how experience could be 
epistemically significant. And in contrast to relationalist responses to this challenge, on Gupta’s view, 
                                                 
28  Perhaps more plausibly, linkages may link perceptual judgments, beliefs (and, incidentally, non-propositional 
components of the latter: i.e. concepts) not (or not just) with total experiences, but with individual appearances such 
experiences contain. For our purposes, this complication can be bracketed.  
Let us observe that the assumption that a view contains rational linkages to every possible appearance is crucial. 
If we had reason to assume that linkages to some appearances were absent, such reasons would be reasons to assume 
that there are some cases—viz. cases that involve having experiences that involve the manifestation of untethered 
appearances—in which experience could not play its rational role.  
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there is no need to assume that the epistemic significance of experience must in every case rest on its 
ability to put us in touch with mind-independent items, or in its ability to provide reasons, justification, 
or knowledge by acquaintance.  
On the resulting view, thus, views29 will contain at least two kinds of linkages to experience: 
a) linkages that actually and linkages that b) rationally prompt transitions from having various 
experiences involving various (perhaps even all possible) appearances to responses on the part of the 
subject.30 With this distinction in hand, we are ready to move on to the next claim: Linkage 
Institution. Before we do, let us note in passing that the idea that views contain linkages to all possible 
experiences raises a question structurally analogous to questions we raised for both Hanson and Siegel.  
On Hanson’s view, recall, conceptual elements must be hooked up with phenomenal states, which 
gives rise to the problem of Amalgamation. Analogously, on Siegel’s view, phenomenal states must 
be related to the properties they are taken to present, which gives rise to the problem of Non-
Arbitrariness. On Gupta’s view, finally, experiences must be hooked up, via linkages, both with actual 
responses and with responses it would, on the view in question, be rational to transition to upon 
having such experiences. Accordingly, for Gupta, the question how Amalgamation and Non-
Arbitrariness are initially set up has an obvious counterpart. To have a name for it, we can call it the 
question of Linkage Setup—the question, that is, how linkages are initially set up. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, if Hansonians endorse an account of Modifiable 
Amalgamation, the problem of Amalgamation can, to a certain extent, be made less pressing. For on 
                                                 
29  Again, perhaps ‘outlooks’ is the better expression (see fn. 27). 
30  Such linkages may link views with various responses, such as judgments, beliefs, and actions. As indicated in the 
introduction, Gupta explicitly acknowledges further linkages between views and to acceptance of beliefs and views, 
to recognitions of commitment, and to ostensive definitions (see Gupta 2018, fn, 6; Gupta 2019, chapter 8). In the 
context of the latter, note that the notion of linkages may serve to develop a fuller account of conceptual content. On 
such an account, conceptual content would involve not just the way the relevant concepts are inferentially articulated, 
but also linkages between these concepts and appearances. Arguably, such linkages would constitute what Gupta calls 
phenomenological profiles (cf. Gupta 2018, section 32, passage (9) quoted from Byrne et al 2018 above, as well as 
Gupta 2019, §§189-190; §271, and in general: Gupta 2019, chapter 8, for his account of the relation between 
experience and concepts). Such an account, I think, could well be used to supplement e.g. the broadly holistic notion 
of content that figures in the Hansonian Variable Content View. It was the possibility of supplementing that 
account that explains why I kept insisting (mainly in footnotes) that while a concept’s inferential articulation in a given 
subject’s background view is, on Hanson’s view, an essential part of what that concept means for that subject, 
inferential articulation may not yet provide the complete account. Developing such an account, however, goes beyond 
the purview of the current project, though I will briefly return to the idea in 10.3.1 and in 10.4. 
313 
 
the assumption that there is some way in which, perhaps as part of the natural process of learning 
one’s first language, the relevant dispositions of amalgamation are set up initially, a story can then be 
developed as to how such these dispositions can change in response to one’s experience, including 
one’s interactions with others, as the discussion of Elijah’s case brought out. If this move is open to 
Hansonians, Gupta can, of course, make it, too. As the following passage indicates, he does:  
(13) The idea behind the Ur-View is this: We humans come into the world not only with 
a particular sensory apparatus that shapes our perception but also with a tendency to 
take the world to be a certain way. Nature endows us with a view. There is variation 
here, to be sure, just as there is variation in sensory apparatuses. Still, the variations 
cluster around a center, and I am calling this center the Ur-View. This is the view 
that children acquire at an early age. It is also the view that evolves into a 
commonsense view as the human child explores the world and that, later, can evolve 
into a sophisticated scientific view as the child receives an education 
(Gupta 2019, §365). 
The idea of such an Ur-View, Gupta acknowledges, is a fiction, but, he claims, a useful one (cf. 
Gupta 2019, §365, fn. 7). Importantly, it will be useful if supplemented with a story how such an Ur-
View can evolve by way of integrating beliefs, judgments, etc. that subjects rationally transition to in 
response to their experience and that may require them to revise their views. It is a large and important 
part of Gupta’s overall project to provide such an account of view revision, albeit a part that here, we 
need not review.31 For present purposes, what matters is that on each of the accounts we considered, 
the question how an initial view is established is one that remains to some extent left unanswered. 
And to the extent that the more general question can be raised whether there are any features that 
something must have in order to be a view in the first place, this question remains open to be further 
explored as well.32 A final question that, for now, remains open, is the question how exactly it is that 
linkages are parts of views. I will return to this issue in 9.2.3. 
                                                 
31  The relevant account of empirical revision is already present in in Gupta 2006 and is supplemented in Gupta 2019, 
especially in chapters 9-11. 
32  I briefly return to this issue in 10.3.1 and in 10.4. It should be acknowledged that Gupta accepts, both in Gupta 2006 
and in Gupta 2019, that there are at least three a priori requirements that govern views that are admissible starting 
points for a process of view-revision: coherence, non-rigidity, and receptivity. See Gupta 2006, chapter 4, and Gupta 
2019, §95. for discussion. That said, these constraints are imposed on initial views based on the argument that views 
that are inadmissible, if confronted with possible streams of experience, exhibit a dynamic behavior that prevents 
revision. These views behave, as it were, like the pathologically vain Vivek in that they are incapable of accepting 
certain revisions. Importantly, however, on Gupta’s view, the restrictions on initial views flow from assumptions on 
what dynamic behavior a view must exhibit to be such as to serve the goals of empirical inquiry (see Gupta 2006, pp. 
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9.2.2 Linkage Institution 
According to Linkage Institution, rational linkages are instituted by experience. In this context, I 
wish to make two observations. First, given that the linkages referenced in Linkage Institution are 
rational linkages, we can ignore the other linkages discussed in the previous section—linkages, that is, 
that we can construe as a Gupta-style variant of Hansonian dispositions to transition. Second, note that 
when he talks about what experience institutes, Gupta’s usage is not completely uniform; in some 
instances, for instance, he refers to what the given in experience institutes not in terms of rational 
linkages, but as rational transitions (cf. Gupta 2019, §75, §82).33 
To begin with, let us consider again passage (8) (with one sentence added in the beginning): 
(14) [T]he rational role of experience is to render rational transitions from antecedent views 
to judgments. Because of your visual experience, a rational linkage obtained between 
your view and your judgment, which made your move to the judgment rational. The 
experience did not render your judgment rational; it rendered your transition, your 
move, to the judgment rational (Gupta 2019, §73). 
In the context of this passage, Gupta emphasizes that by itself, visual experience does not provide one 
with any entitlement to perceptual judgments. After all, on his view, experience is a matter of 
appearances being manifested to a subject’s consciousness. And since appearances by themselves 
neither constitute a notion of experiential content nor provide any information as to what they are 
appearances of, it is unclear how experiences, so construed, should provide entitlement. What is 
needed to get such entitlement, Gupta suggests, is an antecedent view. And it is only in the presence 
                                                 
159f. for remarks to this effect). I think that in the context of Gupta’s larger project of elucidating the role experience 
plays in empirical debate, this way of justifying criteria of initial admissibility is perfectly legitimate. However, I strongly 
suspect the following: if we ask what conditions must be in place for any social practice to be such as to justify the 
attribution that members of the relevant practice endorse something that can intelligibly count as a view, it is likely 
that the criteria of admissibility Gupta endorses—and perhaps further ones—could be justified as falling out from 
such an account. Pending such an account, I will only state that I think that such an account would supplement, rather 
than contradict, Gupta’s assessment with respect to the criteria he lists. 
33  Furthermore, he sometimes says that it is views that institute links between experiences and judgments (see Gupta 
2019, §83). The question this raises, again, is one of the questions raised in fn. 26 above, i.e. how to think about the 
rational relations between the various components of views—especially between beliefs and linkages. 
  Note that observing that what Gupta calls ‘the given in experience’ or, alternatively, ‘the hypothetical given,’ is 
just the conception of the general role of experience that we have been working with since 7.3. For a less fully 
developed version of the conception, cf. Gupta 2006, for the fully developed version cf. Gupta 2019, chapter 4. 
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of such a view and the rational linkages that, as we saw in the previous section, such views contain 
that having an experience can provide one with conditional entitlement to beliefs, judgments, etc.—
entitlements that are conditional on the view. 
The characterization so far is familiar and, I think, unobjectionable. The claim that experience 
institutes either rational transitions or rational linkages, however, is, I think, potentially misleading, for 
‘institute’ can be understood as ‘establish’ or ‘originate.’ As we discussed in the previous section, 
linkages, as Gupta construes the, are an integral part of views already. Accordingly, it is prima facie 
unclear how experience should serve to institute them.  
Moreover, recall passage (12). According to it, the occurrence of an experience makes it rational 
for the subject to transition to some response or other. But arguably, such an occurrence does not 
institute a rational transition. Rather, we should say upon having a specific experience that, in the 
subject’s view, must already be coiled up in the rational linkages the view contains, the fact that for 
the subject to make a specific transition would now be the rational thing to do becomes, as it were, 
rationally salient (it need not become salient to the subject). In other words, in the context of the fact 
that one’s background view must already contain linkages between all possible experiences and 
responses that it would be rational to transition to if the respective experiences were had, having a 
specific experience confers on certain transitions the status of actually being rational, given the context 
at hand. We may then say that having the experience institutes the status of certain transitions as being 
the ones that in the context at hand are actually rational. This, I think, is an acceptable reading. It is, 
however, different from saying that experience establishes such rational transitions in the first place.  
Next, consider a case in which, upon having an experience, the subject of that experience realizes 
that the belief that it is now rational for her to transition to, given her background view, conflicts with 
that view. In such a case, having undergone the experience is vitally important for what should happen 
next: a modification of the view and its linkages. Without having had the experience and without 
having transitioned (or perhaps: having imagined what it would be to transition) to what, in the context 
at hand, having the experience makes rational to transition to, the subject may not have come under 
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any imminent pressure to resolve the resulting conflict.34 But having had a suitable experience, such 
pressure will arise—though the subject may for various reasons fail to acknowledge it. Suppose, next, 
that the conflict is recognized and resolved. If so, the subject’s view will be modified. And although a 
full account of how linkages and beliefs are rationally related is still pending, it is obvious that in many 
cases—e.g. the cases of Elijah and Lea discussed in the previous chapter—the linkages to experience 
the revised view contains will to some extent differ from those contained in the antecedent view.35 
Arguably, then, perceptual experience can play a vital and often indispensable role in the process of 
establishing new linkages. However, even in cases in which experience does play an indispensable role 
in bringing about the relevant conflicts that rationally prompt revision, it still depends massively on 
the details of the view how such a conflict will be resolved.36 Accordingly, while it can be granted that 
for many cases in which new linkages are being instituted, experience plays an important role, it cannot 
play this role in and of itself.  
In sum, I think that Linkage Institution should be rejected. At the very least, it should be taken 
with a grain of salt. I do not think that for Gupta to concede this point would be in any way damaging 
to his account—it is a friendly suggestion, not a grave objection. But I do think that institution talk is 
misleadingly suggestive in that it invites an interpretation that I suspect Gupta, too, would wish to 
resist: that experience, in and by itself, could serve to establish either transitions or linkages. Let us 
move on and discuss the last remaining claim: Ineffability. 
                                                 
34  Some conflicts that can be revealed by way of having a recalcitrant experience (i.e. an experience that makes rational 
to a belief that conflicts with one’s antecedent view) may be such that one could also have noticed such a conflict 
upon reflection on one’s view. However, not every possible conflict will be of that kind that experience is only one 
way of discovering it. In the absence of experience, I cannot, for instance, figure out through reflection that my strong 
belief that it will rain in Pittsburgh this afternoon conflicts with the belief I form upon spending what turns out to be 
a sunny afternoon in the office.   
35  It would be an interesting result if it could be shown that every change in the beliefs contained in a view entailed a 
change in what linkages the view contains. I think it is very plausible that this is true for the subset of changes that 
are triggered by conflicts that arise in response to one’s experience. I am not entirely sure, however, that it is also true 
for changes in beliefs more generally. Conceivably, changes in one’s beliefs about the relations between various highly 
abstract mathematical objects could leave the vast majority of extant linkages unaltered. That said, even such changes 
will affect what judgments one will be rational to transition to in response to reading an essay about the relevant 
objects. I will remain neutral on the issue. 
36  More plausibly, it will depend on the outlook, which, again, includes other factors besides propositional attitudes, as 
well as on further factors such as time constraints. 
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9.2.3 Ineffability 
According to Ineffability, recall, rational linkages between views and experiences cannot be captured 
through propositional attitudes. There is, I think, something right, but also something very wrong 
about this claim.  
What is obviously right is that rational linkages themselves are not propositional attitudes. 
Moreover, it is also right that there is a sense in which we cannot directly talk about what appearances 
items manifest to our respective consciousnesses. There is a sense in which I cannot communicate to 
you the phenomenology of my experience, nor can I ever find out what the appearances are that 
various items manifest to your consciousness. I cannot point my appearances out to you, nor is it 
entirely clear what it would be to engage in some process of internally pointing them out to myself.   
In this context, note that all of this is compatible with Gupta’s repeated insistence that 
appearances are not private. For in making this claim, he is merely insisting on the following: it is 
possible that you and I, upon seeing the same or different items, can have subjectively identical 
appearances. It is, however, also possible that your and my appearances diverge.37  
Importantly, such divergence, if it obtained, would not need to be problematic. For recall that 
appearances do not wear on their sleeves what they are appearances of. They do not, in and of 
themselves, inform us about anything in our environment. Suppose that the appearances a given item 
manifests in the consciousness of two different subjects, in identical circumstances, differ. Still, they 
are appearances of the same item. Thus, even if the appearance a given item manifests in your 
consciousness were to differ significantly from the appearance it manifests in mine, nothing stands in 
the way of the assumption that we are still able to communicate, and “pick out,” as Gupta asserts, 
“with the aid of experience, common objects to think about and to disagree about” 
(Gupta 2019, §208). 
                                                 
37  In conversation, Gupta suggested to me that it may turn out that if two subjects are physiologically constituted in the 
exact same way, their appearances are identical, perhaps necessarily so. This need not be so, he granted, but there is 
nothing in principle that rules out that same constitution yields, or must yield, sameness in appearances in identical 
circumstances (see also Gupta 2019, chapter 12). 
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Different appearances can play the exact same functional role in the mental economy of different 
subjects and as such correspond to each other. Of course, such correspondence may often be less 
than perfect so that candidate corresponding appearances may not play exactly the same roles in the 
different subjects’ respective mental economies. As we have repeatedly insisted, on the conception of 
the general role of experience we are considering, if your and my background views differ, looking at 
the same items in identical environing circumstances can make rational transitions to different 
judgments, beliefs, etc. Accordingly, even on the assumption that all of the appearances an item 
manifests in our respective consciousnesses are subjectively identical, this alone entails nothing with 
respect to what function they play in our respective mental economies. Discovering and sorting out 
differences in how, given our respective views, we do and should respond to our experiences is an 
important part of what empirical debate allows us to do. But for such resolutions to be possible, it is 
not a requirement that the experiences we have as we perceive various items be subjectively identical, 
nor that the functional roles they play in our respective mental economies correspond fully. Patently, 
without some common ground, communication will fail. But in the context of some common ground, 
conducting an empirical debate to enlarge common ground will become possible and differences in 
appearances will not entail “an entrapment of the participants in their respective private worlds” 
(Gupta 2019, §311). 
Again, what is right about Ineffability, I think, is that we cannot, as it were, capture and convey 
what appearance given items manifest to our consciousnesses by way of somehow directly specifying 
them.38 Consequently, we cannot specify the rational linkages that views contain by directly specifying 
a specific appearance and then proceed by claiming that in the context under consideration, some 
rational link obtains between the appearance thus singled out and certain beliefs, judgments, etc. Such 
a procedure must fail at the first step: appearances cannot be directly specified. 
                                                 
38  The notion of ‘direct specification’ is supposed to label the kind of specification that would enable you to gain some 
intimate understanding of which appearances these items manifest to me, an understanding identical to whatever 
understanding I may have when appeared to in such ways. Again, I take it that the idea that there is a specification 
that could possibly achieve something like this is erroneous. Moreover, I also doubt that the thought that I could have 
an understanding of my appearances is particularly clear. 
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What rubs me as misleading about Ineffability, as stated, is that it invites the interpretation that 
rational linkages between views and experiences cannot be made discursively available at all. If that 
were accepted, they could not be subjected to explicit rational critique.39 They could at best be 
modified as a by-product of the process of view-revision.40 If this interpretation is part of what 
Ineffability is supposed to express, I think we should reject it. For even if we accept that we cannot 
specify appearances directly (whatever that would come to), it does not follow that we cannot 
meaningfully talk about them at all.  
Surely, rational and non-rational linkages that connect appearances and responses transitioning 
to which would be rational upon having them will to a large extent be implicit in the views we hold (I 
return to this further below). Also, if views contain linkages to every possible appearance, there 
number must be legion. Further, as we noted before, the question what, given a view, it is rational to 
transition to upon having a given experience can be hard to find out. But we can have views about 
what is rational to transition to, views that may be mistaken. Indeed, figuring out what in the context 
                                                 
39  In an unpublished paper presented to the Wilfrid Sellars Society at the Eastern APA 2017 in Baltimore (Kremer ms.), 
Michael Kremer argues for the following thesis: what unites the conceptions Wilfrid Sellars, in his seminal 1956 
lectures on Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, attacks as mythical is the idea “that there is some element or 
aspect of our cognitive [life] that can be taken for granted – that is beyond rational criticism, cannot be put into question” 
(Kremer ms., p. 1). And somewhat more concisely, at the end of the essay, he talks about “the impossibility of the 
kind of status that the Myth of the Given insists on conferring on some or other inner aspect of our cognition – a 
status as somehow within the space of reasons, yet immune in advance to rational criticism and revision.”  
Another reading of the myth, one that focuses on the epistemological given, provided by deVries and Triplett 
(cf. deVries and Triplett 2000), is this: “the broadest characterization of the given is that it is an element in experience 
that has positive epistemic status simply in virtue of the occurrence of that experience,” where knowledge of this 
given is both epistemically independent and epistemically efficacious.  
In my discussion so far, I have throughout avoided framing my arguments with reference to the so-called given. 
The correct characterization of the given is itself a contentious issue and getting embroiled in the relevant debates 
seemed like a distraction. Here, I just add two notes for participants of that particular debate, without providing 
further explanation as to what I take notions like ‘the given’ or ‘space of reasons’ to denote: first, note that on neither 
characterization of the given, there is anything mythical about Gupta’s appearances. Regarding the former, 
appearances cannot be mythical they are not within the space of reason. Regarding the latter, by themselves, they do 
not have any positive epistemic status.  
Second, on Kremer’s characterization, linkages, if they are part of the space of reasons, would come out as 
mythical if linkages cannot be thematized and thus made available for rational criticism. I thank Michael Kremer for 
challenging me, in conversation, to think about whether linkages are mythical in his proposed sense. His question is 
in part what prompted me to write this section. 
40  Gupta’s response to my request to clarify the way in which rational linkages can be rationally modified in Byrne et al. 
2018 can be read as pointing to this possibility. I agree with Gupta that the idea of automatic adjustment of rational 
linkages in the context of view revision is perfectly acceptable. What I am suggesting in what follows is that this may 
not be the only way for such linkages to be rationally modified. 
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of a given view one would in fact be rational to transition to can itself be an important part of empirical 
debate. Rational linkages that are contained in views are like inference tickets that are implicit in our 
views and whose function is to rationally license transitions from various experiences to e.g. perceptual 
beliefs. And in the course of an empirical debate, what we take to be the relevant transitions that 
having specific experiences would license can be made explicit and become the topic of debate.  
Doing so cannot and of course does not require the impossible: there is, again, no need to specify 
appearances directly. But we can specify appearances by way of providing view-dependent 
descriptions. Such specifications can be descriptions using phenomenological concepts such as color 
and shape concepts (“I am having an appearance as of a red ball”), but there is no need to impose a 
restriction on the relevant descriptions to the effect that in them, phenomenological concepts must 
figure. For if, as Gupta concedes, “I have a white appearance” can be a view-dependent way of 
describing one’s experience, nothing should prevent us from holding that “I have an x-ray tube 
appearance” can be such a description, too.41 
I think that both in empirical debate and in other contexts, we make explicit, and thus make 
available for discussion, what we take to be the relevant rational linkages quite frequently. Consider a 
scientist, Mia, who is about to design an experiment. As she does, Mia may consider what she takes 
to be the various observations that she may make in the course of the experiment along with what, in 
light of these various experiences, would be the rational responses to transition to, respectively. Take 
a and b to be view-dependent descriptions of one’s experience and p and q some suitable beliefs. If so, 
Mia might, as she designs her experiment, engage in considerations like the following: “Were I to 
observe a, I should conclude that p. However, in case I observe b, believing p would not be rational. 
In such a case, I should believe q instead.”  
Furthermore, suppose that Mia tells her colleague Thea about the experiment that she is about to 
design, its possible outcomes, and about what in case of the various possible outcomes she takes 
                                                 
41  Gupta thus, too, acknowledges the category of phenomenological description (cf. Gupta 2019, §192), grants that they 
can be used to communicate something about how one is appeared to, and, finally, that descriptions of how one is 
appeared to need not be (and often would not be usefully) couched in phenomenological terms (cf. ibid., §199). As 
far as I can see, he does not consider the possibility of issuing such descriptions for making explicit rational linkages. 
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herself to be entitled to infer. Now, several things can happen. Thea might of course simply agree with 
Mia’s assessment. But Thea might also have further ideas about possible outcomes or disagree with 
the inferences Mia thinks she would be rational to draw in the various scenarios under consideration. 
The latter disagreement could in turn arise for different reasons. It could be that Mia and Thea have 
various theoretical disagreements which lead to different assessments of what inferences would be 
warranted in the various scenarios. Accordingly, in the ensuing debate, they could try to uncover and 
sort out their theoretical differences. If things go well, this could involve making progress with respect 
to arriving at an improved conception of what, upon having experiences that both would describe in 
the same way, it would be rational to do.42 
But their disagreement could also have a different source. For simplicity, let us suppose that upon 
seeing the same items in the same conditions, the appearances these items manifest to their respective 
consciousnesses are subjectively identical. Even so, it could still be that Mia’s and Thea’s respective 
views are slightly different in how they group color appearances into similarity classes. In suitable 
circumstances, such a difference in similarity grouping could be the source of their disagreement.43 
But if they come to an agreement (which they may not), then arguably, doing so will be facilitated by 
way of spelling out what each takes to be rational in light of the possible various experiences, which 
will bring the disagreement to light and put them into a position to resolve the issue. 
                                                 
42  One way in which Gupta characterizes the role of experience is to make rational transitions from a subject’s acceptance 
of a view to the subject’s acceptance of a belief, etc. In light of the fact that what the rational linkages are that a view 
contains will be opaque to the subject (because they are difficult to determine and because there are a vast number of 
them—one for each possible appearance), we should acknowledge that for a subject to accept a view will standardly 
be an act that occurs in a context in which the precise shape of the view is not, and probably cannot be, fully 
understood. Accepting a view and developing it further through processes of revision may thus be construed as a 
process during which the subject gains an increasingly better understanding of what the view she accepts is. 
43  To illustrate, consider a rather simple case. Suppose that in the experiment Mia is considering, the test subjects’ task 
is to pull an apple out of a bag and eat it on the condition that it is pink, and receive a reward for eating it, but refrain 
from eating it if it is red (and receive a reward for not eating it). Suppose, further, that the bag contains a number of 
uniformly colored apples and that each apple’s color lies somewhere on the spectrum between pink and red. Now, as 
Mia and Thea look at the variously colored apples, the following disagreement may arise:  
Mia: If subjects ate this apple (pointing at one of them), they would receive no reward. 
Thea: Why, of course they would! 
Mia:  No, they would not. After all, it is red. 
Thea:  No, it is not. I see it as pink – don’t you? 
At this point, Mia and Thea, having arrived, aided by their experience, at the core of their dispute, should now in 
principle in a position to find a way of settling it.  
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Relatedly, I think that in the context of making explicit what we take the rational linkages between 
possible experiences and beliefs to be, the notion of seeing as may serve a helpful function after all. For 
Mia might as well think: “Were I to see the item in question as F or as exhibiting activity U, I should 
conclude p, otherwise q.”44 Seeing as, in other words, serves to form view-dependent descriptions of 
experiences that can in turn figure in characterizations of what one takes (correctly or not) to be the 
rational linkages one’s view contains. Such characterizations take the shape of (indicative or 
subjunctive) conditionals.45 Arguably, they allow us to make available for rational discourse an 
important stratum of the inferential relations we take, within our view, to obtain between our view-
dependent empirical descriptions and further beliefs—inferential relations that contribute to giving 
our views their distinctive shape, and that are, on Hanson’s broadly holistic view, part of what 
determines what to the subject who employs them, the concepts that figure in the descriptions of her 
experience mean. To emphasize, our conceptions of what the rational linkages are that are implicit in 
our views, in other words: what, given what we believe, we are rationally committed to judge, belief, 
or do in light of having a certain experience, may be wrong. But in empirical debate, this is something 
we can find out. Through empirical debate, our understanding of what we are indeed committed to 
can improve. 
In this context, let us note that in a footnote, Gupta remarks that he does not reject the notion 
that experience has content as illegitimate. Here is what he says: 
(15) Indeed, the hypothetical given, which I have argued for, enables one to assign a 
content to experience: the subject’s view together with her experience yields a content 
that can be associated with the experience. […] I believe that the content of 
experience—though a legitimate notion—is, from the logical point of view, otiose. 
(Gupta 2019, §223, fn. 31) 
In the context of the suggestion just offered, one could think that the last sentence should be rejected 
as too strong. For suppose I am right that the notion of seeing as can serve an important role in making 
explicit the rational linkages that we take our views to contain, where such linkages are understood as 
                                                 
44  Note again that seeing as does not involve any commitment to the belief that things are as one sees them as. 
45  Again, with Brandom, I take it that subjunctive conditionals serve to express commitments that are robust across 
various contexts. 
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being implicit in the inferentially articulated structure of the beliefs that co-constitute our views.46 
However, recall that the motivation for Hanson to claim that seeing as  must involve concepts depends 
on his thought that only if concepts are involved in experience itself can experience be epistemically 
significant. On Gupta’s proposal, however, the significance of experiences does not depend on the 
idea that concepts are somehow operative in experience itself. Accordingly, it is open to defenders of 
a Gupta-style view to argue as follows: granted, seeing as talk can play a fruitful role. This role is to form 
view-dependent descriptions of experiences that in turn can figure in characterizations that serve to 
make discursively available which view-dependent inferential linkages between experiences and 
beliefs, judgments, etc. we take our views to contain. But to say that seeing as talk can play this important 
expressive role is not at the same time to accept that the experiences thus characterizable must also 
be understood as in fact involving the concepts that in characterizing them we employ. Seeing as talk 
can thus be recognized as important, but the idea that experience must be an instance of seeing as in 
Hanson’s sense, where this requires for concepts to be operative in experience itself, can be rejected.47 
In sum, then, I think that Ineffability should be rejected. Moreover, I think that once we 
acknowledge that rational linkages can be construed in terms of inference tickets that are implicit in 
our view and determine what, given our view and upon having experiences that we take to fall under 
various description, we ought to transition to, we benefit in two ways. For one, we see that negotiating 
what we take the inference tickets actually licensed by our views to be is an important part of empirical 
debate.  
Second, we gain a better understanding of the sense in which the rational linkages Gupta thinks 
obtain between experiences and judgments, beliefs, etc. depend on and are part of the subject’s view. 
They are part of the view in that they form an important stratum of the inferential commitments that 
are implicit in the inferential articulation of those among our concepts that can figure in empirical 
                                                 
46  Of course, the notion can also be employed to make explicit actual linkages, which, as I suggested, need not be rational. 
Making these discursively available is an important part of empirical discourse, too, since doing so makes them 
available for criticism. 
47  Note that on the resulting position, the question we faced in the previous chapter, i.e. how to understand what it 
could be for concepts to be employed in experience in an instantaneous and passive way, no longer arises. 
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descriptions. And though they are implicit, our conceptions of them can be made discursively 
available, and consequently improved, with the help of view-dependent descriptions of one’s 
experiences that can be formed by way of using the seeing as locution. 
9.3 TAKING STOCK 
As I acknowledged at the end of the introduction to this chapter, Gupta’s view is rather complex. Still, 
I contend that even though we only considered two (albeit important) components of his view—his 
account of appearances and his notion of rational linkages—we are left with a good sense both of the 
view’s potential and of some areas in which further development may be needed. 
In 9.1.1, I presented Gupta’s view of appearances, forestalled a few misleading interpretations, 
and showed that in principle, Gupta’s account is compatible with both projection effects and cases 
of expert vision proper, including cases of the kind introduces in 2.3.2, in which beliefs bring it about 
that, as Hanson puts it, the elements of the visual field cohere in new or different ways.  
In 9.1.2, I showed that in its current form, Gupta’s view prompts questions with respect to the 
notion of presence. These arise in the context of his suggestion that total hallucinations could be 
construed as cases in which mental images or brain states are presented to the subject’s consciousness. 
One question is how we are to construe the notion of presentation so as to allow that e.g. brain states 
can be so presented. I also showed that his account of appearances, since it is committed to the idea 
that having appearances requires that some item be presented to the subject’s consciousness (IRA), 
appears to impose a restriction on what projection effects are possible. Assuming that Gupta, too, will 
prefer an account that does not prejudicate factual matters, and that beliefs cannot, at least not for us, 
be elements of the presentational complex, I offered various ways in which the account could be 
modified so as to allow projection effects to be what cause total hallucinations. The most attractive 
and most conservative strategy, I suggested, is to construe the empty presentational complex as a 
formal item that can be present to consciousness and thus manifest appearances to consciousness. 
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This allows that beliefs, being part of the perceptual situation, can modify such appearances. I also 
suggested that this solution may be helpful more generally in that it may carry over to other 
problematic kinds of total hallucinations as well. 
In 9.2, I began by highlighting that Gupta’s account of the general role of experience applies to 
experiences generally, i.e. independently of whether the experience in question has been modified by 
doxastic effects. I then centered my discussion on the consideration of three claims: Linkages in 
Views, Linkage Institution, and Ineffability. In 9.2.1, I emphasized the importance of the notion 
of linkages for Gupta’s overall account and considered two kinds of linkages that views can contain. 
In doing so, I drew on parallel considerations offered in chapter 8 and noted that the Hanson’s 
problem of Amalgamation and Siegel’s problem of Non-Arbitrariness have a counterpart in 
Gupta’s view: Linkage Setup.  
In 9.2.2, I turned to the claim that rational linkages or transitions are instituted by experience. 
Overall, I suggested that the claim should be rejected or at least taken with a grain of salt. The reason: 
talk about institution invites erroneous interpretations concerning how linkages and transitions come 
about. In 9.2.3, finally, I argued, that there is an important sense in which the claim that rational 
linkages between views and experiences cannot be captured through propositional attitudes should be 
rejected. For I suggested that making discursively available what one takes to be the actual and rational 
linkages one’s view contains is both possible and an important aspect of empirical debate. In this 
context, I suggested that the Hansonian notion of seeing as that Gupta eschews can serve the important 
role of making discursively available the conceptions we have of such linkages in the shape of 
conditionals from view-dependent descriptions of experience, formed with the aid of the seeing as 
locution, to beliefs, judgments, etc. Moreover, I suggested that we can understand these linkages to 
be part of the view in that they form an important stratum of the inferential commitments that are 
implicit in the inferential articulation of those among our concepts that can figure in empirical 
descriptions. 
In the next and final chapter, I will provide an extended summary of the discussion conducted in 
this book and provide an eight-point list of the most important lessons learned. I then consider a 
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challenge and a complaint, which will serve to direct us towards a number of ways in which the project 
pursued in this book can be developed further. In closing, I provide a recap of what these ways are 
and briefly indicate how the lessons we learned may be fruitfully applied to a variety of areas of 
research—in philosophy and beyond.
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10.0 CONCLUSION 
If what we believe shapes our experience, experience is doxastically variable. If we ask what the forms 
are that experiential doxastic variability can take, our answer will depend on what we take experience 
to be. But if we ask whether the doxastic variability of experience is a feature of experience that we 
can accept and accommodate or a problematic feature of experience that we need to explain away or 
against which we need to mount defenses, the answer, I have suggested, depends on what we take its 
role to be. In this book, I have argued that once we adopt the right and general conception of what 
the role of experience is, various accounts of experience can be devised that meet the two constraints 
that have been guiding our inquiry from the beginning: first, the accounts are fully compatible with 
doxastic variability. Second, they accommodate a notion of rational empirical constraint. 
In the following, I begin by providing a detailed summary of the preceding chapters (10.1). Next, 
I provide an eight-point report of the most important results of our inquiry (10.2). I then comment 
on what I call the No Phenomenology challenge and the Receptive Knowledge complaint (10.3). In closing, I 
provide an overview of ways in which I think the project begun in this book can be pursued further, 
and a list of areas in which the lessons we learned can be fruitfully applied (10.4). 
10.1 SUMMARY 
In the preceding chapters, we examined various kinds of views that offer accounts of the nature and 
the role of experience. Throughout, our guiding questions was the following: can the view 
accommodate phenomena of doxastic variability and make sense of the notion of empirical constraint?  
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This question turned out to be a rather effective diagnostic tool. Assessing whether the respective 
accounts can accommodate putative instances of doxastic variability required taking a very close look 
at what, on these accounts, experience is taken to be. In some cases, doing so revealed severe problems 
already, which were often further aggravated when we asked how, on the view under consideration, 
cases of doxastic variation could be accounted for. 
Hanson’s original position on the theory-ladenness of observation provided a first example. His 
notion of experience, we found, is in important ways underdeveloped. He lacks a satisfactory account 
of its phenomenal dimension and faces the issue of Amalgamation—the question how, in experience 
as he understands it, the conceptual and phenomenal are fused. 
Still, analyzing Hanson’s view yielded important tools and insights. Inter alia, we extracted from it 
two very different notions of how our beliefs could affect experience: beliefs could affect either 
experiential phenomenology or experiential content. The former, Hanson suggested, comes in two 
main flavors. One comprises effects that may be characteristic of many cases of expert vision: this 
comprises selection effects (which we mostly ignored), but also effects on how, as Hanson puts it, in 
one’s visual field, the various elements cohere (though Hanson concedes that such effects are hard to 
classify). The second flavor comprised what I labeled projection effects, which modify the elements 
in one’s visual field more directly, e.g. by modifying their color, shape, size, or other features, even 
which elements are present. 
While Hanson thinks that such broadly causal effects beliefs may have on experiential 
phenomenology are both possible and actual, he spends most of his efforts on examining the semantic 
determination relations that he takes background beliefs to stand in with experiential content. As we 
saw, that such relations obtain follows from Hanson’s broadly holistic account of conceptual content. 
On it, the concepts operative in experience, i.e. concepts that complement the seeing as locution, derive 
an essential part of what they mean to the experiencing subject from the way they are inferentially 
articulated in the subject’s overall doxastic context. 
Sketching an account of this shape enabled Hanson to address one of the main puzzles he sought 
to address: how different subjects—such as Tycho and Kepler—can see the same object: the sun, can 
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profess to see that object as the same thing: the sun, and yet see different things. Hanson’s solution, 
we saw, is this: in Tycho’s and Kepler’s respective doxastic contexts, the concept sun is inferentially 
articulated in significantly different way.  Therefore, for each, utterances such as “This is the sun.” 
take on a different meaning. In the following regimented sense, thus, they see different things: the see 
the same object, but each sees it as the kind of thing that figures in his specific theory. 
While analyzing Hanson’s broadly holistic account of experiential content, we noted that 
Hanson’s idea that seeing as is intelligible only in terms of seeing that entails another interesting claim: 
any doxastic contexts in which the concepts complementing the seeing as locution acquire their meaning 
must contain beliefs that are knowledgeable even by our own lights. Hanson’s idea, I held, is 
defensible. For if we assume, of an experiencing subject, that she lacks beliefs that we take to be 
knowledgeable entirely, we can no longer make sense of what, for her, it could be to see anything as 
anything.  
Another important piece I extracted from Hanson’s view was the shape of his response to the 
worry that doxastic effects on experience could be damaging in such a way as to rule out that 
experience can still constrain our beliefs. By drawing on Hanson’s way of treating cases of illusions, I 
showed that the idea that experience is doxastically variable does not, eo ipso, rule out that experience 
can provide empirical constraint. To make constraint possible, what is needed is the assumption that 
the experiencing subject’s beliefs do not determine the phenomenology of her experience completely. 
If our experiential phenomenology is such that what we see behaves in ways that diverge from the 
expectations associated with what we see things as, such divergences—the doxastic embodiment of 
empirical constraint—may in turn rationally prompt modifications of one’s doxastic context.  
On Hanson’s view, this latter idea could not be cashed out. Again, Hanson spends a lot of energy 
on giving an account of what he takes to account for the epistemic significance of experience: its 
alleged content. His account of the phenomenal dimension of experience, however, is hardly 
developed. It does not enable us to see how experiential phenomenology could both be subject to 
doxastic variation and at the same time be constituted by the mind-independent items. But plainly, it 
is the latter whose characteristics must be what accounts for the fact that experiential phenomenology 
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can deviate from our expectations. Initially, Hanson’s view thus turned out to be deficient. In chapter 
8, I showed that there are interesting ways in which it can be developed further. To get into a position 
in which I could begin to improve the view, however, further lessons had to be learned, and alternative 
views to be rejected.  
Prompted by the realization that Hanson’s account is wanting in that it does not contain an 
account of experiential phenomenology that explains how such phenomenology could at least in part 
be independent from the subject’s beliefs, I turned to a thorough analysis of various relational views. 
For the proponents of these views purport to offer just that: an account on which the phenomenology 
of experience is constituted by the subject’s being related to various mind-independent items.  
Before I turned to the relational view, I distinguished, in chapter 3, the two flavors of doxastic 
variability operative in Hanson’s account that in the remainder of the book we returned to 
repeatedly—Doxastic Variability of Experiential Content (DVEC) and Doxastic Variability of 
Experiential Phenomenology (DVEP).  
Next, I introduced the basic structure of the relational view and suggested that it is best 
understood as a combination of three theses: No Content, Acquaintance, and Constitution. Due 
to their commitment to No Content, it was obvious that relationalists cannot accept DVEC, nor 
Beliefs May Co-Determine Experiential Content (BMCC). But I suggested that relationalists who 
are sympathetic to a broadly holistic account of conceptual content might accept the more general 
thesis that Beliefs May Co-Determine Content (BMCC), which on their view would be a thesis not 
about experiential content (since they take there to be none), but about the content of e.g. perceptual 
judgments and beliefs.  
Relationalists who accept both BMCC and the broadly holistic account implicit in Hanson’s 
position, I argued, incur an explanatory debt. For presumably, relationalists will also want to say that 
the content of judgments, etc. is at least partly constituted by the mind-independent items experience 
relates us to. If so, they must show how this idea and a broadly holistic account of content go together. 
The same, I indicated, may be true of Hanson as well. For if he thinks that the phenomenology of 
experience contributes to experiential content, it is unclear what this contribution would look like.  
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The parallels between Hanson and the relationalists, I argued, extend even further. On the one 
hand, I suggested that Hanson seems to be in a comparatively better position to explain how 
experience may bear on our beliefs than the relationalists. For on the assumption that experience itself 
is endowed with content, it is not mysterious that experience so construed could bear on other 
contentful states. Conversely, it is less clear how experience, if construed in terms of a relation that 
constitutes a phenomenology, could do the same. On the other hand, however, I showed that both 
Hanson and the relationalists must address the same structural questions: a) how does experiential 
phenomenology related to worldly items, and b) how does experiential phenomenology to the 
conceptual? The former clearly arises for both. The latter arises too, just in different places. For the 
relationalists, it appears as the problem how to connect experience with perceptual beliefs and 
judgments. For Hanson, it assumes the shape of the problem of Amalgamation, i.e. of how in 
experience, the phenomenal and the conceptual are fused. 
As we recap the problems besetting the various relationalist accounts we considered, let us start 
with Fish’s account. Fish, recall, has no obvious way of accommodating the notion of phenomenal 
identity, unless he resorts to claiming that such identities are a matter of brute fact. Also, he assumes 
without argument that the phenomenology of experiences that different subjects undergo in the same 
circumstances is the same.1  
Further, he provides no account of the visual recognitional capacities that would allow us to 
understand which properties can and cannot figure in the presentational character of experience, what 
these properties are, how they relate to the mind-independent properties in the subject’s environment, 
how the latter are to be understood, how, accordingly, to construe expert vision, and how the 
                                                 
1  As we saw in 9.1.1, on Gupta’s presentationalism, there is no need for such an assumption. Arguably, Fish might try 
and adopt a similar approach as Gupta, drop the idea that the phenomenal properties that the experiences of different 
subjects in identical condition have are the same, and substitute the idea for it that in the mental economy of different 
subjects, the phenomenal properties of their respective experiences play corresponding functional roles.  
Note, however, that by the lights of Gupta’s account and the Hansonian account we considered, this is still too 
strong an assumption. For on them, differences in the subjects’ background views will often entail that the functional 
role of various experiences—i.e. what upon having them the subject would be rational to transition to—will differ as 
well. What is needed is merely some significant enough overlap in the experiences’ functional roles that allows the 
different subjects to single out items to jointly talk about. 
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experience of the expert and that of the layperson can have something perceptually in common. 
Finally, his account seems to be at odds with Basic Acquaintance and as the discussion of the banana 
case illustrated, he has no way to accommodate projection effects, nor can he explain them away. 
There is a number of respects in which Brewer’s account improves over Fish’s (cf. 5.5). But it, 
too, turned out to be problematic. For one, we noted that the notion of visually relevant similarity 
relations that his account of thin looks rests on is ambiguous. While most of the time, it appears that 
he holds that these similarity relations obtain between objects, at times, Brewer seems to think that 
they are relations between proximal stimuli or ways of visual processing. 
Furthermore, we found that in general, his notion of looks is hard to place. Are ways things look 
properties of objects (ways things look) or properties of experiences? And how is it that visually relevant 
similarity relations ground, explain, or constitute them? 
Further, how are we to understand Brewer’s claim that registering visually relevant similarity 
relations yields a change in the subject’s experiential phenomenology? How is such a change triggered 
exactly and what does it amount to? Is there really a phenomenally relevant distinction that the notions 
of thin and thick looks tracks? How are the alleged two kinds of phenomenology related and why does 
Brewer feel compelled to reject the claim that there is a single uncontroversial notion of visual 
phenomenology on which it makes perfectly good sense to ask, and it is always possible to answer, 
whether two experiential conditions are phenomenologically identical tout court? Finally, Brewer’s 
account, like Fish’s cannot neither accommodate projection effects nor explain them away. 
Genone’s account, while interesting and potentially powerful, was problematic, too. First, the 
notion of entirely mind-independent appearance properties that lies at the core of his account remains 
less than clear. Second, his account of experiential phenomenology and of how it is constituted is 
rudimentary at best. Third, Genone has no account of expert vision. I suggested, however, that his 
account of misleading appearances affords the resources for developing an account of expert 
judgment and that an account of expert vision proper could be constructed by drawing on the idea 
that effects that fall under expert vision proper are mediated by attention. Of course, both the details 
and the viability of such an account depend on whether Genone can make his account of appearances 
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and his account of constitution work. If that could be achieved, however, the prospects of developing 
an account of expert vision might be quite good. Moreover, such an account would seem to be better 
than those proposed by Fish or Brewer in that it would not obviously suffer from the same problems 
besetting the latter. 
With respect to projection effects, I suggested, fourth, that there are two strategies Genone 
could pursue: the first is to endorse phenomenal pluralism, the idea that the phenomenology not of 
perception, but of total experience, may contain multiple layers of phenomenology that differ in their 
respective etiologies. This suggestion, I argued, raises further difficult issues.  
For one, it undermines the relationalist core tenet that experience is a relation to mind-
independent items. Accordingly, relationalists like e.g. Fish and Brewer will resist Genone’s proposal 
and suspect that experience so construed may not fit into the relationalist epistemological framework.  
Second, and similar to an issue we saw arise for Brewer, the proposal leaves it open how the 
putative layers of phenomenology interact. Pursuing this first strategy, accordingly, tasks Genone with 
providing an account of experiential phenomenology that shows how these issues can be addressed. 
The second strategy I suggested Genone might pursue to address projection effects involves 
exploiting the resources his account of misleading appearances already provides. On this strategy, in 
putative cases of projection effects, what shifts is not the phenomenology of experience, but rather 
the way in which perceiving such appearances and judgments are hooked up within the perceiving 
subject’s mental economy. That is is a possible strategy on Genone’s account, I suggested, makes it 
superior to Fish’s and Brewer’s view in that it allows Genone to potentially explain away each and 
every projection effect. That said, for the strategy to be acceptable, more work is required. Apart from 
the desolate status of his account of appearances and of experiential phenomenology, Genone would 
have to address the following issues:  
First, it is not clear that phenomenal pluralism can be rejected in general. 
Second, on the strategy suggested, the subject’s background view plays a major role in determining 
whether the judgments subjects issue based on their experiences are true or justified. If the background 
view is given as much weight as proposed, then experience will be able to play a justificatory role only 
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if the background view is suitably correct and if perceptions of appearances and judgments are hooked 
up in the right kind of way. Whether that is something relationalists who want to credit experience 
with playing a significant role in providing justification and knowledge will find acceptable can be 
doubted. At the very least, a story will have to be told of what needs to be in place on the part of the 
subject—in terms of beliefs, conceptual capacities, and ways in which perceiving appearances is 
hooked up with judgments—to make acquiring knowledge and justification possible.2 
Third, I showed that Genone leaves it unclear how to construe the relation between perceived 
appearances and judgments. His statements are ambiguous between causal-dispositional and broadly 
epistemic interpretations. Both raise further questions that Genone does not address. If the relation 
is causal, questions arise concerning how to understand its epistemic import. If the relation is 
epistemic, it is unclear how perceiving appearances can provide experiential premises, reasons, or 
otherwise serve to normatively constrain the experiencing subject’s judgments and beliefs. Moreover, 
and finally, that the specifics of the relation depend on the subject’s background view is something 
Genone claims, but provides no account of. 
In the end, my verdict on relationalist accounts was this: as things stand, they must be rejected. 
They cannot help us understand how mind-independent items constitute experiential phenomenology 
and fail to accommodate various phenomena falling under DVEP. As my discussion of Genone’s 
account illustrates, issues as to how to accommodate expert vision may not be unsurmountable. With 
respect to projection effects, however, problems run deeper. For the possibility of such effects 
undermines the relationalists’ core tenet that experience is a relation thanks to which we are put in 
touch with mind-independent items. Accordingly, the relationalists’ default strategy in dealing with 
putative projection effects must be to assume a defensive stance; they need to explain them away.  
Ultimately, the relationalists’ problems with accommodating projection effects thus rest on their 
commitment to a specific conception of what experience is and what it does for us. It is their 
conception of experience as inevitably putting us in touch with mind-independent items that forces 
                                                 
2  We will encounter the same kind of questions in 10.3.2, when we consider the Receptive Knowledge Complaint. 
335 
 
them to take a specific stance on whether projection effects are actual or possible—on a matter, as 
Gupta would say, that a logical inquiry should not and could not settle. But once the overly restrictive 
relationalist conception is dropped, as in Siegel’s, Hanson’s, and—for the most part—Gupta’s view, 
accommodating projection effects becomes possible. Simultaneously, the overwhelmingly plausible 
idea that experience may often play the role of relating us to mind-independent items can be preserved. 
Leaving relationalist views behind, I turned to Siegel’s (Rich) Content View. Arguably, Siegel’s 
position is the most sophisticated recent representationalist account of experience that takes not just 
doxastic effects very seriously, but effects that may be exerted on experience by cognitive and 
psychological background states more broadly. However, Siegel’s view, too, turned out to be 
problematic.  
First, I showed that the argument she provides for it, her Argument from Appearances, begs the 
question against Hanson, against the relationalists, and against proponents of what she calls two-factor 
views of perceptual experience. But not only is Siegel’s Content View insufficiently motivated, she 
also leaves us, second, without an account of Experiential Content and, third, without an account 
of how phenomenal states and the properties she takes such states to present as instantiated are related, 
and of the sense in which they are related, as she puts it, non-arbitrarily. This lack of an account of Non-
Arbitrariness, as I dubbed it, is unfortunate since Siegel seems to accept both that the same kind of 
phenomenal state can bear different contents and that different kinds of phenomenal states can bear 
the same contents. At the same time, she takes it to be a serious objection against opposing views that 
they allow the association between phenomenal states and representational contents to potentially vary 
drastically. Given such statements, questions concerning not just how to individuate the properties 
she takes to constitute such contents, but also what governs which properties a given phenomenal 
state presents as instantiated become pressing. 
After the assessment of Siegel’s (Rich) Content View, I turned to the account of the rational role 
of perception that she develops in Siegel 2017. This account rests, first, on the idea that the default 
rational role of experience is that of providing justification and, second, on the idea that one’s beliefs, 
desires, biases, and other cognitive and psychological background states can influence the way things 
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look to one. Taken together, these two ideas give rise to the following familiar worry: experience that 
has been influenced by e.g. irrational or false beliefs could serve to illicitly strengthen those beliefs. As 
I noted in 7.3.2, the strategy Siegel pursues in addressing such cases shares a feature with that of the 
relationalists: like the latter, Siegel’s approach is primarily defensive. Beliefs that are due to expertise 
are an exception, as they are said to lead to an increase of justificatory power. But from Siegel’s point 
of view, other effects of doxastic variation pose a serious threat. They threaten to undermine the 
alleged default rational role of experience, again: that of justifying beliefs. Accordingly, such effects 
are grouped together with effects had by irrational states on experience and are said to yield 
experiences that are hijacked by the subject’s outlook.  
Siegel, I pointed out, makes two crucial suggestions: first, experiences have an epistemic charge 
and an accompanying epistemic power to justify beliefs, which in hijacked experiences is reduced. 
Second, the rational thing for a subject to do in response to her hijacked experience is to suspend 
judgment. Both these suggestions are integral elements of her overall defensive strategy, as both are 
tailored to render hijacked experiences epistemically harmless. In virtue of the first suggestion, 
hijacked experiences are taken out of the justification business, as it were, in that they are stripped off 
their alleged epistemic powers. Second, they are outlawed by being classified as irrational, so that even 
though subjects may not be in a position to realize it, they had better disregard them. In the noble 
realm of epistemic progress and rational comport, hijacked experiences are thus demoted to second-
class citizens, with no voting rights and with no other positive role to play, either. 
Siegel’s defensive strategy, I emphasized, is both revisionary—in virtue of its account of epistemic 
powers—and counterintuitive—due to its verdict on what a subject of hijacked experiences would be 
rational to do. Siegel accepts this. But I argued that we should not and need not join her.  
First, I found it impossible to accept Siegel’s suggestion that for subjects undergoing hijacked 
experiences, the rational thing to do is suspend belief. I agreed that doing so might, in some contexts—
and certainly from our doxastic context, in which the hijacking is known to occur—be the most 
rational thing to do overall. That said, I insisted that from the experiencing subject’s perspective, 
suspending judgment will in many cases look highly irrational. A more satisfactory account of 
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empirical rationality, I take it, must accommodate the important sense in which the rationality of 
subjects is perfectly unimpaired when they do what is rational by the lights of the perspective provided 
by the best doxastic context that in the context at hand is actually available to them—the one they in 
fact inhabit. 
Second, I suggested that accepting Siegel’s proposal saddles us with the consequence that possibly 
countless of the experiences we undergo in our social interactions with others are hijacked, so that we 
should suspend judgment on them. Furthermore, the account we would have to give of the cultural, 
intellectual, and moral evolution of contemporary society would not be a story of how our experience 
assist us in rationally overcoming false, irrational, and biased beliefs. Instead, it would be a story on 
which cultural, intellectual, and moral progress mysteriously occurs against the background of 
numerous failures to respond to hijacked experiences in the way that on Siegel’s view we should: by 
suspending belief. 
Again, at its core, Siegel’s strategy is defensive. It serves to protect her conception of the default 
rational role of experience. For just like putative cases of projection effects undermine the role 
relationalists take experience to play, experiential hijacking, including that due to projection effects, 
undermines the default role standard representationalists take experience to play: that of justifying beliefs. 
The response to the relationalists was to drop the idea that experience must inevitably play the 
role of relating us to mind-independent items. In 7.3.3, I thus suggested that with respect to the 
standard representationalist conception, we can make an analogous move. For once we acknowledge 
that on Siegel’s account, hijacked experience does not play its alleged default role anyway, and that for 
all we know, experience may not play that role very often, we can see that there is some motivation to 
drop the standard representationalist conception of experience as well.  
As soon as we entertained this suggestion, it became obvious that most of the measures Siegel 
takes to mount her defense against what she thinks are the epistemically pernicious effects of 
experiential hijacking appear necessary only if one has already accepted the standard representationalist 
conception of experience as serving to justify beliefs. Once this standard conception is eschewed, 
however, the worry that hijacked experiences might provide illicit justification for false or irrational 
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beliefs simply evaporates. It is then possible for us to entertain the idea that since providing 
justification is not what such experiences do for us anyway, they may well have a positive role. And 
pace Siegel, uncovering that role does not require taking measures designed to explain why hijacked 
experiences are sapped off their default epistemic powers first.  
Eschewing the standard conception allowed us to reinstate hijacked experiences as ordinary 
denizens of what above I dubbed the noble realm of epistemic progress and rational comport. We can 
grant that merely in virtue of having such experiences, subjects manifest an irrationality that is 
ultimately rooted in the specifics of their cognitive and psychological background states. But we can 
still take seriously that there is a role such experiences play for subjects that undergo them: that of 
making rational view-dependent transitions to judgments, beliefs, and actions.  
Endorsing this general conception of the role of experience, that of making rational view-
dependent transitions to judgments, beliefs, etc., which I adopted from Gupta, was a move that for 
the rest of the inquiry was absolutely crucial. I first combined this conception with a view that still 
remains rather friendly towards Siegel’s own account. For though it involves dropping her 
commitment to a notion of epistemic charge and, crucially, the idea that a subject’s most reasonable 
response to her hijacked experience is to suspend belief, it retains her commitment to the Content 
View. Then, after a recap of the strengths and weaknesses of the views considered up to that point, I 
fused the general conception of experience with a subsequently revamped version of Hanson’s view.  
In doing so, I highlighted that dropping Siegel’s Content View and adopting Hanson’s 
conception of experience in terms of seeing as puts us in a better position with respect to addressing an 
issue that on Siegel’s view (like on Fish’s) remains unaddressed: how to understand Experiential 
Content in the first place. To accept Hanson’s broadly holistic conception of content and, thus, the 
semantic dimension of Hanson’s account of theory-ladenness, was to leave further behind the 
relationalists’ and Siegel’s defensive stance towards doxastic variability. For as we had already noted 
in the second chapter, on Hanson’s position, theory-ladenness, in this semantic sense, is not a 
contingent threat that needs to be rendered harmless. Rather, it is an essential feature of experiential 
content—or rather, of conceptual content in general. For according to Hanson, the intelligibility of 
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such content essentially rests on how such content is inferentially articulated with other contents. 
Having taken on board Hanson’s broadly holistic account, I focused on his account of empirical 
constraint and showed, in more detail than in the second chapter, how implausibly strong the 
assumptions are that one must endorse to argue that experiential hijacking rules out the idea of rational 
empirical constraint. By drawing on the cases of Elijah and Lea—whose responses to their respective 
experiences I couched throughout in terms of the general conception of the role of experience I 
recommend—I argued for the following: subjects of illusions and even of experiences modified by 
projection effects may still come to acknowledge tensions between their standing beliefs and the 
beliefs that having their experiences makes rational to transition to. For subjects to be able to realize 
such tensions, I noted, requires that their condition not be pathological, so that they can remain 
sufficiently open to the possibility that they may be wrong in how they see and characterize things, 
and open to what others may have to say. At any rate, I took it for granted that for a subject to realize 
the presence of such a tension, she comes under some rational pressure to resolve it. And while doing 
so may happen in various ways and while which resolution the subject chooses may, but need not be 
rationally settled by the subject’s background view, in many if not most cases, such a resolution will 
entail some revision—a change in the subject’s view. 
Making the need for such revisions salient naturally raised the question what effects such revisions 
might in turn have on the subject’s subsequent experience. In response, I distinguished various 
possible effects. First, I suggested that the phenomenology of the subject’s experience might shift 
towards having a phenomenology that is anyway amalgamated with different kinds of seeing as, i.e. 
kinds whose content better matches the updated beliefs of the subject about what she sees. In the case 
of projection effects, for example, such a shift could be a shift towards an experiential phenomenology 
with respect to which projection effects are reduced and that is amalgamated with instances of seeing 
as that correspond with suitably modified contents. Second, I suggested that changes in the 
background view could leave the phenomenology of experience unaltered and instead modify what 
contents the relevant phenomenology is amalgamated with. Doing so, in effect, was to suggest that 
amalgamation need not be set in stone, but may be modifiable. 
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The idea of Modifiable Amalgamation invited a comparison with Genone’s account of 
misleading appearances. Drawing on this comparison, I then suggested that Hansonians can construe 
instances of seeing as as manifestations of what I dubbed dispositions of amalgamation. These, I stipulated, 
are heavily context-dependent, background-view dependent and potentially modifiable dispositions 
subjects have to enter into certain conceptually contentful non-committal states (i.e. specific instances 
of seeing as) as they undergo experiences with various kinds of phenomenology.  
Dispositions of amalgamation, I suggested, may differ in how stable they are. But even in cases in 
which experiences are stably hijacked, I argued, suitable changes in the subject’s background view will 
still affect what, upon having such an experience, it is rational for her to transition to, and may even 
make rational transitions to beliefs that are in fact justified—which is a possibility that on Siegel’s 
account, due to her defensive stance towards hijacked experiences, could not properly come into view. 
I also noted a complication: the construal of instances of seeing as in terms of manifestations of 
dispositions of amalgamation, and the assumption that such dispositions can be quite stable, while arguably 
in line with Hanson’s general account, requires that we take the operation of these conceptual 
capacities in instances of seeing as to be to some extent autonomous from the subject’s background 
view. It requires that we devise a conception of how, in experience, conceptual capacities are quasi-
autonomously and passively deployed. 
Instead of pursuing this issue further, I suggested that in addition to dispositions of amalgamation, a 
Hansonian might accommodate a further set of dispositions, which I called dispositions to transition. The 
latter, too, I stipulated, are heavily context-dependent and modifiable view-dependent dispositions 
that take as input, inter alia, states of seeing as and trigger transitions to beliefs, judgments, etc. Reference 
to such dispositions, I suggested, can be used to model and explain how subjects actually behave in 
various contexts, which may diverge from how they would behave if they did what, upon having their 
experience and given the doxastic context they inhabit, is in fact rational. 
In closing, I emphasized that on the revamped Hansonian account, it remains possible for 
experiences to play a role in arriving at beliefs that are indeed justified. For the conception of 
experience as making rational transitions to judgments, etc. is general enough to allow us to subsume 
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what Siegel and standard representationalists endorse as default conception as a special case. If 
circumstances are suitably correct, experiences can indeed play an important role in justifying beliefs. 
That said, it may be that arriving at beliefs that are in fact justified is a rare feat, or one that, if not rare, 
may be hard to recognize. (If that does not seem enough, I add here, one must show how more can 
be had.) 
In leaving the revamped Hansonian view, I indicated that the considerations concerning 
Amalgamation and Hanson’s account of Experiential Content could in principle be used to 
supplement the view sketched in 7.3 and even Siegel’s own view. However, I left this task to aspiring 
Siegelians and instead turned to an examination of Gupta’s presentationalist account of experience.  
Gupta’s account, I suggested, is interesting in several respects. For our purposes, the most crucial 
feature is that it provides a detailed account of experiential phenomenology. On this account, 
experiential phenomenology is constituted by appearances that are manifested in the subject’s 
consciousness as environing items are presented to the subject’s consciousness. Gupta, like the 
relationalists, eschews the notion of experiential content altogether, but is not committed to the core 
relationalist idea that every aspect of experiential phenomenology must be accounted for in terms of 
the subject’s relation to mind-independent items. Nevertheless, for appearances to be manifested at 
all, Gupta requires that some item be presented to the subject’s consciousness, which is what I called 
the Item Requirement on Appearance (IRA). To be fully compatible with conceivable projection 
effects, more specifically, with total hallucinations that are brought about by such effects, this part of 
Gupta’s view, I argued, should be modified. After considering several options, I proposed that the 
most conservative way to do so which also respects, in a sense, IRA as well is to allow that an empty 
presentational complex can serve as a formal item that can be present to consciousness. Thus 
modified, I think, Gupta’s account is far superior to the relationalist accounts we considered earlier. 
Not only does it drop the idea that experience must inevitably be a relation to mind-independent items 
entirely, it is also fully compatible with all possible cases of DVEP, including total hallucinations that 
are based on projection effects. 
342 
 
Gupta’s account, I noted, contains an interesting and crucially important element that he himself 
does not focus on much, but that, I suggested, is worth exploring: the notion of rational linkages. It is 
in virtue of these linkages that all experiences a subject could possibly have are hooked up with beliefs, 
judgments, etc. that it would, in the context of a given view, be rational to transition to if any of the 
various possible experiences were had. Accordingly, only in the presence of a view that contains such 
rational linkages, experience can play the general role that, on the conception that Gupta proposes 
and that I accept, it is taken to play.  
In my discussion of these linkages, I distinguished rational from actual linkages, argued that we 
should reject as misleading an assertion Gupta occasionally makes, i.e. that experience institutes such 
linkages, and suggested that the notion of seeing as can be drawn upon to make our (fallible) conception 
of these linkages explicit and thus available for empirical debate. I also suggested that we construe 
such linkages as inference tickets from view-dependent descriptions of experiences to judgments, 
beliefs, etc. that upon having such experiences, it would be rational to transition to. Doing so, I 
claimed, provides us with a better understanding of how it is that these linkages are contained in the 
view: they form an important stratum of the inferential commitments that are implicit in the inferential 
articulation of those among our concepts that can figure in empirical descriptions.  
Accepting the modified version of Gupta’s account of appearances constituted the second crucial 
move of our inquiry. It provided the last missing piece necessary for constructing a kind of account 
that meets both constraints that guided our inquiry: to be fully compatible with doxastic variability 
and yet to be able to provide empirical constraint. In the next section, I will sum up the lessons that I 
think we have learned. 
343 
 
10.2 LESSONS LEARNED 
Again, the aim of this inquiry was to find an account of experience that is fully compatible with the 
doxastic variability of experience in its various possible flavors and that at the same time has room for 
the thought that experience plays an important role in constraining our beliefs.  
As we think about which lessons we learned, the results of our inquiry can be roughly divided 
into ones that are destructive, and ones that are constructive, and ones that concern open questions. 
I return to the latter in 10.4. Here I list, first, five major destructive and then three constructive results.  
First, Hanson’s original account is flawed. It lacks an account of Amalgamation and an account 
of experiential phenomenology to undergird the proposed account of empirical constraint. 
Second, relationalism, in its current state, is entirely unfit to meet our two constraints. Not only 
are the various notions of phenomenology we examined problematic (if not borderline unintelligible), 
they are also mostly incapable of accommodating expert vision and projection effects. The latter in 
particular is not incidental to the views we considered. Rather, it is due to relationalism’s fundamental 
tenet: that the nature and the role of experience is inevitably to relate subjects to mind-independent 
items.  
Third, Siegel’s Content View is ill-motivated and deeply problematic in that it lacks an account 
of Experiential Content, an account of experiential phenomenology, and an account of how 
phenomenal states and experiential contents are related: an account of Non-Arbitrariness. 
Fourth, standard representationalist accounts, on which the default role of experience is taken to 
be that of serving to justify beliefs, are in trouble when trying to accommodate putative cases of 
doxastic variation. They need to explain how it is that experiences that are affected by background 
views cannot play that default role. As our analysis of Siegel’s view illustrated, doing so may force 
them to go on the defense and take some fairly revisionary and unintuitive steps.3  
                                                 
3  I acknowledge—thus the ‘may’—that not every representationalist will see the need to even mount the kind of 
defenses that Siegel mounts or—for that matter—any defenses at all. I imagine, for instance, that John McDowell 
will respond to the possibility of doxastic effects on experience by remaining completely unperturbed and by 
shrugging them off. Rejecting any particular pressure to mount defenses, he would, I suspect, insist that though 
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Granted, we have only examined Siegel’s account and the number of representationalist accounts 
is legion. But arguably, the problems we found are not incidental to Siegel’s account. Ultimately, they 
rest on their conception of the default role experience plays for us, and on their idea that in order to 
play that role, experience must have content. To the extent that other representationalists share these 
commitments, on their views, similar problems will plausibly arise. Other representationalists, too, will 
need an account of Experiential Content that explains the Tycho-and-Kepler case, an account of 
experiential phenomenology, an account of Non-Arbitrariness that explains how the phenomenal 
and the conceptual relate, and a way of dealing with doxastic effects that shows that they do not 
undermine the default role standard representationalists take experience to play. 
Fifth, and relatedly, given that relationalism and standard representationalism are currently the 
two dominant kinds of accounts of experience, the result that proponents of both camps struggle with 
accommodating such effects is highly significant. If it is true, as I suggested, that the difficulties we 
found are not merely incidental to the views we examined, numerous contemporary accounts of 
experience must be rejected. 
The first constructive result is that, sixth, plenty of views that meet the two constraints are 
conceivable. I indicated repeatedly that the lessons we learned in chapters 8 and 9 could be used to 
supplement earlier views. The partial account of Amalgamation sketched in chapter 8 (and, relatedly, 
the account of empirical constraint and the account of modifiable amalgamation) could serve as a 
model for an account of Non-Arbitrariness, Hanson’s account of Experiential Content could serve 
to supplement Siegel’s view and the Siegelian view sketched in 7.3, and Gupta’s (slightly modified) 
account of the phenomenology of experience could be used to supplement the Siegelian view and 
Siegel’s view, and can easily be used to supplement Hanson’s account, which solves the two major 
problems we found with Hanson’s view in chapter 2. And if we drop Hanson’s commitment to the 
idea that seeing as must be understood in terms of concepts that are operative in experience (the 
alternative conception was discussed in 9.2.3), the resulting view dodges the problem how we are to 
                                                 
perception is a capacity for acquiring knowledge, we must surely grant that this capacity is fallible and that there are 
circumstances in which we cannot exercise it non-defectively. I comment on this stance in 10.3.2.  
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think about the idea that in experience, conceptual capacities are quasi-automatically and passively 
deployed. Incidentally, Hanson’s account of Experiential Content could also be used to supplement 
Gupta’s view, who lacks a fully developed account of conceptual content. 
The resulting view meets the two constraints that guided our inquiry. Moreover, quite possibly, 
further views can be developed that do, e.g. the views that we would get by fusing Gupta’s 
presentationalist account with a) a Hansonian account that retains the idea that concepts are operative 
in experience, b) a Siegelian account roughly modeled on what was discussed in 7.3 (suitably 
complemented), or even c) Siegel’s account. Neither of them settles in advance whether cases of 
doxastic variability are actual or physically possible or not. Whatever turns out to be the case, the 
resulting account will be compatible with it. Crucially, however, to meet the two constraints, the 
accounts mentioned need to adopt the general conception of experience in terms of making rational 
transitions to beliefs, judgments, etc. For if they adopt or retain a conception of experience on which 
experience, by default, serves to justify beliefs, or one on which it inevitably serves to put us in touch 
with mind-independent items, the problems discussed above crop up again.  
Seventh, as the potpourri of views mentioned in the last paragraph indicates, the possibility of 
devising an account that meets the two constraints is entirely independent of whether one commits to 
the idea that experience has content.  
Granted, the idea that Hansonians will insist on, e.g. that in experience, conceptual capacities are 
deployed automatically and passively, must be spelled out further. But if that can be done, 
representationalists would be in a good position to develop their account. And if one suggests that by 
comparison, Gupta’s account is better off since it does not face this problem, recall that the positive 
characteristics of his notion of presence are not entirely worked out, either.4 Relationalism, on the 
other hand, is pretty much ruled out. That said, Gupta’s presentationalism may serve as a substitute 
since it preserves many of the ideas relationalists hold dear: the idea that experience has no content, 
                                                 
4  Of course, this would be a problem that representationalists who endorse Gupta’s presentationalist account may have, 
too. But maybe not. For they could argue that to make proper sense of the notion of presentation required, what is 
needed it is exactly the idea that they insist on and that Gupta rejects: that in experience, conceptual capacities are 
passively deployed. I will officially remain neutral with respect to this issue. 
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that it cannot, thus, be erroneous, that the phenomenology of experience is important, and (like 
Genone) that what subjects may judge in response to their experience depends on their background 
view. 
Eighth, and relatedly, the long-standing dispute between relationalists and standard 
representationalist concerning the question whether experience has content may in an important sense 
fail to get to the heart of the matter. Arguably, neither view can satisfactorily deal with doxastic 
variability. But this has nothing to do with their commitment in favor or against the notion of content. 
What really matters is getting the conception of the role of experience right. Once we do, the 
content/no-content dispute that has been dominating the contemporary debate for roughly two 
decades turns out to be secondary, at least with respect to this issue.5 
There are more lessons we learned, but these, I take it, are the most important ones. In 10.4, I 
will list ways in which the project begun in this book can be pursued further. To bring some of them 
into focus, I consider, in the following section, two possible challenges to the kind of account of view 
I have been developing. 
10.3 THE NO PHENOMENOLOGY CHALLENGE AND THE RECEPTIVE 
KNOWLEDGE COMPLAINT 
In this section, I consider a challenge and a complaint. The former arises from a suggestion, offered 
by Robert Brandom, that we endorse a view that drops the notion of phenomenal experience entirely, 
and that we can do so without explanatory loss (10.3.1). The latter is a complaint John McDowell 
might raise: that the conception of experience we have been working towards fails to accommodate 
what he insists we must accommodate: a notion of receptive knowledge (10.3.2).  
                                                 
5  The latter concession reflects the fact that in light of what I noted in the previous footnote, a possible way of resisting 
the claim that the distinction is secondary tout court is to argue that the notion of presence can only be made sense of 
by way of drawing on the idea that presence requires the operation of concepts. 
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10.3.1 The No Phenomenology Challenge 
If we look back at our discussion since chapter 7, we can see it as developing along the following 
trajectory: beginning from Siegel’s (Rich) Content View, the discussion moved gradually further 
away from it by subsequently dropping various of Siegel’s commitments.  
Throughout, we sided with Siegel’s claim that experience could be affected by beliefs, but also by 
various other forms of cognitive and psychological background states. Other parts of her view, 
however, were subsequently eschewed. The first and most important step was to drop Siegel’s 
emphasis on justification and instead adopt a conception of the general role of experience as making 
rational view-dependent transitions to beliefs, etc. And since eschewing the focus on justification 
removed the motivation to accept Siegel’s account of epistemic powers and her particular take on 
what subjects of hijacked experiences are rational to do, we dropped these as well.  
The second step was to transition to a revamped Hansonian conception, the Hansonian Variable 
Content View. Doing so, in effect, involved dropping Siegel’s problematic commitment to a notion 
of experiential content in terms of properties that are presented as instantiated, in and by experience. 
Since Siegel provides no account of how to understand such properties, adopting Hanson’s broadly 
holistic account of content determination was a significant improvement. By providing such an 
account, his view is more powerful than Siegel’s in at least the following respect: it allows him to 
address cases like the Tycho-and-Kepler case, whereas on Siegel’s account, it is not obvious how this 
can be done. 
The third step was to transition to a discussion of Gupta’s presentationalist account, to analyze 
his conception of experience as involving the manifestation of appearances, and to ultimately embrace 
a slightly modified version of it that allows that appearances can be manifested in a subject’s 
consciousness even if no item is presented to that subject’s consciousness. Doing so involved 
dropping another one of Siegel’s commitments: that to a very thin and rather uninformative account 
of experiential phenomenology. The consideration of Gupta’s account then brought into view the 
option of dropping yet another one of Siegel’s commitments: not just her commitment to a specific 
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conception of experiential content, but the commitment to the more general idea that experience has 
content in the first place. (I will hasten to add that for reasons indicated in the previous section, this 
move is not forced.) 
As we review this trajectory, we might wonder why one should be moved to accept Gupta’s 
conception of phenomenology in the first place. Since we are in the business of dropping unnecessary 
commitments anyway, why not drop the commitment to a notion of phenomenal experience 
altogether and propose an account on which all epistemic and rational work is done by a combination 
of the subject’s background view and causal inputs that in turn trigger dispositions to make certain 
judgments, form certain beliefs, or take certain actions, say? After all, one could propose, all we need 
to get the process of world-driven view revision off the ground is a conception on which mind-
independent items can help bring about beliefs or judgments that conflict with some standing beliefs 
contained in the antecedent view. If all experience does is to play the functional role of being that 
which brings about suitable beliefs or judgments (rationally or not), why not suggest that causal stimuli 
can play that role just as well and that accordingly, the notion of phenomenology construed in terms 
of appearances becomes otiose? And if such a view were equipped with a broadly holistic account of 
content, it would also retain the insights contained in the semantic aspect of Hanson’s account of 
theory-ladenness as well.  
Call a conception with that kind of shape the No Phenomenology View. The challenge it raises 
is this: why favor a presentational conception of experience over the No Phenomenology View?  
We can grant that the notion of phenomenology is difficult to spell out. I, too, argued at length 
that relationalist accounts of experiential phenomenology are problematic in numerous ways. Also, 
and clearly, neither Hanson nor Siegel provide anything close to a satisfactory account of experiential 
phenomenology. Gupta’s account, I contend, constitutes a major improvement in this respect. And 
yet, I argued that the notion of presentation Gupta relies on may need to be refined further. For one, 
it needs to be slightly modified so as to be fully compatible with projection effects. More importantly, 
however, it may need to be circumscribed more fully so as to delineate its positive characteristics more 
clearly and thus to distinguish it from—or perhaps characterize it as a specific subset of—ordinary 
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causal relations. In sum, if eschewing the notion of phenomenology altogether is motivated in part by 
the assessment that extant accounts of experiential phenomenology are not fully satisfactory, we may 
grant that such an assessment has some force. 
However, it is one thing to say that there are respects in which extant accounts of x are still 
wanting, and quite another to claim that this renders the notion of x unnecessary or, stronger even, 
unintelligible. As for the stronger claim, arguably, even the notion of experiential phenomenology in 
terms of ‘what it’s like’ to have an experience can be further restricted so as to remove the subject’s 
responses to her experience from its scope and thus point us towards what remains, i.e. to that which 
arguably, Gupta’s notion of appearance is intended to capture. Further, suppose that like Hanson, 
someone were to talk about the phenomenal dimension of experience in terms of image-like elements 
that represent pictorially or, as some relationalists do, in terms of looking some specific way, e.g. F. We 
may resist such characterizations for sound theoretical reasons. But dismissing them on the grounds 
that it is completely unclear what they are supposed to capture constitutes a much more radical move. 
It involves a radical break with a common conception of experiential consciousness on which being 
conscious involves not just the actualization of conceptual capacities, but at least also a kind of 
phenomenal awareness that is distinctive of experience and absent in thought. 
Again, we should concede that there are good reasons why on might reject some specific accounts 
of experiential phenomenology. I provided my own reasons why some such conceptions should be 
rejected. Another reason, briefly discussed in 2.3.1, is that on accounts that most contemporary 
philosophers reject (as did Hanson), phenomenal states are taken to be perceptions of epistemological 
intermediaries, i.e. sense-data, that play a very distinct epistemological role: that of providing, 
somehow, a sort of basic and indubitable knowledge. If one then also tries to draw on knowledge of 
such intermediaries in an attempt to ground knowledge about mind-independent things, the specter 
of skepticism looms large. Also, such accounts constitute what many consider a prime example of the 
so-called Myth of the Given. Consider the following characterization of this myth offered by Robert 
Brandom: 
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(1) [t]he Myth of the Given is the claim that there is some kind of experience the having 
of which does not presuppose grasp of concepts, such that merely having the 
experience counts as knowing something, or can serve as evidence for beliefs, judgments, 
claims, and so on, that such a nonconceptual experience can rationally ground, and not 
just causally occasion, belief. (Brandom 2002, p. 93) 
 
Let us begin by noting that though both Hanson and Gupta could well agree that being in 
phenomenal states need not presuppose the grasp of concepts (though Hanson will insist that having 
epistemically significant experiences does presuppose such grasp), neither thinks that being in such 
phenomenal states can by itself provide knowledge, evidence, or rational grounds.  
As for Hanson, our discussion in 2.3.1 brought out the following: given his conception of what 
makes experience epistemically significant—the involvement of concepts in the form of instances of 
seeing as—and the constraint that he takes to govern the intelligibility of such concepts—that some 
beliefs that we, too, would count as knowledgeable be already involved in the subject’s background 
view—he thinks that for one to epistemically capitalize on one’s experience, a background view that 
contains knowledge so construed must already be in place. Also, on his view, the content of experience 
is not propositional in form. Thus, gaining knowledge from experience would at the very least require 
that the subject also endorse that things in fact are the way she sees things as—and that she do so for 
good reasons. For Hanson, thus, to think that some knowledge could be derived from experience—
from scratch, as it were—is both to mistake what it takes for experiential content to be intelligible and 
to ignore the fact that such content is not propositional and thus not a content that could so much as 
petition us to endorse it. Hanson’s account, in sum, does not fall into the Myth of the Given as 
Brandom characterizes it. 
It is also a crucial element of Gupta’s view that experiential phenomenology in and of itself does 
not and cannot provide knowledge. Having an experience, on his view, is not to gain knowledge by 
acquaintance, e.g. of appearances. Also, as experience has no content, it cannot serve to provide one, 
on its own accord, with propositional contents. Like for Hanson, for Gupta, too, experience cannot 
play its role in isolation: to play it, a background view that contains linkages to experience needs to be 
in place. Gupta’s view, too, avoids the Myth of the Given as Brandom characterizes it. 
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Finally, while it is true that both on Gupta’s view and on the Hansonian Variable Content View 
sketched in chapter 8 experience plays the role of rationally grounding something—viz. transitions to 
certain judgments, beliefs, etc.—again, it cannot do so in isolation. For experience to play that role, a 
suitable background view that contains the requisite rational linkages must be in place. 
If it seems counterintuitive and radically revisionary to reject Hanson’s and Gupta’s notions of 
experience on the grounds that they are unintelligible, and if, moreover, neither falls into the Myth of 
the Given as specified, one can still try to defend the following claim: these notions are unnecessary 
since they serve no explanatory purpose. We might still feel significant pressure to accommodate the 
idea that experience has a phenomenology. Again, giving up this idea is at odds with philosophical 
and, arguably, ordinary conceptions of consciousness that are thoroughly entrenched. But suppose it 
was granted that our human constitution happens to be such that when the world causally impinges 
on us, such impingement is accompanied by some distinctive experiential phenomenology only 
contingently. One could still insist that this phenomenology, however one cares to specify it, plays no 
significant explanatory role. Put this way, the proponent of the No Phenomenology view—the 
Contra-Phenomenologist—challenges us to spell out what good the notion of phenomenology does 
for us and insists that as long as no answer is provided, the notion had better be dropped.  
Let us consider a proposal that some Contra-Phenomenologists embrace: all one needs to issue 
an observation judgment is two distinguishable sorts of practical know-how. Here is how Brandom, a 
professed Contra-Phenomenologist, characterizes them: 
(2) First, one must have acquired a reliable differential responsive disposition: a disposition 
reliably to respond differentially to some kind of stimulus. Which stimuli we can come 
differentially to respond to depends on how we are wired up and trained. […] Second, 
one must have the capacity to produce conceptually articulated responses: to respond to 
red things not just by pecking at one button or closing one circuit rather than another, 
but by claiming that there is something red present. (Brandom 2002, p. 96) 
Again, the suggestion the Contra-Phenomenologist offers is that having such dispositions to 
respond in a conceptually articulated way is all we need to make sense of the idea that by causally 
eliciting such conceptually articulated responses in us, the world can exert empirical constraint on our 
beliefs. The notion of experiential phenomenology serves no explanatory purpose.  
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I contend that a defender of the idea that the notion of phenomenology is useful—a Pro-
Phenomenologist—can do more than resorting to intuitions about the nature of consciousness (no 
matter how widely these are shared) or than insisting that at least her notion of experience avoids the 
Myth of the Given. Instead, she can point to the fact that there are multiple possible combinations of 
environing items, properties, and subjective states such as brain states, states of the visual system, or 
cognitive and psychological features, including beliefs, that can elicit, in a given subject and in suitable 
circumstances, the same conceptually articulated response. In other words, wildly different stimulus 
conditions can each trigger the same response. And in suitable circumstances, responding to such 
different stimuli in the same way can be a perfectly rational thing to do.  
To have an example, suppose that you are presented, first, with a piece of red chalk in ordinary 
sunlight, second, with a piece of white chalk in red light, third, with a piece of yellow chalk seen 
through a magenta filter, fourth, with a piece of chalk that is yellow, but due to some futuristic device 
or hypnotic technique, you are suddenly saddled with the irrational, but irresistible belief that all pieces 
of chalk must be red. Then, fifth, you have a total hallucination as of a red piece of chalk.  
Suppose, moreover, that you have no idea of what the various conditions are that you find 
yourself in—you know nothing about lighting conditions, nor about any filters that may have been 
placed between you and the piece of chalk, nor are you aware of the fact that suddenly, an irrational 
belief intrudes your mental economy, or that you are having a total hallucination. In each case, let us 
assume, you form the following belief: this piece of chalk is red. (Obviously, only in the first of the 
scenarios, the judgment you arrive at is true, in the others, it is false.) What, the Pro-Phenomenologist 
can ask, serves to explain that you are disposed to give identical responses in these very different cases?  
I confess that I am uncertain what answer the Contra-Phenomenologist can offer. To insist that 
it is simply a brute fact that you have dispositions to respond to various actual and possible conditions 
that yield the same output—i.e. a judgment to the effect that some piece of chalk is red—is to reject 
the demand for an explanation. To say that in these various scenarios, the causal chains have some 
common element that serves as trigger for the disposition seems rather ambitious, given that the 
situations are so different (and more radically different ones could be devised). At the very least, it 
353 
 
incurs the burden of providing a way of specifying that common element. If, in contrast, we ask the 
Pro-Phenomenologist, she has an answer readily available: on her view, all these cases share a common 
feature. In each of them, the various items presented to your consciousness—and in one case, the 
absence of such items, conjoined with whatever causes the hallucination (a belief or a brain state, 
say)—are such that in the perceptual situation at hand, the appearances that are manifested in your 
consciousness are subjectively identical. On the assumption that the subject’s background view does 
not significantly change between the presentations of chalk pieces, having an experience with the same 
phenomenology will thus (actually or rationally) prompt the same response.6 
The Pro-Phenomenologist thus offers a specific conception of what it is that the reliably 
differential responsive dispositions Brandom refers to are dispositions to respond to. According to 
this conception, they are responses to what appearances are manifested in the subject’s consciousness. 
At the same time, the Pro-Phenomenologist will happily assert that having experiences with a certain 
phenomenology need not always trigger the same response. Since the relevant dispositions to respond 
are view-dependent, in different situations or (time-slices of) subjects, having experiences with the 
same phenomenology can trigger (either actually or rationally) very different responses. To take one 
of Brandom’s own examples, having two experiences with the same phenomenology can trigger, 
against the backdrop of one doxastic content, the judgment that there is a characteristically shaped 
track in a cloud chamber, while against the backdrop of another doxastic context, it can trigger the 
judgment that a mu meson is present. 
There may be other ways in which the notion of phenomenology is explanatorily helpful. One 
way that we have not discussed is provided by Gupta’s account of ostensive definitions. On it, roughly, 
having certain experiences can make it rational for subjects to transition to the stipulation of an 
ostensive definition (see Gupta 2019, chapter 8). By way of issuing such definitions, the concepts 
                                                 
6  For the fourth case, this assumption could be false. However, suppose that the strong irrational belief has a very local 
effect. It could affect either the appearance presented by the yellow chalk such as to turn it into an appearance that 
makes rational the judgment that the chalk is red, or determine what, given an appearance as of a yellow chalk, it is 
rational to transition to: viz. the judgment that it is red. The former would be an instance of a projection effect, the 
latter a background-view induced change in the rational linkages the subject’s background contains. Since what I need 
for my example is subjective identity, not change in linkages, I stipulate that the case at hand is a projection effect. 
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ostensively defined get to be associated with various appearances—in part by being associated with 
some of the appearances that are, when the definition is issued, manifest in the subject’s 
consciousness, in part by becoming suitably related to appearances that are already associated with the 
concepts that figure in the ostensive definition.7 If we call the sum of such associations a concept’s 
phenomenological profile, this notion can serve to enrich the notion of conceptual content and undergird 
a distinction between concepts that have—on the view under consideration and in specifiable 
circumstances—observational uses and concepts that lack such uses.8 At the same time, such 
associations, too, need not be robust and could be subject to change. Moreover, if we reject 
Ineffability, we can argue, as in the case of rational linkages discussed in 9.2.3, that by drawing on the 
notion of seeing as, the associations constitutive of a concept’s phenomenological profile can be made 
explicit and thus be made available for rational criticism.  
In sum, the claim that the notion of phenomenology is explanatorily otiose is not obviously true. 
And while I do not pretend to have fully settled the issue, I propose the following: if we take into 
account that rejecting the notion of experiential phenomenology is a highly revisionary move and that 
some strong motivations for dismissing specific such notions do not apply to Hanson’s and Gupta’s 
respective views, to step further away from Siegel’s view by rejecting the notion of phenomenology 
altogether is a step that takes us too far. Put in a more conciliatory fashion: to the extent that what 
motivates the Contra-Phenomenologist’s rejection of the notion of phenomenology is the worry that 
by accepting such a notion one would endorse the existence of something that is taken to do some 
explanatory work and at the same time cannot be subjected to rational criticism, it can be conceded 
that such a worry would have force. But with respect to Gupta’s account of phenomenology, 
particularly in the context of rejecting Ineffability, such a worry, I claim, would be misplaced. 
                                                 
7  Note that according to Gupta, ostensive definitions cannot occur in the absence of a view. Thus, and emphatically, 
they do not provide a way of addressing the problem of Linkage Setup. 
8  For the notion of phenomenological profile, see Gupta 2019, chapter 7, esp. §188f. Phenomenological profiles are 
similar to what, in my discussion of the Hansonian Variable Content View, I called dispositions of amalgamation in the 
following respect: both serve to associate concepts with phenomenal states or appearances. 
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10.3.2 The Receptive Knowledge Complaint 
As he comments on Gupta 2006, John McDowell claims that to devise an account on which empirical 
rationality is intelligible “we must find a way to make sense of receptive knowledge,” (McDowell 2009a, 
p. 468), where receptive knowledge is obtained if one can recover from individual experience how 
things are in the world. In saying that one perceives that such-and-such is the case, McDowell points 
out, one claims epistemic credentials of a certain sort for believing that such-and-such is the case. But 
on Gupta’s view, he insists, such credentials cannot be exhausted by what one’s experience gives one. 
Rather, “they have to be reconstructed out of that plus something not given by the experience itself” 
(McDowell 2009a, p. 468). And this, McDowell urges, is no truism.9  
Moreover, he claims, citing Rödl (2007) for support, that if we fail to make sense of receptive 
knowledge, knowledge immediately yielded by experience, we make empirical rationality unintelligible. 
(ibid., p. 468) The worry, then, is that an account that, like Gupta’s, implements the idea that the role 
of experience is to make rational view-dependent transitions to beliefs, judgments, etc. has no room 
for receptive knowledge. 
In what follows, I respond to this worry in two ways. First, I give an overview of some of 
McDowell’s most recent statements pertinent to the conception receptive knowledge and raise some 
questions concerning the conditions that on his own view must be in place to make such knowledge 
possible (10.3.2.1).  
Second, I will provide some pointers as to how, on a Hansonian Variable Content View that has 
been enriched by Gupta’s presentationalist account of experiential phenomenology, such conditions 
would have to be specified (10.3.2.2). I suggest that if we accept McDowell’s claim that a satisfactory 
account of experience must allow us to make sense of receptive knowledge, the view we have been 
considering does provide some resources to implement such a notion. Since the notion may turn out 
                                                 
9  In the introduction to Gupta 2006, Gupta cites it as a truism that the same subjective character of experience can be 
brought about by the collaboration of very different factors. (see the section entitled The Multiple-Factorizability of 
Experience, Gupta 2006, beginning on p. 5). Thus, Gupta suggests, if the subject is just provided with an individual 
experience that has some subjective character, she cannot recover any knowledge about the world or the self. 
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to merely play the role of a regulative ideal, it may well be that McDowell remains dissatisfied. Settling 
the issue, I suggest, requires an account that neither Gupta nor McDowell provide: an account of what 
conditions need to be met for something to intelligibly count as a view. 
10.3.2.1 McDowell on Receptive Knowledge Perception, McDowell’s holds, is first and 
foremost “the capacity for knowledge through impacts of reality on the senses” (McDowell 2018, p. 
89). Knowledge yielded by perception, he contends, is empirical rationality at work. To understand 
empirical rationality, i.e. how experience relates rationally to judgment, McDowell suggests that we 
must begin by understanding non-defective operations of empirical rationality in what he calls its 
fundamental mode. In such non-defective operations of empirical rationality in its fundamental mode, 
the subject engages in self-conscious acts of issuing judgments that are knowledgeable. She issues such 
judgments on the basis of her perceptual experience—“on the ground that it is manifest to her in her 
experience that things are as she judges them to be” (McDowell 2018, p. 90). For that is what 
experiences that are perceptions do for us, McDowell asserts, they make ways things in fact are in the 
world perceptually manifest to the subject. Moreover, it is, he claims, internal to perceptual experiences 
that they are potentially a ground for perceptually knowledgeable judgments (ibid., p. 91). For 
experience to make ways things in fact are perceptually manifest to the subject, which is for them to 
be such potential grounds, involves, McDowell claims, an actualization of the same conceptual 
capacities that in their complete actualization involve the issuing of knowledgeable judgments.  
The actualization of these capacities in perceptual experience makes available what McDowell 
elsewhere calls intuitional content (cf. e.g. McDowell ms.), which, like judgments, owes its specific unity 
to the faculty of concepts and is non-discursive, since as of yet unarticulated content. But it is due to 
the form it possesses by virtue of the unity it has that such content is potentially conceptual content—
content, that is, that can figure in discursive operations. For one can, by issuing a judgment, articulate 
such content and thus make it discursively available (or parts thereof, since articulation, McDowell 
remarks, brings loss of specificity). And if judgments are grounded on the perception of how things 
in fact are, they entail that things are as they are judged to be, and are thus truly knowledgeable. 
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There are various subtle aspects of McDowell’s position which in the present context we can 
ignore. But against the background of our previous discussion, even this brief sketch raises a number 
of questions. More specifically, it raises questions concerning what McDowell thinks needs to be in 
place, on the part of the subject, for it to possess the kind of capacity for receptive knowledge he 
thinks one must make room for to make the notion of empirical rationality intelligible in the first 
place. Inter alia, such questions concern what determines what it is that the conceptual capacities that 
McDowell, like Hanson, takes to be operative both in (human) experience (broadly construed) itself 
and in issuing judgments, are conceptual capacities for. 
To make this more vivid, consider the case Hanson discusses: both Tycho and Kepler look at the 
sun, in identical circumstances, and see it as the sun. If Hanson is right, their judgments express 
different propositions, since for each of them, the concept sun has a different meaning. Suppose each 
of them issues the following judgment: “This is the sun,” or the token judgments p and p*, for short. 
How are we, on McDowell’s view, to characterize what is going on as they issue their respective 
judgments?  
First off, are the judgment tokens issued by Tycho and Kepler, respectively, instances of empirical 
rationality operating in its fundamental mode? Perhaps not. For note that McDowell distinguishes 
empirical rationality in its fundamental mode from empirical rationality that is “at work in judgments 
inferentially grounded on things the judging subject perceives to be the case” McDowell 2018, p. 90, 
emphasis added). Moreover, McDowell recognizes that experiences can ground knowledge in such a 
way that the subject non-defectively employs her fallible capacities to recognize what her experience 
makes manifest to her as falling under certain concepts. And the contents of the judgment issued by 
way of non-defectively employing such recognitional capacities need not themselves figure in the 
intuitional content that is yielded by the actualization of the conceptual capacities that make how 
things in fact are manifest to the subject. Perceptual knowledge that we gain by recognizing cardinals 
or tables, say, does not require that the intuitional content of our experience contains the content 
cardinal or table. 
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Given this distinction, whether the judgment tokens Tycho and Kepler issue count as instances 
of empirical rationality operating in its fundamental mode, or as instances of empirical rationality at 
work in judgments inferentially grounded on things Tycho and Kepler perceive to be the case, or as 
instances of empirical rationality at work in judgments that they issued by way of employing  certain 
recognitional capacities will depend, on McDowell’s view, on what distinguishes these various ways 
for empirical rationality to be at work, and to which kind of way, accordingly, the token judgments 
that we imagine Tycho and Kepler as issuing count as belonging. Suppose one’s background view 
concerning contained a significant number of beliefs about the sun, each of them knowledgeable. 
Would that fact make the conceptual capacity that is involved in one’s issuing judgments about the 
sun a capacity that could figure in non-defective operations of empirical rationality in its fundamental 
mode? Or are the capacities whose actualization count as operations of that specific kind limited to 
certain kinds of conceptual capacities? To make this distinction clearer, what is needed is an account 
of what the intuitional content of an experience can possibly be. 
A related question concerns what it takes for the actualization of such a capacity to be non-
defective. Suppose that we take the conceptual capacities involved in Tycho’s and Kepler’s token 
judgments p and p* to be recognitional capacities. What needs to be the case for one to be able to 
exercise this capacity in a non-defective way?  
A simple but largely uninformative answer is that one needs to be able to self-consciously issue 
knowledgeable judgments about the sun, and to do so on the ground that one recognizes that the ways 
things in fact are that are made manifest in one’s experience are such that the thing perceived falls 
under the concept sun. 
But what is required for one to have this ability? Suppose we assume, again, that all the many 
beliefs a subject S holds about the sun are knowledgeable. Presumably, having some such 
knowledgeable beliefs would have to play at least some role in co-constituting S’s capacity to issue 
judgments about the sun that are either non-defective operations of empirical rationality in its 
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fundamental mode or non-defective operations of a suitable recognitional capacity.10 Suppose so. But what 
if we were to now remove one knowledgeable belief about the sun from S’s background view, what if 
two, three, four, etc.? If so, would the remaining beliefs still serve to co-constitute a recognitional 
capacity that can provide knowledge? The question has a somewhat absurd ring to it. Having a 
recognitional capacity for acquiring receptive knowledge with respect to some object, it seems, should 
not be taken to depend on the number of knowledgeable beliefs one holds about that item. And yet, 
it also sounds right that for co-constituting such a capacity, having too few of such beliefs might be 
insufficient. 
Alternatively, let us ask what would happen if we made one, two three, or more of S’s beliefs 
about the sun false or irrational? Would that deprive her of the recognitional capacity? Depending on 
how one answers this question, the conception of what is required for one to possess conceptual 
capacities necessary to acquire knowledge about the sun can turn out to be very demanding. 
Arguably, we should construe Tycho’s and Kepler’s respective token judgments p and p* as being 
issued from within a doxastic context that contains at least some false beliefs about the sun. 
Accordingly, with respect to p and p* we can ask: can they still count as non-defective exercises of 
empirical rationality at work (in either of its modes) in such a way that the resulting judgments are 
knowledgeable? Or are we to say that p and p* could not have been fully or properly grounded on 
what has been made manifest in their respective experiences, because both these judgments and the 
conceptual capacities that in issuing such judgments are actualized are intelligible only in a context that 
contains false beliefs? Do Tycho and Kepler, in issuing p and p*, respectively, exercise their extant 
recognitional capacities to recognize the sun defectively or are we to say that given their false beliefs, 
Tycho and Kepler lack the capacity to recognize the sun altogether?  
If either of these options is accepted, it seems that we should say that their respective token 
judgments do not count as instances of receptive knowledge. Of course, if asked how they know that 
the sun has risen, each of them would say that this is the kind of thing they can know because they 
                                                 
10  For simplicity, I am ignoring the third option, i.e possibility that this could be a case of empirical rationality at work 
in judgments inferentially grounded on things the judging subject perceives to be the case. 
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can see it. Still, since what they take themselves to be seeing will differ from what is actually there to 
be seen—certainly in Tycho’s case and perhaps to some extent in Kepler’s as well—the propositions 
expressed by p and p*, respectively, should not be knowledgeable.  
Suppose we approach the example from a different angle and ask what individuates the 
conceptual capacities that are actualized in p and p*, respectively, and what individuates the capacities 
actualized in their having their respective experiences in the first place. 
As for the former, let us assume again, that we construe them as fallible recognitional capacities. 
These capacities—are they the same in both Tycho and Kepler or are they different? If they are the 
same, what makes them the same? That they target the same physical object? If they are different, is 
that fact a function of the differences in the views they hold about what kind of thing the sun is? 
As for the latter, the capacities actualized as Tycho and Kepler have their respective experiences 
and that that account for the intuitional content of their respective experiences—are they the same in 
both or different and what determines the answer to this question? Moreover, are these capacities 
such that their actualization puts Tycho, Kepler, or both in a position, in principle, to acquire at least 
some receptive knowledge of the sun on the ground that it is, due to the actualization of these capacities, 
manifest to them in their respective experiences that things are as they could judge them to be (even 
if they do not)?  
To deny this would be to deny that they perceive the sun, which rings implausible. Not to deny 
it, however, raises the question what the conceptual capacities are that make manifest to them, in their 
respective experiences, ways things in fact are with the sun. And if some way of specifying these 
capacities is proposed, we can ask, further, whether for those capacities to be available to the subject 
to actualize them in experience depends on further conditions that their background views meet, e.g. 
that they hold a sufficient number of knowledgeable beliefs about what these capacities are capacities 
for or, perhaps, that in the experiencing subject’s background view, the relevant concepts are 
articulated in some suitable way.  
If so, one would again like to know what the conditions are that the background view must meet 
for the capacity to make manifest ways things in fact are, in experience, to be one that the subject 
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counts as possessing. And if neither the presence of suitable knowledgeable beliefs (again: which ones? 
how many?) nor a suitable articulation of the relevant concepts in the subject’s background view is 
what is required for a subject to possess a capacity that enables her to gain receptive knowledge, the 
question arises: what then?  
Which conceptual capacities account, by their being actualized in experience, for the intuitional 
content that can serve as potential ground for knowledgeable judgments? On one view, the relevant 
conceptual capacities that could be actualized in non-defective operations of empirical rationality in 
its fundamental mode that make available potential grounds for knowledgeable judgments are 
restricted to the conceptual capacities necessary for acquiring knowledge of, say, secondary and 
perhaps some primary qualities such as color, shape, or movement. Alternatively, one could think of 
them as of also including conceptual capacities necessary for acquiring perceptual knowledge of 
middle-sized material things of forms of the living (see McDowell ms.; McDowell 2009).  
Some answer to this question is needed, but no matter how we answer it, the more pressing 
question is how we are to think about these capacities. It is an open, but pressing question what needs 
to be in place for the capacities that do make available, by being actualized in the subject’s experience 
itself, potential grounds for knowledgeable judgments, to in fact be such capacities, i.e. capacities that 
enable one to acquire receptive knowledge. It seems highly plausible that at least part of what needs 
to be in place is that the subject hold a background view that meets certain minimum requirements. 
If so, one would like to know what, according to McDowell, these requirements are.11 
In this section, I began by providing a sketch of McDowell’s notion of receptive knowledge and 
suggested that to assess whether a given notion of experience can accommodate such a notion, many 
questions need to be addressed first about what the possession of the capacity for acquiring such 
knowledge entails about the subject’s mental economy. Instead of trying to determine what 
                                                 
11  These are only some of the questions that arise if we look at McDowell’s own position. Further questions arise if, e.g. 
like Hanson and Siegel, one takes it that the content one’s experience makes available to one is amalgamated or non-
arbitrarily associated with certain kinds of phenomenal states. For it could be that for one’s conceptual capacities to 
be such as to enable the subject to issue knowledgeable judgments on the ground that ways things are manifest to her 
in her experience, the relevant concepts must be associated with such states in the right kind of way. 
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McDowell’s answers to these various questions might be, I will, in the next section, provide a sketch 
of what, on the kind of account that we have been considering, would have to be in place for receptive 
knowledge of the kind that McDowell insists we must make room for to be possible. 
10.3.2.2 Hansonian Receptive Knowledge In 10.1, I claimed that accounts of experience 
that fully accommodate the doxastic variability of experience and that at the same time leave room for 
the idea that experience can constrain our views can be constructed regardless of whether one accepts 
the idea that experience has content. Since McDowell does accommodate a notion of content, I will 
frame the following in terms of a view that involves a commitment to experiential content as well, i.e. 
by drawing on the Hansonian Variable Content View, supplemented by Gupta’s presentationalist 
account of appearances as manifested in the experiencing subject’s consciousness.12 Analogous 
considerations, I contend, could be given just in terms of Gupta’s presentationalism as well.13 
In the last section, the overarching question raised was the following: how must we think about 
the conceptual capacities that are operative both in the subject’s experience and in the subject’s 
response to it for receptive knowledge to be possible?  
As we think about how to address this question from the perspective afforded by the revamped 
and supplemented Hansonian view we are considering, recall, first, that on such a view, if a subject S 
undergoes an experience, it can happen that what undergoing the experience triggers are dispositions to 
transition to beliefs and judgments that in light of S’s view it is not in fact rational to transition to. Since 
in such a case, S may respond to her experience in a way that is neither rationally required nor 
permissible, we will have to say that the resulting judgments cannot be non-defective exercises of 
                                                 
12  For what follows, it is irrelevant that, as I argued in 9.1.2, Gupta’s presentationalism may need to be slightly modified 
so as to be fully compatible with the idea that projection effects could be what brings about total hallucinations. 
13  I am assuming, whereas Gupta is not, that the inferential articulation of concepts accounts for an essential part of a 
concept’s content. Accordingly, to the extent that in the following, I draw on the idea the content of experience 
(which, recall, Gupta thinks is an otiose notion) and the content of the judgments that the subject, in response to her 
experience, transitions to, is co-determined by the inferential articulation of those judgments and the concepts figuring 
in them within the subject’s background view, Gupta himself might demur. However, on the assumption that no 
principled objections stand in the way of combining a Gupta-style account of experience with a broadly holistic 
account of content determination, arguably, on a view that combines these elements, analogous considerations will 
be possible. 
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empirical rationality. Accordingly, as we consider candidate cases of receptive knowledge, we must 
focus on cases in which S self-consciously transitions to judgments, etc. that are indeed rational by the 
lights of her experience and her view.14 
Consider cases, then, in which S self-consciously transitions to judgments in such a way that her 
transition is in accordance with what by the lights of her experience and her view is in fact rational. 
However, depending on the details of S’s background view, it may well be that the judgments that in 
response to her experience she self-consciously and rationally transitions to are neither true, rational, 
nor justified. For it could be that her background view is partly false or her outlook partly irrational 
and that these parts are partly involved in the transition in question. Moreover, it could also be that 
the phenomenology of her experience, the content of the seeing as that via suitable dispositions of 
amalgamation is amalgamated with the specific phenomenal state that she is in as she undergoes her 
experience, or the dispositions of amalgamation themselves are modified by such background conditions. 
But it could also be that these effects are counteracted by suitable beliefs. 
Accordingly, if we think about what suitable candidate cases of receptive knowledge could be, we 
should also hold that for receptive knowledge to be possible, such effects must either be absent or at 
the very least counteracted by suitable beliefs.15 
Note that the former option need not be construed as requiring that S’s background view be 
completely free from false or irrational elements. For it may be that in the perceptual context in 
question, these elements have no effect. Suppose, for example, that everything you believe about the 
                                                 
14  It could happen that a given subject transitions to a judgment that would indeed be rational for her to transition to, 
in the context at hand, without its being the case that the transition is brought about in the right kind of way. It could 
be, for instance, that in a given subject, having an experience triggers her disposition to transition to a judgment which 
merely happens to be one that it is, in light of her view and her experience, rational to transition to, but that the 
subject does not transition to it for that reason. To rule out such cases, I included the condition that the subject self-
consciously transition to the judgments at hand, which I intend to imply that her transitioning to the judgment is a 
conscious transition to what, in the light of her view, it is rational to transition to, for the reason that she acknowledges 
that her making such a transition is rational in that way.  
15  Whether one accepts the latter will depend on how one answers questions like the following: can a judgment issued 
on the basis of a hijacked or a illusory experience, where the doxastic background is such that it counteracts the 
hijacking or the illusion count as a case in which the subject acquires receptive knowledge? Suppose I know that I am 
in conditions in which red things look green and green things look yellow (say). Can I, by looking at what looks green 
to me, acquire receptive knowledge that the thing I am looking at is red? If I know that what I am looking at is the 
Müller-Lyer illusion, can I acquire receptive knowledge about the length of the lines?  
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sun is correct. Suppose, further, that you hold a false belief about, say, a highly theoretical 
mathematical conjecture such as e.g. the Goldbach Conjecture, or an irrational implicit bias about 
members of a certain group.16 Plausibly, these false or irrational elements need not affect the content 
of your experience or the judgments you rationally transition to in response to it in any significant 
way.  
It must be noted, however, that the question whether the presence of such false or irrational 
elements has any or no significant effects on the content of perceptual judgments, i.e. where significant 
effects would be such as to undermine their status as knowledgeable, depends on the details of the 
broadly holistic account of content determination our Hansonian endorses. For on some such 
accounts, the individuation of contents will be extremely fine-grained, so that every difference in the 
background view will entail a difference in the contents contained in any given judgment.17 On other 
such accounts, the individuation of content will be less fine-grained. On such accounts, undermining 
the status of judgments as being knowledgeable may be less easy. 
The details of Hanson’s own view are unclear. But plainly, for a Hansonian to accept the claim 
that false and irrational elements may not affect the contents of perceptual judgments in any significant 
way would be to incur a burden: she would need to provide a holistic account of content determination 
that yields that result. To reject the claim, however, is to impose very strong constraints indeed on 
what needs to be the case for receptive knowledge to be possible. For it would then be possible only 
if the background view satisfies very demanding requirements on the truth, rationality, and justificatory 
status of its component beliefs. Receptive knowledge, on such a view, would turn out to be akin to a 
regulative ideal, something to aspire to, but that need not in fact be part of all ordinary epistemic 
practices of issuing perceptual judgments. 
Even on such a view, however, receptive knowledge remains possible, even though it is true that 
the ideal provided by the conception of an ideal background view that would enable subjects to acquire 
                                                 
16  According to the Goldbach Conjecture, every even integer greater than two is the sum of two prime numbers. 
17  An argument for such an account may be construed on the basis of pointing out that in any given view, all concepts 
are such that they are at least implicitly connected via various subjunctive conditionals. See Brandom 2015, chapter 6 
for a relevant discussion. 
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such knowledge may be a distant one.18 This need not be worrisome if one is also happy to accept that 
in our ordinary epistemic practices, attributions to the effect that a given judgment is an instance of 
knowledge are strongly context- and view-dependent.19  
To illustrate, suppose that in our presence, Tycho utters the sentence “This is the sun.” Arguably, 
in many practical contexts, we could take his utterance as an instance of knowledge. In doing so, we 
would take his utterance to be such that his word “sun” serves to single out a specific item that we, 
too, think is currently present in our environment. And in the context at hand, singling out that item 
may be all that is required. In other contexts, we could well disagree with his utterance, for instance if 
it is a context in which the sun has been characterized as an object that behaves in ways we think it 
cannot behave, e.g. as moving around the stationary earth. In such a context, the difference between 
Tycho’s and our background beliefs would be conversationally salient. Accordingly, we might take his 
utterance “This is the sun” as an assertion to the effect that the item that he recognizably singles out 
is a kind of thing that we think it is not. And while in such a context, a fellow Tychonian would still 
take Tycho’s utterance to be an instance of knowledge, we certainly would not.  
Presumably, for McDowell, the idea that the possibility of receptive knowledge is merely that 
associated with a potentially distant regulative ideal will be unsatisfactory. He might wish to insist that 
receptive knowledge must be involved in any ordinary epistemic practice of judging for it to be an 
epistemic practice at all.20  
                                                 
18  To show that on such a view, receptive knowledge is impossible, one would have to show that it is impossible, e.g. 
through a process of revisions of views, to eventually arrive at a background view that meets these strong constraints. 
19  Recall that in chapter 2, it was suggested that on Hanson’s view, the knowledge a background view must contain to 
make instances of seeing as intelligible was knowledge as attributed, e.g. by us. The idea was that we could not make sense 
of anything as a practice involving seeing as unless some of the beliefs that within that practice co-determine the content 
of the concepts that complement the seeing as locution are such that we, too, consider them as knowledgeable. 
20  See McDowell 2009a, pp. 468-9: “[W]e must find a way to make sense of receptive knowledge, knowledge immediately 
yielded by experience. Otherwise we make empirical rationality unintelligible. [reference to Rödl 2007, chapter 3]. If 
that is right, then when he accepts the supposed truism [i.e. that individual experience in and of itself does not allow 
us to recover how things are in the world] Gupta deprives himself of the very idea of rationality in empirical belief. 
There is no prospect of reconstructing that idea, in terms of revision sequences or anything else, in a context that 
includes denying something on which the idea’s viability depends.” In McDowell 2009a, McDowell does not pursue 
this line of argument further. For present purposes, what matters is that the passage can be read as suggesting that on 
McDowell’s view, receptive knowledge cannot simply be a regulatory ideal, but must be part of very epistemic practice.  
366 
 
Showing how this is possible, on the view we are considering, would require some heavy lifting 
and I confess that I am not certain whether it can be done at all. One way of making some progress 
could be to provide an argument for the suggestion indicated above: that false and irrational elements 
in one’s background view need not always matter for whether the judgments that—upon having a 
certain experience in the context of a given background view—one rationally transitions to are 
knowledgeable.21 Even if such an argument were provided, however, one would still need to show 
that anything that could possibly be an epistemic practice presupposes a context in which at least some 
conceptual capacities of the participating subjects are such as to enable them to acquire receptive 
knowledge of this kind. 
Whether and why there is a pressing need for an argument of the latter kind is an interesting 
question. Gupta, in his response to McDowell (cf. Gupta 2009) in effect rejects the idea McDowell 
and Rödl endorse, i.e. that to make sense of empirical rationality, one needs to accommodate the idea 
that every possible epistemic practice must make sense of receptive knowledge.  
Resolving this dispute goes beyond what I can here hope to achieve. Instead, I close by noting 
the following: presumably, both Gupta and McDowell will grant that for something to be an epistemic 
practice, the participating agents must enjoy experiences, accept or hold (at least implicitly) a view, and 
possess various conceptual capacities. Resolving Gupta’s and McDowell’s dispute, I suggest, thus 
requires providing, inter alia, an account of what is required for someone to hold a view in the first 
place and an account of how conceptual capacities are to be understood and individuated.  
                                                 
21  Doing so could require giving an account of the content of perceptual judgments on which it becomes intelligible that 
the doxastic context that serves to co-determine such contents can be isolated from certain erroneous beliefs that 
figure in the subject’s background view overall. Alternatively, one could try to specify such contents by drawing on 
the phenomenological profiles associated with the concepts figuring in the perceptual judgments in question. 
However, as long as such accounts of content are pending, what the prospects of such strategies are must remain an 
open question. 
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In 10.3.2.1, I raised corresponding questions for McDowell. Here, I will add that Gupta does not 
provide a full account of what constraints must be in place for something to intelligibly count as a 
view,22 either, nor of how we are to understand conceptual capacities and what individuates them. 
We are left, thus, not with a solution, but with a set of further tasks. In the next section, I close by 
summing up a number of ways in which the current inquiry could be fruitfully continued and by 
outlining a few areas of philosophical research to which its current results can be fruitfully applied. 
10.4 STILL NO END IN SIGHT: OPEN QUESTIONS AND FURTHER AVENUES 
TO PURSUE 
In this chapter, I began by providing a detailed summary of the argumentative trajectory pursued in 
this book, highlighted what I take to be the main lessons learned, and considered two challenges: the 
No Phenomenology challenge and the Receptive Knowledge complaint. The last section brought into view a 
number of ways in which the project pursued in this book could be developed further. Let us collect 
them and add some more. For one, and perhaps most pressingly, I suggested, in 10.2, that there is a 
variety of possible views that can satisfy the two constraints that guided our inquiry. Moreover, 
throughout, I indicated that various views could be supplemented with parts of other views and in the 
course of all these suggestions, I never made a full commitment to any of these views in particular. 
This is studied. For all of the views we considered needed some work, including what I take to be the 
two most promising ones: the revamped Hansonian Variable Content View, complemented by 
Gupta’s presentationalist account of experience, and Gupta’s presentationalism. If I have succeeded, 
I have shown that there is reason to think that neither of the two dominant kinds of accounts of 
experience is in principle well-positioned to meet both the constraints that guided our inquiry, that 
                                                 
22  As indicated before (cf. chapter 9, footnote 32), Gupta does provide some constraints, but these flow from the 
requirements he thinks on the dynamic behavior views must exhibit to be such as to serve the goals of empirical 
inquiry, not from considerations concerning what must be the case of something for it to intelligibly count as a view. 
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there are numerous ways in which proponents of the various views we considered could try to improve 
their views further, and finally, that views that do meet both constraints are possible if both a suitably 
modified version of Gupta’s presentationalist account of appearances and the general conception of 
experience as making rational transitions to judgments, beliefs, and actions are accepted. This, I take 
it, is no small feat.  
However, if pressed, I will say that personally, I favor a view that combines the strengths of 
Gupta’s conception of the general role of experience and his (slightly modified) presentationalist 
account of appearance with Hanson’s original insights, including his broadly holistic account of 
conceptual content and his claim that for seeing as to be intelligible, the experiencing subject needs to 
possess some beliefs that we, too, take to be knowledgeable.  
With respect to how to fuse what I take to be the best parts of their respective views, and how to 
develop the resulting view further, here is a list of issues that I think are worth pursuing.  
1) I side with Gupta in suspecting that the idea that experience has content may be dropped (for 
a qualification, see point 4) below). That said, I think that the idea that experience involves seeing 
as may not need to be given up.  
I already suggested that the notion of seeing as may serve an important expressive role. For 
one, I suggested, in 9.2.3, that it can serve to form view-dependent empirical descriptions of 
experiences, which can in turn figure as antecedents of (indicative and subjunctive) conditionals 
that we can use to make explicit, and thus discursively available, our conceptions of the rational 
linkages that we take our background views to implicitly contain,23 where on the construal I 
suggest we endorse, rational linkages are part of the view in that they form an important stratum 
of the inferential commitments that are implicit in the inferential articulation of those among 
our concepts that can figure in empirical descriptions.  
                                                 
23  As I indicated in 9.2, we can distinguish rational from actual linkages, which correspond to what in 8.2 dubbed 
dispositions to transition. These govern how subjects are disposed to respond to their experiences in actual situations. 
Plainly, the seeing as locution can be exploited to make these linkages explicit as well.   
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By the same token, as indicated in 10.3.1, the seeing as locution can serve to make discursively 
available one’s conception of any given concept’s phenomenological profile. There may, 
however, be a further use for seeing as, not for the notion, but for the state. That said, as indicated 
in 9.2.3, I am not certain that we need to think about such states in terms of passively deployed 
conceptual capacities. Rather, I am inclined to think about states of seeing as as dispositional 
states, in which the experiencing subject is ready to engage in certain view- and context-
dependent transition to certain judgments, etc. once suitable further conditions are met.  
Characterizing such a state, e.g. a given subject S’s specific state of seeing something specific 
as red in a given context fully may be a potentially gargantuan task. At the very least, it would 
require making explicit the view-dependent and contextually salient rational linkages that serve 
to inferentially articulate the concept or concepts figuring in the complement of the seeing as 
locution that S would deploy to characterize her experience—in this case, the concept ‘red.’  
But if we are to characterize S’s state not just in terms of which transitions to judgments, 
beliefs, and actions S—given her experience and her doxastic context—would be rational to 
make, but also which transitions S is actually disposed to make, given all other contextually 
salient factors—including e.g. the S’s further psychological and cognitive states—the requisite 
characterization would have to be even more complicated.24  
Patently, how the relevant dimensions along which such dispositional states could be 
characterized is something worth exploring. The point of doing so, presumably, would be in 
the context of trying to make sense what others are doing, either in terms of what they consider 
rational or in terms of what other psychological and cognitive factors might be in play as they 
are ready to respond to their experience.  
Relatedly, we may take the dispositions that detract from the subject’s ability to respond to 
her experience in a way that she should, given her view, to limit her ability to see things clearly, 
                                                 
24  Note that, we might, at least in some contexts, exclude the latter kind of specification precisely on the grounds that 
to the extent that such further factors shape the subject’s overall disposition to respond to her experience, these 
factors detract from her actually and fully seeing the object as red.  
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at least relative to her view. If so, specifying such dispositions could be a way of specifying that 
which needs to be overcome in order to see clearly, which is a project worth pursuing not just 
in the area or theoretical philosophy, but also in the area of moral perception, as would be the 
project of specifying the kinds of attitudes and epistemic virtues that would allow one to 
overcome such dispositions.25 
2) Hanson’s broadly holistic account of content, I think, is quite intriguing. In fact, in interpreting 
Gupta’s rational linkages, as I have done, in terms of inference tickets, as being part of the view 
in that they form an important stratum of the inferential commitments that are implicit in the 
inferential articulation of those among our concepts that can figure in empirical descriptions, I 
have taken a first modest step towards interpreting Gupta’s account in the context of an 
approach on which the meaning of concepts is construed in a broadly holistic fashion.  
Yet arguably, Hanson’s holistic account is very rough—much more sophisticated accounts 
of inferentially articulated conceptual systems are available.26 But even with respect to such 
sophisticated accounts, I think, it is well worth exploring the possibility of combining them 
with suitable parts of Gupta’s account. What I have in mind is not just a construal of rational 
linkages and, perhaps, states of seeing as in the way I have sketched. Rather, I think that Gupta’s 
account affords resources that may serve to enrich broadly holistic accounts of conceptual 
concepts. 
Gupta, as I have noted, does not provide a full account of conceptual content. However, 
as I noted in 10.3.1, in the context of his discussion of ostensive definitions, Gupta provides 
an interesting account of how, with the aid of experience, concepts can be introduced and 
defined. In the process of introducing concepts, such concepts are linked with experiences, in 
part by way of suitably associating the concepts introduced with the experience had while 
introducing them, in part by associating them with experiences that are already linked with the 
                                                 
25  As indicated before, I have begun to engage in this kind of project in Rosenhagen ms-a, Rosenhagen ms-b, and, to 
some extent, in Rosenhagen fthc. 
26  See especially Brandom 1994, 2008, and 2015. 
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concepts that are deployed in providing the ostensive definition. Establishing such definitions 
in turn generates the relevant concept’s phenomenological profile. An interesting project, 
accordingly, would be to fully flesh out a conception of conceptual content that lays alongside 
the dimension of conceptual content that is constituted by the way the relevant concept is 
inferentially articulated in the subject’s doxastic content another dimension of content that can 
be specified in terms of the relevant concept’s view-dependent phenomenological profile. 
Doing so would be to provide a way of enriching the inferential dimension of conceptual 
content by a dimension that connects—albeit in view-dependent and thus rationally modifiable 
ways—the relevant concepts with the subjective dimension that is constituted by the various 
appearances items manifest in the subject’s consciousness and thus, albeit in a doubly mediated 
way, with the mind-independent items that in most experiences are presented to consciousness.  
3) Our discussion at the end of 10.3.2.2 brought us face-to-face with the question whether a 
conception of what can intelligibly count as an epistemic practice must have room for receptive 
knowledge—not just as an ideal to strive for, but as an actual part of that practice. McDowell, 
as I interpreted his view, answers this question in the affirmative, Gupta, on the other hand, 
does not. The interpretation of Hanson’s view that I provided in the second chapter hints at a 
possible third position. According to it, the knowledge that any view against the background of 
which instances of seeing as are intelligible must involve is not receptive knowledge, but 
knowledge as attributed to the seeing subject by others, i.e. knowledge as attributed by us.  
In the context of the discussion in 10.3.2.2, I suggested that resolving Gupta’s and 
McDowell’s (and, as we may now add, Hanson’s) dispute may require that we provide, inter alia, 
an account of what is required for someone to hold a view in the first place and an account of 
how conceptual capacities are to be understood and individuated. This, too, is a way in which 
our inquiry should be pursued further. 
4) As indicated earlier, Gupta’s account of presentation needs to be sharpened. In 10.2, I claimed 
that in the context of the debate on how to accommodate doxastic variability, the importance 
of the long-standing debate between proponents and opponents of the idea that experience has 
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content is secondary to the question what we should take the general role of experience to be. 
However, I also indicated (in footnotes 4 and 5) that in the context of a different question, this 
debate may still be rather important, viz. in the context of the debate what a viable account of 
presentation requires. Exploring this question further is, thus, another way of pursuing our 
inquiry further. 
Obviously, the issues just raised are complex, the disputes between the disputing parties deep, 
and the consequences of siding with one side or the other philosophically far-reaching. Accordingly, 
while I can only hope to eventually make progress with respect to at least some of them, I already 
count it as a satisfying result that our inquiry has brought them to the fore.  
But if we turn our gaze away from these fascinating questions, we can see many ways in which 
the lessons we have learned can already be applied to various areas of philosophical and non-
philosophical research. Let me list just a few.  
Patently, the account of experience can be used to make novel contributions in pretty much every 
area of philosophy in which experience is credited with some important role, e.g. in debates, within 
epistemology, e.g. on 
• the structure of epistemic justification, 
• epistemic norms and epistemic virtues, 
• the new evil demon problem, 
• the nature of evidence, 
debates within general philosophy of science, e.g. on 
• the nature and putative problems with the so-called theory-ladenness of scientific 
observation, 
• the nature and preconditions of expert vision, 
• the development of scientific concepts and theories,  
debates within aesthetics and moral philosophy, e.g. on  
• the role of value-laden experience for moral progress, 
• aesthetic perception and expertise, 
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and, finally, debates within social, feminist, and comparative philosophy, e.g. on 
• implicit bias and the claim regularly asserted that ideology manages experience, 
• feminist stand-point epistemology, 
• Buddhist notions of perception (which, like e.g. Iris Murdoch and Simone Weil, highlight 
the role of attention and compassion for achieving clear vision), 
• the Jaina doctrine of anekāntavāda (the so-called many-sidedness of reality), 
Outside philosophy, too, there are numerous potential applications. Here, I will mention just two. 
First, consider that within the cognitive (neuro-)sciences, a growing number of researchers endorse 
predictive coding accounts (e.g. Jacob Hohwy, Andy Clark, Karl Friston, Gary Lupyan). According to 
such conception, roughly, the brain is a hypothesis-testing machine that generates percepts in a way 
that is highly responsive to top-down effects. It then adjusts its hypotheses about the world in response 
to the information incompatible with these hypotheses—the so-called predictive error—that it actively 
seeks out in order to test the hypotheses implemented. If we bracket the fact that e.g. agentive talk 
about the brain is philosophically problematic, clearly, the idea that percepts (whatever they are) may 
be generated by way of integrating top-down effects, including those exerted by cognitive states such 
as beliefs, moods, etc., can be easily accommodated on the kind of account that I have been 
recommending. At the same time, our discussion suggests that proponents of the two dominant 
accounts of experience will struggle. Accordingly, one can reasonably hope that predictive coding 
accounts, popular within the cognitive (neuro-)sciences, can be made (more) intelligible by way of 
interpreting them in terms of the account I have been suggesting we endorse. Second, consider an 
entirely different area: conflict resolution. It is a distinctive feature of the view that I have been arguing 
for—more specifically: a distinctive feature of the conception of the role of experience as making 
rational view-dependent transitions to judgments, beliefs, and actions—that it makes room for the 
possibility that subjects who inhabit different doxastic contexts may relative to their respective views 
be rational to respond to similar perceptual situation in wildly different ways. In many contemporary 
approaches to conflict resolution—e.g. Marshall Rosenberg’s approach to non-violent 
communication—a lot of emphasis is placed on the idea that to resolve a conflict, conflicting parties 
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should avoid communicating with one another in a way that involves issuing evaluative 
characterizations of the actions issued by the opposing party. Instead, participants are to communicate 
how they experienced the situations that gave rise to the conflict and talk primarily about their own 
reasoning processes and the emotional responses that flew from them.  
In the context of the view I have been recommending, the function of such a conversational style 
is to make available to the opposing party the background view within which one’s own responses 
become intelligible as rational or anyway understandable responses to the situation at hand. This, the 
idea goes, serves to instill mutual understanding and to establish common ground. For it may well be 
that given the characterization of the situation and the experiences offered by one of the parties 
involved, it would, for the respective opposing party, have been rational, too, to respond the way the 
first party di. Consequently, the view I am suggesting provides a theoretical underpinning for why it 
is that the conversational style within approaches to conflict resolution makes good sense.  
In sum, I propose that the view of experience I am suggesting succeeds where the two dominant 
kinds of approaches—relationalism and standard representationalism—struggle. Most importantly, it 
fully meets the two constraints that have been guiding our inquiry throughout, namely to be fully 
compatible with doxastic effects on experience while at the same time providing a notion of empirical 
constraint. To make progress in this regard, I have suggested, the question whether experience has or 
lacks content is secondary; the key move is to reject the restrictive conceptions of the role of 
experience adopted by relationalists and standard representationalists. At the same time, the 
conception of the rational role of experience that I adopt from Gupta is general enough to 
accommodate that experience does, perhaps often, play the role which each of the opposing parties 
holds dear.27  
As I have argued, the resulting conception of experience raises a number of interesting questions, 
concerning e.g. how to think about concepts in terms of both inferential articulation and—for some 
                                                 
27  This is certainly true for relationalism. It is also true for representationalism if we think of the primary role of 
experience not in terms of providing knowledge or justification tout court, but in terms of conditional justification, i.e. 
justification relative to a view. 
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concepts—phenomenological profiles, what preconditions need to be met for something to be a view 
or for something to be a capacity that affords receptive knowledge, and how to think about perceptual 
presentation. Moreover, I have hinted at a number of areas within and outside of philosophy in which 
the account of experience I have been recommending can be fruitfully applied.  
In one sense, our inquiry has come to its end. But in another, it has just begun. 
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